What about the original external regress? In the case where c is ontologically prior to a and b, this difference in fundamentality by itself gives rise to a real difference between a and c (and between b and c). Given those real differences, c can play the role of relating and grounding the distinctness of a and b. But, what about the case in which a and b are ontologically prior to c? Now we do seem to have a problem, because now c's existence seems to depend on the prior distinctness of a and b.
This could be turned into an argument that at least some wholes are ontologically prior to their parts, a holistic conclusion that would also be attractive to Bradley and other moderate Monists. This argument for the possibility of holism depends on just two assumptions: Constituent Ontology, and the thesis that there can be no distinctness without relatedness. Given Constituent Ontology, there are just two ways for two things to be distinct (on the assumption that distinctness requires relatedness). First, the two might differ intrinsically, in which case they contain distinct parts (since all the intrinsic properties of a thing are parts of it), and second, the two might inherit their distinctness from the different roles they play in some larger whole or structure. The first way cannot provide the ultimate ground for distinctness without an infinite regress. Thus, we must suppose there to be some cases of distinct things a and b that are distinct not because they contain different proper parts but because of the disparate roles they play in some larger structure. We thus arrive at the following argument:
a bradleyan refutation of universal bottom-up grounding (for constituent ontologists)
Assume that there are some distinct things a and b.
The distinctness of a and b must be grounded in some relation (Bradley's assumption).
Given Constituent Ontology and premise 2, the distinctness of a and b must be grounded either in the fact that they have different parts, or in the fact that they play different roles in some larger whole, c.
It is impossible for the distinctness of all things to be grounded in some difference in their parts, since this would lead to an infinite regress. So, we can suppose that the distinctness of a and b is not grounded in any difference in their parts.
Consequently, the distinctness of a and b is grounded in the fact that they play different roles in some larger whole, c.
Assume for contradiction that all wholes are grounded in their parts.
So, c is not ontologically prior to a or to b (from 6).
However, the fact that a and b play different roles in c cannot even partially ground their distinctness, given 7, since the fact that a and b can play different roles in c presupposes their prior distinctness. Contradiction.
Consequently, the hypothesis in 6 must be false: if there are distinct things, their distinctness must be grounded in the different roles they play in some whole that is not grounded in its parts.
So, if there are distinct things, there must be some whole that is not grounded in its parts.
However, this conclusion does not prove that all wholes are prior to their parts, much less that the whole universe is prior to everything else. In fact, the argument seems to point to the conclusion that it is universals that derive their distinctness from ontologically prior structures in which those universals play different roles. Once we have established distinctness relations between universals, we can use those distinct universals to differentiate particulars. There is no refutation here of the thesis that all wholes composed entirely of particulars are grounded in their parts. Perhaps a Bradleyan Monist could turn to the theory of Amphibian Bundle Theory, which we discussed in Section 10.3, with a single, cosmic structural universal as the fundamental entity, and all ordinary particulars as amphibians within that structure. We will turn next to some more recent arguments for a similar conclusion in the next section.
11.2.4 Jonathan Schaffer's Cosmic Monism
Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has defended a moderate form of Monism, one involving the claim that there is only one fundamental thing, namely, the cosmos or the universe. Like Spinoza, Schaffer does not intend to contradict our ordinary beliefs about such things as “ships and shoes and sealing-wax, cabbages, and kings” (to quote Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland). What we say and believe about these ordinary things are true, but they are ultimately made true by one thing: the whole universe. Schaffer's Monism should be thought of as an example of what we called ontological grounding in Section 3.4: parts of the universe exist and have essences that ensure that all of their properties and relations can be ultimately explained in terms of monadic properties of the whole universe.
Schaffer relies in part on modern physics in support of Monism, especially the phenomenon of quantum entanglement as described by quantum mechanics. When several particles become entangled together, they lose their individual identities, merging into a single, inseparable quantum system. On some, but not all, interpretations of quantum mechanics, the whole universe constitutes a single, entangled system, from the time of the Big Bang and ever thereafter.
However, this is true only on the so-called “no-collapse” interpretations of quantum mechanics. On the more standard Copenhagen interpretation, quantum systems collapse when interacting with observers. The collapse breaks the entanglement, giving rise to wholly separate, disentangled particles. Whether to accept the Copenhagen interpretation or the no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is itself a decision involving metaphysics. To the extent that common sense and ordinary experience tell us that the world consists of a number of things, they give us reason to reject the no-collapse interpretation.
Importantly, Schaffer doesn't deny that the universe has parts, in a sense. He simply denies that the parts of the universe (like you and us) are fundamentally real. Instead, our existence simply consists in the universe's being a certain way. For example, your existence consists in the universe's being human-ish at some place and time.
Schaffer offers two principal arguments for Monism. First, he appeals to the plausible principle that all fundamental entities have precise, determinate, and non-arbitrary or objective boundaries. If something is fundamentally real, then there should be a definite and objective fact whether or not it is located at any spatial point and whether or not it includes as a part any given material body.
