After a short rest I set off early on the 18th of June for Belfort, where I arrived at about 08.00 hours. Between Montbéliard and Belfort long columns of French vehicles, including much heavy artillery, were parked along the road. They had already surrendered. Thousands of prisoners were camped outside the entrance to the old fortress. But there were no German flags to be seen on the towers of the forts, and there was still shooting to be heard inside the town. I stopped a motor-cycle despatch rider of the 1st Panzer Division on the open space in front of the Lion de Belfort, and asked him where his divisional headquarters was located. The alert young man knew that his general was at the Hôtel de Paris and led me there. I found Wenck, who was very surprised to see me so early in the morning, and when I asked for the divisional commander he told me that that officer was in the act of taking a hot bath. I could well understand that this staff might well want a good wash after the terrific race which they had been running for the last few days, and I took advantage of the wait until Kirchner should appear to sample the breakfast that French cooks had prepared for French officers. Then I inquired about the position here and learned that the division was at present only in control of a part of the town, while the French still held the forts. Only the troops in the barracks had agreed to surrender. The forts refused to capitulate without a fight and must, therefore, be assaulted.
The division organised an assault group for the attack on the forts and on the citadel. The battle began at about noon. The first fort to be captured was Basses-Perches, followed by Hautes-Perches, near where I was standing, and the citadel itself. The tactics employed were extremely simple: first, a short bombardment by the artillery of 1st Panzer Division; then Eckinger’s rifle battalion, in armoured troop-carrying vehicles, and an 88 mm. anti-aircraft gun drove right up to the fort, the latter taking up position immediately in front of the gorge; the riflemen thus reached the glacis without suffering any casualties, climbed up it, clambered over the entrenchments and scaled the wall, while the 88 mm. anti-aircraft gun fired into the gorge at point-blank range. The fort was then summoned to surrender, which under the impact of the rapid attack it did. Our ensign was hoisted to mark the completion of the surrender, and the assault troops turned to their next task. Our casualties were very light.
On this day other elements of 1st Panzer Division, under the command of Colonel Nedtwig, reached Giromagny to the north of Belfort. They captured 10,000 prisoners as well as 40 mortars and 7 aeroplanes, besides a great deal of other equipment.
Panzer Group moved its headquarters to Montbéliard.
Meanwhile, the French Government had resigned and the veteran Marshal Pétain had formed a new Cabinet which began to negotiate for an armistice on the 16th of June.
Our main task now was to establish contact with General Dollmann and to complete the encirclement of the enemy forces in Alsace Lorraine.
While the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division was fighting its way forward through the Jura, towards Lomont and the Pruntrut corner, the 2nd Panzer Division reached the upper Moselle at Rupt and Remiremont. The 6th Panzer Division, under General Kempff, took Épinal in much the same way that the 1st Panzer Division had captured Belfort. In each of these fortresses we made some 40,000 prisoners.
Advance units of the Seventh Army reached Nieder-Asbach, to the south of Sennheim, in Upper Alsace.
On the 19th of June the advance was resumed and contact made with Seventh Army at La Chapelle, to the north-east of Belfort. We had a certain amount of trouble with the eastern Belfort forts, but finally these too surrendered. 1st Panzer Division stormed the heights of Belchen and the Ballon de Servance and at about midnight captured Le Tillot. The 2nd Panzer Division took Fort Rupt on the Moselle. The advance through the Vosges was carried out on a broad front. The infantry divisions of I Army Corps, advancing towards Épinal from the north, had to be halted, since the roads were already overloaded with panzer troops and the arrival of infantry formations as well would have brought all movement to a standstill. The infantry complained loudly at Army Group headquarters about what they regarded as this ill-treatment; they too wanted to have a go at the enemy. I sent my operations officer, Major Bayerlein, with all speed by aeroplane to Colonel-General Ritter von Leeb, since I wished the Army Group commander to know my reasons for halting the infantry. Bayerlein arrived just in time to prevent any unpleasantness.
The headquarters of the Panzer Group was now moved to the resort town of Plombières, an old spa well known to the Romans. We spent three very agreeable days there.
The collapse of the French was complete. On the 20th of June Cornimont fell, and on the 21st Bussang in the Vosges. The 2nd Panzer Division reached St. Amé and Tholy, the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division Delle and Belfort. We took 150,000 prisoners. Arguments had developed between the generals of Army Group C concerning the numbers of prisoners captured by their respective troops; which prisoners belonged to whom? Colonel-General Ritter von Leeb had to sit in judgment like Solomon. He allotted the figure of 150,000 to me and added the flattering comment that had it not been for the encircling movement of my Panzer Group through Belfort and Épinal the totals for all units would have been considerably smaller.
Since the crossing of the Aisne the Panzer Group had taken in all approximately 250,000 prisoners, besides an incalculable quantity of equipment of all sorts.
On the 22nd of June the French Government agreed to an armistice. We were not immediately informed of its conditions. On the 23rd I drove through the Vosges, by way of Schlucht and Kaysersberg, to visit General Dollmann in his headquarters at Colmar. I saw once again the town in which I had spent my happy childhood.
