by Simon Jones
The British, therefore, were holding craters 2 and 3, and crater 6 and the adjacent crater (called 7), although it was reported that they held all four central mine craters. The point after the attack was the most vulnerable to German counterattack – before the attackers had time to construct defences and bring up ammunition they could be cut off by a barrage. The charge supposed to blow a trench to mine No.1 failed to explode and other efforts to dig communication trenches to the positions held proved unsuccessful under the heavy German fire and in the sticky and loose debris thrown up by the mines. Consolidation proved very difficult: the mines had destroyed the drainage installed in the German trenches and they began steadily to fill with water, and rain became heavier.
Over the following week, British attempts to gain a line beyond the craters were unsuccessful. Finally, in an attack in the early morning of 3 April, they took the four central craters. General Haldane confirmed this for himself by going round the whole front that morning, but consolidation had hardly begun. The 2nd Canadian Division was due to relieve the British 3rd Division during the night and the Canadians could barely find a front line distinguishable as such. There was no wire in front of the trenches, which were collapsed and just a series of shallow ditches. The four large craters formed a continuous and almost impassable obstacle and the only route was around the flanks; carrying parties had to be roped together to rescue men from shell-holes, wounded and dead lay half-buried in the mud and the line was held by a series of detached posts.33 Brigadier General Ketchen, commanding the 6th Canadian Brigade, fully expected a German counterattack. He concluded that the line beyond the craters was untenable, as it was observed by the Germans on the Ypres ridge. It was impossible to drain the trenches and German shelling prevented work to strengthen the position. He wished therefore to hold only the rear lips of the craters. However, the German attack came on the night of 5 April: they took all four central craters and secured the area with an intense barrage while they consolidated. Attempts to retake the craters were foiled by broken communications and confusion as to finding objectives. A Canadian bombing party reported itself in Craters 4 and 5 when they were holding Craters 6 and 7 (making the same error as the Royal Fusiliers):
In a broken sea of old and new craters, shell holes and damaged trenches, where if men even dared to raise their heads above the surface by daylight they were shot, orientation was practically impossible. There were seventeen mine craters in the area, and although Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 were the largest, the troops did not know this, and any one pair of craters might only too easily be mistaken for another.34
When it transpired that the Germans held the four large craters, it was accepted that the only option was to withdraw from the craters and attempt to render them untenable to the Germans, just as they had to the British. The British in fact lacked the heavy artillery ammunition they needed and the Germans proceeded skilfully to drain and fortify the craters. On 19 April the Germans succeeded in driving the Canadians from craters 6 and 7, failing against Crater 1. The Canadians held the original front line and the Germans held and had consolidated the four large craters.
The operation had been a failure and the advantage of the mines was lost. Douglas summed up the results for 172 Company: ‘…our work had been more or less useless except as a great blow to German morale and the killing of several hundred of their troops.’35
The reasons for the failure of the attack lay in the problem of integrating mines into the attack and the inability to hold the position once captured. The reports and enquiries into the loss of the craters drew a number of lessons. Major General Haldane reported that the psychological impact of the mines was very great, not only on the Germans but also on the attackers: ‘The explosion of the mines had a curious paralysing effect on our men for a few seconds only.’36
The Royal Fusiliers were not prepared for the fact that the six mines would not fire simultaneously. This was inevitable with multiple blows, but it had a crucial effect on their attack. Despite their earth-shaking power, the effects of the mines were also very local. There was barely a need to delay the infantry advance after the detonation of the mines as the debris fell much faster than expected. Brigadier General Potter stated: ‘60 yards is about the limit of debris of a dangerous size even from very large mines and Infantry can safely advance 15 seconds after the explosion.’37
No attacking troops were injured by falling debris. Haldane reported that no heavy fragments fell further than 50yds beyond the crater lips and ‘very little of any kind but dust beyond about 80 yards’. No one had experience of the effects of very large mine charges and Stevenson, the 2nd Army Controller of Mines, had estimated three times these figures. Although reports were contradictory as to whether the British front line trenches were damaged by the blows, the infantry could possibly have laid out closer to the mines before attacking, that is, in front of their trenches rather than behind. Haldane criticized the location of the mines as being too close together. In the wet ground, the mixture of clay and sand slurry scattered by the explosions was particularly sticky and treacherous. It made moving anywhere near the craters extremely difficult and meant that it was impossible to pass between the four central craters: ‘… on a front of 700 yards, 500 yards was rendered practically impassable to Infantry and the attack was narrowed down to a front of 100 yards on either flank.’38
The attack could only be launched at the shoulders of the salient and this worsened the problem of the two battalions making contact and thus consolidating. The attempt to consolidate and hold the position was also made particularly difficult by the very bad state of the ground, which prevented both movement and digging. Communication trenches to the captured positions, not started beforehand because of German observation, were almost impossible to construct after capture for the same reason and were under heavy German artillery fire. The charge placed by a forcing jack, which was supposed to blow a communication trench to crater No.1 failed, for reasons that are unclear. Reports state that it either failed to go off, or did but only resulted in wrecking the existing British trench.
