by Simon Jones
Hence, after a particularly tragic disaster on Vimy Ridge, an order appeared one day that no dugout in the front line was to be more than two metres deep, and that all those already in existence were to be blown up.
What this iron order meant can be understood only by those who know the mass of stuff that, often without a break for weeks together, was flung on the trenches. To have to crouch under fire without cover, belaboured without a pause by shells of a calibre sufficient each one to lay a fair-sized village in ruins, without any distraction beyond counting the hits mechanically in a half-dazed condition, is an experience that almost passes the limits of human endurance. For this reason the men who issued the order, and threw hundreds of thousands naked and defenceless into the fire, took on themselves one of the heaviest responsibilities the mind can conceive. And yet, even though I may be one of the victims, I can but admit they were right.53
The northern section of the Givenchy–Hulluch subways, showing the transversal converted into an infantry communication tunnel and the extension, Caledonian or Bunny Hutch tunnel. From Ball, ‘The Work of the Miner on the Western Front’.
The infantry dugouts and defensive tunnels, in the same area, showing in addition the tunnel linking Givenchy Keep with Marie Redoubt. From Grieve and Newman, Tunnellers.
In contrast to the Germans, the British expanded underground accommodation in parts of their front line although, like the Germans, they made lavish use of dugouts and tunnels for support and counterattack troops. On the 1st Army front north of Vimy Ridge, where the opposing mine systems reached an impasse in the summer of 1916, the British enlarged their transversal tunnel, which ran beneath or in front of their front line into a communication subway in which it was possible to walk underground almost continuously for four miles.54 The northernmost portion of this line was at Givenchy-lès-la-Bassée and here, during the German attacks in April 1918, the British underground defences were put to a severe test. At Givenchy the subway ran for about 720yds beneath the British front line up to the northernmost point at Bunny Hutch shaft head where it ran back at a right angle to Moat Farm in the support lines. This tunnel, called Bunny Hutch or Caledonian tunnel, was dug by 251 Tunnelling Company to provide an additional access to the mine system in case the Germans should have gained occupation of the British front line and they had to blow the shaft head. The underground defences in Givenchy had been conceived in the summer of 1916 by the 1st Army Controller of Mines, Lt Col G.C. Williams, and the scheme, described by the commander of 251 Company, Major H.J. Humphrys, was:
...that the front line should consist of a number of detached posts, strongly fortified, access to which should be obtained by interconnected underground tunnels, well lighted and connected to dug-outs and forward headquarters, all of which should be constructed by the tunnelling companies.55
Off Bunny Hutch tunnel was a complex of dugouts housing troops for counterattack. A separate tunnel linked two key strong points in the support line, Givenchy Keep and Marie Redoubt, 300yds apart, and included dugouts to accommodate two battalions with 40ft of cover and numerous exits. In March 1918, the 55th West Lancashire Division practised daily evacuation of the tunnels and dugouts to man the Givenchy positions as rapidly as possible.56 This sector was recognized as of key significance owing to the coalfields in the area and the proximity to the Flanders battlefield, which was the main line protecting the channel ports. The German attack of 9 April, the opening of the Battle of the Lys, fell primarily on a Portuguese division, which gave way, but to the south the 55th Division halted the German advance. On the morning of the attack the Germans penetrated 300yds into the village as far as the church, but isolated posts in the front line held out and strong points in the rear halted the attackers. During the morning British counterattack platoons drove the Germans out of the Givenchy positions. The attack failed because the Germans did not follow the tactics required to deal with underground defences: they did not keep up with their barrage to catch the defenders underground and did not mop up the British in the posts that they bypassed when penetrating.
