In Munich I met Field-Marshal Rommel at the Vier Jahreszeiten Hotel in order to discuss with him the lessons he had learned in the African theatre. That evening I returned by air to Berlin. On the 18th I inspected artillery weapons at Jüterbog and flew the same day to Berchtesgaden for a conference with Hitler. On the way there we landed at Grafenwöhr, which enabled me once again to investigate the troubles of the 51st and 52nd Panther Battalions so that I was able to report on them at first hand to Hitler. Apart from the technical weaknesses of the not yet perfected tanks, neither the crews nor the commanders were by then sufficiently experienced in their handling, while some of them even lacked adequate battle experience. Unfortunately not even these considerations sufficed to persuade Hitler or his Chief of the Army General Staff to abandon the ill–Starred offensive in the East, which was now begun under the code name Citadel.
We had lost the African theatre on May 12th with the capitulation of Tunis. On July 10th the Allies landed in Sicily. On the 25th Mussolini was deposed and imprisoned. Marshal Badoglio was entrusted with the task of forming a new government. The defection of Italy had therefore to be reckoned with in the near future.
While these events in the South were bringing the war ever closer to Germany, in the East Hitler launched an offensive which was both inadequately planned and carried out. From the area of Bielgorod in the south ten panzer, one panzergrenadier, and seven infantry divisions attacked, while in the north seven panzer, two panzergrenadier, and nine infantry divisions went in from the area west of Orel. Everything that the German Army could muster in the way of attacking strength was committed in this offensive; Hitler had himself correctly said in Munich that it must not fail, since even a return to our original positions would spell defeat. It is not yet clear how Hitler was eventually persuaded to launch this attack. It seems likely that pressure by the Chief of the Army General Staff was the deciding factor.
The attack began on July 5th. Our tactics were those that had been used many times before against the Russians, who as a result knew exactly what to expect. Hitler had had two alternative plans: one to attack through Sevsk against the most advanced part of the Russian salient, the other to break through and roll up the Russian front southeast of Kharkov. He had scrapped both these plans in favour of the Zeitzler plan which involved a double envelopment of the Russian salient in the Tim area with the purpose of regaining the initiative on the Eastern Front.
I visited both the attacking fronts during the time between the 10th and the 15th of July; I went first to the southern and then to the northern area, and talked to the tank commanders on the spot. I there gained an insight into the course that events were taking, the lack of our men’s experience in the attack and the weaknesses of our equipment. My fears concerning the premature commitment of the Panthers were justified. Also the ninety Porsche Tigers, which were operating with Model’s army, were incapable of close-range fighting since they lacked sufficient ammunition for their guns, and this defect was aggravated by the fact that they possessed no machine-gun. Once they had broken into the enemy’s infantry zone they literally had to go quail shooting with cannons. They did not manage to neutralise, let alone destroy, the enemy rifles and machine-guns, so that the infantry was unable to follow up behind them. By the time they reached the Russian artillery they were on their own. Despite showing extreme bravery and suffering unheard-of casualties, the infantry of Weidling’s division did not manage to exploit the tanks’ success. Model’s attack bogged down after some 6 miles. In the south our successes were somewhat greater but not enough to seal off the salient or to force the Russians to withdraw. The Russian counter-attack began on July 15th towards Orel, the defence of which weakened our own offensive. The town had to be evacuated on August 4th. On the same day Bielgorod fell.
Up to this time the Susha–Oka position to the north-east of Orel had weathered every storm. This was the defensive line that I had chosen in December 1941 for my Second Panzer Army and into which I had withdrawn that army. This had been the reason for my quarrel with Hitler which Field-Marshal von Kluge had made use of in order to bring about my dismissal.
By the failure of Citadel we had suffered a decisive defeat. The armoured formations, reformed and re-equipped with so much effort, had lost heavily both in men and in equipment and would now be unemployable for a long time to come. It was problematical whether they could be rehabilitated in time to defend the Eastern Front; as for being able to use them in defence of the Western Front against the Allied landings that threatened for next spring, this was even more questionable. Needless to say the Russians exploited their victory to the full. There were to be no more periods of quiet on the Eastern Front. From now on the enemy was in undisputed possession of the initiative.
