Grey's hopefulness, passed along to Berlin, pleased the Wilhelmstrasse. On July 12, the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin telegraphed Vienna: "The German Government believes that it has proof that England would not take part in a war caused by disturbances in the Balkans even if Russia and France were involved in it… England certainly would not expose itself to danger for Serbia or even Russia's sake." Grey made plain to Lichnowsky as well as to the Russians that there were limits to what Britain could approve in Austria's punishment of Serbia. Surely, the Foreign Secretary urged, Vienna did not think of annexing any Serbian territory. Jagow understood and on July 18 telegraphed, "England will not prevent Austria from calling Serbia to account; it is only the destruction of the nation that she would not permit."
Everything depended on the terms of the Austrian note. At two p.m. on July 24, Count von Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador in London, handed a copy to Grey. Grey characterized it as "brusque, sudden, and peremptory"; later he amplified this to "the most formidable document that has ever been addressed from one state to another." He took the document with him to that day's Cabinet meeting and, when discussion of Ireland was concluded, informed his colleagues. Returning to the Foreign Office, Grey's first reaction was to ask for an extension of the forty-eight-hour time limit (already down to thirty-one hours by the time the Foreign Secretary received the ultimatum). Coincidentally, in St. Petersburg, Sazonov had had the same reaction and had made the same request. Austria rejected both appeals. Grey then urged the Serbs to be conciliatory and to "give [to Austria] a favorable reply on as many points as possible within the time limit." The Foreign Secretary also proposed a reconvening of the Six Power Conference of London, which had successfully mediated the Balkan upheavals in 1912-1913. The same ambassadors were still in London-Lichnowsky of Germany, Mensdorff of Austria, Imperiale of Italy, Cambon of France, and Benckendorff of Russia-and could be brought together on a few hours' notice. All were personal friends. "If our respective governments would only use us and trust us and give us the chance," Grey wrote, "we could keep the peace of Europe… an honourable peace, no vaunting on one side and humiliation on another."
The key to Grey's proposal lay with Germany: if Berlin agreed to mediation, Vienna would have to accept. Accordingly, Grey sounded Lichnowsky first. The Foreign Secretary assumed that the Germans were anxious to calm the Balkan turbulence and prevent war. Grey's assumption seemed to have been sustained on the morning of July 25, when the German Ambassador read him a telegram from the Wilhelmstrasse confirming that Germany had had no previous knowledge of the text of the Austrian ultimatum. Lichnowsky, deliberately left ignorant by Berlin, responded wholeheartedly to Grey's conference proposal. "I see in it the only possibility of avoiding a world war," he telegraphed to Jagow on the afternoon of the twenty-fifth. "Grey will not bestir himself again… Once more, I urgently advise the acceptance of the English proposal."
Hoping for a favorable response from Berlin, Grey delayed sending the proposal to other governments. July 25 was a Saturday and in the early afternoon the Foreign Secretary left London for his fishing cottage in Hampshire. The text of the proposal telegram was left in Sir Arthur Nicolson's hands. At three p.m. Sunday, July 26, the Permanent Under Secretary decided to send out the proposal and to summon the Foreign Secretary back to London. Telegrams over Grey's signature went immediately to the foreign ministers in Paris, Rome, and Berlin. "Ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs if he would be disposed to instruct ambassador here to join with the representatives [of the other invited Powers] and myself to meet in a conference to be held here." If so, "active military operations should be suspended pending results of the conference."
Lichnowsky, supporting Grey's initiative, dispatched three telegrams to Jagow within six hours on the twenty-seventh. His language exhibits frustration and growing panic: "Sir E. Grey had me call on him just now… [He had just read] the Serbian reply to the Austrian note. It appeared to him that Serbia had agreed to the Austrian demands to an extent such as he would never have believed possible… Should Austria fail to be satisfied with this reply… it would then be absolutely evident that Austria was only seeking an excuse for crushing Serbia… I found the Minister [Grey] irritated for the first time. He spoke with great seriousness and seemed absolutely to expect that we should successfully make use of our influence to settle the matter… Everybody here is convinced… that the key to the situation is to be found in Berlin and that, if peace is seriously desired there, Austria can be restrained from prosecuting-as Sir E. Grey expressed it-a foolhardy policy." And later: "Our entire future relations with England depend on the success of this move by Sir Edward Grey. Should the Minister succeed… I will guarantee that our relations with England will remain… intimate and confidential… Should Austria's intention of using the present opportunity to overthrow Serbia… become more and more apparent, England, I am certain, would place herself unconditionally by the side of France and Russia… If it comes to war under these circumstances, we shall have England against us."
Berlin was unmoved; three weeks of effort by the Reich government had gone into preventing other Powers from interfering by mediation. Jagow felt obliged to forward Grey's proposal to Vienna, but he prefaced the English note with his own disclaimer: the German government declared "in the most decided way that it does not identify itself with these propositions; that, on the contrary, it advises [Austria] to disregard them, but that it must pass them on to satisfy the English Government." In Berlin, Jagow told Sir Edward Goschen that the proposed conference "would practically amount to a court of arbitration" and could not be considered without Austrian approval. In London, Lichnowsky was instructed to give Sir Edward Grey the same explanation.
