by Tim Saunders
After almost twelve hours in action on the exposed hillside, 23/Hussars could not be replenished with ammunition in broad daylight, so they were relieved by 3/RTR at about 15.00 hours. 23/Hussars had lost thirty-three troopers killed in action, thirty-three wounded and six missing. G Company 8/RB joined 3/RTR on Hill 112. Rifleman Norman Habertin recalls shortly after their arrival on the hill-top:
‘The storm broke. The enemy had been watching us settle down and before a single trench had been dug, down came those dreaded “moaning minnies”. There was nothing to do but lie down and bite the earth. A half-track a few yards away went up in flames and when the mortaring finally stopped, the complete battalion was in a state of utter chaos. All the company vehicles were mixed up, no one knew where their section or platoon was, wounded men were yelling for help and nobody in authority could get any orders carried out.’
8/RB were not the only occupants of the Hill. It was not long before the infantry discovered that some of the enemy bunkers were still occupied.
‘Suddenly a scraggy-looking beggar in field grey appeared from a hedge with his hands in the air. He was rushed off at the point of a bayonet. He kept looking back, frightened or perhaps worried about what was happening to his companions. A moment later, two more, one an officer, were captured.’
A German prisoner is directed back towards the Odon.
These Germans were the forward observation officers who had, in well-prepared and deep dugouts, called down fire on to their own positions. Thus hoping to drive off the increasing number of British who were arriving on the hill and occupying positions above them.
Despite losses of almost forty Shermans, the British position on Hill 112 was secure, as the infantry and tanks were joined by the all important supporting arms from divisional and corps troops. However, their positions on Hill 112 were surrounded on three sides and, in addition, they were at the end of a very exposed corridor, that was in places, little more than a mile wide! Lieutenant General O’Connor, commander VIII Corps, and Montgomery himself, must have been acutely aware of this as they digested the flash signal from Ultra: Rommel had authorized the release of the forty thousand men of II SS Panzer Corps. This powerful formation was to counter-attack the British salient from the west, astride the Odon, and destroy VIII Corps. Hill 112 and 11th Armoured Division in the bridgehead was under threat. Consequently, the most exposed elements of the division were withdrawn. Major Noel Bell of 8/RB describes the operation:
‘There was much confusion. Nobody seemed to be sure what was happening or what the form was. Brian approached, supported under the arms by two of his section leaders. The parts of his face not covered with blood showed through deathly pale. We gave him a shot of brandy from a flask; he coughed. The trucks and carriers made their way back through the orchard. We saw a half-track burning, one of H Company’s. Ammunition was exploding and the burning tyres made vivid circles of flames. We made lager, and attempted to find order out of chaos A feeling of depression swept through us. There were only two officers left. The morning just a few hours behind us, seemed another age.’
The following morning, as the attack by II SS Panzer Corps was delayed until mid- morning, it seemed safe to order 3/RTR and their two companies of 8/RB back to Hill 112. They set off full of misgivings, anticipating another day under a continuous and heavy fire from the surrounding Germans. The enemy had, surprisingly, not reoccupied the hill, probably because the two SS Panzer Corps were concentrating on their part in the attack on the ‘Scottish Corridor’. With little bother, 29 Armoured Brigade re-occupied their positions of the previous day on Hill 112. However, as Major Noel Bell recalled, all was not quiet for long:
Knocked out Shermans on Hill 112.
‘Shelling and mortaring commenced, varying in pitch from time to time. Bren carriers were blown bodily off the ground, but there were no direct hits. Our mortars, working with those of ‘H’ Company, put down a steady stream of fire. Sergeant Hollands continued to operate the mortars until wounded by shrapnel. Naish, leaning against a bank above his slit trench, was holding the wireless headphones in his hand, the better to hear any approaching shells, when there was an explosion nearby; shrapnel tore through the Bakelite, leaving in his hand only the metal band.’
