The Russians attacked again on December 21st and by Christmas Eve had succeeded in encircling Budapest. They reached a line Lake Balaton–Stuhlweissenburg–west of Komarno–north of the Danube to the Gran. From there the front more or less followed the line of the Hungarian frontier. The battles were fought with great ferocity by both sides. Our casualties were heavy.
In the area of Colonel-General Harpe’s Army Group North Ukraine (renamed Army Group A in September) the Russians had reached the line of the Vistula as far as Warsaw during the course of their summer offensive. Farther south there was fighting between the rivers San and Visloka. This army group consisted of First Panzer Army, under Colonel-General Heinrici, in the Carpathians, Seventeenth Army, under General Schultz, between those mountains and the Vistula, and Fourth Panzer Army, under General Balck and later under General Gräser, along the Vistula. About August 1st the Russians secured a number of bridgeheads across the Vistula, of which the most important was at Baranov, while there were smaller ones at Pulavy, Magnuszev, and a fourth point. The Russians’ advances through the mountains were of course slower and smaller. The situation at Baranov was particularly critical during the period of August 5th-9th. Here for days on end the Russians were on the point of breaking through. It was thanks to the inexhaustible energy and skill of General Balck that a major disaster was finally avoided. After launching fierce attacks that lasted for weeks on end, Balck succeeded in considerably reducing the size of the Baranov bridgehead, eliminating another minor one, and also winning back some of the ground lost at Pulavy. The Russians thereupon switched their point of main effort to the mountains. In the Sanok and Jaslo areas they managed to break into, but not through, our positions. The eastern Beskidy range could be held until events in Hungary compelled First Panzer Army to withdraw to the line Kosice–Jaslo. At the beginning of the new year the line held by this army group ran along the Slovak frontier to a point east of Kosice–west of Debica–west of Staszov–south of Opatov–the Vistula north of its junction with the San–Warsaw. Also there were the various bridgeheads mentioned above.
Sketch Map 32
The Battles in Hungary. Situation 5.10–21.12.44.
Army Group Centre consisted of Ninth Army, under General von Vormann, Second Army, under Colonel-General Weiss, Fourth Army, under General Hossbach, and Third Panzer Army, under Colonel-General Reinhardt until August 15th and then under Colonel-General Rauss. After Field-Marshal Model was transferred to the Western Front, on August 15th, Colonel-General Reinhardt was appointed to command this army group. In August the enemy had reached a point immediately before Warsaw, and from there the army group’s front line then ran Ostrov–Sudauen–the frontier of East Prussia–west of Schaulen–west of Mitau. In September the enemy advanced north–east of Warsaw as far as the Narev, establishing bridgeheads across that river in October on either side of Ostenburg. In the period October 5th-19th the Russians, as already described above, broke through the German front west of Schaulen and thus finally cut off Army Group Centre from Army Group North. On October 19th Army Group Centre withdrew its left wing on Memel, and on October 22nd evacuated the two bridgeheads it had been holding on the northern bank of the river, at Tilsit and Ragnit. During the period October 16th-26th the Russians attacked East Prussia in the area Wolfsburg–Gumbinnen–Goldap. After heavy fighting this attack was held and even, on occasion, thrown back a short distance. What happened in East Prussia was an indication to the inhabitants of the rest of Germany of their fate in the event of a Russian victory.
As already described, Army Group North had been withdrawn, during the period 14th-26th September, into a bridgehead in the Riga area, from where it was to join Army Group Centre with all speed. This intention was frustrated by the divergent views of the army group commander, Colonel-General Schörner. He kept his armoured strength around Riga and Mitau instead of moving it to the area west of Schaulen and he thus contributed to the success of the Russians’ breakthrough at Schaulen and the final severance of contact between his army group and the rest of the army. Army Group North consisted of the Sixteenth and Eighteenth Armies with an initial total strength of twenty-six divisions; even after the evacuation by sea of a portion of this force, there were still sixteen divisions with the army group, all urgently needed for the defence of Germany. After the evacuation of Riga during the period October 7th-16th, the army group’s front remained almost static until the end of the year, running from the coast south of Libau–Prekuln–south of Frauenburg–east of Tuckum–the coast of the Gulf of Riga.
In general the long front from the Carpathians to the Baltic was relatively quiet so that the building of fortifications and the withdrawal of panzer and panzergrenadier divisions to form a mobile reserve was successfully carried out. All the same, twelve weak divisions could provide only a very inadequate reserve for such an enormous front, approximately 725 miles long, and against such vast superiority of strength as the Russians now possessed.
