stronger than the Gestapo: This list of French personalities is preserved on microfilm in the National Archives (original German document of December 24, 1942).
“always a little nervous”: Biographical document by Gerald Mayer and Fritz Kolbe.
though nothing had happened: It was a miracle that the Gestapo did not discover George’s activities.” “The Story of George.”
by Fritz, the Kappa: It is not known why the name “Kappa” was chosen to designate the information supplied by Fritz Kolbe. As for the term “Boston series,” this is probably a name chosen at random.
of Crosica in October: The liberation of Corsica took place from September to October 4, 1943. It was the first French department to be liberated. Corsica had been annexed by Italy on November 11, 1942. Four Italian divisions had occupied it, joined in July 1943 by a brigade of the Waffen-SS and in September 1943 by a German division transferred from Sardinia.
twelve days went by: Bern, undated internal document of the OSS, probably from immediately after the war, on the activities of the Bern office, National Archives.
correspondents in the OSS: National Archives.
cables to President Roosevelt: “From early July 1944 forward, General Donovan sent many of the Dulles reports to President Roosevelt verbatim, but aside from the case of Sunrise [the Wehrmacht surrender in Italy], there is scant record of White House reaction. Nor was Dulles’s input discussed by FDR and Churchill. One searches in vain for a single instance in which the riches of Bern’s intelligence on Germany made a difference on the high policy level.” Neal H. Petersen, “Allen Dulles and the Penetration of Germany,” in George Chalou, ed., The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 287.
revelations from “George Wood”: Document no. 1 of the Boston series, National Archives.
qualities for the position: “Although officially a member of the party, Pohle agreed to transmit my messages to Ernst Kocherthaler. Beginning in the spring of 1944, he went to Bern six or eight times,” Fritz wrote in an autobiographical document composed in Berlin in January 1947. “Several German diplomatic officials had to help. Most of them did it by friendship for George and by hatred against the Nazis, others because they liked George’s presents of cigars and chocolate which he brought home from his trips to Switzerland.” “The Story of George.”
some to Karl Ritter: Biographical document by Gerald Mayer and Fritz Kolbe.
the surgeon the truth: “Sauerbruch was never in the inner circle. I had always his whole confidence and trusted him completely, but it was not necessary to let him into my affairs. Of course he knew that I was dealing with the Allies, but I gave him neither details nor names except the name of Dr. Kocherthaler.” Letter from Fritz Kolbe to Allen Dulles, May 29, 1945 (written in Hegenheim), personal archives of Fritz Kolbe, Peter Kolbe collection.
one typed single-spaced: Kappa message received in Washington February 23, 1944. See also Anthony Quibble, “Alias George Wood,” Studies in Intelligence (a CIA publication), Spring 1966, vol. 10.
confessed after the war: Autobiographical document, May 15, 1945.
“may explain the inconsistencies”: Kappa message, February 25, 1944.
“April and June 1944”: Kappa message, April 17, 1944 and Boston document no. 284. The source was Hans Thomsen, envoy of the Reich in Stockholm.
spies based in Ireland: Boston document no. 154.
“no other card available”: Biographical document by Gerald Mayer and Fritz Kolbe. The postcard is preserved in the National Archives.
his personal secret code: Fritz Kolbe had devised a secret code that he considered very secure and he had shown it to a specialist in the Foreign Ministry. Biographical document by Gerald Mayer and Fritz Kolbe.
German legation in Switzerland: The Americans were very surprised at receiving this postcard, which had taken three weeks to reach them. After some investigation, it was confirmed that an Edgar H. Yolland, who had worked for the American intelligence services in Turkey until August 1943 (when he had been dismissed), was in the process of approaching the Germans in order to obtain a German passport. In exchange, he offered to reveal the information in his possession. It is impossible to tell whether Edgar Yolland was neutralized in time. For Berlin, Yolland’s defection could not have come at a better time. A few weeks earlier, the Vermehrens, a couple of Abwehr agents based in the Reich’s consulate in Istanbul, had defected to the Allies. The event had brought about the definitive disgrace of Admiral Canaris in Germany, a prelude to Himmler’s seizure of control over the Abwehr.