Disagreements during the Second Half of 1943
On July 15th I had gone to France in order to inspect the armoured units located there. At the end of July I was visiting Tiger units at the troop-training area of Senne, near Paderborn, when I received a telegram from Hitler summoning me to East Prussia. During the conference there I fell sick. I had become infected with dysentry during my visit to Russia, had originally taken no notice of this and undergone no treatment and now, as a result, I was confined to a sick-bed. As soon as I was able to travel I flew back to Berlin for proper treatment; however, I had to undergo an operation in early August which kept me laid up until the end of that month.
Immediately before being operated on I was visited by General von Treskow, who had formerly been Field-Marshal von Kluge’s first operations officer. He informed me that he came on behalf of the Field-Marshal. The latter wished me to know that he was prepared to accept a reconciliation between us if I was ready to take the first step. He proposed that he and I should then work together with the object of diminishing Hitler’s powers as Supreme Commander of the Armed Force. My very exact knowledge of Field-Marshal von Kluge’s unstable character prevented me from accepting this suggestion. I was therefore bound to decline General von Treskow’s offer.1
My condition improved slowly. The heavier enemy air-raids on Berlin, which began in August 1943, did not, however, permit the rest that a convalescent requires. So my wife and I accepted an invitation of Speer’s to go to a government-controlled inn, located among the beautiful Alpine scenery of Upper Austria, which had been converted into a convalescent home. We arrived there on September 3rd and on the very next day heard that our Berlin home had been largely destroyed by a direct hit and was certainly uninhabitable. What remained of our possessions was stored in a barrack’s cellar at Wünsdorff. This was a severe blow. We were debating whether we should not migrate permanently to Upper Austria, when I received a telegram informing me that the donation which had been first mentioned in the autumn of 1942 had now been made. Schmundt had arranged this when he heard about the destruction of our home. In view of our position we had no choice but to accept the gift in the spirit in which it was made. In October 1943 I took my wife to Deipenhof, in the Hohensalza district, which was to be her home until the arrival of the Russians on January 20th, 1945.
Meanwhile during my absence an attempt had been made to stop producing Panzer IV’s and to build assault guns in their place. The Todt Organisation, which was building the Atlantic Wall and other fortifications, proposed that tank turrets be built into pill-boxes; in view of our limited production this would undoubtedly be a serious blow to our mobile tank forces and showed a complete lack of comprehension of the real situation.
Immediately I had returned from convalescent leave I tackled the problem of anti-aircraft tanks. Hitler approved the construction of twin 37 mm. guns. On the other hand he did not approve of the installation of the quadruple 20 mm. gun, which was already available, on a Panzer IV chassis, so the production of this important defensive weapon was once more postponed.
On October 20th, 1943, Hitler inspected a quantity of new equipment at the troop-training area Arys. This included wooden models of the Tiger II—which our enemies were later to ch
risten the ‘King Tiger' and which was an exceptionally successful new model—of the Vomag tank-destroyer, and of the Jagd-Panzer (‘the hunting panzer’), an iron model of the Jagd-Tiger with a 128 mm. gun, the 380 mm. armoured mortar on a Tiger chassis, together with the special Panzer III and other light and heavy armoured equipment designed to run on railway lines.
A severe bombing attack on October 22nd hit the Henschel works at Cassel and temporarily stopped all production there. It now became plain that I had been right earlier in the year when I had anticipated air attacks on our tank-producing centres in the near future. I went at once to Cassel to express my sympathy to the factory workers, most of whom had lost their homes and counted many dead and wounded among their dependants. In the great bombed assembly shed I was given the opportunity of addressing the workers; I avoided using the clichés that were current at the time and that would have been doubly unacceptable on so grave an occasion as this. What I said was warmly listened to by the workers; we understood one another. I was frequently to receive evidence of their attitude towards me through friendly messages that the workers sent me and which gave me great pleasure.
