On February 6th fighting began inside the town of Posen. Near Küstrin the Russians won a bridgehead over the Oder. On February 8th their attacks at Pyritz and Arnswalde were repulsed but the battles in those areas continued for several days.
From February 10th the enemy began to attack west of the Vistula in the Schwetz and Graudenz areas. On February 12th Elbing was lost.
The Allies continued to attack the German oil plants as well as numerous towns. Berlin in particular now experienced the full fury of the air raids.
On February 13th we lost Schwetz on the Vistula, a great deal of territory in Pomerania and—on our extreme right wing in Hungary—the castle at Budapest. On February 15th Konitz, Schneidemühl and Tuchel fell, on the 16th Grünberg, Sommerfeld and Sorau. Breslau was encircled. On the 18th the same happened to Graudenz. On February 21st Dirschau fell.
On the other hand between February 17th and 22nd Army Group South managed to eliminate a Russian bridgehead across the Gran. This success was due to the intelligent leadership of the army group commander, General Wöhler, of whom Hitler remarked at the conference when his plan of attack was discussed: ‘Wöhler is no National-Socialist, it’s true, but at least he’s a man!’
On February 24th we lost Posen and Arnswalde, on the 28th Schlochau, Hammerstein, Bublitz, and Baldenburg in Outer Pomerania, on the 1st of March Neustettin.
Finland declared war on Germany on the 3rd of March.
On this day German troops attacked in the area of Lauban, in Silesia, in order to recapture the sole rail-link east of the Riesengebirge between Berlin and Silesia. The attack was successful until March 8th but had only local significance.
On March 4th the Russians reached the Baltic between Köslin and Kolberg. All Outer Pomerania was now lost to us.
The behaviour of the Russians in the occupied German provinces was indescribably atrocious. I myself saw fleeing columns of refugees. Numerous accounts by eye-witnesses reached the OKH as well as the Propaganda Ministry. State-Secretary Naumann, of the Propaganda Ministry, asked me on behalf of Dr. Goebbels if I would address both the domestic and the foreign Press and protest against the atrocities that the Russians were committing. I agreed to do so on March 6th, since I wished at least to try to ameliorate the sufferings of the German people by means of an appeal to the chivalry of our adversaries. In the course of this appeal I referred to the Anglo-American air terror. I regret to say that this desperate plea of mine was without success. Humanity and chivalry had both disappeared during those months. The war of revenge pursued its unutterably ferocious course, and when ten days later Naumann asked me to speak on the wireless I declined to make a second futile appeal. I could no longer offer my poor nation any hope.
On this 6th of March the Western Allies penetrated deep into the centre of Cologne. In the East the Russians were pressing on to Stettin.
On March 7th the Western Powers broke through the German front towards Koblenz. In the East Graudenz fell. The Russians continued irresistibly to occupy Pomerania.
On March 8th the enemy in the West succeeded in capturing the bridge over the Rhine at Remagen intact. The destruction of this vital crossing-place was impossible owing to a lack of explosives. Hitler raved and demanded victims. Five officers were summarily executed.
On March 9th the Russians reached the eastern bank of the Oder on either side of Stettin. We managed to retain a bridgehead on that bank.
In Hungary our attack was launched at last and achieved initial success. But spring had begun down there and the ground was soft in consequence, which made it difficult for our tanks to advance. No great results could therefore be anticipated for the offensive. North of Lake Balaton a certain amount of territory was recaptured, but south of that lake the attack soon bogged down.
On March 12th there was street fighting inside Breslau.
The air war went on with undiminished fury. Berlin was bombed for the twentieth successive night.
On March 13th the Russians fought their way into Küstriner Neustadt. They reached the Gulf of Danzig and Putzig. Our own attack in Hungary made progress. But in view of the catastrophic development of the situation as a whole this limited success was quite unimportant.