Soviet regime in Germany: Kappa message, April 27, 1944 and Boston document no. 259. A little later, in November 1944, the Germans regretted the departure of Marcel Pilet-Golaz, whom they considered “their last support in the Swiss Federal Council.” Boston document no. 604.
letter received in February: German diplomatic cable, January 22, 1944, microfilm, National Archives.
the fall of 1943: A month later, in late February 1944, Jean Jardin tried to meet Allen Dulles, who at first refused to see him. On Jean Jardin, see the biography by Pierre Assouline, Une éminence grise (Paris: Balland, 1986), p. 125: “Laval and Pétain intended to make Jean Jardin into a veritable go-between with Allen Dulles.”
(the Abwehr) in Switzerland: Kappa message, March 13, 1944.
was located in Zurich: Biographical document by Gerald Mayer and Fritz Kolbe.
Chapter 10
on January 22, 1944: National Archives.
we know the answers: Message from London to Bern and Washington, Kappa series, January 28, 1944.
document into the wastebasket: Quibble, “Alias George Wood.”
a former Chicago lawyer: The department headed by Alfred McCormack (Special Branch) had nearly four hundred employees. It was the largest military espionage unit, specializing in the interception of enemy signals (SIGINT). McCormack’s investigation was carried out in close cooperation with the British. See Quibble, “Alias George Wood.”
intelligence and counterespionage: Memorandum Re Procedure for Handling Kappa Intelligence, August 7, 1944, and Method of Control of Boston Series Material, February 29, 1944, National Archives. See also Quibble, “Alias George Wood.”
in late February 1944: Boston document no. 111 and Kappa message, March 29, 1944.
and the Far East?: Message from OSS Washington to Allen Dulles, March 22, 1944, National Archives.
of the Japanese administration: In August 1940, American military espionage had succeeded in cracking the Japanese diplomatic code. This decoding system was given the name Magic. Thanks to Magic, the imminence of a diplomatic break between the United States and Japan was known before the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. But the information was not treated as it might have been, for want of relevant analysis.
when the opportunity arose: The episode of the Japanese postcard is recounted in detail in the following: “The Story of George”; the biographical document by Gerald Mayer and Fritz Kolbe; Morgan, “The Spy the Nazis Missed.” Allen Dulles often told the story in his postwar writings. See, for example, The Craft of Intelligence (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).
prime minister of Hungary: Unpublished memoir by Allen Dulles, Allen W. Dulles papers (box 114, file 11).
on March 22, 1944: Ruth Andreas-Friedrich, Der Schattenmann (1947; Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1984).
breakdown over the incident: Biographical document by Gerald Mayer and Fritz Kolbe.
good offices of Fritz: Boston document no. 1166.
maybe pulling our legs: Kappa message, December 29, 1943.
trap with terrible consequences: This is the analysis of Timothy Naftali, an American historian specializing in intelligence and the Second World War. Interview on Fritz Kolbe produced by Linda Martin for The History Channel in September 2003 with the title “The Too Perfect Spy.” Available in The History Channel Store: http://store.aetv.com/html/product/index.jhtml?id=4383
6.
to Berlin for interrogation: Bern, a summary of OSS Bern activities during the war, National Archives.
in the Hungarian capital: Questioned by the Americans after the war, Ritter claimed to have worked with Veesenmayer for only a few weeks. He claimed not to have been aware of the program for the extermination of the Jews of Hungary (he thought they were being sent to “work camps”) and said that Veesenmayer was overwhelmed by the actions of the SS. Interrogation of Karl Ritter, July 24, 1947 (US Chief Counsel for War Crimes document in the collection of Hans-Jürgen Döscher, Osnabrück).
spreading through neutral countries: In October 1942 and January 1943, warning messages on this subject were circulated in the Foreign Ministry. Source: German Foreign Ministry.
and goings in Switzerland: Biographical document by Gerald Mayer and Fritz Kolbe.
determined to take action: Walter Bauer came from Heilbronn in southern Germany. This industrialist was close to Christian intellectual circles in Freiburg who were thinking about the democratic future of Germany. As the assassination attempt of July 20, 1944 approached, he frequented Carl Goerdeler, who was supposed to become chancellor after the putsch. Bauer drafted the cultural segment of the policy speech that Goerdeler intended to deliver if he became chancellor.
by a Jewish family: The coal conglomerate of the brothers Ernst and Ignatz Petschek was at the time one of the most powerful companies in the sector in central Europe.
came to recognize them: After the failure of the July 20, 1944 plot, Fritz Kolbe volunteered to help Carl Goerdeler escape to Switzerland, but the plan was not carried out in time. Morgan, “The Spy the Nazis Missed.”
