PEpist 2.1 Ethical Practices Presumption. It is prima facie plausible to suppose that all of the presuppositions of our fundamental ethical beliefs and practices are true.
The Ethical Practices Presumption is only a presumption. We're not begging the question against Nihilism. Given a compelling argument for Nihilism, the presumption in favor of those beliefs embedded in our practices could be overridden. However, it seems reasonable to treat these beliefs as true until proven false. Surely we have prima facie reason to believe such things as (17–19):
(17) Each person has a duty of gratitude toward those who have benefited him or her.
(18) One ought to compensate others for damage one has done to their property.
(19) Each person has a right to be treated with respect through impartial procedures.
We may be convinced, by overwhelmingly powerful philosophical arguments, that we are wrong to suppose that (17–19) correspond to reality, but, at the beginning of our inquiry, these things seem to be every bit as certain as the deliverances of our senses or our memories. They come close, at least, to what David Lewis has called ‘Moorean facts’ (after G.E. Moore), facts so apparently obvious that good philosophical theories should treat them as fixed points of data.
Even if moderate Nihilists offer a paraphrase of these statements into statements acceptable to Nihilism, the paraphrases would seem necessarily to leave out something crucial to the ethical and legal content of these ordinary beliefs. Rights presuppose rights-bearers, and responsibilities (including debts of guilt or of gratitude) presuppose the continued existence of the one incurring the debt. Paraphrasing these statements into Strawsonian feature-placing sentences would force us to revise many deeply held ethical beliefs.
11.2 Monism
Granting that Aliquidism is very likely to be true, we can now ask how many things there are. In particular, is there only one thing, or is there more than one?
11.2T Pluralism. More than one thing exists.
11.2A Monism. Exactly one thing exists.
By ‘thing’, do Monists mean anything at all or only particular things? We'll interpret Monism as the commitment to the existence of exactly one thing, whether that thing is conceived of as a universal or particular (or neither or both). Thus, Monists must either be Nominalists or Bundle Theorists of an odd sort, since the only possible bundle contains just the one universal.
Unlike Nihilism, Monism has been defended by a number of prominent philosophers. It can be difficult to tell about some historically important metaphysical theories (e.g., those of Parmenides, Baruch Spinoza or F.H. Bradley) whether they should be interpreted as cases of Nihilism or of Monism. As we saw above, Nihilism could be expressed by saying something like ‘It Socratizes wisely’, with the pronoun ‘it’ serving merely as a grammatical dummy, corresponding to nothing at all. Alternatively, the proposition that it Socratizes wisely could be interpreted as an expression of Monism: the one thing that actually exists Socratizes wisely.
The motivation for Monism could rely largely on Ockham's Razor (PMeth 1). If we can explain all of the phenomena with the postulation of a single thing, why postulate more? Of course, Ockham's Razor demands only that we avoid multiplying entities needlessly. We do have direct evidence for the existence of a plurality of things. Our sense perception and memory abound with examples of such evidence.
PEpist 3 Appearance of Bodies and Minds. Perception and memory present us with what are apparently distinct physical things, including some embodying apparently distinct minds.
PEpist 4 Presumption of Reliable Perception. It is prima facie plausible to suppose that human perception and memory are reliable.
In light of Appearance of Bodies and Minds and Presumption of Reliable Perception, we ought to accept that there really are distinct physical things and distinct minds, unless there is a metaphysical argument for rejecting the presentations of sense perception and memory. Thus, an appeal to Ockham's Razor alone is not a sufficient case for Monism.
As in the case of Nihilism, so too in this case we can distinguish between extreme and moderate forms. Extreme Monists endorse a strong claim, one that entails that all of the evidence of our senses and memory is simply and thoroughly wrong. For extreme Monists, the appearance of plurality is a mere illusion. In contrast, moderate Monists modify the thesis in such a way that they can accept that much of what we believe on the basis of our senses is true, if properly understood. Moderate Monists offer paraphrases of our ordinary beliefs in terms of the nature of a single particular, or they might claim that there are real facts about ordinary things but facts that are wholly grounded in facts about the one, uniquely fundamental thing.
We can also distinguish between two kinds of moderate Monists—a strong version for those who defend a conceptual grounding of the Many in the One, and a weaker version who defend an extra-conceptual grounding of the Many in the One (using the distinction we introduced in Section 3.4). Conceptual reductionists hold that the reduction of the Many to the One is licensed solely by facts about our concepts about the plurality of the things in our world. We are supposed to conclude that these concepts, although ostensibly true of many particulars, are in fact made true about facts about the One Real Thing. Ontological reductionists, in contrast, believe that the many things exist and have real essences, but these essences guarantee that all of the facts about the many things can be fully explained by reference to facts about the One Fundamental Thing.
Conceptually Reductionist Monists can claim that their view is superior, in terms of ontological economy, since they can deny that many things really exist, while Ontological Reductionist Monists cannot make this claim. Extra-Conceptual Reductionists can, however, claim that their theory has some advantage in economy over the thesis that there are many fundamental things, since the Monists reduce the number of fundamental things as well as the number of fundamental truths.
