by Tim Saunders
5/Wilts were clearly on a roll. Towards the end of their battle, Captain ′Abe′ Lincoln, the charismatic commander of B Company and fluent German speaker, calmly walked up to one of a platoon of assault guns (Stug IVs from 10th SS Panzer Division). Holding up his hand, he imperiously demanded to speak to the commander who, with a look of incredulity, popped up out of his hatch and was invited to surrender! This was a popular idea with the gun crews. However, negotiations were interrupted by salvos of shells from the British 5.5in guns that sent Captain Lincoln diving for cover and the Germans motoring back to the safety of Hill 112 as fast as they could.
4/Wilts
On the south side of the road, 4/Wilts had to fight their way through a wooded area and clear some outlying farms before reaching their objectives south of Maltot. Their war diary gives an indication of the lower level tactics.
′H-Hour 1730 – Bn moved with two coys up, C Coy left, A Coy right – res[erve] D Coy left, B Coy right. Because of the close nature of the ground one tank moved with each platoon – Two sects [sections each of 8 – 10 men] of each pl leading and one sect moving close to the tank as its bodyguard against bazookas, sticky grenades, etc, which might be fired from amongst the woods and houses – co-operation by the tanks was very good.′
Clearly protecting the tanks, which were especially vulnerable to attack in close country and villages, was a priority if the infantry were to enjoy the firepower of the tanks′ machine guns and main armament. Working closely or ′co-operating′ with the infantry, the tanks would blast the enemy out of their defences, thus considerably reducing the risks inherent to the infantry in an unsupported attack in the close country. To ensure proper coordination with the infantry, squadron commanders went into battle on foot alongside the infantry commanding officers. This resulted in swift, effective decision making. One early result was that the squadron commander who saw that A Company 4/Wilts had been held up on the open approaches to Lieu de la France, at the eastern end of Maltot, quickly organized tank support. His headquarters′ tanks brought up the Crocodiles and, together with HE, flame and machine-gun fire, made short work of the German defenders. The advance continued.
William Biles, a private with a platoon headquarters, describes an incident early in C Company′s attack:
′We were told to take a small house in the wood, only five Jerries inside, easy. …As I walked up the road all I could see through the foliage was the top windows and part of the front door. Number 3 Section got the job of actually assaulting, and as they tore up the path, a machine gun fired a short burst and wounded two of them. One managed to crawl away but the other chap was hit in the stomach. So our Red Cross bloke put a big red cross on the end of a bayonet and held it out where the Germans could see it. There was no firing so he crawled out; then they fired and hit him in the leg. So it was decided to call up the tank from the rear. But I had the bright idea, as I was Number One of the 2in mortar, to fire HE on the house. My mate opened up the case, and I lay down behind the mortar and poked it in the general direction of the front door; I′d never fired the thing before, so I was hoping for the best! "Well, Bill, I′ll bung em in and you fire ′em" said the Sergeant. I pulled the handle but when the first one hit, it didn′t explode, it just poured smoke. "They′re not bloody HE, they′re smoke rounds," yelled the Sergeant. "Never mind," he said, "we′ll use those while he′s opening the bloody HE." So he was putting ′em down the barrel, and I was letting ′em off, when I hears a rat-tat-tat right behind me head. It was our tank, firing into the house, which was covered in thick white smoke. Hell of a din! Then they raided the house and instead of five coming out, there was forty-five.′
Crocodiles in action.
In the woods, the fighting was short, sharp and bloody. The deadly game of cat and mouse through the trees, quarries and trenches strained the infantry′s every nerve. Those who fought the battle lost all sense of time. However, the artillery records indicate that the bulk of the task was completed within two hours. Mopping up and securing gains, as usual, took longer but as light faded one last German position remained unsubdued. The enemy had withdrawn to Chateau Maltot in 4/Wilts′ area to make their final defence, despite being cut off as the advancing companies bypassed the strong point.
