by Simon Jones
According to Harvey, his proposal reached GHQ from the War Office on 28 December, but, writing after the war, Harvey recalled details which he may only have learned later, in particular:
…that certain men specially skilful in tunnelling clay – termed clay-kickers – were admirably suited for mining and sapping. As the soil on the British front was all clay of a sort his suggestion was at once agreed to and a demand for 500 of such men… sent to the War Office.25
According to Norton Griffiths his proposal got no further until 13 February 1915, when he received a telegram to report immediately to Lord Kitchener at the War Office. He described the meeting at a reunion of British Tunnellers in 1927:
Alone in his room at the War Office he showed me the urgent despatches which had been coming from Lord French, to the effect that unless some means could be found of checking the mining efforts of the Germans, he (Lord French) would probably have to withdraw certain sectors of the line. Lord Kitchener, to whom I had had the honour of being known, both in the South African campaign and in Egypt, asked me to amplify my suggested mining scheme. Just before this interview the Boche, it will be remembered, had given us a nasty blow at Ypres, had lifted, almost en bloc, most of the officers of one of the Lancers regiments then in the trenches in the Ypres sector, in a dug-out near Hill 60, and had buried some 22 or more at Givenchy, in addition to several minor mines they had sprung in our front trenches.
To his demand I replied that the only thing I could suggest, subject to examination of the ground, would be to use ‘Moles’. When he said, ‘What on earth are “Moles”?’ I said, ‘Clay Kickers, or workers on the cross’, using a North-country expression for this class of small tunnel mining. As his patience showed signs of giving way, I then proceeded to demonstrate, much to the amusement of Major-General Sir George Scott Moncrieff and others of the Army Council with the fire shovel from the War Office grate, and showed him lying on the floor, what a Clay Kicker really was, and what a small hole he could work in, with the result that he turned round and said, ‘Get ten thousand immediately.’ I replied that I did not think there were ten thousand in the British Isles, and that it would be necessary to examine the ground before one could ascertain whether this form of mining were possible. The result was I was off that very night to France, with two of my expert London underground tunnellers who were employed on important underground works at Manchester for that Corporation. (Sir John Norton Griffiths MP)26
Norton Griffiths was to have a profound impact on British mining capacity.
In the New Year mining over much of the Western Front rapidly escalated. West of the Argonne lay the Champagne region. The area of Hill 191, between Massiges on the French side and the hill called by the Germans Kanonenberg, was taken and retaken and saw the early acceleration of mine warfare. From Hill 191 the French had observation deep into the Aisne valley in the German rear. After spotting French spoil heaps, by means of mirrors on the trench parapet, the German pioneers embarked on countermeasures and sapped to within 20m of the French trenches. After several attempts to storm the trench failed with heavy casualties, they continued sapping on the night of 8 December and used mining to get to within 5m of the French positions. On the following evening they charged a mine and, once infantry were in place, the pioneer officer lit the fuse ‘using a cigar - matches were inappropriate because of the proximity to the enemy’.27 The charge blew a path into the French trench and also by chance detonated a French mine, destroying a significant part of the position.