Moderate Monists, whether Conceptual or Extra-Conceptual Reductionists, must embrace some version of Ostrich Nominalism (7.1A.1A) if they believe that the One is a particular. Since Monism entails that only one thing exists, there cannot exist both universals and particulars. Thus, Monists must postulate either a single universal (and no particulars) or a single fundamental particular (and no universals). For simplicity's sake, let's assume that Monists' One Thing is a fundamental particular. Moderate Monists must suppose that many things are true of this one thing (corresponding to each of the many common sense beliefs we have). Moderate Monists must take each of these many things to be primitive, irreducible facts about the one thing. Hence, moderate Monists must embrace the Ostrich Nominalist account of predication.
In what follows, we examine four arguments for Monism: those of Parmenides, Spinoza, Bradley, and Jonathan Schaffer. It is likely that all four of these philosophers were moderate Monists. The latter three are explicitly so. In the case of Parmenides, the historical evidence is sketchy, but the latter half of Parmenides' philosophical poem suggests that a kind of truth can be attributed to beliefs about the physical world.
The distinction between conceptual and extra-conceptual reduction is a somewhat more subtle distinction, and it can be difficult at times to discern which sort of Monism a given philosopher is defending. Prima facie, Parmenides and Bradley seem to be making the stronger claim of Conceptual Reductionism, while it seems pretty clear that both Spinoza and Schaffer are defending the weaker claim of Extra-Conceptual Reduction.
11.2.1 Parmenidean Monism
Parmenides of Elea authored a single work, a poem traditionally titled On Nature. In the first part of this poem, Parmenides seems to be arguing for Monism. We reconstruct his argument as one designed to show that we cannot know or even believe that more than one thing exists, rather than to provide a positive case for Monism. The center of Parmenides's argument is the claim that we cannot think about non-being. He assumes that thought (and related things, like knowledge and reference) is a binary relation, a relation between the thinker and the object of th
ought. Whenever a relation holds, it seems to be necessary that both relata really exist. Hence, one can never think of anything non-existent. This is an issue that we will investigate in some detail in the next chapter, in Section 12.1. As we shall see, Meinongians will disagree with Parmenides on just this point. However, most contemporary philosophers reject the Meinongian solution.
Parmenides would then have to show that we could not think about a situation consisting of two or more things without thinking about something non-existent. It seems reasonable to suppose that, if two distinct things exist, then there must be something (some fact) that distinguishes one from the other. It could be that one has a quality, like redness or roundness, that the other lacks. At the very least, if there are two things A and B, it would seem that B would have to lack the property of being identical to A, and A would have to lack the property of being identical to B. So, to think of A and B as distinct, we would have to attribute negative properties to each of them. Parmenides argues that attributing a negative property to something necessarily involves thinking about the absence of the corresponding positive property. But to think about an absence is necessarily to think about the thing that is absent, which is to think of something non-existent (see Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983).
Observe, first of all, that even if this argument were successful, it wouldn't establish Monism. It doesn't even show that we couldn't believe, or even know, that there are two or more things. It only purports to show that we cannot think of two particular things as distinct. Just because I cannot think about particular cases of distinctness, it does not follow that I could not know that cases of distinctness exist. For example, I cannot think about a natural number so big that it cannot be thought of by me, but I can nonetheless believe that there are such numbers.
We can use the resources of Truthmaker Theory (2.1T) to recast Parmenides' argument into a form that demonstrates the impossibility of there being more than one thing (and not just of our thinking of them). This argument would depend on the assumption that every proposition ascribing distinctness to a pair of things must have a truthmaker, and this truthmaker must involve the attribution of contradictory properties (one positive, and one negative) to the two distinct things. The rest of the argument proceeds in a similar fashion:
If there exist two distinct things A and B, then the truth of their distinctness must have a truthmaker.
This truthmaker must make true the attribution of contradictory properties to A and B, one positive property and the other a negative property.
Such a truthmaker must include two truthmakers as parts. One must make it true that A has F and the other that B does not have F, for some positive property F. Let's call the truthmaker of B's not having F ‘N’.
In order to make it true that B does not have F, N must make it true that the possible state of affairs of B's having F is non-existent.
The truthmaker of the non-existence of any x must include x itself as a part (since that is the only way that it can specify that it is x, in particular, that doesn't exist).
To be part of an existing truthmaker, a thing must exist.
If the truthmaker of the non-existence of x exists, then x itself cannot exist (since the existence of a truthmaker for any proposition ensures the truth of that proposition.)
So, there is no truthmaker of the non-existence of x (for any x), since for the state of affairs to exist, x would have to both exist and not exist (from 5, 6, and 7).