By 19.00 hours, it was clear that the Chateau had become a problem. As they moved up from reserve to take the lead along the banks of the small Rau de Maltot and up onto the ridge to the south-east of Maltot, B Company came under heavy fire from the upper floors. The enemy had halted the advance in its tracks. B Company′s accompanying troop of tanks was brought forward and started to soften up the defenders; however, the strongly built Chateau seemed to absorb the HE shells and Besa machine-gun fire. After a while a Wehrmacht medic came out of the chateau bearing a flag of truce and requested that they be allowed to evacuate the growing number of wounded. His request was refused, unless all the defenders came out and surrendered. Unable to accept these terms, the German medic returned to the Chateau and the battle resumed. At dusk, Lieutenant Rutherford′s 18 Platoon assaulted the Chateau with tanks moving as close as they dared to help the assaulting infantry break into the Chateau. 18 Platoon gained entry to the ground floor, which they largely cleared, but were subsequently subjected to a hail of grenades thrown down the stairwells and through holes in the ceiling. Sergeant Eyer led a charge up the main stairs, but in the now almost complete darkness, they were beaten back. During the course of the night, the outbuildings were steadily cleared and the main Chateau received the regular attention of the tanks.
The Chateau, last position of the German defenders at Maltot, and the same building today.
Despite the continuing resistance at the Chateau, both 4 and 5/Wilts reported that, between 21.30 and 22.00 hours, they had successfully reached their objectives on the western edge of Maltot and the woods to the south. The two 7/RTR squadrons were released at 22.30 by the grateful Wiltshires. Having lost eight tanks, they now returned to leaguers behind the start line. Back in Maltot, as darkness fell, the battle started to die down, but it was not until shortly after first light the following morning that the Germans in the Chateau surrendered. Private Main was detailed to escort the prisoners to the Brigade POW collection point:
′There was one bloke who spoke good English. He told me that they had held out thinking that the SS would counter-attack and rescue them and when no attack came at dawn, the Major faced the inevitable and surrendered before the Chateau was blown down bit by bit. Apparently, there had been some discussion about the risk of surrendering as some had seen what happened to prisoners in Russia.′
The inevitable German counter-attack failed to materialize; clearly a sign that weeks of battle had taken its toll on the enemy. 10th SS Panzer Division was reduced from 15,000 men to just 2,289. Only the most important positions were to be counter-attacked, despite what Hitler demanded in Berlin. Maltot was lost but the British were contained below the ridges of Hill 112, with its dug-in tanks and guns.
Daylight revealed that the infantry had an unpleasant surprise to deal with. Captain Robbins, who had in the previous week taken over as adjutant of 4/Wilts, recounts:
′we didn′t realize that 130 Brigade had been put into Maltot and had been virtually written off during Jupiter. We saw their destroyed vehicles and the rotting bodies scattered around the village. It doesn′t take long for a body to rot in the hot sun.′
Some of the upwards of 400 prisoners taken during the fighting at Maltot. These veterans of the Russian Front are all holders of the Iron Cross.
Main Street, Maltot then and now.
As a stretcher bearer with B Company Headquarters, Private Geoff White describes a harrowing task in understated terms;
′Another duty we had to perform was burying the dead Dorsets and Hampshires. This wasn′t very nice, especially as you were looking out for the next shell. Burying the bodies and wondering when you were going to join them isn′t fun!′
Outside the village the German panzers and anti-
tank guns fired down into Maltot from the south-east ridge of Hill 112, which made life very unpleasant for the British infantry. The attack had been well prepared and very well executed by two battalions who had been schooled in the cauldron of battle. It is with some justifiable pride that the Wiltshires claim that their capture of Maltot was ′a text book operation′. Over four hundred prisoners from 272nd Infantry and 10th SS Panzer Divisions had been taken.
The End at Hill 112.
