by Tim Saunders
Bren Gun carrier equipped for signalling.
′Suddenly I heard the roar of a Panzer a few hundred yards to our rear and looked round saw this huge monster with gun equally huge pointing towards us. Diving flat on the ground just in time to evade an armour piercing shell which the Panzer fired. The shell passed literally a few inches above my posterior – the fragments of steel from the hole it made in my vehicle showered my backside and it was like a pin cushion with all the needles pushed in… I ran into the orchard and was lucky to see a dug-out made by the Germans and it had a wood cover. I ran into this and there found three others, all British.
′The Germans soon overran this area and were riddling these dug-outs with machine-gun fire. We soon realized this was likely to be our end and we shook hands and prayed – there′s nothing like this to make a man pray. We heard the rattle of Army boots running over the top of us – the spasmodic burst of gunfire as they raked the dugouts. Our thoughts raced through our heads – what would my folks at home be doing – how would they react to the formal notice of killed in action. One of the soldiers in this dug-out was having a puff at his last and only cigarette – in a state of nerves he would have a puff and then pass it to his mates to do likewise. Myself, I was resigned to be either killed or captured. I was not afraid, just filled with regret that all the future things I had planned and hoped for were now just vanishing.′
A knocked out Bren Gun carrier and 6-pounder destroyed south of Maltot.
Ruins of Maltot village after the fighting.
The OP carrier of Captain Paul Cash. It was destroyed by a Tiger tank at Maltot. Bombardier Douglas Lakey MM, is on the left.
Stalemate
By 13.00 hours, a stalemate had set in across the front. 10th SS Panzer Division with elements of I SS Panzer Corps had contained the British advance on their ′stop line′ but the Germans were still dangerously exposed. It had taken virtually all their combat power to achieve this and reinforcements from 9th SS Panzer Division were still some distance away. The war diary of Panzer Group West recorded the following ′Sitrep′ at 14.00 hours:
′In the course of the morning the enemy succeeded in capturing Eterville and Maltot. But all assaults on the dominating feature, Hill 112, were repulsed.′
It is clear from German reports of 10 July 1944, that they fully appreciated Montgomery′s strategic aims. However, so compelling was the threat of a British breakout to the east, that they could do little but respond to the attacks on Hill 112, just as Montgomery had intended. On the other side of the hill the 43rd Wessex had few reserves available to continue the attack, other than 4 Armoured Brigade. In a particularly terse exchange, Brigadier, later Field Marshal, Lord Carver came under pressure to join the battle. However, he felt that the conditions to launch his lightly armoured Sherman tanks had not been met.
′The Churchills of a squadron of 9 RTR supporting the final phase of the attack being almost all knocked out by anti-tank fire from this wood [the Orchard on the crest of Hill 112], which the infantry had not cleared. Having confirmed this myself when I took my tactical headquarters forward… I said I would not order my leading regiment over the crest towards the River Orne until the wood had been cleared of enemy as agreed… [Major General] GI Thomas came on the [radio] set himself and said that his information was that all objectives had been secured, and that I must start my forward thrust. I said I was on the spot and his infantry brigadiers were not, and that if he did not believe me he could come and see for himself. This, not surprisingly, did not please him. He insisted that I should order my tanks to advance over the crest. I said that if I did, I expected that the leading regiment would suffer 75 per cent casualties… and not reach their objectives. He asked me which regiment I proposed to send. I told him it was the Greys [Scotland′s only Regular Army cavalry regiment]. ′Couldn′t you send a less well-known regiment?′ he replied, at which I blew up. Finally, he accepted my arguments, but relations between us… were permanently soured.′
The western end of Maltot with the dominating ridge beyond used by German tanks.
With hindsight, it could be argued that 4 Armoured Brigade′s intervention at this stage could have been decisive in breaking the stalemate before the arrival of 9th SS Panzer Division. The cost would, however, almost certainly have been very high. The fate of the more heavily armoured Churchills would indicate that Brigadier Carver′s estimate of his leading regiment′s casualties would probably have been correct. History would also have had to compare tank casualties for Operation JUPITER with those suffered, little over a week later in ′the death ride of the British armoured divisions′ during Operation GOODWOOD.
At 15.00 hours, a commanders′ conference assembled in the tower of the Fontaine Etoupefour church. From here, Major General Thomas and his brigadiers could see that the situation around Chateau de Fontaine and Eterville was far from quiet and Hill 112 had obviously not been taken. This conference decided three things. Firstly, that 4/Dorsets who were now in reserve between Chateau de Fontaine and Eterville should immediately move to the support of 7/Hampshires in Maltot. Secondly, that, despite the understandable reluctance of Brigadier Carver to attack, elements of 4 Armoured Brigade were to be brought south of the Odon in order to secure gains against German counter-attacks. This was because there was a very real concern that the Germans were proving to be far more numerous than anticipated and that a powerful counter-attack could drive the division back across its start line and beyond. Elements of three SS panzer divisions had been identified and the Hohenstaufen was known to have been relieved in the line by 277th Infantry Division. The third, and most important, decision was that 5/DCLI in their assembly area north of the Odon should dismount from their Kangaroo armoured personnel carriers and move by foot to the bottom of Hill 112. They were the Division′s only other uncommitted battalion and were to renew 129 Brigade′s attack on the high ground. Captain Pat Spencer Moore, Major General Thomas′s ADC, summed up his general′s dilemma:
The church at Fontaine Etoupefour. During the fighting it was used as the Anchor O.P. site for 122 Field Regiment RA and subsequently by Major General Thomas to review the progress of the battle. See pages 56/57 for view from church tower.