The fortifications built on the Eastern Front had meanwhile made our line, long and far too thin as it was, yet sufficiently strong for quiet periods. We did our best to make use of the experience we had gained during the recent battles, but in so doing came up against Hitler’s opposition. One essential requirement at the front was that the ordinary main line of defence (Hauptkampflinie)—to be defended on normal occasions—must be separated from the major line of defence (Grosskampflinie), which was intended to be held in the event of the Russians launching a large-scale attack against any one sector. The officers at the front wished to build this major defensive line some 12 miles behind the main line of defence, to camouflage it carefully and to install a holding garrison inside it. They further wanted a standing authority to withdraw the bulk of their forces into this major defensive line as soon as the Russian artillery preparation that heralded a forthcoming attack should begin, leaving only rearguards in the old main line of defence; the Russian’s barrage would thus be wasted, his assault, so laboriously prepared, would be fruitless and by the time he came up against our well-prepared defensive positions he could in consequence be repulsed. There can be no doubt that this theory was absolutely correct. I approved it and submitted it to Hitler. He lost his temper, saying that he refused to accept the sacrifice of 12 miles without a fight and ordered that the major defensive line be built from 1 to 2 miles behind the main line of defence. He was basing his ideas on the conditions prevailing in the First World War when he gave those nonsensical orders, and no arguments could bring him to see reason. This mistake of his was to cost us dear when the Russians broke through in January of 1945 and our reserves—again on a direct order of Hitler’s and against my judgment—were once again too close to the front. Main line of defence, major defensive positions, reserves, all were buried beneath the tidal wave of the initial Russian breakthrough and lost to us. Hitler’s rage was turned against the men who had built the defences and—since I stood up to him—against me. He ordered that the minutes of the conferences held in the autumn of 1944 on the subject of a major defensive line be sent for, maintaining now that he had always wanted a 12-mile gap. ‘Who was the half-wit who gave such idiotic orders?’ I pointed out to him that it was he himself who had done so. The minutes were brought and read aloud. After a few sentences Hitler broke off the reading. He was convinced at last. Unfortunately it was by then too late, for the Russian break-through was an accomplished fact.
I shall have occasion to refer again to Hitler’s tactics when describing the great Russian offensive. Since he continued to believe that he was the only real front-line soldier at Supreme Headquarters—and indeed so far as the majority of his military advisers were concerned he did know far more about active service than they—and since the grotesque flattery of his Party comrades, led by Ribbentrop and Goering, had given him the illusion that he was a great military leader, he absolutely refused to learn from others. ‘There’s no need for you to try to teach me. I’ve been commanding the German Army in the field for five years and during
that time I’ve had more practical experience than any gentlemen of the General Staff could ever hope to have. I’ve studied Clausewitz and Moltke and read all the Schlieffen papers. I'm more in the picture than you are!’ That was one of the many reprimands that I was vouchsafed when attempting to give him a slightly clearer idea of the requirements of the time.
Apart from our own troubles we were also most anxious about the fighting ability and the loyalty of our Hungarian allies. I have already mentioned the attitude which the Regent, Horthy, had assumed towards Hitler. Understandable as this attitude may be from the Hungarian point of view, for the Germans it seemed unreliable. The Head of the Hungarian State was hoping for a rapprochement with the Anglo-Saxon powers. He wished to establish contact with them by air. Whether he did in fact attempt to do so, and whether the Western Powers were agreeable to his propositions, I do not know.1 But I do know that a number of senior Hungarian officers were deserting to the common enemy, among them, on October 15th, General Miklos whose acquaintance I had made when he was military attaché in Berlin, and the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, Vörös, who had recently visited me in East Prussia, had assured me of his loyalty to the alliance, and had accepted a motor-car as a present from me. In this car, my own Mercedes, he drove off a few days later to the Russians. No reliance could be placed on the Hungarians any more. Hitler therefore overthrew Horthy’s government and put Salaszy in his place; this latter was a Hungarian Fascist of little ability and less tact. This happened on October 16th, 1944. Conditions in Hungary were in no wise improved as a result, and what remained of mutual trust and sympathy was destroyed.
In Slovakia, which had originally been entirely on the German side, partisans had now been very active for a long time. Travel by railway became increasingly perilous. Through trains were compelled to stop, the passengers searched and German soldiers, and particularly German officers, murdered. This led to severe counter-measures. Hatred and murder stalked the country, as was to be more and more the case in other lands. The Great Powers had deliberately called out the partisans, who fought without regard for international law; this led inevitably to defensive counter-measures being taken; the prosecutors and judges at Nuremberg later said that these defensive counter-measures were contrary to international law and criminal, despite the fact that when the Allies entered Germany they drew up a far harsher penal code than ever did the Germans in occupied territories. That a disarmed and exhausted Germany did not give them occasion to pass sentences according to that code is beside the point.
In order to complete the picture it is necessary to glance at the situation in Italy. On July 4th, 1944, the Allies had entered Rome. The Commander-in-Chief South, Field-Marshal Kesselring, was holding a line in the Apennines to the north of the eternal city, and his army group was fighting fiercely against superior enemy forces. More than twenty divisions were tied down in these defensive battles. The Italians who had remained true to Mussolini were of little assistance owing to their limited combat ability and could only be used on the Riviera. Behind the German front there was bitter partisan fighting, begun with Italian cruelty, that compelled energetic counter-measures if the effort of supplying the army group was not to be totally abandoned. The military tribunals of the victor nations who later judged the events that there took place did not assume the cloak of impartial justice, but preferred to act simply according to their own prejudices.