On 30 July 1944, the British breakout-from the lodgement began, but it was not where the Germans expected it to be. They had been preparing to resume their defence of Hill 112 and the line of the River Orne. However, in the preceding days, the centre of gravity of the British Second Army had been transferred to the western flank alongside the Americans who were beginning to forge south. The lateral passage of lines (crossing through the rear of other divisions) by units grouped under XXX Corps was a marvellously executed piece of staff work, showing considerable discipline and training in one of the most difficult phases of war. By the early hours of 1 August 1944, II SS Panzer Corps vehicles were streaming away from Hill 112 to the new crisis point in the area of Mont Pincon. Here they would again meet their old adversaries – the 43rd Wessex and 15th Scottish Divisions – in a mobile battle of an entirely different character from that fought between the Rivers Odon and Orne.
Replacing 43rd Wessex on Hill 112 was the 53rd Welsh Division which, in the relatively quiet conditions, was able to expand its area of responsibility to take over the frontage formerly held by the two divisions. As increasing numbers of Germans were drawn to face the breakout in the south-west, the Recce Regiment of the Welsh Division was able to slip through the le Bon Repos crossroads:
′We crept over the brow of the hill at zero hour to see a large open expanse of shell-potted ground with many knocked out tanks and vehicles scattered about. My first thought was whether my [armoured] car would add to this collection. I had never felt so frightened before. Our progress was slow but we edged down the narrow road, dodging a demolished carrier and bumping over shell holes. There was a road barrier 300 yds ahead, which I kept well covered with my Bren. Despite mines cleared by the assault troop, A Sqn got into the shell torn village of Esquay. C Sqn advanced on the right and reached the River Orne at Pont de Coudray after an amazing advance of five to six miles in the wake of the retreating enemy!′
As the centre of events moved westwards, the advantageous and remarkable views from Hill 112 lost their relevance. On 4 August 1944, after all the blood spilt down its slopes, Hill 112 fell into the hands of 53rd Welsh Division with hardly a fight. Let the words of War Minister Sir James Griggs′s report to the House of Commons have the final say on the six weeks of fighting at Hill 112:
′Meanwhile, the British and Canadians, though making some local gains, were primarily concerned with holding the hinge position south-west of Caen and containing the greater part of the enemy′s available armour. To them had been assigned the unspectacular task of forming the anvil upon which the German Forces were held and pounded to destruction.′
CHAPTER SIX
TOURS OF THE HILL 112 BATTLEFIELD
The tour described here will enable the visitor to travel around the main scenes of action in the Hill 112 battle area. It is assumed that the visitor will have transport, be it minibus, car or bicycle. However, there are a couple of parts of the battlefield that can only be visited on foot and are included in the tour itinerary described below. This combination of vehicle and foot will cater for most tastes.
The tour starts in the Odon Valley between the villages of Verson and Fontaine Etoupefour. Most visitors will approach the area from the Caen area or more likely from the city’s Peripherique autoroute. For those setting out from the centre of Caen you should head for the western outskirts and the Peripherique. From the Peripherique take exit nine and join the D675, signposted Rennes and Verson. Follow the signs around the roundabouts towards Verson. Four hundred metres after the roundabout the road forks downhill to the left. Take the D 214, signposted to Fontaine Etoupefour. At the Verson church follow the road to the left. Pause by the bridge across the River Odon.
DEATH VALLEY (see map)
You are at the bottom of the Odon Valley or what became known to the Wessex Division as ‘Death Valley’. This unspectacular stream was an obstacle to both wheeled and tracked movement. The watercourse is quite deep and steep-sided, with the tree-lined banks providing further problems. This bridge was in No Man’s Land on the morning of 10 July 1944, and 46 Highland Brigade attacked eastwards towards Bretteville and Louvigny past this point. Further to the west, the Royal Engineers had prepared crossings for vehicles by clearing trees, grading the banks and by a certain amount of in-filling of the streambed. The 43rd Wessex’s mortar platoons and forward divisional artillery batteries were positioned in the valley bottom. One gunner recalls that: ‘The stream was clogged with corpses, ours and theirs, and was seen to run red with blood. This is where we got our “fresh” water from for several weeks.’