On 20-21 December the French Colonial Corps launched a major attack and took the whole of the Massiges position, leaving the Germans 500 to 600m from the summit of Hill 191. The side of Hill 191 facing the Germans presented a steep escarpment and the Germans proceeded to sap up to the foot, from where they would be able to mine into the side of the hill protected from observation and fire. As the saps progressed, the French fire on them became heavier, forcing the Germans to sink their saps more deeply. The French also began to push forward saps, attempting unsuccessfully to counter the German advance, and, in the words of Captain Arndts, commanding the 4th Ruhr-Hessian Pioneers, ‘on both sides the saps strained forwards like antenna.’ By connecting the sap heads about 50m from the French a new trench system was formed as a base from which to begin the mining operations. The French made a determined attack to push back the Germans on 28 December but, after heavy grenade fights, the Germans regained control of their positions. The Pioneers used aerial photographs to assist in forming a survey accurate enough to begin mining and started driving six tunnels into the chalk at the end of December, four of which were against the escarpment position of Hill 191. The amount of work was such that a reinforcement company was placed under Arndts’s control. In line with siege practice, Arndts also dug a transversal defensive gallery running across his position from which listening could be carried out for French countermines. On 7 January they heard noises from the tunnel on the right flank, forward 20m, and from other points. Arndts blew a charge from his tunnel 3 on 9 January and the French occupied the crater until the Germans drove them out with grenades. On 13th, the French blew charges against tunnels 1 and 2, but without success. As the German tunnels progressed the pioneers could hear the French underground in front and on either side. The chalk conducted sound some distance and the Germans began to deliberately intensify work in the two defensive tunnels to mask the progress of the main attack galleries (1, 2, 5 and 6). On 21st they established by listening that the French had reached very close to the main galleries 5 and 6 and were able to blow one of the defensive galleries without damaging their attack galleries. The French miners still came on and could be heard continuously at work from all the German galleries:
Those who saw such mine warfare at its peak know what pressure on the nerves this underground struggle costs. Furthermore they know what sense of duty and what contempt for death are demanded foremost of the honest pioneers in the mining section who, in short breaks from work, strained to listen deep underground in bad air which hardly supported breathing... (Regimental historian of Ruhrhessische Pionier Bataillon Nr. 11)28
In the early hours of 23rd, the French blew against tunnel 2, destroying the defensive tunnel. They blew again shortly afterwards and a third time at 5pm, reaching close to the shaft of tunnel 2. It was vital that the French were stopped before they could destroy the shaft, as this would seriously set back the work. Throughout the night, in conditions of maximum quiet and care, the Germans loaded a large charge in tunnel 2, tamped and fired it. This was effective in halting French work in the area. On 26th, 27th and 28th there were alternative French and German blows at tunnels 6 and 4, but the main German galleries remained intact. The German deception measures apparently prevented the French from identifying the main threat. On 27th the four main galleries measured between 35 and 45m and the order was issued to enlarge the ends for each to take 5,000kg of gunpowder. Special carrying parties were organized to bring the 20,000kg of gunpowder into the trenches. Carrying the boxes of powder through the long saps exposed to French fire was particularly dangerous, as it was liable to be detonated by impact or naked flames. On the night of 30 January, tunnel 5 had been charged with about 4,000kg when some ignited at the tunnel entrance, but it burnt itself out before reaching the main charge. Charging was completed by the night of 1 February and the charges fused and tamped. The blowing of the mines was scheduled for 3 February and was to be followed immediately by an infantry attack. Heavy French shelling was directed particularly on the jumping-off trenches from which the Germans would attack, and on the morning of the attack this broke the detonator leads in several places, which had to be quickly repaired in time for the attack.
The mines were in two groups of two and the firing, carried out by Lieutenants Kühn and Oehlmann, was described by Arndts:
It was an unforgettable sight of terrible beauty, when on this day - zero 12 midday - four enormous columns of earth, each about 100m high, with a dull crash ascended high into the
air, and then collapsed majestically onto themselves. How then the earth from four craters spat out enormous masses of smoke, which veiled the whole area. It was the largest blow which had been carried out up to then on the western front. Over 400 hundredweight of powder was detonated at the same time. Complete portions of the enemy position flew into the air. The stone hail had hardly rained down when the infantry with the pioneers stormed forwards.29
An eyewitness description of the assault appeared in the Frankfurter Nachrichten:
We had worked feverishly four months long and for the last four days without sleep in order to make all preparations to make the attack. Mountains of small scaling ladders lie ready to be carried forward at night and all the equipment – shields, entrenching tools, flare cartridges, sandbags, ammunition etc. – lies ready brought up overnight. Now morning comes. Ceaselessly man after man trudges forwards with timbers, scaling ladders and equipment. Their boots stick over the ankles in the tough mud and with trouble they climb step by step the stairs, well-worn by hundreds of heavy boots, upwards to the copse. We move forward. The assault columns are already standing at the ready. Still some quietly spoken words and a handshake with the column commander. Watches are synchronized one last time. The slight rifle fire is as normal and betrays nothing of what is approaching. Again we check the time, still five minutes, then from four places in the enemy front line will be detonated the mines which our pioneers previously placed with indescribable troubles over 50m away under the enemy position. Now two minutes to go. We stand crouching in the trench – still ten seconds – then one second – two muffled explosions. I see, like volcanoes, as high as a house – no a steeple – four black fountains of earth. Human body parts, cubic metre-sized lumps of earth fly, turning ponderously, into the air. It grows dark. Masses of earth now come clattering down. Many men are buried up to the waist. They must be dug free.