On Monday morning, July 27, news of Serbia's submission to the Austrian ultimatum reached London. To Venetia Stanley, Asquith described his reaction: "Serbia has capitulated on the main point, but it is very doubtful if any reservation will be accepted by Austria which is resolved upon a complete and final humiliation. The curious thing is that on many if not most points Austria has a good and Serbia a very bad case, but the Austrians are quite the stupidest people in Europe… It is the most dangerous situation of the last forty years." When the Cabinet met at eleven a.m., Grey reported that Count von Mensdorff had told him that Vienna regarded the Serbian reply as inadequate. He described the Six Power Conference proposal, announcing that France and Italy had accepted immediately; the German reply had not yet arrived. The question of Britain's obligation to maintain Belgian neutrality was raised and the Cabinet agreed to discuss the matter in detail at a subsequent meeting. The First Sea Lord's order not to disperse to the Fleet concentrated at Portland was approved.
When, on Tuesday, July 28, news arrived that Austria had declared war on Serbia, Haldane gave up hope. "The German General Staff is in the saddle," he said. That afternoon, Grey told the House of Commons: "It must be obvious to any person who reflects upon the situation that from the moment the dispute ceases to be one between Austria-Hungary and Serbia and becomes one in which another Great Power is involved, it cannot but end in the greatest catastrophe that has ever befallen the Continent of Europe at one blow. No one can say what would be the limits of the issues that might be raised by such a conflict; the consequences of it, direct and indirect, would be incalculable." Asquith was pessimistic. That night, he and Margot entertained the Churchills and Benckendorffs at dinner. After his guests left, the Prime Minister walked to the Foreign Office, where he found Grey and Haldane. Until one a.m., the three men talked. Asquith's opinion was that "nothing but a miracle could avert war, but still not a British war."
Beginning on Wednesday, July 29, the Cabinet met daily, sometimes twice a day. After the Wednesday meeting, a telegram was sent to all naval, military, and colonial stations warning that war was possible. Grey was instructed to inform the German and French ambassadors that "at this stage we were unable to pledge ourselves in advance, either under all conditions to stand aside, or in any conditions to join
in." The Cabinet concluded that a decision regarding a violation of Belgian neutrality, if and when it was made, "will be one of policy rather than of legal obligation."
Disappointed by Berlin's rejection of a Six Power Conference, Grey still had not given up hope of working with Germany. On the afternoon of the twenty-ninth, the Foreign Secretary called in Lichnowsky and said that, if the Wilhelmstrasse would not accept Britain's lead in mediation, Britain would accept a German lead, following any approach Berlin thought feasible. Grey reiterated his belief that Austria had a legitimate grievance against the Serbs and even suggested that Austria might occupy Belgrade to assure compliance with her conditions. Grey believed that an Austro-Serbian war must inevitably escalate into an Austro-Russian war, but even that, he told the Ambassador, would not necessarily concern Great Britain. So long as the conflict was confined to Austria and Russia, England could stand aside, but once Germany and France became involved, the vital interests of England were threatened. Any threat to France's role as a Great Power would bring any English government, Liberal or Conservative, into the war.
Lichnowsky hurriedly sent Grey's remarks off to Berlin. The Ambassador's telegram came to the Kaiser. William's marginalia on this dispatch were remarkable:
That sets me out of the running.
Sir E. Grey just sent for me again. The Minister was entirely calm, but very grave, and received me with the words that the situation was continuing to grow more acute.
The worst and most scandalous piece of English Pharisaism that I ever saw! I will never enter into a naval convention with such scoundrels.
Sazonov had stated that after the declaration of war he will no longer be in a position to negotiate with Austria direct,
In spite of the Czar's appeal to me!
and had requested them here [in London]
to take up the mediation efforts again.
That sets me out of the running
Sir E. Grey repeated his suggestion already reported, that we take part in a mediation a quatre, such as we had already accepted in principle. It would seem to him to be a suitable basis for mediation, if Austria, after occupying Belgrade,
Good. We have been trying to accomplish this for days, in vain!
for example, or other places, should announce her conditions. Should Your Excellency [the dispatch was addressed to Jagow], however, undertake mediation, a prospect I was able early this morning to put before him, this would of course suit him equally well. But mediation seemed now to him to be urgently necessary, if a European catastrophe were not to result.
Instead of mediation, a serious word to St. Petersburg and Paris, to the effect that England would not help them, would quiet the situation at home.
Sir E. Grey then said to me that he had a friendly and private communication to make to me, namely, that he did not want our warm personal relations and the intimacy of our talks on all political matters to lead me astray, and he would like to spare himself later the reproach (of) bad faith.
Aha! The common cheat!
The British Government desired now as before to cultivate our previous friendship, and it could stand aside for as long as the conflict remained confined to Austria and Russia.
This means, we are to leave Austria in the lurch. Mean and Mephistophelian!
Thoroughly English, however.