′It was clear to the GOC that only a completely fresh attack on Hill 112 could stabilize the battle – perhaps even win it – or perhaps incur even more shattering losses? It was a gambler′s throw by Thomas. The only problem was that he was gambling with the lives of hundreds of his well-trained but completely green young soldiers. It must have been a terrible decision… .′
Meanwhile, at 15.00 hours, a counter-attack by 20 SS Panzer Grenadiers Regiment confirmed the urgency of the need to support 130 Brigade at Maltot and at Eterville. Artillery fire slowed both attacks but finally Typhoons, diving down on the enemy vehicles moving in the open, halted the German advance. Once again the effect of the feared jabos spitting cannon fire and rockets had been proved. However, against concealed targets and single fast moving vehicles they were far less effective, hence their inability to be of much help to 129 Brigade on top of Hill 112.
Ruined house at Maltot.
4/Dorsets
Having being relieved in Eterville, 4/Dorsets had barely two hours to reorganize after their heavy casualties and reload with ammunition before orders came to ′move now′ to support 7/Hampshires at Maltot. There was little time to spend planning, 4/Dorsets′ companies were simply allocated quadrants of Maltot to reinforce, marry up with Churchills of C Squadron 7/RTR and advance southwards. As little was known except that the Hampshires were still in the village, there was to be no fire support from artillery. Company Sergeant Major Laurie Symes recalls the battalion′s mood:
′My company – D – formed up for the attack on the reverse slope in front of Chateau Fontaine waiting for the off. I was in the company Bren gun carrier which was loaded with the company′s reserve ammo. Neither, myself or my driver gave a thought at the time what would have happened to that lot, if we had been hit
by an 88. The whole company had their tails up for this attack and were eager to go. I looked up the slope to see Major Eastwood, our company CO up front with his walking stick and whistle. When the time came, off we went through the standing corn.′
The Dorset′s move at 16.00 hours coincided with the final act of 7/Hampshires′ defence of Maltot. As 4/Dorsets approached the village, they met the remnants of the Hampshires withdrawing from the ruins. Once the repeated German counter-attacks had gained a foothold in Maltot the Germans could not be effectively engaged by artillery and air support, for fear of hitting 7/Hampshires, who were eventually overwhelmed and were now withdrawing.
In a recording made in a captured German trench, somewhere on the ridge between Eterville and Maltot, the BBC news reporter, Chester Wilmot, recorded these words while looking down on the northern outskirts of the village:
′By now that wood was enveloped in smoke – not the black smoke of hostile mortars but white smoke laid by our guns as a screen for our infantry who were now being forced to withdraw. We could see them moving back through the waist-high corn and, out of the smoke behind them, came angry flashes as the German tanks fired from Maltot. But even as the infantry were driven back another battalion was moving forward to relieve them, supported by Churchill tanks firing tracer over the heads of the advancing men. They moved right past our hedge out across the corn. The Germans evidently saw them coming, for away from our right flank machine guns opened up and then the Nebelwerfers… .′
Two days after the battle, the Wyvern News, the divisional daily newsheet, printed amongst news of the raising of travel restrictions to the West Country and improvements to Service pay, a comment on Wilmot′s report.
′People at home last night on the 9.00 p.m. News heard a broadcast of the fierce fighting around MALTOT in which our units were engaged. The recording made within 500 yards of the most forward positions, was most vivid. One recording designed to give an impression of the din of battle gave the sound of ′Moaning Minnie′ mortar shells arriving and bursting. The announcer was blown into a ditch and left the recording machine running. The striking words at the end of the report were "and now the infantry, who have been in the centre of all that, are up and moving forward again through the shattered cornfields.′
Sergeant Stevens′s troop several months after the battle.
During the advance, Corporal Chris Portway records the horror of 4/Dorsets′ second encounter of the day with their own airforce′s ordnance.
′A squadron of our own rocket firing Typhoons dropped out of the sun in twos and threes with the noise of an express train: the field seemed to rise up in flames; there was a great noise of rending metal. Rooted to the spot, we gazed upwards as another plane dived; we saw the wings shudder as the rockets were released. Explosions tore at the tortured earth. We hung on with our bare hands clutching the soil. My comrade at my side became a messy gore of rags. In front of me was the company dispatch-rider with no legs. A man came running out of the dust and smoke, total bewilderment on his face.′
This terrible description of a tragic ′own goal′, only too common in war, uses many of the same words and phrases as Germans do when describing Jabo attacks.