Therefore, in particular, N cannot exist. (From 4 and 8)
Therefore, there cannot exist two distinct things. (From 1–4 and 9)
Every premise of this argument can be challenged. First of all, we might doubt whether a true proposition of distinctness needs a truthmaker at all. Second, as we discussed in Chapter 9, it is plausible to think that the only truthmaker that is needed for the distinctness of A and B is the pair A and B. This version of Parmenides's argument assumes that two indiscernible but distinct things are impossible, which the Max Black thought experiment of two indistinguishable spheres gave us reason to doubt.
Premise 3 is also doubtful, since it requires the assumption of Truthmaker Maximalism. Negative truths, like B's not having F, may not require truthmakers: they might instead correspond to the absence of a truthmaker of B's having F. Even if we did need truthmakers for negative truths, premise 4 assumes that such negative truthmakers must attribute non-existence to a possible state of affairs. Why couldn't N instead simply verify some negative relation (like non-instantiation) between B and F? Why couldn't N be a Totality Fact (see Section 2.4.2), a fact connecting F-ness with the totality of things that instantiate, which verifies B's not having F simply by not including B in that totality?
11.2.2 Spinoza's Monism
Baruch Spinoza offered a set of metaphysical arguments that could be interpreted as attempting to show that only one thing exists. In fact, Spinoza argued that there is just one substance, where a substance is defined as something that exists in itself and that is conceived of through itself. Everything else, including people, stars, and motes of dust, are modes or attributes of that substance. The interpretation of Spinoza on this point is notoriously difficult. We might take the many finite modes to be modifying tropes (see Sections 8.2 and 9.3.2.2), all modifying a single, necessarily existing and necessarily unique substrate.
We build to an argument drawn from Spinoza's Ethics and his Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being (Spinoza 1677a/1958a and 1677b/1958b), beginning with eight Spinozistic metaphysical principles (S1–S8):
S1. Something exists.
That is, Nihilism is false.
S2. Everything is either caused by something else or caused by itself.
Spinoza assumes that everything has a cause. His notion of a self-caused thing is puzzling, since it seems odd to say that something caused itself to exist. (We'll discuss this further in Chapter 26.) However, Spinoza's argument could easily be reformulated in such a way as to replace all talk of self-caused things with talk of uncaused things.
S3. Any self-caused thing must have existence as its very nature.
Spinoza assumes that there are no unexplained, brute facts. He accepts the Principle of Sufficient Reason, that is, the claim that there is a sufficient reason or explanation for every truth. If something exists and is not caused to exist by something else, then it must contain within itself a sufficient explanation of its own existence. Spinoza supposes that this could happen only if it is of the very nature or essence of the thing to exist.
S4. Anything whose nature is to exist is infinite.
This is another controversial claim, but one that was widely held throughout the late ancient, medieval, and early modern periods. If a thing exists by its own nature, then it is a thing of pure or absolute existence, containing within itself all of the power and reality of all possible beings. Such a being could legitimately be described as unlimited or infinite.
S5. There cannot exist two infinite things with the same nature.
Spinoza supposes that whenever two things exist with the same nature (for example, two spatially extended things), then each is limited by the presence or existence of the other. Neither can exhaust the category that they share, since if one did, it would leave no “room” for the other.
S6. If one thing causes another, then the two things must have the same (fundamental) nature.
This is one of the most important principles of Spinoza's philosophy. When one thing causes another, it can give to the other only what it already contains in itself. According to Spinoza, something cannot cause a thing with a nature N without having the nature N within itself, in some fashion. Most philosophers in recent times have challenged the truth of S6 because there seem to be many exceptions to it. For example, there are cases of transmutation, like an atom of uranium becoming an atom of uranium plus some decay products. In some cases, one fundamental particle can decay into particles of new kinds. Energy of one kind can be converted into energy of another kind, like kin
etic energy converting into heat or vice versa. According to Darwinian evolution, a population of one species can over time give rise to a population of a different species. Spinoza might respond that in all of these cases, there is some more fundamental kind of nature of the cause that is preserved in the effect. Natures involving a certain quantity of mass-energy and charge, for example, might be thought to involve some more fundamental common nature.
S7. A finite thing and an infinite thing cannot have the same (fundamental) nature.
The idea behind S7 seems to be that finite and infinite things are too different to share the same nature. In the Ethics, Spinoza makes the even stronger claim that no two things can have the same nature. He argues that two things cannot be really distinct from each other unless they are different in their most essential attributes, a mere difference in modes or inessential characteristics is not enough. Spinoza thought that one and the same thing could exist with many, contradictory qualities at once, by having those incompatible qualities at different times and places. He believed in the possibility of multiple, simultaneous locations of the same thing.
S8. If something is caused, then it is (ultimately) caused by a self-caused thing.
Like many philosophers, Spinoza rejected the possibility of an infinite causal regress. Any chain of causation must originate with an absolutely uncaused thing.
Here is a proof that exactly one thing exists, employing S1–S8:
Any self-caused thing is infinite. (S3, S4)
Any two self-caused things would have the same nature (S3).
There cannot be two self-caused things. There is at most one self-caused thing.
The Atlas of Reality Page 39