The Ardennes Offensive
Early in December Hitler moved his headquarters from East Prussia to Ziegenberg, near Giessen, so that he might be closer to the Western Front where the crucial and final German attack was now about to be delivered.
The entire strength of the German Army that could be collected together during the last few months was to attack from the Eifel towards the Meuse south of Liége, with the object of breaking through the relatively thinly held Allied front in this sector; this force was then to cross the Meuse towards Brussels and Antwerp, thus achieving a strategic break-through; the enemy forces to the north of the breakthrough were finally to be encircled and destroyed. Hitler believed that such an operation—if successful—would severely weaken the Western Allies and would give him time to move strong forces eastward so that he would be in a position to defeat the anticipated Russian winter offensive. He thus expected to gain time, to shatter the enemy’s hopes of total victory, so that he would drop his insistence on unconditional surrender, and to make him willing to accept a negotiated peace.
The weather and delays in making ready the new formations forced him repeatedly to postpone the date of the attack, originally intended for mid-November. It was eventually launched on December 16th.
Two panzer armies had been formed for this attack, Fifth Panzer Army, under General von Manteuffel, and Sixth Panzer Army, under the SS Colonel-General (Oberstgruppenführer)Sepp Dietrich. The point of main effort was to be on the right wing, in Sixth Panzer Army’s sector, which contained the best-equipped units of the Waffen-SS. Fifth Panzer Army was in the centre. General Brandenberger’s Seventh Army was responsible for protecting the left flank of the two attacking armies; but this army lacked the mobile strength necessary for carrying out its difficult assignment.
Both the Commander-in-Chief West, Field-Marshal von Rundstedt, and the commander of Army Group B, Field-Marshal Model, had proposed that the attack be made with a limited objective, since they did not regard the forces available as sufficiently strong to achieve the long-range operational results envisaged in the Hitler plan. They wished the attack to be limited to the area east of the Meuse with the purpose of defeating the enemy forces located along the east bank between Aachen and Liége. But Hitler turned down this proposal and insisted on his more grandiose plan.
The attack therefore began on December 16th and General von Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army immediately succeeded in making a deep penetration of the enemy’s positions. The foremost armoured units of this army, the 116th and 2nd Panzer Divisions, reached points very close to the Meuse. Elements of the 2nd Panzer Division actually reached the river bank. Sixth Panzer Army was less successful. Heavy congestion on the narrow, ice-bound roads, belated switching of the rearward, blocked units to Fifth Panzer Army’s sector, and insufficiently rapid exploitation of initial success caused this army to loose mobility, that prime requisite for all large-scale operations. Since Seventh Army also ran into difficulties, parts of Manteuffel’s armour had soon to be moved south to strengthen the threatened left flank. From that point on a break-through in the grand manner was no longer possible. Even by December 22nd it was plain that a less ambitious objective would have to be chosen. A sensible commander would on this day have remembered the looming dangers on the Eastern Front which could only be countered by a timely breaking-off of the operation in the West that was already, from the long view, a failure. However, not only Hitler, but also the OKW and particularly the Armed Forces Command Staff could, during these fateful days, think of nothing save their own Western Front. The whole tragedy of our military leadership was revealed once again towards the end of the war in this unsuccessful Ardennes Offensive.
On December 24th it was plain to any perceptive soldier that the offensive had finally broken down. It was necessary immediately to change direction and to face east once again before it was too late.
Defensive Preparations in the East
From my headquarters, now moved to the Maybach camp near Zossen, I observed with a heavy heart the progress of our offensive in the West. For the sake of my country I had hoped that it would lead to a complete victory. But since, on December 23rd, it was clear that it could no longer result in a great success, I decided to drive to Supreme Headquarters and to request that the battle, which was causing us heavy casualties, be broken off and that all forces that could be spared be immediately transferred to the Eastern Front.
Intelligence of the imminent Russian offensive had meanwhile increased. The assembly areas of the major enemy forces were confirmed. Three main attacking groups had been identi
fied:
1. In the Baranov bridgehead a Russian force consisting of 60 rifle formations, 8 tank corps, 1 cavalry corps and 6 other tank formations was ready to attack.
2. To the north of Warsaw 54 rifle formations, 6 tank corps, 1 cavalry corps and 9 other tank formations were assembled.
3. On the East Prussian border there was a force of 54 rifle formations, 2 tank corps and 9 other tank formations.
Apart from these the following forces had been identified:
Fifteen rifle and 2 tank formations south of Jaslo,
Eleven rifle formations, 1 cavalry corps and 1 tank corps in the Pulavy area,
Thirty-one rifle formations, 5 tank corps and 3 other tank units south of Warsaw.
Panzer Leader Page 48