Precise Boundaries of Fundamental Things. If something is a fundamental entity, then both its spatial boundaries and its material composition are precise, determinate, and objective.
Next, Schaffer contends that all spatial and material entities other than the whole universe have vague boundaries, boundaries that are indeterminate or arbitrary. This certainly seems true of ordinary objects, like ships or shoes or cabbages. There are particles near or on the surface of the thing that could be counted as part of the object or not, with equal reasonableness. Thus, Schaffer's argument goes as follows:
If something is a fundamental entity, then its boundaries and material composition are not vague.
The whole universe is the only material thing without vague boundaries and composition.
Therefore, there is only one fundamental material thing, namely, the universe.
This argument cannot establish Monism all by itself. It would have to be supplemented by a thesis of Materialism, the claim that all fundamental entities are material. If, for example, there are immaterial souls or angels, they could not be fundamental entities.
In addition, both premises of the argument could be challenged. Perhaps some fundamental things are ontically vague (a possibility we will explore in Section 12.2.2). Moreover, it isn't obvious that every material thing is vague. Some vagueness might be merely a matter of the limits of our knowledge (the thesis of Epistemicism—discussed in Section 12.2). If there are point particles or if there are precisely defined regions of space occupied by some unique glob of stuff, both these particles and these precisely defined globs would have precise and determinate boundaries.
Schaffer's second argument begins with the proposal that we must choose between Monism and
Atomism. That is, either there is only one fundamental thing, and everything else is merely a kind of virtual part of that One Big Thing, or else the only fundamental things are the metaphysical atoms, simple entities with no parts at all.
11.2T.1 Fundamental Atomism. Necessarily, every fundamental entity is atomic (lacking parts).
It would be redundant, Schaffer argues, to suppose that both wholes and their parts are equally fundamental. We should either choose the parts and treat the whole as nothing over and above its parts arranged in a certain way or we should choose the whole and treat the parts as merely virtual, as different aspects of the whole associated with different regions of space. Once we've made our choice, we should stick to it consistently, leading us ultimately to believe either in the One Big Thing or in the many small, indivisible things. That is, we should go for Monism or Fundamental Atomism.
This argument of Schaffer's turns on the possibility of atomless gunk, a notion that we explore in more detail in Section 22.4.2. Atomless gunk is a material body that is gunky.
Def D11.1 Gunky Body. A material body x is gunky if and only if x has parts but no ultimate parts, that is, for every part y of x, there is a distinct, still smaller part z of y.
Atomless gunk has parts but no ultimate parts. Each part of a bit of atomless gunk has parts of its own, and those parts have further parts, and so on, ad infinitum. Schaffer takes it as plausible that atomless gunk is a real possibility, that it is at least possible that some material bodies are gunky. In fact, there are live scientific theories that posit the gunkiness of matter. Schaffer therefore embraces the Possibility of Ubiquitous Gunk.
Principle of Natural Philosophy (PNatPhil) 1 Possibility of Ubiquitous (Atomless) Gunk. It is possible for nothing to exist but atomless gunk (things with parts but no atomic parts).
Schaffer also assumes that it is metaphysically necessary that something fundamental exists, a version of what we have called Aliquidism. We are now ready to give Schaffer's main argument for Monism:
If Monism is false, then Fundamental Atomism is true (i.e., every fundamental entity is atomic).
If Fundamental Atomism is true, then it is necessarily true.
It is possible for nothing to exist but atomless gunk. (Possibility of Ubiquitous Gunk)
Necessarily, if nothing exists but atomless gunk, then there are no atomic things. (From the definition of atomless gunk)
So, it is necessarily the case that if nothing exists but atomless gunk and Fundamental Atomism is true, there are no fundamental entities. (From 4 and the definition of Fundamental Atomism)
But, it is necessarily true that there are fundamental entities (since Aliquidism is necessarily true).
So, it is necessarily the case that if nothing exists but atomless gunk, then Fundamental Atomism is false. (From 5 and 6)
So, Fundamental Atomism is possibly false, since it is possible for nothing to exist but atomless gunk. (From 3 and 7)
So, Fundamental Atomism is in fact false (from 2 and 8).
So, Monism is true. (From 1 and 9)
The weakest part of Schaffer's argument is step 1: the forced choice between Monism and Fundamental Atomism. As we shall see in Chapter 22, there are other viable alternatives, alternatives that combine Pluralism with the thesis that some composite entities (like organisms and homogeneous continua) are fundamental.
In addition, Schaffer's position is vulnerable to a parallel argument against Monism. Let's say that A is an encompasser of B just in case B is a part of A. Then we can define ‘junk’ in a way parallel to our definition of ‘gunk’:
Def D11.2 Encompass. x encompasses y if and only if y is a proper part of x.
Def D11.3 Junky Body. A material body x is junky if and only if it has encompassers but no ultimate encompasser: that is, for every y that encompasses x, there is a distinct, still larger encompasser z of y.
If junky material bodies are possible, then it is possible for there to be no cosmos, since the cosmos is by definition something that has no further encompasser. This means that Monism is possibly false. But, if it is true, it is necessarily true. Hence, Monism is false.
