In order to determine whether “Wood” was trustworthy, each document that he provided was closely scrutinized by the OSS in London. The files were transmitted to Washington with long commentaries. Paragraph by paragraph, word by word, everything was gone over with a fine-tooth comb and weighed against information derived from other sources. “Paragraph 1 is probable but hard to verify,” “paragraph 2 had been verified, its content is accurate,” “paragraph 3 is correct,” and so on. While the Allies had still not ruled out the possibility of a trap, they nevertheless thought it less and less likely. Nothing in “Wood’s” attitude led them to detect suspect behavior. If this was a game of deception, “it will have been far and away the most elaborate deceptive strategy so far known either to British or American counterespionage services,” wrote Norman Pearson in his November 23, 1943 memorandum.
“Wood’s” motivations seemed to be purely individual. “On the whole,” Pearson went on, “it seems likely that whether or not Wood is acting as he does from the ideological motives he professes, and despite the fact that he is unwilling to receive any money for his services, he is at the same time not unaware that after the Defeat some special consideration might be accorded to him.” The conclusion was chilling: “The habits of rats on sinking ships are well known.”
9
THE “KAPPA FILES”
Ankara, October 1943
“Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail,” U.S. Secretary of State Henry Stimson had said in 1929. This deep disdain for espionage was very widespread in English and American diplomatic circles. Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, British ambassador to Turkey since 1939, and a diplomat of the old school, shared that way of thinking. Intelligence was outside the scope of his work and he did not want to hear it talked about. This indifference was close to negligence—he had an Albanian servant named Elyeza Bazna, of whom he had no thorough investigation made, though the man came to him out of the blue, and the ambassador never suspected that he had hired a dangerous spy in the pay of Germany.
In late October 1943, Bazna decided to contact the Germans to offer them secret documents from the British embassy. He had managed to steal the key to the personal safe of Ambassador Knatchbull-Hugessen while the ambassador was sleeping. He had had a copy made and was thus able to get his hands on confidential documents of the greatest importance. He immediately thought of making them available to the enemies of England in exchange for hard cash. On the evening of October 26 he went to the German embassy on Atatürk Boulevard, where he met Ludwig Moyzisch, a former journalist from Vienna with the official title of commercial attaché, who was in fact a permanent agent of the intelligence services. In their conversation, Bazna spoke French and claimed that his name was Pierre. He said that he hated the English, who had “killed his father.” He offered documents of “exceptional quality” in exchange for money, although he had nothing to show for the moment. He was asking for fabulous amounts (twenty thousand pounds for two rolls of undeveloped film). “Pierre” gave Moyzisch two days to think about it, letting him know that he would not hesitate to look for a better client—for example, the Soviets—in the event of a German refusal.
Moyzisch, somewhat skeptical, informed the ambassador, Franz von Papen, of this astonishing offer. Von Papen was very fond of all kinds of intrigue and believed in the virtues of combining diplomacy with espionage. Because of the scope of the affair, von Papen referred it directly to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in Berlin, who turned the file over to his assistant, Horst Wagner, liaison officer between the ministry and the SS. The file was soon turned over to Walter Schellenberg, head of foreign espionage. He decided to pay the twenty thousand pounds “to see,” and was not disappointed by the result. The first “delivery” from the Albanian servant contained many details about conversations at the highest level between British and Turkish leaders. These negotiations dealt with a highly strategic question: Was Turkey finally going to abandon its de facto neutrality? Would it shift into the Allied camp, and if so, at what price? Its strategic interest was to remain outside the war, even though it secretly dreamed of a dual defeat: first of the Soviets and then of Nazi Germany.
Ambassador von Papen could use the documents photographed by the Albanian valet to attempt to thwart the maneuvers of the Allies. Always one step ahead thanks to the information provided by his spy, he was in a position to put very targeted pressure on the Turkish authorities in order to force them to maintain their neutrality. He decided to name this exceptional spy “Cicero,” because of the particularly eloquent nature of the material supplied. In Berlin, Walter Schellenberg hoped to use Cicero to decipher the English secret codes. On November 4, 1943, a plane from Berlin landed in Ankara with the sum of two hundred thousand pounds sterling on board. This treasure was to pay the spy for several months. It turned out much later that these were counterfeit bills expertly produced by a secret agency of the Reich’s espionage services.
