5.4.1; 6.3.7–9) or even Agesilaus (X. Hell. 3.4.29; 5.4.24–34), or voicing appreciation for the skill of Epaminondas, Sparta’s Theban foe (X. Hell.
7.5.8 and 19). His Hellenica was based on eyewitness events or events for which he had immediate sources, whence they received disproportionate
treatment, as for instance the extended account of the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae (X. Hell. 1.7) and the lengthy account of the small town of Phlius (X. Hell. 7.2; sometimes spelled Phleious; see Cawkwell 1979: 43–4). He is also fond of personal anecdote and military strategy, though he presumably thought that these were vehicles for conveying important values or knowledge.
We cannot be certain about the dates of composition of sections of the
Hellenica, but we may observe one plausible division into three sections with natural divisions, with possible dates of composition (Cawkwell
1979: 18):
I Hellenica 1.1.1–2.3.10, covering the end of the Peloponnesian War, 411–404 bc, after the part treated by Thucydides;
II Hellenica 2.3.11–5.1.36, from the close of the Peloponnesian War to the Peace of Antalcidas, 404–387 bc;
III Hellenica 5.2.1–7.5.27 (end), from the Peace of Antalcidas to the battle of Mantinea, 387–362 bc.
Section I may have been composed about 393 bc into the 380s bc, perhaps after Xenophon had settled at his Peloponnesian estate in Scillus; it cannot
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have been written before 401 bc and had to be started after 399 bc, that is, after the period of Xenophon’s service, described in the Anabasis. Section II was possibly written 385–380 bc, after the Peace of Antalcidas, an event that may have inspired him to write this section, though the present consensus is that section II was composed late in his life, in the 350s bc. Section III may have been written late in Xenophon’s career; Hellenica 6.4.37
alludes to an event in 358 or 357 bc, and the author died about 354 bc.
The work was certainly written over several decades during the author’s lifetime, in sections drafted between publication times of his other works.
In part it emulates Thucydides’ own choice of contemporary history,
though it lacks the conceptual unity of that historian and the homogeneity of theme of a single great conflict. But the real achievement of the Hellenica is in its tracing of the success or failure of fellow Hellenes consistently to live up to the higher principles of their culture as Xenophon saw them.
themes of the Hellenica
This work, like the Anabasis, lacks a proem or any overt statement on methodology. This is partly an act of authorial self‐effacement from the continuator of Thucydides, but also an indication that the author lacked the compelling narrative unity of a single great war and had no interest in imposing artificial theoretical structures on such an amorphous period, as Polybius did later for his subject. The leap straight into events belies Xenophon’s subordination of philosophical or theological themes to the
record of human events in a loosely causal relationship.
One scholar reasonably suggests that three major principles underlie
Xenophon’s Hellenica:
panhellenism and a very militarily oriented notion of perfect community life, both inspired by his time with the ten thousand Greek mercenaries; a belief that good leadership was the critical factor in determining the success of an army or polis; that the divine was an essentially provident force working for good in human history. (Dillery 1995: 15)
These themes, in varying manifestations, were evident also in the Anabasis and obviously reflect the author’s core interests in writing. Though
Xenophon’s conception of order may come from the world of the military, we must note the corollary that the properly functioning army, with its top‐down chain of command, is similar to an oligarchic polis. There are hints at dissatisfaction with democracy, perhaps a legacy of Xenophon’s Socratic ties, as manifest in his account of the arrest and execution of
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Theramenes (X. Hell. 2.3.15–56). Xenophon’s politics and affection for good order in the military arose, one can argue, from a deep personal
conviction, seen even in his other writing on estate management (the
Oeconomicus). Xenophon presents models for good and bad city‐states, utopias and dystopias – respectively Phlius (X. Hell. 7.2) and Athens under the Thirty (X. Hell. 2.3–4) (Dillery 1995: ch. 5). The Peloponnesian War resolved nothing with regard to the best form of state, to the political roles of citizens and non‐citizens of various kinds of status, and to how interstate alliances function best in an equilibrium (Pomeroy et al. 1999: 330–1). The Greek states of the Hellenica are shown to be in a tension, seeking pragmatic solutions to these questions, as the author obliquely critiques error and valorizes heroic action.