“too old” for his taste: Sauerbruch proposed to Fritz Kolbe not that he become a member of the Wednesday Club but that he address it. Biographical document by Gerald Mayer and Fritz Kolbe.
of the Weimar Republic: Paul Löbe was born near Breslau in 1875. He was trained as a typesetter. A deputy beginning in 1920, he was president of the Reichstag between 1920 and 1932. In June 1933, he took the head of the Social Democrats who had decided to remain in Germany, as opposed to those who had taken refuge in Prague. After the SPD was banned by the Nazis on June 22, 1933, he lived in hiding and was sent to a concentration camp. Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Bonn.
a comrade in arms: There is no indication that Fritz crossed paths with other major figures of the underground Social Democrats of the time, such as Julius Leber and Wilhelm Leuschner.
after the fall of Nazism: Kappa message, June 13, 1944.
individualism of Western civilization: National Archives.
in PostWar Europe: The Jewish Question in PostWar Europe, dated March 6, 1944, National Archives.
terror of being arrested: “Fritz’s heart was beating so hard as he went through customs that he was afraid it would give him away.” Morgan, “The Spy the Nazis Missed.”
for a handsome tip: Biographical document by Gerald Mayer and Fritz Kolbe.
headquarters cabled back: Kappa message, April 11, 1944.
quality of the document: Apparently only the military attaché and his Air Force colleague sent their cables to the Foreign Ministry, which was not the case for the naval attaché, according to a remark in a notarized document written by Allen Dulles in January 1948 to facilitate Fritz Kolbe’s immigration to the United States. Allen W. Dulles Papers.
the Thai prime minister: In December 1938, Pibul Songgram became prime minister of Thailand and implemented a “pan-Thai” policy that was nationalist, expansionist, and racist (anti-Chinese). Siam at that time adopted the name Thailand. In 1941, Songgram drew his country, initially neutral, onto the side of Japan. In recompense, he received part of Laos and Cambodia, the northern part of Malaya, and part of Burma. But in Washington and London the Free Thai movement of Seni Pramoj and, in the country, the network of Pridi Phanomyong, then regent, organized the resistance. Thanks to the contacts the resistance made with the Allies starting in 1944, Thailand was not treated as an enemy by the United States after the Japanese capitulation in 1945.
transmitted to Washington: Bern, National Archives.
more than ten sections: Kappa messages, April 19 and 21, 1944.
espionage network in Sweden: Kappa message, April 17, 1944, list of the principal members of the Abwehr in Sweden.
same kind for Spain: Kappa message, April 18, 1944.
on the Russian front: Kappa message, April 12, 1944.
Antwerp, or maybe Norway: Ibid.
Reich’s envoy in Dublin: See, for example, Kappa message, April 12, 1944, and Boston document no. 154 (“there is a tank arsenal and a sizeable airfield for heavy bombers located at Hatfield…. Most of the tanks are reported to be of the Sherman type. Ninety per cent of the total number of pursuit planes are said to be built in this general neighborhood…. American forces are reaching Bristol constantly, night and day.”)
used by the Allies: Germany had been working since late 1943 on the development of the technology of miniaturized submarines, like the Biber (Beaver), which had a one-man crew. The use of these submarines beginning in the spring of 1944 produced mixed results because of many technical problems.
the invasion even starts: Kappa message, April 12, 1944.
their arms for liquor: Kappa message, April 13, 1944.
gathered around Marthe Bibesco: Marthe Bibesco (1889–1973) was a figure in literary and social life in Paris and Bucharest. The author of many books, she was surrounded by crowned heads and famous writers.
alone win him over: Kappa message, April 12, 1944, reprinted in Neal H. Petersen, ed., From Hitler’s Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence Reports of Allen Dulles, 1942–1945 (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1996), pp. 267–68.
they are more severe: Kappa message, April 15, 1944.
the object of pity: Ibid.
at 60% of capacity: Kappa message, April 14, 1944.
