Navy, Russian, 13-18, 64, 74
Navy, U.S., 14, 102, 234, 325
as crisis-response force, 138-54
good planning by, 362-63
and Manthorpe Curve, 63-79
post-Cold War vision, 73-78
and Tailhook scandal, 72
Near-peer conflict, 326
Net-centric war, 327-29
New Core states, 55-58, 169, 240-41, 374-78
New economy, 33-34
New ordering principle
Big Bang as strategy, 278-94
the greater inclusive, 267-78
life out of balance, 247-50
rise of system perturbations, 258-67
September 11, 2001, 250-57
New rule sets, 9-11
future worth creating, 46-58
gaps in, 27-34
for new era, 18-35
playing Jack Ryan, 12-18
and WWII vs. Vietnam War, 35-46
New Rule Sets Project, 46-48, 146, 151, 197-98, 225, 304
New World Order, 59-63, 157, 194, 271
New York City Police Department, 353
New York Times, 136, 216, 236, 263
New York Times Magazine, 104
Nigeria, 126
1920s, 29, 309
1930s, 28-29
Nixon, Richard, 38, 42
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 321
Non-Integrating Gap. See Gap nations
Nonstate actors, 88
North America, 2, 220
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 87, 373, 382
North Korea, 84, 90, 131, 133, 330, 334, 377, 379
No-win scenario, 149-52
Nuclear power, 330
Nuclear weapons, 39-41, 84-85, 161, 172, 300, 316, 325
O
Occupation force, 318
Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA), 137-38
Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), 179-80
Official developmental aid (ODA), 202
Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (Kagan), 52
Oil, 182-85, 200
companies, 215
flow of, 214-24
Old Core economies, 55-58
Old Europe, 143, 288
Oliver, Dave, 72
OPEC, 42, 221, 312
Operation Desert Storm, 42, 64, 81, 117, 310, 318, 329-30
Operation Iraqi Freedom, 264, 277, 289,310, 318, 329
Operation Liberty Shield, 277, 317-18
Overseas Filipino Workers, 212-13
Overwhelming force, 337
P
Pacific Rim, 372, 382
Pakistan, 188, 235-36, 330, 352, 377
Paraguay, 134
Peace, 62
Peace and Conflict Ledger 2003 (University of Maryland), 351
Peace dividend, 64, 82, 196, 301
Peacekeeping operations, 144, 164-65, 314, 319
Pearl Harbor, 315
Pei, Minxin, 358-59
Pentagon, 3-7, 16, 95, 372
budget planning, 116, 141
and Bush Administration, 108-10
and China, 110-21, 152, 172
exporting security, 313-15
failure to embrace post-Cold War reality, 59-63, 349
gear-up for war with China, 225-26
how 9/11 saved it from itself, 96-106
insular mind-set of, 193-94
Leviathan vs. System Administrator “departments” in, 318-27
new ordering principle of, 269-70
in post-Cold War era, 23-24
post-Vietnam internal rebuilding, 80
Program Objective Memorandum (POM), 115
vertical thinking of, 110-21
view of national security, 26-27
People flows, 206-14, 240
People’s Liberation Army, 241-42
Perestroika, 127
Perry, William, 96
Persian Gulf, 184-87, 214-22, 277, 309-10, 312, 334, 357, 361-62
Persian Gulf War, 80, 139
Peru, 351
Petrea, Howard “Rusty,” 71
Philippines, 188, 212-13, 352
Pipes, Daniel, 187, 254
Pipes, Richard, 36
Political will, 204-205, 313
Population flows, 206-14, 376
Posse Comitatus restrictions, 321
Potential support ratio (PSR), 206, 209-11
Powell, Colin, 168, 194, 280
Power projection, 299
Preemption strategy, 35, 42, 167-79, 243, 261, 354
Press, 344