FONTAINE ETOUPEFOUR AND LES DUANES
Drive on, following the D214 as it turns to the right and uphill from the valley bottom until a T-junction is reached by Fontaine Etoupefour Church. Turn right and park up outside the church. This was an area of much activity on the morning of 10 July 1944. In the farms opposite the entrance to the church, were the tactical headquarters of both 130 and 214 Brigades, while the church tower offered the observer a view of most of the battlefield. The anchor OP of 112 Field Regiment RA was initially in the tower but moved forward onto the ridge once Chateau de Fontaine and Eterville were taken. From midday onwards, Major General Thomas used the tower as his OP and from this vantage-point, he gave his orders for the afternoon’s attacks. From the church wall on the southern side of the graveyard, today’s visitor can look down towards the modern roundabout and the estate of holiday homes. This area was used by all three battalions of 130 Brigade as their forming up position. Return to your vehicle and head for the round about. Take the third exit and follow the D147A in the direction of Maltot. In passing, note the second turning from the roundabout into the new housing named ‘Rue du General Breeden’ [sic]. Lieutenant Colonel Bredin commanded 5/Dorsets later in the war but in July 1944 he was second in command of 2/Dorsets in the Tilly sur Seulles area and did not take command of the 5/Dorsets until early 1945.
Continue up the road as it rises out of the valley. Almost as the last houses are passed the plane trees and honey coloured buildings of les Duanes farm complex comes into view. Here no man’s land was very narrow. The farm was the initial objective of 5/Dorsets and was taken by C Company. The farm is private property but without trespassing, the visitor can appreciate the way that the soldiers of 2/22 SS Panzer Grenadiers would have fortified the already strong buildings and surrounding paddocks. Easily visible from the church tower, the defenders of les Duanes were the victims of heavy and highly accurate artillery fire and 5/Dorsets were quickly among the stunned defenders.
Les Duanes farm.
CHATEAU de FONTAINE
Resume the journey to the south across open farmland that in 1944 was cloaked in waist-high wheat (modern varieties are much shorter). After 500 metres, a brown tourist sign directs the visitor down a track to the left. This is the access to Chateau de Fontaine. Once on the track, look to the left. This is where 5/Dorsets ‘Horseshoe’ Wood, D Company’s objective, used to be. The Comte du Lar opens the Chateau and his small museum of artefacts, mainly collected from his moat during dredging operations, at irregular intervals over the years. Visits to the chateau can be booked by phone. If you have booked a visit or the gate on the track down to the Chateau, between a double row of trees is open, drive down and park on the gravelled area. The Chateau was largely a ruin in 1944 and marked as such on the 1:25,000 map. The battle further reduced the buildings. However, the present Count has restored the old gatehouse into a small house. The Chateau and the farm buildings to the west were at the centre of 2/22 Panze
r Grenadier Regiment’s defensive positions. Fighting through the Chateau and farm complex was a slow business for 5/Dorsets. It also took 7/Somerset LI, who replaced the captors, several days to winkle out the last snipers, some of whom, concealed in the moat and in the haystacks, caused many casualties. An obvious target for German Nebelwerfers, the area of the Chateau and farm received much attention and were dangerous places to linger in the open by night or day. A steady stream of casualties came back from here in the days following Operation JUPITER and added to the heavy toll of losses of 10 July 1944. Please do not wander around the farmyard. The visitor can see the main features of the farm from the area of the Chateau.
After the battle at Chateau de Fortaine and a group of visitors from 5/Dorsets. The Chateau and farm today. A large objective for a single company of Dorsets.
Return to the end of the Chateau’s drive. Here one can park and, on foot, take the track to turn right in an easterly direction towards Eterville. Be careful not to block the track with parked cars. Those not wishing to walk should return to the road and retrace the route back towards the Fontaine Etoupefour church on the D 214 towards Caen and Odon Bridge. Just before reaching the bridge, take a turning to the right, up a narrow hedged road signposted to Eterville (C1). Follow the road up out of the valley. 4/Dorsets advanced across the open ground to the right, from the area of the church. Note the convex shape of the ground, which meant that much of 4/Dorsets’ advance was out of sight of 1/22 SS Panzer Grenadiers. The Frundsberg’s outpost line lay along the crest and in the open fields just in front of the village edge.