Finally all prospect of a decisive success failed here too. Up to this time the morale of the SS divisions had been good but now it cracked. The panzer troops continued to fight bravely but whole SS units, taking advantage of the cover thus offered, proceeded to retreat against orders. There could be no more reliance placed on such divisions. When Hitler heard of this he almost went out of his mind. He flew into a towering rage and ordered that the divisions—which included his own bodyguard, the Leibstandarte—have their armbands taken away from them. He wanted to send me to Hungary to see that this order was carried out. I refused to do so, pointing out that the National Leader of the SS, who was present at the time, was the direct commander of the Waffen-SS and was also responsible for its discipline; I therefore proposed that he be entrusted with this assignment and that he go to Hungary to ensure that justice be done. Up to now Himmler had always refused to allow the Army any influence on his SS units; he now tried to change this policy, but it did him no good, since I had far more important matters to attend to. This mission of his to Hungary did not win him much affection from his Waffen-SS.
During this period of acute anxiety the leader of the Party’s national organisation (Reichsorganisationsleiter), Dr. Ley, appeared one night at Hitler’s headquarters with a new proposal. He suggested that a volunteer corps be formed from the National Socialist Party officials who no longer had any employment in Western Germany. ‘I can promise you at least forty thousand fanatical fighters, my Führer. They can hold the Upper Rhine and the passes through the Black Forest. You can rely on that. Approve, my Führer, that this élite corps of volunteers be given the proud title of the Freikorps Adolf Hitler. The chief of the General Staff must hand over eighty thousand sub-machine-guns at once.’ I was somewhat less enthusiastic than Dr. Ley about the value of this new formation and proposed to him that he first of all submit to me the actual figures for the number of volunteers enrolled, after which I should see to it that they were all armed. I never heard another word from him about it. Hitler had remained silent throughout. He probably no longer had much confidence in his organisation leader.
Breslau, Glogau, Kolberg, Danzig and Koenigsberg continued to hold out. A heavy battle was raging outside Stettin. Hitler now sent for Colonel-General Rauss, the commander of the Third Panzer Army, in order to find out from him what the position was and what was the combat ability of his army. Rauss began by outlining the general situation. Hitler interrupted him: ‘I’m already in the picture so far as the general situation goes. What I want from you is a detailed exposition of the combat ability of your divisions.’ Rauss now gave him an exact description which showed that he knew every yard of his front and was capable of judging the value of every unit under his command. I was present while he spoke and found his exposition outstandingly lucid. When he had finished Hitler dismissed him without comment. Rauss had scarcely left the Chancellery shelter, where this conference had taken place, before Hitler turned to Keitel, Jodl and myself and shouted: ‘What a miserable speech! The man talked of nothing but details. Judging by the way he speaks he must be a Berliner or an East Prussian. He must be relieved of his appointment at once!’ I replied: ‘Colonel-General Rauss is one of our most capable panzer generals. You, my Führer, interrupted him yourself when he was trying to tell you about the general situation and you ordered him to give you a detailed exposition of the state of his divisions. And as for his origin, Rauss is an Austrian and therefore a compatriot of yours, my Führer.’
HITLER: ‘Absolutely impossible. He can’t be an Austrian.’
JODL: ‘Oh yes he can, my Führer. He talks exactly like Moser, the actor.’
I: ‘Please let me urge you, before you make any decisions, to remember that Colonel-General Rauss showed an exact knowledge of all his front, that he was able
to give a personal evaluation of every division under his command, that throughout a long war he has consistently fought with great distinction, and that finally—as I already said—he is one of our best panzer generals.’
Hitler’s opinion of him remained unfavourable. When I pointed out that we had no surfeit of good generals my remark was ignored. Rauss was relieved of his command. I walked out of the room in a rage and went to see Rauss in order to prepare him for the injustice that he was about to suffer at the hands of his compatriot, Hitler, and which I was incapable of preventing. Rauss was replaced by General von Manteuffel whom the failure of the Ardennes Offensive and the transfer of numerous panzer units away from the West to the East had now made available for fresh employment.
