by George Crile
“They removed the threat we all went to sleep with every night, of World War III breaking out. The countries that used to be in the Warsaw Pact are now in NATO. These were truly changes of biblical proportion, and the effect the jihad had in accelerating these events is nothing short of miraculous.
“These things happened. They were glorious and they changed the world. And the people who deserved the credit are the ones who made the sacrifice. And then we fucked up the endgame.”
The story of Charlie Wilson and the CIA’s secret war in Afghanistan is an important, missing chapter of our recent past. Ironically, neither the United States government nor the forces of Islam will want this history to be known. But the full story of America’s central role in the Afghan jihad needs to be told and understood for any number of reasons. Clearly it’s not helpful for the world of militant Islam to believe that its power is so great that nothing can stop it. But the danger exists for us as well. It may not be welcomed by a government that prefers to see the rising tide of Islamic militancy as having no connection to our policies or our actions. But the terrible truth is that the group of sleeping lions that the United States roused may well have inspired an entire generation of militant young Muslims to believe that the moment is theirs.
To call these final pages an epilogue is probably a misnomer. Epilogues indicate that the story has been wrapped up, the chapter finished. This one, sadly, is far from over.
SOURCE NOTES
The reporting for this book spans fifteen years. It included repeated trips to Afghanistan, Pakistan, the former Soviet Union, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and numerous locations in the United States where people who had figured prominently in the Afghan war could be found. Nearly all of the key figures responsible for running this secret enterprise were interviewed and were generous in their cooperation. However, this book tells the story of activities so concealed from the central authorities of the government itself that no complete account exists in any archive.
The extensive recollections of Charlie Wilson and Gust Avrakotos form the backbone of the greater part of this narrative. Equally important are the scores of other interviews with central figures involved in this operation who sometimes had conflicting opinions but were able to confirm crucial aspects of this most unlikely story.
It was my good fortune to accompany Wilson on a number of his trips—inside Afghanistan itself; into the new Russia; with the royal family in Saudi Arabia; at presidential headquarters in Pakistan; and, memorably, at Charlie’s awards ceremony at Langley. The prickly Avrakotos was also generous with access on his travels, and much time was spent with him in Rome, Aliquippa, the Middle East, and McLean, Virginia.
In any story of this nature, the issue of motives needs to be addressed. The first point to make is that the core interviews were conducted in the enchanted light of a Cold War fairy tale come true during the early 1990s. At the time, inside the CIA, the Afghan campaign was seen as an authentic miracle. The participants were deeply proud of their roles and felt that this was a story that should be told.
In the time I spent with Gust Avrakotos over these many years, I was always haunted by Bernal Díaz’s sad commentary in the preface to his classic book about the experiences he had shared with Cortes, as a conquistador, when they set off for the New World for God, for country, and for gold: “I am now an old man, over eighty-four years of age, and have lost both sight and hearing; and unfortunately I have gained no wealth to leave my children and descendants, except this true story, which is a most remarkable one, as my readers will presently see.”
The following is an extensive, but by no means complete, list of those whose cooperation has made this history possible. As might be expected, some sources cannot be divulged. Certain people whose names it would be repetitious to list in every instance where their recollections were drawn on have been omitted.
Charlie in Texas, from boyhood to Congress: this account draws heavily on Wilson’s own recollections. But also I drew on interviews with the late congresswoman Barbara Jordan; Charlie’s sister Sharon Allison; Charles Schnabel; Charles Simpson, Charlie’s close friend; Joe Murray of Cox Newspapers; Larry L. King of Texas Monthly and Harper’s magazine; Molly Ivins of Texas Monthly and much else; and Paul Begala.
The general accounts of what Wilson himself describes as “the longest midlife crisis in history” come primarily from his own recollections. Many others supplied memorable details and flavor: Stuart Pierson, Wilson’s lawyer; former governor Ann Richards; Charles Simpson; Charles Schnabel; Carol Shannon; Diane Sawyer; Lori White; Molly Hamilton; Agnes Bundy; Elaine Lang; and indeed many others.