My staff was moved to Besançon where we lived at first in a hotel, afterwards moving into the building which had previously housed the French area command. Now that the fighting was over I had the opportunity to thank my generals and general staff officers for their superb performance. Our work together had been marred by no misunderstandings whatever. The brave soldiers had carried out their very heavy duties with the greatest devotion. They could well be proud of their achievements.
On the 30th of June I said farewell to them with the following order of the day:
Group Guderian.
Besançon, 30.6.40.
At this moment, when Group Guderian is about to be dissolved, I want to express to all commands and units who are about to depart for fresh tasks, my very best wishes.
The victorious advance from the Aisne to the Swiss border and the Vosges will go down in history as an heroic example of a break-through by mobile troops.
I thank you for what you have done. It has been the finest fulfillment to my labours and struggles of more than a decade’s duration.
On to fresh tasks, with the same spirit and the same success, until the final victory of Greater Germany is complete!
Heil dem Führer!
signed, GUDERIAN
The Armistice
I recall two visitors who came to see me while I was in Besançon. On the evening of the 27th General Ritter von Epp appeared, the honorary Colonel of the 19th Infantry Regiment, who was passing through Besançon while looking for his regiment: I knew him from the old days when we used to go hunting together in the Spessart. We had a long conversation in which we thoroughly discussed our armistice with France and the future prosecution of the war against England. I enjoyed this conversation all the more since, isolated as I was, I had had no opportunity for an interchange of views on these subjects.
My second visitor, with whom I discussed the same matters on the 5th of July, was the Minister for Armaments and War Production, Dr. Todt. He had come to collect at first hand the opinion of front-line soldiers which might modify the planned developments in the field of tank production.
The German people were rejoicing and Hitler was satisfied with the armistice that had been signed. I felt less enthusiastic about it. In view of the totality of our victory there were several courses open to us. We could have insisted on complete Frenc
h disarmament, on the occupation by our forces of the entire country, on the handing over to us of the French fleet and colonies. We could, alternatively, have chosen an entirely different approach: we could have offered the French the integrity of their country and colonies and their national independence in exchange for their assistance in securing a rapid peace with the English. Between these extremes there lay a host of variants. No matter what course was adopted, the object must be to produce circumstances favourable to Germany for bringing the war to an end, including the war with England. In order to make peace with England the first requirement must be an attempt to reopen diplomatic relations. Hitler’s offer from the Reichstag tribunal cannot be counted as such. I am now aware that it is highly problematical whether Great Britain would, in fact, have agreed at that time to negotiate with Hitler. Nevertheless, the attempt had to be made, if only so that we could not later be accused of having neglected any possibility of a peaceful settlement. If diplomacy should not produce the desired results, then military methods would have to be used, immediately and with all available strength. Of course, Hitler and his staff considered the future prosecution of the war against Great Britain; the well-known plan for the invasion of England, Operation Sea-lion, is sufficient proof of that. But in view of the insufficiency of our preparations in the air and on the sea, which were far below what would be needed to invade, other means would have to be found of so damaging our enemy that he would accept a negotiated peace.
It seemed to me, then, that we could ensure peace in the near future by, first of all, advancing at once to the mouth of the Rhône: then, having captured the French Mediterranean bases in conjunction with the Italians, by landing in Africa, while the Luftwaffe’s first-class parachute troops seized Malta. Should the French be willing to participate in these operations, so much the better. Should they refuse, then the war must be carried on by the Italians and ourselves on our own, and carried on at once. The weakness of the British in Egypt at that time was known to us. The Italians still had strong forces in Abyssinia. The defences of Malta against air attack were inadequate. Everything seemed to me to be in favour of further operations along these lines, and I could see no disadvantages. The presence of four to six panzer divisions in North Africa would have given us such overwhelming superiority that any British reinforcements would inevitably have arrived too late. It would plainly have been far more advantageous to make a German-Italian landing in North Africa in 1940 than it was in 1941, after the initial Italian defeat in that theatre.
It is possible that Italian distrust prevented Hitler from carrying the war into Africa at that time. But it is more likely that Hitler, thinking within the limited framework of continental ideas, failed properly to grasp the decisive importance of the Mediterranean to the British.
Be that as it may, I heard nothing more of my proposals at that time. It was not until 1950 that I learned that General Ritter von Epp did find an opportunity to lay these ideas before Hitler. According to Captain Wenig, who had accompanied Epp to see him, Hitler was not interested in exploring the possibilities involved.
My stay at Besançon enabled me to get to know the Jura. On the 1st of July I gazed from the top of Mont Rond down across the famous Lake of Geneva. I also visited Lyons to see my elder son, who had been wounded for the second time during the Campaign in the West. He received an advance of seniority as a reward for the bravery he had shown.
Our relations with the prefect and the mayor of Besançon were correct. Both these gentlemen were consistently courteous and polite.