This bombing attack was followed by another on November 26th directed against the Berlin works of Alkett, Rheinmetall-Borsig, Wimag, and the Deutsche Waffen-und Munitionsfabriken.
On December 7th it was decided that the full production capacity of the old Czech 38-ton tank be switched to tank destroyers; these, to be built on the Czech tank chassis, and protected by sloping armour plate, were to mount a recoilless gun and a machine-gun with a curved barrel. They passed their tests very satisfactorily. This tank destroyer was intended to be the basic weapon for the anti-tank battalions of the infantry divisions, and was thus the belated answer to my proposals made on March the 9th.
The defensive weakness of the infantry against the ever-growing masses of Russian tanks had resulted in increased casualty figures. One evening during his briefing Hitler burst out in a long and violent diatribe against the senselessness of sending infantry divisions into action with insufficient anti-tank weapons. I happened to be present at the time. I was standing opposite Hitler while he let himself go on this subject, and doubtless he noticed the somewhat sarcastic expression on my face, for he suddenly broke off, gazed at me in silence for a moment or two, and then said: ‘ You were right. You told me all this nine months ago. Unfortunately I didn’t listen to you.’ I was now at last in a position to carry out my ideas on this score, but it was too late. Only one-third of our anti-tank companies could be equipped with the new weapon by the time the Russians launched their 1945 winter offensive.
So much for technical tank development up to the end of 1943. The operational situation had changed greatly during the second half of that year, very much to our disadvantage.
When our unfortunate Kursk offensive was broken off, the Eastern Front ran as follows: Taganrog, on the Sea of Azov—along the Donetz to a point immediately west of Voroshilovgrad—along the Donetz again to the bend in that river south of Kharkov—inclusive Bielgorod-Ssumy-Rylsk-Ssevsk-Dimitrovsk-Trossna-Mzensk (east of Orel)-Shisdra- Spas-Demiansk-Dorogobush-Velish (west of Velikie-Luki)—through Lake Ilmen—along the Volchov to the north-east of Chudova—a line running south of Schlüsselburg, Leningrad and Oranienbaum—the coast of the Gulf of Finland.
The Russians now proceeded to attack this front, first of all in the sectors of Army Groups A, South and Centre. A Russian attack towards Stalino was repulsed during the period 16th-24th July. On the other hand fifty-two rifle formations1 and ten tank corps attacked towards Kharkov and Poltava and succeeded in establishing a deep penetration of our front. A break-through was prevented, but on the 20th of August Kharkov was lost. A fresh offensive was launched on the 24th of August from the Taganrog-Voroshilovgrad line, and here the Russians did manage to break through. By the 8th of September the German line had had to be withdrawn to a line Mariupol-west of Stalino-west of Sslaviansk. By mid-September the Donetz line had been abandoned; at the end of September the Russians were outside Melitopol and Zaporozhe and had reached the line of the Dnieper all the way from the latter town to the Pripet Marshes.
The Russian counter-attack against Army Group Centre came in on July 11th. By August 5th Orel had fallen. Between August 26th and September 4th the enemy succeeded in making a deep penetration towards Konotop-Neshin and this he managed to enlarge during the next few days. By the end of September the point where the Dnieper emerges from the Pripet Marshes had been reached; from here the front ran northwards, through Gomel on the east of the Dnieper to Velish.
During the second half of October the Russians crossed the Dnieper between Dniepropetrovsk and Kremenchug. By the end of that month the German front south of Zaporozhe had collapsed and by the middle of November had been thrown back across the Dnieper. We retained two bridgeheads, a large one near Nikopol and a smaller one to the south in the Cherson area. Farther north the Russians captured Kiev between the 3rd and 13th of November and pushed on to Zhitomir.