With regard to Charlie as a visible and invisible power on the Hill, I drew upon the insights of former speakers Tip O’Neill, Jim Wright, and Tom Foley; former majority leader Tony Coelho; former whip Bill Gray; David Obey, lately chairman of Appropriations; and many others from the Appropriations world, notably Representative John Murtha, the late Clarence “Doc” Long, and Silvio Conte, the ranking Republican on Appropriations; Representatives Joe McDade, Louis Stokes, and Bob Livingston. I also drew on interviews with the Washington lobbyist Denis Neill; former representative Steve Solarz; Esther Kurtz of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC); Maurice Rosenblatt; Zvi Rafiah; Ed Koch; and Representatives Henry Hyde, Bob Mrazek, Tom Downey, Bob Dornan, Dave McCurdy, Lee Hamilton, Edward Boland, and Pat Schroeder.
Wilson’s misadventures in Nicaragua are described again by Wilson himself but also by the late Tacho Somoza; Ed Wilson, formerly with the CIA but now serving a life sentence; Pat Derian, Jimmy Carter’s assistant secretary of state for human rights; former Representative Jack Murphy; and Tina Simons, formerly of both Ed and Charlie Wilson’s staffs, who is now in the federal witness protection program.
Wilson’s entry into the Afghan arena in response to Dan Rather’s report (as well as others’) was described by Jim Van Wagenen of the Defense Appropriations subcommittee staff and was supplemented with Wilson’s own account. Dan Rather was also interviewed.
Charlie himself described his trip to Sabra and Shatilla and his extreme disappointment and sadness at discovering that the Israelis had permitted a massacre of innocents. Wilson himself described the poisoning of his dog and the revenge that he took. He also described his first meeting with Zia ul-Haq, which occurred on this trip; Joanne and Zia discussed this first encounter, too.
The overall account of Wilson’s struggles with the Agency to escalate the war, as well as afterward when he became their “station chief on the Hill,” started from Wilson’s own descriptions. In every instance, however, his version is accompanied by accounts of the same events from a broad range of CIA officers Wilson encountered, including Bob Gates, Tom Twetten, Clair George, Frank Anderson, Jack Devine, Milt Bearden, Howard Hart, Norm Gardner, Art Alper, Larry Penn, Mike Vickers, Charles (Chuck) Cogan, Ed Juchniewicz, John McMahon, and Gust Avrakotos.
Joanne Herring is the primary source for the account of her life in Texas, her global anti-Communist network, and her efforts to convince Charlie Wilson and President Zia to champion the Afghan cause. The account of Charles Fawcett’s life and his involvement with the Afghans comes from Fawcett himself, who was very generous with his time. Arnaud de Borchgrave, the Baron and Baroness di Portanova, and Hasan Nouri also contributed. The seduction of Doc Long and Wilson’s legislative maneuvers to push through the Oerlikon draw on lengthy interviews with Jeff Nelson, Norm Gardner, and Jim Van Wagenen, as well as on accounts from Wilson, Joanne Herring, and Zia.
Primary night, 1984, was resurrected by Charlie’s sister Sharon, Joanne Herring, Charles Fawcett, and Joe Murray.
Wilson’s own descriptions of his travels were richly supplemented by those of the various women who accompanied him, most notably Trish Wilson, Carol Shannon, Cynthia Gale Watson (Snowflake), and Annelise Ilschenko (Sweetums), as well as by Joe Christie and Colonel Jim Rooney.
Gust Avrakotos himself evoked his steel-town childhood and his recruitment into th
e CIA’s elite Clandestine Services. Readers will understand that several people who filled me in on Gust’s early career there can be thanked but not identified. The story of Avrakotos’s sessions with Nitsa, “the witch,” and his hidden days at the CIA “underground in the underground” come from Avrakotos himself and others who asked that they not be named (a notable exception being the recollections of Art Alper, the demolitions expert).