Alongside the three thematic “principles” there is a focus on individuals and their character, which is in common with the focus in Herodotus
and Thucydides: portraits of ethical virtue or vice are enacted, with the author’s implicit praise or censure. Leaders in particular embody or per-sonify the values of the Greeks – the scheming, the selfish, and the one who sacrifices himself for the good of the state. Paradigmatic are individual commanders, notably the Spartan Mnasippus, the Athenian Iphicrates,
and Jason of Pherae (Dillery 1995: ch. 6). Xenophon certainly had both
positive and critical points to make. Through the speeches of Callistratus and Procles in Book 6, Xenophon proposes to his contemporaries that
Athens and Sparta should put an end to their mutual hostility and join in promoting a new type of empire, “one based not on force, but on a reputation for fairness and generosity, and the respect and influence that come from such a reputation” (Dillery 1995: 248–9).
In addition, the theme of “power” is central to the narrative. With the vacuum left by the fall of Athens and the hovering threat of Persian
hegemony, power among Greek states is a constant theme. In particular,
it has been argued that the Theban speeches at Hellenica 3.5.8–15 have resonances with the Plataean debate in Thucydides (Th. 3.53–68; see
Stanke 2006). In the Xenophon passage, the Theban ambassadors say
that they did not support Sparta in its attack on the Piraeus; the Spartans treat free allies as slaves; there is a “double servitude” of states to the governors set up by Sparta and to the Committee of Ten set up by Lysander
in each city. Take command, they urge Athens, since the Spartan empire
is more vulnerable as a land‐based one than your sea‐based empire was:
For at that time when you held dominion [ e ̄ rchete] you were the leaders, you recall, of those only who dwelt on the sea; but now you would become the leaders [ he ̄ gemones] of all alike – of ourselves, of the Peloponnesians, of
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those whom you formerly ruled [ e ̄ rchete], and of the King himself with his vast empire. (X. Hell. 3.4.14)
Empires are forever, seems to be the implication, only the hegemony
changes. Yet the Thebans themselves use a rhetoric of overt flattery to their own advantage, and against the obvious arguments that Athens suffered setbacks because of Thebes in the past. Xenophon, by direct allu-
sion to the Thucydidean passage on Thebes and indeed to Thucydides’
general discourse on power, suggests that the role of the imperial state has shifted from Athens to Sparta; but the dynamics of power remain in which smaller city‐states appeal to bigger ones regardless of traditional cultural alliances. In short, Xenophon, at least in part, has inherited Thucydides’
view that states typically abandon the “ancient simplicity” in favor of a pragmatic, sophistic rhetoric to maintain or acquire rule over others. It is noteworthy that the Thucydidean model persists in
Xenophon’s analysis
even after the fall of Athens, in complex ways (Rood 2004b: 341–95).
Xenophon’s solution, as above, may be an overly optimistic hope that
Athens and Sparta should jointly share a more peaceful type of power
among the Greeks while resisting the manipulation of the non‐Greeks.
narrative of the Hellenica
A brief synopsis of the events of the period will help contextualize the narrative, which is required more here than in earlier works owing to
the greater complexity of the events. Thucydides’ Book 8 recounts the
political turnabouts in 411 bc: the collapse of Athenian democracy and
the imposition of an oligarchy called the Four Hundred, which, due to
internal factions, was replaced by a broader oligarchy, the Five Thousand, which soon, in turn, lapsed again into full democracy. After this, in the summer of 411 bc, the Athenian fleet won a signal victory over the
Spartans at the battle of Kynossema in the Propontis, thanks to
Alcibiades’ help.