Meanwhile the Foreign Ministry had apparently decided—though too late—to open negotiations with the Western Allies through the intermediary of a neutral power. A certain Dr. Hesse, whom Ribbentrop trusted, appeared in Stockholm but had no success. Nevertheless the rumours concerning this mission brought me into contact with my adviser on foreign policy, Dr. Barandon, once again. We decided that I should go to see the National Leader of the SS, Himmler, and should propose to him that he use such international channels as were available to him—in particular the Red Cross and similar organisations—in an attempt to bring the increasingly senseless slaughter to an end.
After the disappearance from the scene of General Wenck, Himmler had proved a complete failure so far as the offensive in the Arnswalde area went. Conditions at his headquarters grew steadily more chaotic. I received no reports from his sector of the front and never had the impression that orders issued by the OKH were being carried out there. I therefore drove, in mid-March, to his headquarters near Prenzlau in order to find out what the situation was. Himmler’s chief of staff, Lammerding, greeted me at the entrance with the words: ‘Can’t you rid us of our commander?’ I told Lammerding that this was purely a matter for the SS. When I asked for the National Leader I was told that he was suffering from influenza and was being treated by his personal physician, Professor Gebhardt, in the Hohenlychen sanatorium. I immediately drove there, where I found Himmler in apparently robust health, and decided that I, at least, would never have permitted a slight cold in the head to take me away from my troops when they were involved in so critical a situation. I then pointed out to this SS potentate that he held, on his own, a whole series of the highest appointments in the state: he was National Leader of the SS, Chief of the German Police, Minister of the Interior, Commander-in-Chief of the Training Army, and finally he commanded Army Group Vistula. Each of these posts required the full-time activity of one man, or at least such had been the case during the early stages of the war; and no matter what respect I might have for his ability, such a plethora of offices was bound to be beyond the strength of any one individual. Meanwhile he must have realised by now that a command of troops at the front is no easy matter. I therefore proposed to him that he give up his command of the army group and concentrate on his other offices.
Himmler was no longer so self-confident as in the old days. He hesitated: ‘I can’t go and say that to the Führer. He wouldn’t approve of my making such a suggestion.’ I saw my chance and took it: ‘Then will you authorise me to say it for you?’ Himmler now had to agree. That same evening I proposed to Hitler that the overburdened Himmler be relieved of his command of Army Group Vistula and that in his stead Colonel-General Heinrici, at present in charge of First Panzer Army in the Carpathians, be appointed to succeed him. Hitler disliked the idea, but after a certain amount of grumbling finally agreed. Heinrici was appointed on March 20th.
What could have induced a civilian like Himmler to insist on holding a military command? That he was totally ignorant of military matters was a fact of which he, and indeed all of us, Hitler included, were well aware. So why did he do it? Apparently one of his motives was his measureless ambition. Above all he wanted to win a Knight’s Cross. Then too, like Hitler, he completely underestimated the qualities that are necessary for a man to be a successful commander of troops. On the very first occasion when he had to undertake a task before the eyes of all the world—one that could not be carried out by means of backstairs intrigue and fishing in troubled waters—the man inevitably proved a failure. It was complete irresponsibility on his part to wish to hold such an appointment; it was equally irresponsible of Hitler to entrust him with it.
At this time Speer, whose attitude towards the course of events was becoming one of increasing scepticism, came to see me. He brought me the information that Hitler intended to arrange for the destruction of all factories, water and electrical installations, railways and bridges before they should fall into enemy hands. Speer rightly pointed out that such a crazy deed must result in mass misery and death to the population of Germany on a scale never before seen in history. He asked for my help in ensuring that no such order be carried out. I readily agreed to give it him and I immediately set to work drafting an order in which I laid down the defensive lines that were to be held throughout Germany and specifically ordered that only immediately in front of these few lines might demolitions be carried out. Nothing else whatever in Germany was to be destroyed. All installations that served to feed the populace and to provide it with work were to remain untouched. On the next day I took my draft to Jodl, who had to be informed of its contents since it dealt with a matter which concerned all parts of the Armed Forces. Jodl submitted my draft to Hitler, but unfortunately not when I was present. When I saw him again on the following day, and asked him what Hitler’s reaction had been, he gave me an order of Hitler’s to read which was the exact contrary of Speer’s and my intentions.