Chetniks and the Germans: “The Chetnik leaders have decided to join the further movements of the German Wehrmacht. They wish to continue the struggle against communism under all circumstances…. They are also ready to enter into action frontally with the German Wehrmacht against the Russian Army.” Boston document no. 553.
“favoring Muslim autonomy”: Kappa messages, April 15 and 18, 1944. After the invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941, puppet states under the boot of the Reich had been set up in Croatia (Ante Pavelic) and in Serbia (Milan Nedic). Beginning in February 1943, the British chose to give increased support to Tito’s resistance at the expense of Mihailovich’s Chetniks, who then turned to the Germans.
“Peter,” his son’s name: Kappa message, April 11, 1944.
a few years later: Biographical document by Gerald Mayer and Fritz Kolbe.
comments and photograph them: “I sent undeveloped film. There were up to sixty exposures per roll and two to four rolls in each shipment…. I took the photographs in Maria Fritsch’s on-site apartment in the Charité hospital. This was where the documents were kept, which was not without danger with the bombing,” Fritz wrote in an autobiographical document in Berlin in January 1947. The sending of photographic documents did not really begin to function until the fall of 1944. Bern, National Archives.
of cables every time: See, for example, Boston document no. 163. It is one of the longest of the series: twelve pages entirely devoted to deliveries of Spanish tungsten to Germany.
the situation is ripe: Document of April 25, 1944 (Germany in April 1944), based on a conversation with Fritz Kolbe, OSS Bern, National Archives.
friends in the Abwehr: Among the few regular informers of the OSS coming from the Reich, there was notably Eduard Wätjen, a colleague of Hans-Bernd Gisevius at the German consulate in Zurich, a member of the Abwehr who had been trained as a lawyer. His mother was American, and his sister had married a Rockefeller.
an occasional businessman: Notably Eduard Schulte, a German industrialist who was one of the first to inform the Allies of the existence of Auschwitz, in the first months of 1942
.
the cafés of Basel: Message from OSS Bern to Washington, October 30, 1943, National Archives.
and without Festung Europa: Kappa message, April 12, 1944. Document sent to the White House: Memorandum for the President, April 15, 1944, microfilm (entry 190c, MF1642, roll 18). Document sent to the military leadership: letter from Edward Buxton to the secretary of the Joint US Chiefs of Staff, April 18, 1944, microfilm (entry 190c, MF1642, roll 18), National Archives.
gaining the victory now: Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum. The document can be found online at: www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box4.
defense against invasion: Kappa message, April 17, 1944; Memorandum for the President, April 19, 1944. This continuation of the story was also distributed to the military leadership, letter from Edward Buxton to the secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 19, 1944, microfilm (entry 190c, MF1642, roll 18), National Archives.
any hot invasion material: Quoted in Petersen, ed., From Hitler’s Doorstep.
“in Burma,” he wrote: Final report of Alfred McCormack on the Boston series, May 6, 1944, National Archives.
was false or incorrect: Quibble, “Alias George Wood.”
the material on Japan: Message from David Bruce, May 12, 1944, quoted by Srodes, Allen Dulles, Master of Spies, p. 296.
with his useful suitcase: Philby, My Silent War, pp. 107–08.
Shepardson, known as “Jackpot”: Whitney H. Shepardson had headed the espionage branch of the OSS (Secret Intelligence Branch or SI) since 1943. Shepardson, a businessman and lawyer, was on old friend of Allen Dulles. They had both been members of the American delegation to the Versailles treaty negotiations in 1919.
quite usual in conspirators: Kappa message, April 26, 1944.
of the Weimar Republic: The largest league for the defense of republican institutions was the Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold, established in 1924, which had three million members in the late 1920s.
this small underground army: There are several sources on the “militia” of Fritz Kolbe, notably a document of April 25, 1944 (Germany in April 1944) based on a conversation with Fritz Kolbe (OSS Bern, National Archives), as well as the biographical document by Gerald Mayer and Fritz Kolbe.
A Spy at the Heart of the Third Reich: The Extraordinary Story of Fritz Kolbe, America's Most Important Spy in World War II Page 32