Proceedings, 327, 332-33
Program Objective Memorandum (POM), 115
Proliferators, 300
P-3 spy plane, 282
Putin, Vladimir, 127
Q
Qaddafi, Muammar, 306
Quad Btu, 219-20
Quagmires, 153, 194
R
Racism, 361
Rag-top option, 72
Ramstein Air Force Base, 179, 362
Raw materials, 133-34, 218-19
Reagan, Ronald, 30, 128
Realists, 342
Red Army, 60, 89
Refugee flows, 164, 313
Reggio, Godfrey, 247
Regime change, 215, 314, 375
Relief operations, 144
Religious fundamentalists, 187
Religious-inspired transnational terrorism, 3-46
Replacement migration, 209
Reproducible strategic concepts, 19-20, 30
Reserve currency, 244, 307-308
Reserves, U.S., 102, 319, 325
Resources, 199-201
Ressam, Ahmed, 254
Revolution in military affairs (RMA), 194
Ridge, Tom, 256
Roaring Twenties, 29, 309
Rodrik, Dani, 131
Rogue states, 83, 93, 122, 135
Romania, 112
Roosevelt, Franklin, 58
Royal succession, 133
Rule of law, 127, 130
Rule-set loss, 203
Rule sets, 9-10, 82-83, 202-203
for American way of war, 332-39
different, for different worlds, 166-79
economic, 168-79, 197-98, 202-203
gaps in, 27-34, 88
lack of, and investors, 132-37
need for new security, 85, 268
and New Rule Sets Project, 46-48, 197-98
resetting, 34, 240, 244-45, 260-64
Rumsfeld, Donald, 104, 168, 180, 226, 237, 315, 318
Russia, 68, 100, 131, 169, 264, 352
bankruptcy of, 199-200
economic reform in, 127-29
post-WWI, 143
Russian Federation, 334
S
Sacred terror, 43-46
SARS superspreaders, 263
Saudi Arabia, 219, 362, 380-81
Schaefer, Charlie, 73, 77
Schwarzkopf, Norman, 64
Seam States, 188-89, 369
Seattle Man, 265
Security
bilateral, 188-89
exporting, 179, 303-15, 369
flows of, 231-45
fracture of market for, 79-88
for Lesser Includeds, 149-51
no rules without, 203
Security dilemma, 204
Separatist movements, 348-49
September 11, 2001, 2, 7, 19, 24
and Cantor Fitzgerald, 46-48
change in rule set since, 10-11, 34-35, 88, 92-95
how 9/11 saved the Pentagon, 96-106
immediate aftermath of, 256-66
inability of U.S. to stop attack, 317
as launch for Big Bang strategy, 281-94
Serbia, 84, 93
Show of force, 145
Shrink the Gap strategy, 305-306, 355, 360, 369
Siegel, Adam, 138-39
Sierra Leone, 374-75
Simon, Steven, 43
Singapore, 130, 203
Single crisis response, 138
Small Arms S
urvey, 86
Smith, Leighton “Snuffy,” 16-17, 65
Smuggling, 135
Social Darwinism, 361
Somalia, 81, 99, 119, 144-45, 194, 204, 348
South Africa, 188
South America, 2
South Korea, 31, 90, 124, 130, 239, 306, 330, 334, 377
Soviet republics, former, 330, 352
Soviet Union, 13
August coup, 15
and Cold War, 37-41
collapse of, 59-63, 349
Special Operations Forces, 95, 260, 323-24, 337
Stability, no markets without, 200
State bankruptcy, 376-77
State Department, 30, 95, 373
State-on-state wars, 85
Stearns, Rick “Sterno,” 78
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 41
Strategic concept reproducibility, 19-20, 30
Strategic Policy Analysis Group (SPAG), 13
Strickland, Mike, 78
Submarines, 362
Sub-Saharan Africa, 134, 335, 382
Sudan, 167
Suicide bombers, 216
Syria, 289
System Administrator, 299-303, 315-27, 371
System Perturbations, 258-67, 277, 303-304, 371
T
Tailhook scandal, 72
Taiwan, 62, 90, 101, 241-42, 334, 377, 381
Taiwan Straits crisis, 101
Taliban, 260, 297, 361