This entire history hinges on the first unauthorized encounter between Wilson and Avrakotos in the Rayburn building. Both men gave memorable versions of that incident and of the consequences flowing from it.
How Gust tried and failed to deflect the Agency from the Iran-Contra scandal comes directly from Avrakotos himself and was further amplified by a number of people so well-placed they preferred not to be identified. George Cave, although he did not address the issue of Avrakotos’s memo, provided useful context for understanding the concern of the profession.
The shadowy but indispensable Saudi connection was clarified by Gust Avrakotos, as well as by Prince Bandar (ambassador to the United States and son of the Saudi Defense Minister, Prince Sultan), and Adel el Jabar. The visit to Mohammed’s arms bazaar was reconstructed from the recollections of many participants: Field Marshal Mohammed Abu Ghazala, General Yahia, Denis Neill, Trish Wilson, Gust Avrakotos, Charlie Wilson, and Art Alper.
For the inner history of the new weapons mix and the transformation of America’s Afghan strategy, Wilson and Avrakotos were necessarily the prime sources, along with Mike Vickers and other more concealed participants. General Mohammad Yousaf provided an account from the Pakistani point of view.
The account of the birth and implementation of the McCollum flights and the Weapons Upgrade Program is drawn from interviews with Vaughn Forest, Charles Schnabel, Chuck Barnard, Edward Luttwak, General Richard Stillwell, Wilson, Avrakotos, and General Rahim Wardak.
Larry Crandall provided the most telling account of how the Cross Border Humanitarian Aid Program came into being and how it unexpectedly influenced the war; he made it impressively clear how much of the credit for massively increasing the program’s funding goes to Wilson. Senator Gordon Humphrey, the program’s principal patron in the upper house, also gave further valuable insight, as did Ambassador Dean Hinton and the late Ambassador Arnie Raphel, Professor Tom Gouttierre, Dr. Bob Simon, Ambassador Gerald Hellman, Hasan Nouri, Tajwar Kakar, and upwards of fifteen or twenty NGO and U.S. AID officials who worked in the program.
The intense conservative campaign to demonize the CIA as betraying the Afghans was richly evoked by Neil Blair, Andrew Eiva, Eli Krakowski, Michael Pillsbury, Vince Cannistraro, Karen McKay, Ludmilla Thorne, Senator Gordon Humphrey, Ed Juchniewicz, John McMahon, Gust Avrakotos, and Charles Schnabel.
Wilson’s near-death experience was described by the “Angels,” his sister Sharon, Charles Schnabel, Avrakotos, and numerous others.
For Charlie’s overall relationship to Pakistan and Afghanistan, the interviews with the following officials were of great value: Bob Oakley, Phyllis Oakley, Nick Platt, Richard Hoagland, Craig Carp, General Akhtar, Hamid Gul, Khalid Khawaja, General Raza, General Janjua, General Mohammad Yousaf, Colonel Mujahed, General Aslan Beg, Ambassador Jamsheed Marker, and Hamid Karzai (now president of Afghanistan).
How the hotly contested Stinger initiative came about in the first place and the extent to which its weapons transformed the war was pieced together from many sources, including President Zia, Mike Pillsbury, Andrew Eiva, Milt Bearden, Gust Avrakotos, and Wilson.
This book is indebted to Milt Bearden for his insightful descriptions of his experiences at the front line, especially his supervision of the initial deployment of Stingers. The account of the firing of the first Stinger came from an interview with Engineer Ghaffar, the mujahid who pulled the trigger.
For Charlie’s trip into the war zone, I am indebted to the late Abdul Haq, Rahim Wardak, Ibrahim Jaqani, General Mohammad Yousaf, Kurt Loebeck, President Zia, and Ambassador Arnie Raphel. The showdown over the DIA plane was fleshed out by Colonel Rooney, Gust Avrakotos, Annelise Ilschenko, and once more, by Wilson himself.
With the collapse of the Soviet regime, Russia opened up, and interviews with Generals Varennikov and Gromov were immensely helpful in presenting events from the Red Army perspective. I’m particularly indebted to the late Artyom Borovik, through whom scores of veterans from the Soviets’ Afghan campaign were interviewed.