But if we and France should be involved, then the situation would immediately be altered, and the British Government would, under the circumstances, find itself forced to make up its mind quickly. In that event it would not be
Already made up.
practicable to stand aside and wait for any length of time. "If war breaks out,
This means they will attack us.
it will be the greatest catastrophe that the world has ever seen." It was far from his desire to express any kind of threat; he only wanted to protect me from disappointments and himself from the reproach of bad faith, and had therefore chosen the form of a private explanation.
An absolute failure.
He has shown bad faith all these years just the same, down to the latest speech.
Sir E. Grey added also, that the Government of course had to reckon with public opinion.
We too
Up to the present it had in general been in favour of Austria,
Newly created! If it wants to, it can turn and direct public opinion, as the press obeys it unconditionally.
as the justice of a certain satisfaction due her was recognised; but now it was beginning to turn completely to the other side, as a result of Austrian stubbornness.
With the aid of the jingo press
Sir E. Grey said that he believed, if mediation were accepted, that he should be able to secure for Austria every possible satisfaction; there was no longer any question of a humiliating retreat for Austria, as the Serbs would in any case be punished and compelled, with the consent of Russia, to subordinate themselves to Austria's wishes. Thus Austria could obtain guaranties for the future without a war that would jeopardise the peace of Europe.
Once he had finished scribbling in the margins, William took more space and let his feelings flow:
"England reveals herself in her true colours at a moment when she thinks that we are caught in the toils and, so to speak, disposed of! That mean crew of shopkeepers has tried to trick us with dinners and speeches. The boldest deception, the words of the King to Henry for me: 'We shall remain neutral and try to keep out of this as long as possible.' Grey proves the King a liar, and his words to Lichnowsky are the outcome of a guilty conscience, because he feels that he has deceived us. At that, it is as a matter of fact a threat combined with a bluff, in order to separate us from Austria and to prevent us from mobilising, and to shift the responsibility for the war. He knows perfectly well that, if he were to say one single, serious, sharp and warning word at Paris and St Petersburg, and were to warn them to remain neutral, that [sic] both would become quiet at once. But he takes care not to speak the word, and threatens us instead! Common cur! England alone bears the responsibility for peace and war, not we any longer! That must be made clear to the world."
Bethmann-Hollweg had a different reaction to Grey's warning that Britain would not allow France to be eliminated as a Great Power. That night-it was still July 29-the Kaiser convened a Crown Council at Potsdam. The Chancellor explained Grey's concern over the future of France and urged that some step be taken to calm British fears and ensure Britain's neutrality. A course was agreed on, and Bethmann hurried back to Berlin. He summoned Sir Edward Goschen. The British Ambassador appeared at the Wilhelmstrasse at one-thirty a.m.; by now it was Thursday, July 30. He listened carefully to the Chancellor and returned to his embassy to send a telegram to London. War involving Germany, France, Austria, and Russia was now almost inevitable, the Chancellor had said. "He [Bethmann] then proceeded to make a strong bid for British neutrality. He said that… so far as he was able to judge, the main principle which governed British policy was that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed." This was not Germany's aim, Bethmann insisted. To prove it, he promised-on condition of Britain's neutrality-that a victorious Germany would take no territory from a defeated France. Goschen inquired whether this applied to France's colonies in Africa and elsewhere. Bethmann declined to give that assurance. The Chancellor made a similar offer regarding German military operations on Belgian territory: "When the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany."
Bethmann's proposal astounded Whitehall. It was not only that Germany was openly revealing her intention of attacking France and probably Belgium. It was the Chancellor's naked suggestion that England cynically betray France on the basis of a German promise. Grey's reaction mingled despair and indignation: "The document made it clear that Bethmann now thought war probable… The proposal meant everlasting dishonour if we accepted it… Did Bethmann not see that he was making an offer that would dishonour us if we agreed to it? What sort of man was it who could no
t see that? Or did he think so badly of us that he thought we should not see it?"
Grey immediately wrote a reply to Goschen: "His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal… It would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France-a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover." He walked across to 10 Downing Street with the telegram in his hand. Asquith agreed that they need not wait for Cabinet approval, and the telegram was dispatched. That afternoon, Goschen's telegram, containing the German Chancellor's proposal, and Grey's reply were read to the Cabinet. Grey's decision was approved.
Bethmann had hinted that if war came Germany meant to attack France. Jagow confirmed this to Goschen later on the thirtieth, when he told the British Ambassador that if Germany mobilized, it would be against France as well as Russia. The French government knew what was coming. France's diplomacy since the delivery of the Austrian ultimatum had been hampered by the absence from Paris of both President Poincare and Foreign Minister Rene Viviani. Returning from St. Petersburg aboard the battleship France, they had cancelled their state visit to Denmark, but arrived back in the capital only on the afternoon of July 29. While France had supported Britain's efforts to establish mediation machinery, she had consistently reassured her Russian ally of her willingness to meet the obligations of the Dual Alliance. Secret military preparations were under way; officers and men excused for the harvest were recalled on the twenty-sixth; French battalions in Morocco were ordered home on the twenty-seventh. On July 28, the French General Staff informed the Russian Military Attache in Paris of France's "full and active readiness faithfully to execute her responsibilities as an ally."
Dreadnought, Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War Page 116