In the course of the fall of 1943 and the following winter, Cicero turned over large quantities of invaluable information to the Germans. Ambassador von Papen considered him a first-rate source and used him daily to supply material for his diplomatic cables to Berlin. He informed Hitler in person of the existence of the Cicero file when they met in November 1943. But Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, who detested von Papen, whom he saw as a rival, had every interest in minimizing the importance of the affair. “Too good to be true,” he told Ernst Kaltenbrunner, chief of the German secret services. A trap could not be ruled out. It is thus not certain that Berlin drew all the benefit possible from the information provided by the spy in Ankara.
However, Cicero had enough to feed the curiosity of the leaders of the Reich. In particular, he provided rather detailed reports of the major summit conferences of the Allied camp in Cairo and Teheran in November and December 1943, about which Turkish leaders knew a good deal because of their close contacts with the British. Thanks to Cicero, the Germans were able to grasp the broad outlines of their enemies’ diplomatic strategy: Churchill wanted to open a front in southeastern Europe by trying (without success) to include Turkey in a vast Mediterranean offensive against Germany. The Americans did not share this view. Roosevelt was relatively uninterested in Turkey and was concentrating on an invasion of the European continent from Great Britain. Despite some not insignificant differences of opinion, the Allies’ determination to crush the Axis forces was absolute. Those German leaders who paid attention to Cicero’s revelations could have no illusions on that subject. “Cicero’s documents described with clarity the fate that awaited Germany,” Franz von Papen wrote in his memoirs after the war. “I trembled with emotion before the spectacle of the vast historical prospects opened to me by those stolen documents,” Ludwig Moyzisch wrote many years after the events.
Bern, December 1943
The Allies learned of the existence of the spy in Ankara thanks to “George Wood.” The first mention of Cicero in an Allied document followed another visit to Bern by Fritz Kolbe, which took place over the Christmas holiday. Kolbe brought to the Americans from Berlin a series of cables, some of which came from the German embassy in Ankara. Among the documents that Allen Dulles transmitted to Washington, several mentioned the existence of Cicero.
On December 29, OSS Bern sent to Washington headquarters a coded message mentioning the name of Cicero, with no explanation of the nature of this mysterious source. A few days later, in a cable sent on New Year’s Day 1944, Allen Dulles provided details for his Washington colleagues, referring to a series of documents “on which Milit [Ambassador von Papen] clearly placed great value and which, seemingly, were taken from the Zulu [British] Embassy through a source designated as Cicero.” These details, Dulles added, had been immediately turned over to the British intelligence services based in Switzerland (designated as 521 in OSS language), for transmission to London.
On learning of the content of the information provided by Cicero, the leadership of the Allied intelligence services felt a chill: the spy had given
his German contacts a list of documents prepared by the “Zulu ambassador” (Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen) in preparation for the second Cairo conference of early December 1943, a conference that had unsuccessfully considered Turkey’s entry into the war on the side of the Allies. Also included in the “deliveries” by the Ankara spy was a Foreign Office memorandum dated October 7, 1943 with the title “A Long-Range View of Turkish-British Policy.” All the steps taken by the English to encourage Turkey’s entry into the war were set out in detail. These ultraconfidential materials had been transmitted by von Papen to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin (Grand), between November 3 and 5, 1943.
The identity of Cicero, and what exactly the Germans knew through him, were questions that reached the highest levels of the Allied command during the first weeks of 1944. But the British were slow to react. They waited until the end of January before asking Dulles to ask his Berlin agent for “additional available messages from the Cicero sources.” Almost a month later, they asked for more details about the exact time of the November cables. On January 10, 1944, OSS Bern informed London and Washington that “Wood is ignorant of the identity of Cicero.” Several weeks later, in late February 1944, Dulles wrote: “We are informed by Wood that there is no way of finding out who Cicero is or where the information about Cairo and Teheran originated. He suggests, in connection with this, that the leak might have come from an Albanian-born private secretary of Inönü whom the President took with him to Cairo.” Although fairly close to reality, these details were not sufficient to identify the spy.