The Tank, 67
Tanzania, 167
Taylor, Charles, 88, 133, 375
Telecommunications connectivity, 136-37, 374
Terrorism, 43-46, 84, 91, 93
Terrorist groups, 165, 187-88, 216-17
Tharoor, Shashi, 242
The End of the World As We Knew It (TEOTWAWKI), 118
Theocracies, 134
Third World, 80, 91-92, 190
Threat-identification process, 24
Tiananmen Square protest, 129
Tolkien, J.R.R., 368
Top-down thinking, 367
Top Secret clearance, 342-43, 345
Traditional societies, 135-36, 361
Transitioneers, 69-70, 98-99, 103
Transnational terrorism, 43-46, 84, 91, 93
Truman, Harry, 30-31, 170, 364
“Trust fund” states, 219, 381
Tunisia, 306
Two-Major Regional Conflicts scenario, 61
U
Über-realists, 342
Uganda, 306
Ulam, Adam, 36
Unilateralism, 177, 313
United Nations, 178, 190, 300, 319, 336, 352
High Commissioner for Refugees, 164
population projections, 206-11
Security Council, 33, 177, 322, 376
United States, 31, 229
American way of war, 327-39
defense spending, 299
as empire, 354-66
foreign investment in, 244
future military power of, 315-27
gap in perception with Europe, 52
as Gap Leviathan, 161, 175-76, 204-205, 283, 294, 299-301, 309
and System Administrator, 310-15
as globocop, 350-54
Iraq invasion, 277
Latinization of culture in, 209-10
nationalistic periods in, 123
preemption strategy of, 167-79, 354
security export by, 231-45
sovereign debt of, 378
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 21
U.S. News & World Report, 183
U.S. Refugee Committee, 2002 global survey, 164
USA Patriot Act, 35, 242-43, 256-57
V
Venezuela, 351
Vertical scenarios, 110-21, 250, 262
Vietnam Syndrome, 80, 204
Vietnam War, 80-81, 319
Violence, 85-88, 164-65
Virtual migration, 211-12
Vision, 63
Vlahos, Michael, 42
Voss, Phil, 15
W
Wall Street, 227, 241, 307
Wall Street Journal, 181-83
War
and absence of rule sets, 132
American way of, 327-39
asymmetrical, 89-96, 318
big vs. small, 302
in Gap states, 164-65
great-power, 82, 245, 272, 274
interstate, 84
just, 326
main criterion for waging, 300
net-centric, 327-29
state-on-state, 85, 95
on terrorism, 25, 62, 104-105, 108, 158, 168, 187, 192, 256, 306, 324, 353, 378
without peer, 62
Warlords, 88
War zones, 239
Washington, D.C., 110
Washington Consensus, 130, 168
Washington Post, 105
Weschler, Tom, 303
West Africa, 351
West Bank wall, 292-93
Western Europe, 2, 31, 52, 176
White paper, 67, 76-77
Wilkerson, Tom, 72-73, 76-77
Will, political, 204-205, 313
Wilson, Woodrow, 364
Wired, 213
Wisconsin, 110
Wolfowitz, Paul, 279-80, 291
Women’s status, 135-36, 375
Working brief, 79, 81
World Bank, 31, 162, 347
World Health Organization, 263
World Trade Center bombing, 197, 259
World Trade Organization (WTO), 55, 129-31, 218, 265, 374
World Values Survey, 135
World War I, 143, 309
World War II, 29-30, 32-33, 58, 245, 297, 301, 309, 383
World War III, 60, 84, 99, 151
Y
Yeltsin, Boris, 15
Yen, 307
Y2K, 26, 250-59, 315, 372
Younger populations, 163
Youth bulges, 163-64
Yuan, 307
Yugoslavia, 145-46, 292, 348-49, 352
Yukos {oil company), 128
Z
Zakana, Fareed, 34, 201, 219, 381
Zoellick, Robert, 45, 266, 373
Unofficial Appendix
Esquire, March 2003
The Pentagon’s new map
Thomas P.M. Barnett
It explains why we’re going to war. And why we’ll keep going to war.