Later in the day, a crisis was approaching as the German armour closed in on the Scottish Corridor. Everywhere the British were under pressure. In Montgomery’s words:
‘In view of this it was decided that VIII Corps should concentrate for the time being on holding the ground won, and regrouping started with the object of withdrawing the armour into reserve ready for new thrusts.’
This bland statement, with the safety of hindsight, belies the real gravity of the situation. Hill 112 had to be given up, as without 11th Armoured Division and the corps troops, who were urgently needed elsewhere, the hill could not be held. The 15th Scottish and 43rd Wessex Divisions were already fully committed to holding ground and could not spare any men to re-deploy to replace the armour that was being withdrawn in order to mount counter-attacks.
On Hill 112 Trooper John Thorpe recorded in his diary:
‘Warning Order received: Abandon tanks after destroying gun. But no action until confirmed.
New orders: Retreat, taking the tanks with us. Does anyone know what is going on?’
Thus ended Operation EPSOM. With the historian’s gift of hindsight, it is clear that those commanding the British battle had not fully appreciated the value of Hill 112. They were content to hold a shallow bridgehead over the Odon and give up the firm hold they had on Hill 112. As we shall see, this decision was to have tragic consequences for the soldiers who were to fight for its possession over the following month.
A section of the Rifle Brigade rest beside their half-track on the reverse slope of Hill 112.
CHAPTER TWO
PREPARATION FOR OPERATION JUPITER
A month after D-Day, the Allies had been able to ensure that their rate of build up of men and material had exceeded that of the Germans. They were relatively secure in their lodgement but space was limited, as some D-Day objectives had still not been taken. Caen, 3rd Division's D-Day objective, and Carpiquet airfield, to the west of the city, were still stubbornly held by the Germans. The severe Channel storm over the period 19-22 June, and the consequent destruction of the Americans’ prefabricated Mulberry Harbour, had caused some delays to operations, as a result of a lack of supplies. It could be said that the Allies had won the ‘break-in’ or landing and build up phase but the breakout battle was still proving to be an open issue.
Montgomery’s Plan
As Operation EPSOM wound down on 30 June 1944, Montgomery summarized the tactical situation and gave instructions to his two army commanders, Generals Bradley and Dempsey, in his Top Secret Directive M 505.
‘The General Situation
1. My broad policy, once we had secured a firm lodgement area, has always been to draw the main enemy forces in to the battle on our eastern flank, and to fight them there, so that our affairs on the western [US Army] flank could proceed the easier.
2. We have been very successful in this policy. Cherbourg has fallen without any interference from enemy reserves brought in from other areas; the First US Army is proceeding with its reorganization and re-grouping, undisturbed by the enemy; the western flank is quiet.
All this is good; it is on the western flank that territorial gains are essential at this stage, as we require space on that side for the development of our administration.
By forcing the enemy to place the bulk of his strength in front of the Second Army, we have made easier the acquisition of territory on the western flank.
3. Our policy has been so successful that the Second Army is now opposed by a formidable array of German Panzer Divisions – eight definitely identified, and possibly more to come.
The more recent arrivals seem to have come from far afield. The Divisions identified between CAUMONT and CAEN are as follows:
21 PZ, 2 PZ, 1 SS, 2
SS, 9 SS, 10 SS, 12 SS, LEHR’
Although there were eight German panzer divisions facing the Second British Army, there were only the equivalent of two on the American front. However, back at SHAPE, Eisenhower and his staff did not entirely share Montgomery’s positive view of the situation. Eisenhower had grudgingly, approved Montgomery’s strategy after a briefing prior to D-Day, yet after the war he wrote:
‘…I and all of my service commanders and staff were greatly concerned about this strategic situation near Caen. Every possible means of breaking the deadlock was considered and I repeatedly urged Montgomery to speed up and intensify his efforts to the limit. Montgomery threw in attack after attack…’
The US press was increasingly critical of the campaign’s slow development, particularly on the British front. For obvious reasons, Montgomery was unable to defend himself from such criticism by making his strategy public.