Powerists have another reason for rejecting even a moderate form of Monism. Only fundamental things can bear powers, so Monism entails that there be just one power-bearing entity (namely, the world). This means that the only powers that could be exercised would be the immanent powers of the whole world. Active and passive powers cannot be exercised unless there exist at least two power-bearing entities, one to serve as the agent and one as the patient.
Consequently, if Monism were true, there would be no interactions at the fundamental level. We couldn't interact with the world since we are each part of the world, with no powers of our own. The world would be an extremely small world, a metaphysically lonely entity. This, in turn, would mean that Powerism would lack any special account of how we discover the powers of things through active experimentation (of the kind we described in Section 6.1.2). If Monism were true, it seems that Powerists would have to fall back on an essentially Neo-Humeist account of our knowledge of the laws of nature (as axioms in the best theory of the world), depriving Powerism of one of its most powerful motivations. This conclusion might be resisted if we could find a way for derivative entities to have derivative causal powers of the kind needed for the typical Powerist account of scientific knowledge. Perhaps we could think of the Cosmos as a kind of gigantic organism, whose state confers real but derivative powers on its integral parts.
Note
1. A similar regress could arise for Trope Nominalists, if they imagine that relations are tropes (presumably modifying tropes). Now, instead of exemplification as a tie between universals and particulars, we would need a modification relation between tropes and relata.
12
The Non-Existent and the Vaguely Existing
In this chapter, we take up two clusters of questions concerning existence. The first cluster (Section 12.1) concerns the scope of existence. How wide is the domain of existing things? Does it encompass absolutely everything, or can we speak meaningfully about non-existent things? The second cluster (Section 12.2) concerns vagueness and indeterminacy. Are there vague things and vague categories of things or is all vagueness a matter of referring indifferently to a large number of absolutely precise things? What is the ultimate source of vagueness? Is it ignorance, ambiguous language and concepts, or real indefiniteness in the things themselves?
12.1 Does Everything Exist?
In the last chapter, we considered whether anything exists, and, if so, how many things. Now we will turn to the converse question: does everything exist? Willard Van Orman Quine took it to be obvious that everything exists. When asked what there is, Quine replied that the obviously correct answer is simple: everything. This is Actualism:
12.1T Actualism. Everything (actually) exists.
Alexius Meinong was an early defender of Anti-Actualism (compare Chisholm 1982, Grossmann 1974, Paśniczek 1995, Perszyk 1993, Priest 2005, Routley 1979 and 1982). One of his statements of this position has been translated into the highly paradoxical sentence, “There are some things such that there are no such things.” The suggestion of paradox is considerably lessened in the original German, where the phrase translated ‘there are’ is ‘es gibt’ (literally, ‘it gives’). A better translation would be something like, “Some things are not.” This isn't self-contradictory or evidently absurd, in the way that “Some existing things do not exist” is. We thus formulate Anti-Actualism as follows:
12.1A Anti-Actualism. Some things don't (actually) exist.
If some things don't exist, must it at least be the case that everything could exist? Meinong and his followers deny even this, while Possibilists affirm that everything could exist.
12.1A 1T Possibilism. Some things don't exist, but everything could exist.
12.1A.1A Meinongianism. Some things couldn't exist.
Importantly, the debate between Actualists and Anti-Actualists does not turn
on the supposition that there are different modes of being like existence and something else (like mere subsistence). Meinong himself made a distinction between existence and mere subsistence. Concrete things, like physical objects or people, exist, while abstract things, like numbers, states of affairs, or similarities merely subsist. However, we are interested in Meinong's claim that some things do not even subsist. This has nothing to do with the existence/subsistence distinction. To simplify things, we will use ‘to exist’ and ‘to be’ interchangeably, in a way that is equivalent to Meinong's broader term, ‘to subsist’. Thus, we are concerned with the question of whether some things don't exist.
There are, at first glance, many examples of things that don't exist. Unicorns, golden mountains, and round squares don't exist. Mythical and fictional characters, like Santa Claus and Sherlock Holmes, don't exist. We can even say things like, “The innocence of Manson doesn't exist.” In addition, many objects of thought, perception, and intention don't exist. Ponce de León searched for something that doesn't exist, namely, the Fountain of Youth. In hallucinations, one can “see” (in some sense) non-existent things, and one can believe in non-existent things, as physicists once believed in the ether or as some astronomers believed in Vulcan, a supposed planet inside the orbit of Mercury.
There are, therefore, plausible truths that seem to involve or presuppose the existence of non-existent objects. Unicorns don't exist; Conan Doyle wrote about Sherlock Holmes; Ponce de León searched for the Fountain of Youth; and Benjamin believes in his imaginary friend. Actualists must argue that, contrary to appearances, these truths do not entail that some things don't exist. The appearance of reference to non-existent things, either individually or en masse, must be dispelled through an appropriate paraphrase: a proposition that lacks any such apparent reference and that is plausibly equivalent in content to the original proposition.
The Atlas of Reality Page 41