Sergeant Geoff Cleal, still with Advanced Battalion Headquarters remembers, equally bitterly, that:
′During the advance to Maltot we were pinned down in standing corn, some of which was burning. We were trapped rabbits at harvest time. Every time we made the slightest movement, we were greeted with a burst of machine-gun fire. It was frightening to hear the bullets hitting the corn above my head.′
Sergeant Jim Stevens, with his troop′s three remaining M10s, was supporting the Churchills of 9/RTR:
′E Troop pushed on towards Maltot when the second M10 was put out of action by an airburst over that bloody open turret, wounding the gun crew and putting it out of action. The third M10 was hit by an 88 in the front, killing the driver and wireless operator. Slivers of steel from the inside of the hull, wounding the troop commander in the neck and the No 1 sergeant in the back. They escaped through the hatch in the bottom of the M10, as German machine gunners were firing at the turret. They both made it back to the RAP.′
By 16.45 hours most of 4/Dorsets had reached Maltot and were attempting to consolidate in defensive positions. But once again they had superimposed themselves on German positions and confused fighting resulted. Corporal Chris Portway, with the leading companies, describes the action at the edge of the village:
′We were in an empty tank pit sheltering from the mortar fire and sorting ourselves to continue, when we saw a coal scuttle helmeted head peer over the rim. But he was too slow and we got him with a single shot before he could stick grenade us… We burst out of the pit firing in all directions and headed for the nearest house. We smashed our way in, which I have always regretted as it occurred to me at the time that I wouldn′t have liked it if it were my house. Clearing each house, we moved on until in one we were sorting out our remaining ammunition, when we heard movement upstairs. We listened and aimed shots through the ceiling above where we thought the Jerry was. We missed and he sent a shower of grenades down the stairs and holes in the floor. Fortunately no one was seriously wounded and we eventually got him.′
A knocked out M10 of E Troop showing the open turret.
Sergeant Jim Steven′s notebook. The first four entries record the fate of his four vehicles during Operation JUPITER.
The divisional history records that:
′Lieutenant Colonel H.E. Cowie, the CO, arrived at the HQ of 7/Hampshires on the outskirts of the village just behind his leading companies. Too late [he] learnt that what remained of 7/Hampshire were being withdrawn. Meanwhile his two leading companies, expecting to take over from the Hampshires advanced straight into the enemy position and were surrounded. …enemy tanks worked round to the rear of the remainder of the battalion, which lay out in the fields, exposed to fire from every direction. The position had become desperate!′
A Company had followed the same course as one of the Hampshires’ companies and advanced so far to the south-east, that they were lost to a man. Over the next three hours in Maltot, 4/Dorsets’ platoons and sections fought their own cat and mouse battles with the SS Panzer Grenadiers. Overall control of the battle was beyond any one person and the riflemen progressively lost contact with their battalion, company and even platoon headquarters. A troop of towed 17-pounders, from 130 Battery, who accompanied the Dorsets, deployed to form an anti-tank screen around the south of the village.
′They were quickly overrun in a German infantry counterattack and after expending all their small arms ammunition, removed the breech blocks of the guns and retreated to the infantry slits [trenches] losing half the troop in the process.’
The Battalion’s Mortar Platoon were, however, able to provide a greater amount of support. Private Frank Porter recalls:
′We were firing all day from the Odon Valley but I don’t know what at. We only got the direction, elevation and charge that we were to use. We didn’t have the asbestos gloves that we were supposed to have, so we used wetted sandbags to move the barrels that were so hot that the paint had burnt off. The mortars got so hot that there was a danger of the bombs exploding before they left the barrel.’
Outside the village, it was C Squadron 9/RTR’s turn to fight an unequal battle with the superior tanks of I and II SS Panzer Corps. The enemy armour that had worked its way around the village was engaging the Churchills shortly after 17.00 hours. Sergeant Trevor Greenwood′s memoirs describe what happened:
SS-Oberführer Heinz Harmel, commander 10th Frundsberg SS Panzer Division, liaises from an armoured personnel carrier with an SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer of the Leibstandarte Division during the British attack on Louvigny.
′And then I noticed one of our tanks on fire. What was happening? There were no signs of enemy on the hill, and our infantry were in the woods and village. It seemed like a counterattack in force, judging by Major Holden′s further appe
al. He had somehow contacted the infantry commander. And then the Major′s voice… he wanted help …smoke. He got smoke… all of us poured it out as fast as we could. In a matter of seconds, our former peaceful hill crest [half way between Maltot and Eterville] was pretty well littered with burning vehicles – and smoke. I noticed one or two nearby vehicles moving away, but where to? Soon I couldn′t see a thing but smoke, but gave the driver orders to advance: better to go anywhere than stay and be shot up. Eventually I found my way back to lower ground away from the danger zone …but I was still hazy about the situation.
All the same, I felt convinced that something pretty bad had happened.′
Sergeant Jim Stevens′s troop was still in action.