Nearly in the same instant, without wavering, the assault wave of our column takes the mine craters. Terror has seized the enemy. Already numerous prisoners are appearing who, escaping the explosion, wish to save themselves by promptly surrendering. Right and left, in unison, the storm columns jump forward. With the motto ‘on, then through!’ the second and third lines of enemy trenches are also taken in a rapid assault.30
In fact many attackers were injured by falling debris from their own mines, having been too close to the blows.
Mine charge chamber with tamping in bricks, sandbags and timber bracing. From the German demolitions regulations (Sprengvorschrift) of 1911.
The German mining attack on Hill 191 of 3 February 1915. The four mines are shown as circles at the ends of the saps. From Das Ehrenbuch der Deutschen Pioniere.
On 17 February the French carried out attacks preceded by mine explosions on the ridges of Éparges and Vauquois. These ridges, providing important observation east and west of Verdun, were to become major centres of underground warfare. The Éparges ridge, 320m in height, allowed the Germans observation across the Woëvre plain towards Verdun. The French Company 14/15, under Captain JeanLouis-Laurent Gunther, began sapping and mining up the northern and western slopes in mid-November 1914. On 7 February there were signs that the Germans had taken underground countermeasures against the westernmost mines driven from four saps and, so as not to lose four months of work, it was decided to blow these and for the infantry to assault the western part of the ridge on 17 February. The four mines were blown at 1400 but, unlike other mining attacks, this was not the signal for the infantry assault, but for the start of an hour-long artillery preparation, following the methodical procedure of a siege, whereby the artillery and mines together gradually broke down the defences and the artillery bombardment would prevent the Germans from occupying the mine craters. However, it ran the danger of losing the shock value of the mines. The infantry waited at the foot of the slopes at the entrances of the saps until the mines were blown, at which point they entered the saps to be ready to rush the craters as soon as the bombardment lifted at 1500.32 An infantry officer of one of the assaulting columns described the agony of waiting to attack and the moment that the mines were blown:
Everything is empty. I can feel or express nothing but this. All that normally makes up the world, the flow of sensations, thoughts and memories which carry each second of time, nothing is left of them, nothing. No consciousness penetrates the suspense; neither anguish, nor the vague desire of what may occur. All is insignificant, it no longer exists: the world is empty.
And it is at first, against our crouching bodies, a heavy shudder of the ground. We are upright when the monstrous, white fumes, specked with fluttering black things, rise up at the edge of the plateau behind the lines near the horizon. They do not shoot up but expand into immense plumes, which separate one from another, more and more, until forming these four smoking monsters, motionless and riddled with dark projectiles. Now the mines thunder, heavily, gruesomely, like vapours. The noise ebbs, rolls over our shoulders; and at once, on the other side, in every valley, on the whole plain and also the sky, the guns release the breaking floodgates of tumult.
‘Forward! Single file; behind me.’
We climb up towards the entrance to the communication trench without seeing it, buffeted by the tremendous uproar, staggered, crushed, dogged and furious.
‘Forward! Quick!’ The sky splits, cracks and crumbles. The hammered ground gasps for breath. We no longer see anything but a reddish-brown dust which flames or bleeds, and sometimes, through this sooty black and stinking cloud, a fresh stream of adorable sun, a tatter of dying sun.
‘Forward! Follow me… Forward… Follow me…’ (Second Lieutenant Maurice Genevoix, 2nd Battalion 106th Infantry Regiment)33
Genevoix’s battalion moved up the four saps, from the ends of which the mines had been laid, and at 1500 the artillery lengthened its range and infantry and engineers left the saps to capture the craters. The mines and the bombardment were effective in breaking down the defences and the French took and held the western part of the ridge. There unfolded on Éparges a ferocious underground warfare which lasted until the autumn of 1917.34
As predicted by some military engineers before the war, mining was indeed reverted to as a means of overcoming field fortifications. When taken up it was carried on as part of an established methodology of siege warfare, a series of well-described procedures tested over centuries. Both the Germans and French used mining to bite off parts of their opponent’s defensive systems. Mining, however, required yet more men and trench warfare already drew in large numbers of engineers to maintain and supply defences.