The confused landscape proved disastrous when it came to relieving the attacking troops. Efforts were made to prepare the attackers for the changes in the landscape that the mines would bring; for example the craters were marked on the taped training ground. The mines, nevertheless, had a fatal effect on the British and Canadians’ orientation in the position. The 3rd Division was already weakened and tired by operations at the Bluff and the attacking troops had to be relieved immediately after the attack. The whole Division was then relieved by the 2nd Canadian Division before the position was properly consolidated or fully understood by the troops in occupation, with the consequence that the Canadians made the same mistakes as the British in the confused mass of mine craters.
Haldane put forward another reason why his two battalions did not link up, despite his impressing beforehand on the two commanders the need to push along adjoining trenches to assist one another: ‘But for this most unfortunate error… which I can only attribute to the inexperience of the present junior infantry officers, this would have been done…’39
In fact, of the 14 Royal Fusiliers officers in the attack, eleven were casualties. There was nevertheless a contrast between the ability of junior officers and NCOs in the British and German armies to act on their own initiative: the superior German ability to take and hold mine craters was just one manifestation of this.
General Plumer placed blame further up the chain of command:
Major General Haldane attributes the failure in a great measure to the inexperience and lack of military knowledge of the subordinate commanders, but I consider the onus of responsibility lay in the first instance with the Officer Commanding the left battalion – Lieut. Colonel G.C. Ottley of the 4th Royal Fusiliers and Brig-General H.C. Potter commanding 9th Infantry Brigade.40
Plumer commented to GHQ that whilst Haldane’s attack was ‘well planned and most carefully worked out’, he had not suffic
iently taken into account the difficulty of holding the position:
I do not think Major General Haldane impressed on his subordinate Commanders sufficiently the importance of taking steps to ensure that the mine craters should not fall into the enemy’s hands. Whatever opinion he may hold as to the best means to take to defend them and good as the original objective line was the possibility of its being rendered untenable by heavy artillery fire was not sufficiently taken into account.41
Ultimately, the St Eloi attack was on too small a front, a failing which was beyond Haldane’s control, but which was the Corps and Army commanders’ responsibility. Plumer felt obliged to use the St Eloi mines for fear of losing them before he was ready to make real use of them. The Germans had very good observation over the position at St Eloi and so could concentrate artillery fire and render it untenable. An attack on a wider front, as was under preparation on the Somme, might have seemed to be a means of preventing this. The British were struggling with the problems of coordinated attacks, in particular the artillery barrages which were being developed, whereby troops could advance behind their protection. Timing was critical to the success of this method, as shown at St Eloi by the success of the Northumberlands and the failure of the Royal Fusiliers. Adding mines to this equation served to complicate the problem further.
The method of consolidating the near lip of a mine crater, which has been incorporated into the front line. Note the use of observation tunnels to monitor activity inside and on the far lip. Issued by British GHQ, May 1916. From Notes on Trench Warfare for Infantry Officers.
The method of converting the area behind occupied craters into a strong post. The British usually found it too dangerous to occupy the interior of a crater owing to German mortar and rifle grenade fire. Issued by British GHQ, May 1916. From Notes on Trench Warfare for Infantry Officers.
To improve the British performance at taking mine craters and consolidating and holding captured positions, GHQ issued a set of printed instructions in May 1916. These emphasized that: ‘success will only result if there is also an absolute determination on the part of all ranks to get the work done promptly at all costs.’42
When mines were blown, whether by the British or Germans, parties were to be rushed out immediately to seize the crater lip. If blown by the British in an attack on the German trenches, the object should be to seize and hold the whole crater, or a line in front of the crater. It was usually better to hold a line in front and to turn the crater or craters into strong points. When the craters were blown by the Germans, either as a result of an attack overland or fighting underground, troops were usually to seize and hold the near lip only. The British blew practice mines behind the lines to train their troops in capture and consolidation, two in May and one in June of 1916. The Inspector of Mines also made efforts to have these explosions filmed, probably because this was a means of observing and timing the fall of debris.43
Given their performance at St Eloi, it is perhaps fortunate for the British that the mining attack on the Messines ridge did not take place in 1916. Haig’s Flanders attack was to fall victim to the requirements of coalition warfare, as he was obliged to cooperate with General Joffre in his proposed attack on the Somme. In contrast to the Flanders position, in which Haig saw real strategic possibilities, the Somme was chosen by Joffre solely because it formed a junction of the French and British forces and so was convenient for a joint attack. At the beginning of 1916, however, it seemed that the Flanders attack could still be the main British offensive of the summer, and throughout the first half of 1916 Haig kept the attack under preparation. The major German attack on the French at Verdun, which began on 21 February 1916, at first made it seem that the Flanders attack would take precedence over the Somme, as the French would not now be able to cooperate in the Somme attack. On 10 April British GHQ instructed Plumer to submit promptly his plan for capturing the Messines Ridge and its northern continuation, the Pilckem Ridge, with an attack to start on 15 July.44 On 27 May he was ordered to press his preparations with all speed. The ferocious battle at Verdun had the effect of severely reducing the French contribution to the Somme offensive, but the British were obliged to mount their part of the attack regardless. By 4 June the Flanders attack was scaled back to include just the Messines element, because Rawlinson’s 4th Army was to be too far committed to the Somme offensive to attack in Flanders. Haig clung to the possibility that if the Somme attack was not a success, Gough’s Reserve Army could still be sent to Messines. However, after the decision to continue the Somme attack in early July despite the disastrous first day, the Messines attack was further reduced in scale and the date altered to 31 July. It was then postponed again, and by mid-August it was apparent that it would not take place in 1916.