The events that darkened the imminent victory—the arms depot catastrophe in Rawalpindi and the mysterious death of President Zia—were most tellingly portrayed by Milt Bearden, Richard Armitage, Ambassador Jamsheed Marker, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, and Wilson.
For the first phase of the Afghan war, I interviewed Zbigniew Brzezinski, Vice President Walter Mondale, General William Odom, David Aaron, Gordon Stewart, and former CIA director Stansfield Turner.
Among the many mujahideen leaders whose cooperation is particularly appreciated: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Abdul Haq, Jalaluddin Haqani, Professor Mojadeddi, Massoud Khalili, Pir Gilani, General Safi, and Hamid Karzai.
I have not included all of the names of the Afghan mujahideen, the Pakistani soldiers and officials, as well as the many Russian officials and veterans of the Afghan war who were interviewed. There are simply too many to list. The same is true of the numerous U.S. congressional staffers, politicians, and others who were interviewed but whose interviews were not essential to my reporting.
Finally, I have not included the extensive list of interviews conducted in the months before and after 9/11. This research was essential to the thoughts conveyed in the epilogue, but a detailed accounting is perhaps best left for another day. However, I would like to thank the following for their cooperation: President Pervez Musharraf, Malik Shahid Ahmed Khan, and Khalid Khawaja, for serving as my guides into the world of Osama bin Laden and militant Islam.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The inspiration for this book springs from the experience of covering the Afghans in an earlier time when we shared a common foe. Back in the 1980s, it was hard to find anyone who traveled among the mujahideen on the border or inside the war zone who was not permanently moved by their courage and sacrifice and by the hospitality, amidst so little, that the mujahideen always insisted on lavishing upon their guests.
It can be argued that the universal religion or spirit of the American people is the motto of the state of New Hampshire written on its license plates: “Live Free or Die.” The Afghans—and not just a few but almost an entire nation—seemed to embody the very essence of that American idea. Granted, the way the Afghans deal with invaders or, for that matter, with one another inside their own borders is terrifying. But never once during their jihad against the Soviet Union did they resort to what we identify as terrorism outside of their own country—no embassies were bombed, planes hijacked, diplomats taken hostage, or civilians put at risk. And so far, they have not directly joined the terror campaign that their Muslim and Arab friends from other countries have launched.
One can only hope that this continues to be true and that this time, at the end of America’s latest Afghan campaign, the United States will recognize its obligation to help in the rebuilding of this ravaged land. It is hoped that this book will revive the memory of the Afghans as we knew them back then, when—outmanned and outgunned—they faced our Cold War foe, the Red Army, and fearlessly took back their country.
Beyond the Afghans, an unlikely network of people made the telling of this story possible. I am indebted to the late president of Pakistan, Zia ul-Haq, who opened a window on the hidden war so that we could begin to tell the story. For all these years, the two extraordinary central figures in this history, Charlie Wilson and Gust Avrakotos, have occupied my imagination. There was never any question of what motivated these two men: a fierce love of country and the conviction that they had engineered a historic victory for America. They were so convinced of the virtue of their efforts that neither man placed any conditions on their cooperation, i
n spite of knowing that I would be listening to others, many with rival viewpoints. Over the course of many years, my respect and affection for these two men has only grown.
This long venture began with one of those wonderful commissions from Don Hewitt and 60 Minutes that allowed me to explore a world that grew bigger and more fascinating at each stop. Special thanks to Jeff Fager, Patti Hassler, Maureen Cashen, and 60 Minutes II as a whole for their patience, encouragement, and generosity.
Speaking of which, Morgan Entrekin has gone above and beyond an editor’s call of duty, first in his energizing belief in this story and then in his skillful editing of the text. Thanks to everyone at Grove/Atlantic for their ability to calmly cope with the unusual challenges posed by this project—particularly to Michael Hornburg and Muriel Jorgensen who repeatedly went above and beyond the call of duty.