Montgomery went on to give directions to his army commanders: Generals Dempsey and Bradley. The key directives were:
‘6. Our tactics must remain unchanged. Briefly, they are as follows:
(a) To retain the initiative.
We shall do this only by offensive action. On no account must we remain inactive. Without the initiative we can not win… .
Second British Army
8. Tasks as follows:
(a) To hold the main enemy forces in the area between CAEN and VILLERS BOCAGE… .’
Hill 112 was a natural choice for one of the areas where ‘offensive action’ was to be maintained. The Official History describes Montgomery’s operational aims, once Caen had fallen, as follows:
‘Some days must elapse while troops were being regrouped for these twin attacks [US attack towards St Lo and the British Operation GOODWOOD], and meanwhile the pot was to be kept boiling by a limited action to hold the enemy armour in the east and to round off the ground won in the Epsom battle… .’
Operations in the Hill 112 area were to be code-named Operation JUPITER and were to be undertaken by the greatly reinforced 43rd Wessex Division, under command of VIII Corps. After the event, Montgomery described his intentions to
‘threaten to break out of the initial bridgehead on the eastern flank – that is, in the Caen sector. I intended by means of this threat to draw the main enemy reserves into that sector, to fight them there and keep them there, using the British and Canadian armies for the purpose.’
Montgomery goes on, at uncharacteristic length, to justify his decision to commit a division to attack Hill 112. His reasons were in accordance with his overall strategy:
‘Second Army had therefore to position itself for delivering a major thrust east of the Orne when the right time came; that would be when the American break-out operation had gathered momentum and was striking east.
‘There were other urgent reasons for wanting to develop a bridge head east of the Orne [from the area of Hill 112] … First: we had to extend the bridgehead in order to gain space to manoeuvre; this could be achieved best by attacking from the existing bridgehead to the south, south-east and east. Secondly: we required a firm left flank, so that we could launch major attacks to the south without fear of becoming unbalanced by enemy action on our left rear…. [east of the Orne Canal and River]. Thirdly: we required lateral east-west routes, which passed south of the Caen bottleneck. We should not achieve our object if we created a salient, south-east of Caen, and had to rely on maintenance routes which involved a long detour… it follows that we had to thrust south between the Odon and the Orne in order to open lateral routes to the west.’
The German Situation and Plan
At the same time that Montgomery was writing his upbeat M 505 directive to his army commanders, Generalfeldmarschal Wilhelm Keitel was on the phone from Berlin to C-in-C West, Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt. The conversation, recorded by Milton Shulman in his book Defeat In The West, went thus: Keitel: ‘What shall we do?’ von Rundstedt icily replied: ‘What shall we do? What shall you do? Make peace you idiots! What else can you do?’ With that he calmly hung up. Two days later von Rundstedt was relieved of his command.
Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel. ‘What shall we do…?’
Since well before D-Day the Germans had been victims of the deception-plan Operation FORTITUDE. The Allies’ aim was to convince the enemy that the Normandy landings were a feint and that taking vital divisions away from the Pas de Calais would be a mistake. So successful was the deception, that not only did it ensure that the initial build up outstripped the gradual release of German divisions from the Fifteenth Army, but also that the threat of the non-existent First US Army Group (FUSAG) was still believed a month after D Day. Indeed, the day the British launched their attack on Hill 112, 10 July 1944 – Rommel signalled C-in-C West:
Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt. ‘Make peace you idiots!’
‘The enemy has at present 35 divisions in the landing area. In Great Britain another 60 Divisions may at any moment be transferred to the continent. We shall have to reckon with the large scale landing of 1 US Army Group in the north for strategic cooperation with the Montgomery Army Group in a thrust on Paris.’