In order to give an example of Speer’s forthright manner of speech, I should like to quote an extract from a memorandum which he submitted to Hitler on March 18th, 1945, when he and I were trying to prevent the destruction of bridges and factories:
It must be established that, in the event of the battles moving further into German territory, nobody is entitled to destroy industrial installations, mining installations, electrical and other utility works, communication facilities, or inland waterways. A destruction of bridges on the scale at present envisaged would do more damage to our communications network than all the air raids of the past years. Their destruction implies the elimination of all chance of survival for the German people….
We have no right, at this stage of the war, to order demolitions which would affect the future existence of the German people. If the enemy has decided to destroy this nation, which has fought with unparalleled bravery, then the enemy must bear the guilt before history for such a deed. It is our duty to leave the German nation all possible facilities which will enable that nation to re-arise at some time in the distant future.1
Hitler’s reaction to this memorandum of Speer’s, with the conclusions of which I too had identified myself, culminated in these words:
If the war should be lost, then the nation, too, will be lost. That would be the nation’s unalterable fate. There is no need to consider the basic requirements that a people needs in order to continue to live a primitive life. On the contrary, it is better ourselves to destroy such things, for this nation will have proved itself the weaker and the future will belong exclusively to the stronger Eastern nation. Those who remain alive after the battles are over are in any case only inferior persons, since the best have fallen.2
He frequently produced shocking remarks of this sort. I have myself heard him talk in this way, and I replied to him that the German nation would live on: that, according to the laws of nature, it would live on even if the contemplated destructions were carried out: and that such destruction would simply burden that nation with new and avoidable miseries if his intentions were carried out.
Despite all this the order for destruction was issued on March 19th and this was followed, on March 23rd, by instructions from Bormann for its implementation. The demolitions were to be the responsibility of the Gauleiters in their capacity
as commissars for the defence of the Reich. The armed forces had refused to undertake this duty. Bormann had ordered that the populace of the threatened territories be transported to the interior of Germany or, if this proved impossible, be made to march there on foot. The carrying out of this order would have resulted in a catastrophe on a gigantic scale, since no measures to ensure a food supply were taken.
The military authorities therefore combined with Speer to frustrate the implementation of this insane order. Buhle prevented the issue of explosives so that the demolitions could not be carried out. Speer visited one command post after another explaining what the consequences must be if the order were obeyed. We could not prevent all destruction, but we succeeded in considerably reducing the amount that was carried out.
12. THE FINAL COLLAPSE
On March 15th the headquarters of the OKH was heavily attacked from the air. The raid lasted for forty-five minutes and the whole bomb load of an air fleet—enough high explosive to pulverise a large town—was unloaded on our little camp. We were undoubtedly a military objective and we could therefore hardly object at the enemy’s attempt to eliminate us. When the air-raid siren sounded at about noon I was working, as usual, in my office. My wife, it will be recalled, was a refugee from the Warthegau and since she had nowhere else to go Hitler had permitted her to stay with me. She was watching the noncommissioned officer who was engaged in tracing the bombers’ path on the map, and she noticed that when the planes reached Brandenburg they did not, as was customary, continue to Berlin, but turned directly towards Zossen. She had the presence of mind to inform me of this immediately. I at once ordered all departments to repair to the air-raid shelters and had just reached the one assigned to myself when the first bombs began to fall. As a result of this last-minute warning our casualties were happily light. Only the Operations Department had failed to take my advice. In consequence General Krebs and a number of his colleagues were more or less seriously wounded. Krebs had received a blow on the temple; when I went to see him a few minutes after the explosions were over he collapsed unconscious before my eyes. He had to go to hospital and was not able to return to work for several days.
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