Esquire, March 2003 v139 i3 p174(8)
Full Text: COPYRIGHT 2003 ? Hearst Communications, Inc. All Rights Reserved
Shortly after we wrote about military strategist THOMAS BARNETT in last December’s Best and Brightest issue, he gave the Esquire staff a presentation on his theory of war and globalization, just as he regularly does for government leaders as an adviser to the Department of Defense. We’ll never read the news the same way again. This month, Barnett delivers the same briefing to you in “The Pentagon’s New Map” (page 174), in which he maps out America’s recent military encounters and predicts future ones based on patterns of global economic development. “We’re at a time period not unlike after World War II,” says Barnett, who is also a professor at the Naval war College in Newport, Rhode Island. “We’re trying to ask the same great questions, like: How can a military superpower today influence history for the better? We established this overarching ideology for so long that allowed us to justify anything, and that ideology was containment. In some ways, what I’m trying to argue is a new sort of containment—a containment of the new bad places and the desire to shrink them.”
Since the end of the cold war, the United States has been trying to come up with an operating theory of the world—and a military strategy to accompany it. Now there’s a leading contender. It involves identifying the problem parts of the world and aggressively shrinking them. Since September 11, 2001, the author, a professor of warfare analysis, has been advising the Office of the Secretary of Defense and giving this briefing continually at the Pentagon and in the intelligence community. Now he gives it to you.
LET ME TELL YOU why mi
litary engagement with Saddam Hussein’s regime in Baghdad is not only necessary and inevitable, but good.
When the United States finally goes to war again in the Persian Gulf, it will not constitute a settling of old scores, or just an enforced disarmament of illegal weapons, or a distraction in the war on terror. Our next war in the Gulf will mark a historical tipping point—the moment when Washington takes real ownership of strategic security in the age of globalization.
That is why the public debate about this war has been so important: It forces Americans to come to terms with what I believe is the new security paradigm that shapes this age, namely, Disconnectedness defines danger. Saddam Hussein’s outlaw regime is dangerously disconnected from the globalizing world, from its rule sets, its norms, and all the ties that bind countries together in mutually assured dependence.
The problem with most discussion of globalization is that too many experts treat it as a binary outcome: Either it is great and sweeping the planet, or it is horrid and failing humanity everywhere. Neither view really works, because globalization as a historical process is simply too big and too complex for such summary judgments. Instead, this new world must be defined by where globalization has truly taken root and where it has not.
Show me where globalization is thick with network connectivity, financial transactions, liberal media flows, and collective security, and I will show you regions featuring stable governments, rising standards of living, and more deaths by suicide than murder. These parts of the world I call the Functioning Core, or Core. But show me where globalization is thinning or just plain absent, and I will show you regions plagued by politically repressive regimes, widespread poverty and disease, routine mass murder, and—most important—the chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation of global terrorists. These parts of the world I call the Non-Integrating Gap, or Gap.
Globalization’s “ozone hole” may have been out of sight and out of mind prior to September 11, 2001, but it has been hard to miss ever since. And measuring the reach of globalization is not an academic exercise to an eighteen-year-old marine sinking tent poles on its far side. So where do we schedule the U.S. military’s next round of away games? The pattern that has emerged since the end of the cold war suggests a simple answer: in the Gap.
The reason I support going to war in Iraq is not simply that Saddam is a cutthroat Stalinist willing to kill anyone to stay in power, nor because that regime has clearly supported terrorist networks over the years. The real reason I support a war like this is that the resulting long-term military commitment will finally force America to deal with the entire Gap as a strategic threat environment.
FOR MOST COUNTRIES, accommodating the emerging global rule set of democracy, transparency, and free trade is no mean feat, which is something most Americans find hard to understand. We tend to forget just how hard it has been to keep the United States together all these years, harmonizing our own, competing internal rule sets along the way—through a Civil War, a Great Depression, and the long struggles for racial and sexual equality that continue to this day. As far as most states are concerned, we are quite unrealistic in our expectation that they should adapt themselves quickly to globalization’s very American-looking rule set.
The Pentagon's New Map Page 50