Mining, however, came to dominate day-to-day trench warfare on the Western Front. In 1916 the British blew 750 mines and camouflets, while the Germans blew 696 against the British. The most active month was June and the most active sector was the front of the British First Army, which centred on the area Givenchy-lez-La Bassée, Hulluch and Loos.45 The value of mines blown which were not part of a wider offensive plan was questionable given the labour which each required. On the Somme front, however, the British were attempting to use mining for the breakthrough offensive of 1916.
Chapter 6
The Somme 1916
The Somme, and not Haig’s Flanders operation, became the major British operation of 1916. The BEF took over the northern Somme sector from the French in July and August 1915. Although the front of fourteen miles was largely quiet, there were parts which had seen very fierce but local fighting in the winter of 1914 and the spring of 1915. In a number of places mine warfare had broken out, in particular at Carnoy, Bois Français, Fricourt and La Boisselle. General Fowke moved 174 and 183 Tunnelling Companies south, but the British did not have enough miners to take over the large number of French shafts and they agreed to leave their engineers at work for several weeks. To provide the tunnellers needed the British formed 178 and 179 Companies in August, followed by 185 and 252 Companies in October. These units were created partly by recruiting men from units in the sectors and partly from enlistment at home. Good recruits were still found from units such as the 51st Highland Division, which included many Territorials who were professional coal miners from the Fife coalfields. Those miners coming from home were increasingly unfit and many were sent home soon after arrival in France, or within a few weeks, especially during the winter of 1915-16.
The British found shafts of 20–30ft depth, mainly sunk from the front line or close behind. The Germans had the advantage in all of the sectors and in many places were very close to or actually below the front line taken over by the British. During the autumn and winter these companies fought a hard battle. They had first to secure the British lines, in places having to abandon the front line and beginning a new series of shafts further back. The British tunnellers regarded their French counterparts as unproductive, using tunnels which were too cramped for effective working and with excessive timbering, which further slowed their progress. Close below the surface was chalk and inclined entrances were largely used, as the chalk would support them and they facilitated the removal of spoil by tramming. As they sank deeper the chalk became extremely hard and both sides used blasting, especially when closer to their own lines, but it was a method which alerted the other side to activity. The Germans did not feel much threatened until the early months of 1916, by which time the British had created defensive systems at around 40ft depth, including transversals to protect their front lines and deep attack tunnels just above the water level, which they encountered at about 100ft. As the British were achieving this, however, they also relieved more of the French front, at Arras and Vimy Ridge, which contained active mining areas, and in February 184 and 185 Companies were withdrawn from the Somme and sent north. At the beginning of March 1916, Haig formed the 4th Army, which took over the Somme front in order to carry out the Franco-British attack due to begin
in June. He placed General Rawlinson in command and Rawlinson obtained Preedy, whose 170 Company had just carried out the Hohenzollern mining attack, as his Controller of Mines. The five remaining Tunnelling companies on the Somme front were to play a major part in the Somme offensive, especially the first day of the infantry attack.
The Somme was to be characterized by yet larger mines, laid deep in the chalk and often overcharged to throw up high lips for screening and to give advantage to the attackers when, or if, they captured them. The tunnellers were to make two major contributions to the opening attack. Firstly they placed a number of mines beneath or close to the German front lines. Secondly they prepared a series of shallow Russian saps from the British front line into no man’s land (see Chapter 9). Rawlinson’s original attack plan was for a limited advance such as he had evolved during spring and summer 1915, concentrating on taking the first line of German trenches in a tactic that he called ‘bite and hold’. This was a safer method of proceeding, but was extremely slow and politically unacceptable, as the Government believed that the BEF now had both the manpower and munitions to beat the Germans. Haig therefore required Rawlinson to redraw his plan to capture all of the German in-depth defences in his initial attack, to allow a general advance. Rawlinson acquiesced, even though he knew that his artillery was insufficient to destroy either the defences or the defenders to such a depth. Haig likewise complied with the desire of the British government for a quick victory, despite reservations that he had about the ability of his forces to fight effectively. The infantry attack was preceded by a six-day bombardment, prolonged so that the British artillery could shell all of the German defences.