Hitler decided to counter-attack. In accordance with his usual bad habit this attack was to be launched with inadequate forces. After discussing the matter with the Chief of the Army General Staff, I took advantage of a conference on tank questions, held on November 9th, 1943, to propose to Hitler that he give up the idea of numerous small-scale counter-attacks and that he concentrate all our panzer divisions available south of Kiev for the proposed operation through Berdichev towards Kiev. In this connection I proposed that the panzer division which was taking part in Schorner’s defence of the Nikopol bridgehead be withdrawn, together with the panzer divisions of Kleist’s army group which were holding the Dnieper in the Cherson area. I used my favourite old expression, Klotzen, nicht Kleckern (roughly: ‘boot ‘em, don’t spatter ‘em’). Hitler paid attention to what I said but did not make his arrangements accordingly. A short memorandum I composed on the subject was taken into consideration, but the reactions of the responsible commanders in the field stopped Hitler from acting on it. The Berdichev counter-offensive was launched in insufficient strength and after heavy winter fighting broke down in December. The attempt to recapture Kiev and re-establish the Dnieper line failed. On the 24th of December, 1943, the Russians went over to the attack again and threw the German front line back through Berdichev to a point outside Vinnitsa.
The operations of 25th Panzer Division are a good example of Hitler’s tactics in the attack. But before describing these I must go back somewhat in time.
After the Stalingrad disaster a number of the panzer divisions which had been there destroyed were reconstituted; for this purpose the very slender cadres that remained were employed, these being men who through sickness or wounds or for some other reason had avoided capture. After the loss of Africa I undertook a similar programme for the divisions destroyed in that theatre. The 21st Panzer Division was reformed in France with occupation troops and captured equipment. The 25th Panzer Division was set up in the same fashion in Norway. This division was commanded by General von Schell. Schell had been a colleague of mine at the Defence Ministry in 1927-30, when I was working on the problem of troop transportation by motorised vehicles. He had then been sent on detached service to America where for a long time he had studied the problems of motorisation in Henry Ford’s country, whence he returned with many stimulating ideas. Shortly before the war he became Chief of Department In 6 (k)at the General Army Office, and thus the Army’s leading adviser on motorisation. In view of Hitler’s great interest in this problem it was inevitable that the two men should see a considerable amount of one another. Schell was a clever, determined and eloquent man. He succeeded in making Hitler accept his views on simplification of types, mass production and other such matters, and as a result—an unusual occurrence in Germany—was appointed Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Transport and made responsible for the future development of the country’s transportation stock. In this capacity he soon ran up against opposition on the part of the industry—and of tho
se elements of the Party which were connected with the industry—since the industrialists were unwilling to give up their old methods of production. These people undermined Hitler’s trust in Schell, with the result that he was dropped. He was sent to Norway, a very quiet theatre where there were no laurels to be won. The energetic and indefatigable man, however, soon managed to form a useful force from the scattered occupation troops. I supported his efforts that this force be expanded into a panzer division and requested that the unit be moved to France; as a result of the Citadel disaster large-scale transfers from France to the Eastern Front had become necessary and replacements for the West were badly needed. Of course the newly formed unit had to be supplied with new equipment in place of the captured material which it was now using. Even more urgently it needed instruction in the use of this equipment and unit training. It had to be taught the lessons that others had learned on the Eastern Front; after that it might well be employed in some operation that was not beyond its initial capabilities.
But what happened? In October 1943 the division was ordered by Hitler to surrender 600 of its new vehicles to the 14th Panzer Division, another recently formed unit destined for the Eastern theatre; the reason for this was that the OKW and the OKH believed that the 25th Panzer Division would be remaining in France for a long time and could therefore make do with inferior French vehicles. The principal effect of this loss of equipment was felt by the division’s supply services, which were thereby only capable of functioning in the conditions then prevailing in the West. At this time the division’s armoured reconnaissance battalion was in the process of being re-equipped with armoured troop-carrying vehicles. The divisional engineers had received new transport. The I Battalion of Panzer-grenadier Regiment 146 had been issued with new armoured troop-carrying vehicles. Panzer Regiment 9 was not yet fully equipped. Artillery Regiment 91 had to switch from captured Polish guns to German light field howitzers and 100 mm. guns. The anti-aircraft battalion lacked one battery and the anti-tank battalion a company of assault guns. All these deficiencies were well known. They were to be made up gradually in France.
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