At this point Xenophon takes up the last seven years of the Peloponnesian War, which continues in seesaw battles primarily on the coast of Asia
Minor. Despite the Athenians’ victory under Alcibiades’ leadership at
Cyzicus on the Hellespont in 410 bc, he is dismissed. Persia, led by Cyrus, son of King Darius II, supports Sparta, and the Spartan admiral Lysander beats the Athenian navy decisively at Aegospotami, also on the Propontis, in 405 bc. After a long siege Lysander eventually brings Athens to surrender in 404 bc. Lysander installs a group called the Thirty, which, under the extremist Critias, executes the moderate Theramenes and initiates a
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period of political civil strife. Sparta forces a reconciliation between the armed band of Thrasybulus that had taken the port of Piraeus and the oligarchs in the city. In 403 bc democracy is restored in Athens.
Sparta then steps into the leadership vacuum caused by Athens’ fall –
much to the unease of Athens, Thebes, and Corinth. At this point
Persia, led by the new king, Artaxerxes II, thinks it wiser to support the anti‐Spartan forces (a move occasioned by the attempt of Cyrus, his
Spartan‐allied brother, to overthrow him) and to lessen the danger of
another unified Greek resistance. In any case these are the decades of
Persia switching Greek sides several times, presumably to play the
Greeks against one another. Corinth, Athens, and Thebes unite to fight
Sparta in the so‐called Corinthian War (395–386 bc); the Athenian
Conon wins a decisive victory at Cnidus in 394 bc. Artaxerxes dictates
the terms of the treaty among the Greeks – the King’s Peace of 386 bc.
Spartan power is maintained after this, Sparta conquering Olynthus and
then occupying Thebes in 382 bc. Athens and Thebes oppose Sparta
once more in the Boeotian War (378–371 bc, with a brief peace in
375/4). Athens forms a Second Athenian League as a new naval alli-
ance, and Thebes reunifies Boeotia. Artaxerxes again intervenes with a
peace treaty in 372/1 bc, again favoring Sparta, after which the Theban Epaminondas deals a stunning defeat to the Spartan Cleombrotus at
Leuctra in the summer of 371 bc.
At this stage Sparta is in decline and Thebes is on the rise. In 369 bc Thebes restores to independence Messenia, a region in the Southwestern
Peloponnese long under Sparta. Megalopolis on the Northern border of
Sparta is supported by Thebes against the threat of renewed Spartan
empowerment. Athens allies itself with Sparta in 369–367 bc, to thwart
Theban hegemony, and also attempts, through its league, to besiege
Amphipolis (in 368 bc and after), to put colonists at Samos, and to
campaign elsewhere for its own benefit. Athens and Sparta fight Thebes
effectively to a draw at Mantinea in 362 bc, an episode ending with the death of the great Theban Epaminondas. Athens makes peace with all
other Greek states, including Messenia, but not with Sparta after that
battle. Though Xenophon’s account ends with the death of Epaminondas,
he was likely writing until 353 bc – that is, into a period (362–353 bc) that saw the rebellion of Athens’ allies, the further weakening of Athens, and the demise of Theban hegemony in a war against its neighbor Phocis, which was allied with Sparta (this was the Third Sacred War, begun in
356 bc). The collective debilitation of states in Central Greece and
the Peloponnese opened the way for Macedon to rise to power under
Phillip II in the 350s and following.
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Xenophon’s Peloponnesian War narrative in Books 1 and 2 is in a
more sparse and chronologically straightforward, “analystic” style than the sections on later history were; for instance animal sacrifices made by armies and navies prior to battle are omitted by Xenophon, as by
Thucydides, in the account of the Peloponnesian War, but they are a regular feature of the later narrative. Also Books 3 and the following are richer in characterization and dramatic use of speeches. The dating of the respective “sections” of the work was discussed above. The stylistic differences and the comment about the beginning of Greek freedom suggest
that the first narrative originally ended at 2.2.23 (discussed further below; see also Thomas 2009: xxxii–xxxiv).