But for a lack of manpower, French and German, and to a lesser extent British, military engineers regarded mining as being well within their technical ability. During 1915 the use of mining would rapidly escalate and in the process many of the practices of siege warfare would be modified or cast off. Ultimately it was the British, starting with the least technical skill, who were to most fully embrace mining.
The western end of the Éparges ridge, showing the saps from which mines were blown. Maurice Genevoix led the second wave at Sap 6. From Feriet, La Crête des Éparges.
Chapter 3
French Mining Sectors: Carency, Oise, Les Éparges and Vauquois
Carency
Mining operations between the French and Germans reached an intense level in 1915. Initial French success in some sectors was followed in 1916 by German supremacy. An early and celebrated French success was against the German-held village of Carency at the north of Vimy ridge. Sapping and mining preparations towards the defences of Carency were set in motion by the French on 1 January 1915. Three points were identified for attack (designated Alpha, Beta and Gamma salients) and preparations for five saps made by widening the communication trenches and bringing up two trench guns. Continuous rain and vigorous bombing accompanied the sapping, and the French lost a sapper killed and four wounded when a German bomb fell into a sap head. As the saps neared the German lines they were linked to form a new front line
. On 6 January, before the new defences were complete, the French began to mine towards Beta salient, and the next day heard the first German countermines. On the 8th the rain rendered progress impossible and the trenches became impassable, as the labour needed for sapping and mining meant that the engineers were unable to build shelters or drain the trenches. From 18 January the French heard more noises, which became so distinct in Gallery 1 that they feared the Germans would break into their gallery. They used a hand borer to drill from the front line towards the noises, which they blew with 10kg of cheddite, a commercial blasting explosive introduced by the French for military use in November 1914. As the mine galleries progressed, the scale of timber and materials required became a problem. The Germans had clear observation over their rear positions and began to shell the dump immediately behind the trenches. The mine timbers had to be carried up 800m of communication trenches to the mines and large fatigue parties were needed for this dangerous and unpleasant duty. By 29 January, however, the French had charged three mines in front of each salient, ready for an attack on Carency. The attack, however, was postponed and the engineers were redeployed onto the defensive works, which had been neglected while mining. Not for the last time were miners to experience the difficulty of coordinating their intensive labour to the timetable of a wider operation with which, to be effective, they must be synchronized. Their predicament was now that they did not know how the charges would fare if left: the gunpowder was susceptible to damp and the detonating cord was liable to be damaged by mortar fire. In addition, the Germans now had time to mine themselves. When the French heard them approaching the charge laid at Gallery 1, they detonated a small bored mine of 10kg of cheddite, the largest they could blow without affecting the charge already laid. They decided to use the threatened charge in conjunction with a raid, at 0445 the next morning. As the debris fell the infantry ran forward, temporarily occupying the resulting crater, which was about 15m in diameter, and entered the adjacent German trenches. They did not remain in the crater, but found evidence in the German trenches of numerous new mine entrances. On the 8th the Germans blew their first mine. They did not damage the French positions, but the blow served as a warning that mine warfare was now fully engaged in. The French, having only Gallery 1 to counter the large number of workings begun from the Alpha salient, soon discovered that they had lost the initiative. As a rather desperate defensive measure, they drilled a large number of boreholes from their front line trench, with which to blow charges. They hoped that these would impede German progress underground by breaking up the ground, making it unstable and saturating it with hazardous gas. This did not prove viable, but they used the bores as a means of listening and deepened two shafts in the front line to 8m (G2 and G3). They also prepared new tunnels towards Beta and Gamma from points behind their front line trenches, to begin a new, deeper, underground attack. Previously the practice had been to begin galleries as close to the enemy as possible and to drive short, shallow tunnels with the maximum speed and minimum effort. In order now to drive beneath the German tunnels, they started further back to get greater depth. Not having to incline the tunnel too steeply facilitated more rapid removal of spoil.