At the beginning of July my Panzer Group was dissolved, some divisions returning to Germany while others were moved to the Paris area. The staff also went to Paris. We were supposed to organise a great parade at which the Führer was to have been present; fortunately this never took place.
While in Paris I visited Versailles and Fontainebleau, the latter a wonderful old castle full of historical memories and beautiful objects. I was particularly interested by the Napoleonic Museum at Malmaison. The aged and dignified director was kind enough to show me around himself, and I had a most instructive and interesting conversation about the great Corsican with that scholarly historian. Needless to say I visited all the sights of Paris, so far as military conditions permitted. I stayed first at the Hôtel Lancaster: later I was given very comfortable quarters in a private house in the Bois de Boulogne.
My stay in Paris was interrupted by the Reichstag session of the 19th July at which I, as well as the majority of the other general officers, was ordered to be present. Here Hitler announced my promotion to Colonel-General.
Since the parade was not to take place, there was no point in the staff of the Panzer Group remaining in Paris. We were, therefore, transferred to Berlin in early August, where we enjoyed a period of leisure and relaxation.
Meanwhile, the units that had remained behind in France were busy with the preparations for Operation Sea-lion. Even from the very beginning this operation was never taken seriously. In my opinion the lack of a sufficiently strong air force and of adequate shipping—not to mention the escape of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk—made it a completely hopeless undertaking. Those two weaknesses—air power and shipping—are surely the best possible proof that Germany had neither intended nor made any preparations for a war against the Western Powers. When in September the autumn storms set in, Operation Sea-lion, which was already dead, was finally buried.
Sea-lion had one result for the tank troops, in that it led to experiments with underwater tanks, for which purpose Panzers III and IV were adapted. Those vehicles were made ready for operational employment at the tank gunnery school at Putlos, in Holstein, by the 10th of August. They were to be used in Russia during the crossing of the Bug in 1941.
On the basis of experience gained during the Western Campaign, Hitler ordered a tank production of 800 to 1,000 units per month. However, the Army Ordnance Office reckoned that the cost of this programme would be about two milliards of marks, and that it would involve the employment of 100,000 skilled workers and specialists. In view of these heavy expenses Hitler unfortunately agreed to the abandonment of this plan for the time being.
Hitler also ordered that the 37 mm. gun in the Panzer III be replaced by a 50 mm. L60. In fact it was the 50 mm. L42 which was used, a gun, therefore, with a considerably shorter barrel. Hitler was apparently not immediately informed of this modification to his directive on the part of the Ordnance Office; when, in February of 1941, he learned that his instructions were not being carried out even though all the technical requirements were to hand, he became extremely angry and he never forgave the responsible officers of the Ordnance Office for this highhanded act. Years later he was to refer to it.
After the campaign Hitler ordered a considerable increase in the number of panzer and motorised infantry divisions. The number of panzer divisions was soon doubled, though this involved a halving of the tank strength of each division. Thus the German Army, though doubling its nominal strength in armoured divisions, did not acquire double the number of tanks, which was after all what counted. The simultaneous doubling of the motorised infantry divisions placed such a terrific burden on the motor vehicle industry that Hitler’s orders could only be carried out by making full use of all available supplies, including the material captured in the countries of Western Europe. These captured vehicles were markedly inferior in quality to the German ones and were particularly ill-suited for any employment that might be foreseen in the eastern or African theatres.
I was responsible for supervising the organisation and training of a number of panzer and motorised infantry divisions. This kept me fully occupied. During my rare hours of leisure I meditated about the apparent future course of the war, which somehow must eventually be brought to an end. My thoughts turned increasingly towards the south. I believed, as my conversations in Besançon already showed, that the end of the war with Great Britain was the most important, indeed the only important thing.
I h
ad no contact with the Army High Command or with the General Staff. My opinions were not sought, either concerning the reorganisation of the armoured force or as to the future prosecution of the war.
A clear light was first thrown on this latter problem by M. Molotov’s visit to Berlin on the 14th of November, 1940. A terrifyingly clear light.
6. THE CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA, 1941
The Background. Preparations. Opening operations. Crossing the Dnieper. Smolensk-Elnya-Roslavl. Moscow or Kiev? The Battle of Kiev. The Battles of Orel and Bryansk. The advance to Tula and Moscow. My first dismissal.
On May 3rd, 1939, Molotov had been appointed Soviet Foreign Commissar in place of Litvinov. He played a prominent part in negotiating the non-aggression pact with Germany of August 23rd, 1939, which enabled Hitler to attack Poland. The Russians helped in the destruction of Poland by invading the eastern portions of that country on September 18th, 1939. On September 29th, 1939, Russia signed a pact of friendship with Germany and at the same time made a trade agreement that was to be of considerable value to the Germans in the economic prosecution of the war. Meanwhile, the Russians also made the most of the international situation. They seized the Baltic States and, on the 30th of November, 1939, launched an attack on Finland. While Germany’s armed forces were occupied in the West, the Russians compelled the Rumanians to surrender Bessarabia; as a result of this move Hitler, on the 30th of August 1940, felt himself bound to guarantee Rumania’s independence.
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