In fact, the phantom FUSAG only consisted of the charismatic General Patton, a handful of troops, some signals units, poorly-concealed blow-up rubber tanks and fake plywood landing craft. The Allies had yet another vital capability: Ultra. The Ultra code breakers at Bletchley Park had the ability to intercept and read German Enigma encoded radio communications. By 1944, use of Ultra intelligence was central to the Allies’ conduct of the war. It enabled the Allies to reinforce the enemy’s existing beliefs and manipulate their concerns to suit Allied purposes. The combination of Ultra (intelligence) and FORTITUDE (deception) gave the Allies the freedom to assemble sufficient troops at the right time, and in the right place, to ensure a prosperous campaign. On the other side, the Germans had barely sufficient resources available in Normandy to hold the Allies, let alone to ‘throw them back into the sea’ as Hitler demanded.
The arrival of II SS Panzer Corps from Russia at the end of June should have provided the Germans with a formation powerful enough to wrest some of the initiative from the Allies. The Corps, however, arrived at the height of Operation EPSOM and was fed piecemeal into battle. It successfully blunted the British attack, but shortage of troops in the face of relentless pressure and seemingly overwhelming material resources, condemned II SS Panzer Corps to holding a vital piece of ground: Hill 112. In all armies, tactical purists would have argued that a panzer division holding static positions was a criminal waste. Traditionally, the characteristics of armoured formations of mobility, protection and firepower are combined to achieve results through shock action, not through positional defence. Consequently, Generalfeldmarschall Rommel directed Generaloberst Eberbach, Commander Panzer Group West, to review the situation. Orders were given that 9th SS Panzer Division, holding the sector immediately to the west of Hill 112, was to be relieved by 277th Infantry Division from the Fifteenth Army at the pas de Calais. Making their way to Normandy was a slow process for the German infantry. Any movement by day was subject to Allied fighter-bomber attack and, lacking road or rail transport, the Division made their journey largely on foot and mostly at night
Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel.
Just before Operation JUPITER, the German aim had been to extract II SS Panzer Corps from defensive operations so that it could form the nucleus of an armoured reserve. As slow moving infantry divisions arrived in Normandy, German armour would be progressively freed from being forced to react to Allied moves and become, instead, a mobile striking force capable of dictating the course of events. As a first step in achieving this, 9th SS Hohenstaufen Panzer Division was to concentrate in hides to the south-west. Here it would be well placed to support either 10th SS Frundsberg Panzer Division, who were still in the line at Hill 112, or XLVII Panzer Corps. 9th SS Panzer Division started thinning out on the night of 7 July and moved to well-dispersed hides, with the Divisional H
eadquarters at Maisoncelles, to the south west of Villers Bocage. From here, the Division would be well placed to mount operations against either the Second British Army or the First US Army. Once out of the line, 9th SS Panzer Division’s tank strength increased significantly, from on average 50 percent strength after two weeks of battle to approximately 75 percent. Repairs were carried out and such SS reinforcements as were available were taken in to the Division’s battle-scarred units. The regeneration of 9th SS Panzer Division’s combat power created a viable German armoured reserve; exactly what Montgomery was striving to prevent!
SS-Oberführer Heinz Harmel, Commander of 10th SS Panzer Division
The rate of release and movement of German infantry divisions to Normandy meant that 10th Frundsberg SS Panzer Division was still needed to hold Hill 112. There is some debate as to whether or not the German commanders would have been happy to allow the key feature of Hill 112 to be held by a less powerful formation than an SS Panzer Division. However, as 43rd Wessex Division was to find out, the Frundsberg was still very firmly in position. The broad mass of Hill 112 was held by 21 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment (the equivalent of a British brigade), while 22 SS Panzer Grenadiers held the narrow gap between the eastern edge of Hill 112 and the River Orne. Both regiments held the area with several defensive lines. The Division’s reconnaissance and pioneer battalions occupied further in-depth positions that covered the Orne crossings. In support were not only the guns of 10th SS Artillery Regiment and II SS Panzer Corps, but also the much feared and loathed multi-barrelled rocket launchers (nebelwerfers) of 8 Werfer Brigade. The well dug-in SS soldiers, with their armoured reserves and impressive firepower, meant that the Frundsberg’s defences on Hill 112 were going to be a tough nut for 43rd Wessex Division to crack.