Feeling the vise tighten around him, Elyeza Bazna left his position in March 1944. Since mid-January 1944, the British had been actively looking for the source of the leak. At the very moment that Allen Dulles had informed Washington and London of the existence of a mole in the British embassy in Ankara—at the very beginning of January 1944—Ambassador Knatchbull-Hugessen had learned from his Turkish interlocutors that von Papen “knew too much to be honest.” Two British counterespionage agents were sent to Ankara to carry out an investigation in his entourage. In Bern, Allen Dulles had asked them to be discreet and to behave as though the visit were a routine inspection. His concern was to protect his source, Fritz Kolbe, who might be identified by the Germans in case the network were dismantled. The two British agents also had to deal tactfully with the extreme sensitivity of the British ambassador, who could not understand how his embassy could be under suspicion. The detectives questioned Elyeza Bazna but found him too stupid and too ill at ease in English to consider him a suspect.
The Cicero affair could have been a disaster if the leak had not been discovered in time thanks to “George Wood.” “Nothing indicates that the Germans got from Cicero the slightest detail about the plan for a landing in Europe, except perhaps the code name of the operation: Overlord,” Dulles wrote after the war.
Berlin, December 1943
After his October visit to Bern, Fritz thought that it would be a long time before he would be able to come back. Nor did Allen Dulles expect to see him again. It had been agreed that Fritz would thenceforth send what he knew through his friend Albert Bur, the surgeon from Alsace. This complicated means of transmission was probably never used.
Berlin was in a state of chaos. The bombing was more and more terrible. Late November was particularly hard, with thousands of dead, more than two hundred thousand people made homeless, and tens of thousands of buildings destroyed. The central neighborhoods of Alexanderplatz and Charlottenburg (Fritz’s neighborhood) were the most heavily damaged. Railroad stations were one of the favorite targets of the flying fortresses. Even the zoo was hit. A bomb landed directly on the crocodile house during the night of November 23. There were rumors of wild animals roaming through the streets of the city.
The Foreign Ministry was the target of several destructive raids. Only the offices on the second floor could still be used. That winter some of the chandeliers in the ministry began to resemble fountains. The carpets were saturated with water. Pieces of cardboard were hung in the windows in place of glass. It was cold. The diplomats worked with their coats on. Some of the ministry’s departments were evacuated to Silesia. But most heads of departments remained in Berlin, and Fritz Kolbe, as a result, also stayed in the capital of the Reich.
The Charité hospital, where Maria Fritsch lived, had not emerged unharmed from the rain of fire. “All the windows were broken,” wrote the surgeon Adolphe Jung in his notes for December 1943. “Most of the window frames and doors were torn out. Curtains and camouflage cloths for the windows, torn out as well. Cabinets opened and overturned. Plaster fallen from ceilings and walls. A strong wind full of smoke and soot blew through the corridors and the rooms open on all sides…. All the patients were in the cellars. The laundry and storage rooms were emptied out and the patients’ beds set out in them. Long rows of beds were in the corridors, men, women, and soldiers all mixed together.”
Basic goods and services were growing increasingly scarce. Life was constantly punctuated by collections for the community: cloth, old paper, shoes, materials of all kinds, including animals (particularly dogs, requisitioned for the army). Coal was in short supply. It was forbidden to run water during air raids; it had to be kept in reserve to fight fires. But this was not always enough: “Here and there a fire hose, handled by soldiers or firemen, threw jets of water on the houses,” wrote Adolphe Jung. “The water came from the Spree through long pipes in the depths of the river, because, of course, the usual pipes, less than an hour after the bombing, had no more pressure. Even in cellars, you could barely get a small quantity of water.”