Several early stories emphasize character and pointed role changing in
the struggles for power. An Athenian leader, Thrasyllus, ironically captures Alcibiades, a cousin of the famous Alcibiades, among the Syracusans at Lesbos and sees him stoned to death (X. Hell. 1.2); Thrasyllus then joins forces with the general Alcibiades. The Persians delay for three years the Athenian ambassadors seeking peace (X. Hell. 1.4; 407 bc). Three generals are elected at Athens, including Alcibiades, who is praised
upon his return, though the timing – during the Plyntheria festival – is ill omened. Xenophon, following Thucydides, recalls that Alcibiades was originally exiled due to a questionable charge of profaning the Mysteries:
“because of the intrigues of people inferior to him … their only
political principle was self‐interest” (X. Hell. 1.4.11–16; cf. Th. 6.60–1).
A dramatic scene shows Alcibiades standing apprehensively on the deck of his ship upon first arriving, then being received by family, and finally making speeches in the assembly and the Council in his own defense. The
assembly makes him supreme commander: “He was chosen general with
supreme authority [ autokratō r] over the other generals as it was thought
[by the assembly] that he was the man who had the authority to reestab-
lish the former power [ dunamin] of Athens” (X. Hell. 1.4.20). Not long after, in 406 bc, the Athenian navy loses a battle and fifteen triremes at Notium, near Ephesus; the Athenians became angry ( chalepo ̄ s eichon) with Alcibiades for that loss through his “negligence and lack of power,”
in a scene reminiscent again of that at Thucydides 6.61.1, in which the Athenians were also angry ( chalepo ̄ s elambanon) with him. Xenophon echoes the earlier criticism of the unreasoned emotion of the crowd
against a good commander.
Xenophon also notes some dissent in the Spartan camp by portraying
Callicratidas as an independent naval leader, unlike his predecessor
Lysander, who was overly dependent on the patronage of the Persians
(X. Hell. 1.6). Before Callicratidas defeats the Athenians at Arginusae, he
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famously tells Conon “I will stop your fornicating with the sea,” implying that Sparta is the
sea’s proper husband (X. Hell. 1.6.15). But the real dramatic focus in this section is on Athenian infighting in the debate of the Athenian generals. From this Euryptolemus emerges as an advocate
of fair and reasoned deliberation, not emotional fault finding. A storm prevents the generals from collecting the stranded (X. Hell. 1.7.16–32), and Euryptolemus’ sage advice is countered by a vote by those truly
guilty. The outcome is the execution of six Athenians, which those who
voted soon regret; this recalls the remorse of the Athenians in the decisions over Mytilene or after Pylos (Xen. Hell. 1.7.35; cf. Th. 3.36.1 and 5.14.2).
Xenophon, like Thucydides, sees fault in the emotion of the assembly
versus the wisdom of certain leaders; these represent two sides of human nature. The Arginusae affair becomes, from Xenophon onwards, a paradigm for the fickleness of democracy or mob rule.
Then follows the Athenian loss at Aegospotami against the forces of
Lysander based at Lampsachus in the Hellespont. Here Xenophon points
up two ironies. The Athenians might have avoided the loss if they had
followed the advice of the disempowered Alcibiades, and a debate over
the punishment and execution of Athenian survivors is carried out this
time by the Spartans (Xen. Hell. 2.1.25–6 and 31–2). The Athenians are portrayed as ever more brutal, in stories of their plans to cut off the hands of live Spartan captives and of throwing overboard the crews from ships from Corinth and Andros.
Now under siege, the Athenians “thought there was no salvation
except to suffer the same things they had inflicted, injustices they did not in retaliation, but out of wanton violence [ hubris] against men of small cities for no other single reason than that they were in alliance with the Spartans” (X. Hell. 2.2.10). As in Herodotus, Thucydides, epic, and drama, there operates a scheme of suffering ultimately repaying unwarranted aggression, which is more evident here than elsewhere in
Xenophon. When news of the defeat arrives in Athens, the Athenians fear suffering the same fate as others whom they had treated harshly, including Melians, Histiaeans, Scionians, Toronians, and Aeginetans. An extended
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