Half the time, Fritz Kolbe and his close friends were in the shelters. “Life in a bunker,” he said himself of the winter nights of 1943 spent in underground shelters with stale air. You could never be without your civil defense kit, the content of which was strictly determined by the administration: a suitcase containing clothing, extra linen, shoe care products, a sewing kit, a bar of soap and a package of crackers for each person, a container of milk, sugar, oatmeal, a bottle of water, a small saucepan, plates and utensils, and matches. A pitiful set of provisions. In any event, the shelters provided only relative safety: “Cases of violent death were reported when the outside of a shelter was hit by a bomb with no damage to the interior. Some people are said to have fallen, bleeding from the nose and the mouth, dying from a fractured skull. This was caused by the impact transmitted directly to a head leaning against the bunker wall,” according to Adolphe Jung.
Berliners thus lived from day to day, in the expectation of imminent death. But life continued nevertheless. Professor Sauerbruch and his friends in the Wednesday Club continued to meet to discuss various subjects once or twice a month. In addition to a noteworthy presentation by the physicist Werner Heisenberg on “The Evolution of the Concept of Reality in Physics” (June 30, 1943), the year was marked by a presentation by the former ambassador to Rome, Ulrich von Hassell, on “The Personality of King Alexander of Yugoslavia” (December 15, 1943). The members of the club appreciated more than ever the friendly atmosphere of their meetings. One evening at Sauerbruch’s, the austere Ulrich von Hassell even stood unsteadily on a table and started singing old student songs.
A distinct relaxation of social constraints began to be noticed almost everywhere. After the summer of 1943, with the massive movement of families to the countryside, Berlin had become a city of bachelors. From boozy evenings to passing flirtations, men had decided to take advantage of life. “If their wives only knew!” wrote the journalist Ursula von Kardorff. Money no longer had much importance; tips had never been so generous in the cafés and restaurants that were still open. The center of this slightly decadent social life was the Adlon Hotel, near the Brandenburg Gate. In addition, a large foreign population had given the capital of the Reich a new face. Forced labor had brought people from around Europe to replace the Germans who were at the front. From workers to doctors, all professions were represented. Berlin was in the process of becoming
a kind of involuntary melting pot.
The leaders of the Reich no longer knew what to come up with to mobilize the population for a “fanatical” drive toward “final victory.” In December, a directive from Goebbels required journalists to banish the word “catastrophe” from their vocabulary.
Bern, late December 1943
Meanwhile in Washington and London, “George Wood” began to be of real interest. Some secret service figures wanted to ask the Berlin agent questions on precise points. But Dulles informed his OSS colleagues in Washington: “Impossible now to ask 805 more questions without incurring risk, unless he comes back, which is not likely.” For his part, Fritz was furious at not being able to transmit regularly to Bern everything that passed through his hands.
Suddenly, a letter written on December 18, 1943 informed the Americans of the imminent arrival of their friend from Berlin. As had been agreed in October, the message was sent in the form of an innocuous letter to Walter Schuepp, Ernst Kocherthaler’s brother-in-law. “Dear Walter, I wanted to tell you that we are still alive despite the latest bombing. Apart from a few broken windows, nothing happened to us. I take the opportunity to tell you that I will probably be at your house on 27 December. So, save a piece of the Christmas goose for me! Say hello to Ernesto and his family. Merry Christmas!” Fritz had written this letter, signed “Georges” (sic), in Berlin but had given it to a diplomatic courier on assignment to Bern, and it bore a Swiss postmark of 21 December. As soon as he received it, Walter Schuepp passed it on to Ernst Kocherthaler, who immediately sent a telegram to Gerald Mayer: “I have heard from a friend abroad that he will probably be in Bern on the 27th … Since I should by no means miss him, I’m going to be there then, at 13:09. If you could be there too we could talk over our pending business.”
A Spy at the Heart of the Third Reich: The Extraordinary Story of Fritz Kolbe, America's Most Important Spy in World War II Page 15