In a subsequent attack on 18 April the Germans showed more preparation for overcoming the underground defences. The British 1st Division, which had relieved the 55th thirty-six hours previously, was not practised in the defence of the sector and in particular in making a rapid exit from the dugouts and tunnels in the event of attack. The attackers this time kept very close to their barrage (aided apparently by heavy guns firing short) and rushed the front line from just 40yds at the moment that their barrage moved forward. The tunnel exits, probably identified during the previous attack, were targeted by the Germans with gas shells and fire was particularly heavy around the Moat Farm and Givenchy Keep dugouts. The two right companies of the 1st Black Watch were caught before they could emerge from their dugouts and possibly also the enlarged transversal tunnel. Despite the strong points suffering direct hits by heavy shells on both shaft heads they nevertheless resisted the fire. All troops except for a few lookouts remained below and the Adjutant of 251 Tunnelling Company, Captain E.J. Ritchie, described the precautions taken by the miners:
Following the procedure which had been agreed upon, parties of one N.C.O. and a few sappers were detailed to remain at the bottom of each stairway or entrance, with orders to effect any necessary repairs and to blow the stairway or entrance should the enemy gain possession of the trenches.57
The left of the Black Watch held out at Givenchy Keep and was reinforced via the tunnel by Loyal North Lancashires from Marie Redoubt. The Moat Farm position, used as a dressing station, was filled with wounded and, Ritchie recounted, the British were caught in Bunny Hutch tunnel:
Unfortunately, at one time the enemy gained a strong footing in the trenches at the dug-out entrances and as they had commenced throwing gas bombs down, the position had to be surrendered on humane grounds, for the sake of the wounded below.58
The survivors were ordered out by the Germans, the NCOs first, followed by the other ranks. A wounded tunnelling officer was carried out on a stretcher by his men.59 Before dark, however, a British counterattack retook their trenches. Ritchie was in no doubt that the underground defences were the key to repelling the attack:
This battle justified the Controller of Mines policy of deep dug-outs, as without the deep dugouts, there is no infantry in the world that could have held Givenchy Ridge that day, because the intense bombardment in the early morning would have wiped them out, whereas our casualties through shell fire were comparatively light up to the time of the general attack.60
However, the battle again showed the vulnerability of deep dugouts and tunnels if troops were not well-trained in rapid evacuation the moment the barrage passed over, and the danger if the attacker gained control of all entrances. It also showed the Germans adopting the methods which the Allies had developed for overcoming deep shelters.
Deep dugouts, caves and subways offered great advantages both to defenders and attackers. In particular the British disaster of 1 July 1916 stands as the most successful use of underground shelters in withstanding prolonged artillery bombardment and enabling the infantry garrison to repel an infantry attack. The Germans used deep underground shelters to great advantage in their defensive battles of 1915 to 1916. In late 1916 the Allied experience in dealing with them caused the Germans to radically alter their defensive theory and abandon their use in the front line. The dissemination of the new doctrine throughout the German army took time, however. The Allies’ lack of experience of the defensive battle was exposed by the German attacks of spring 1918, but the example of Givenchy shows the successful British use of underground defences and the shortfalls of German attack tactics in dealing with linked centres of resistance of the type that they had invented and used so effectively in 1916. Subways and underground accommodation aided attackers at Verdun and Vimy, but could not solve the problem of crossing no man’s land. Caves and subways offered great advantages to attacking infantry in concealment, shelter and rest in the days bef
ore an attack during their own bombardment and the increased enemy shelling that it attracted. Such refuges meant that troops were able to advance to the attack direct from their places of rest without an exhausting and dangerous approach march into battle. The use of subways at Arras and Vimy was part of greater British and Canadian experience in running and coordinating operations. Their use in 1917 reduced many of the dangers and difficulties faced by the British at the Somme in 1916 when their trenches were heavily shelled and become congested by wounded men. Accommodation and communication tunnels, however, were highly vulnerable to any kind of fluidity returning to operations. Enemy withdrawal rendered the work useless, while rapid advance placed the garrisons at great risk. By the summer of 1917 deep underground shelters in the front line were largely rendered obsolete by more effective methods of attack.
Chapter 11
Conclusion
Siege warfare reached its highest level of development during 1914 to 1918 in a war which was not a siege. Although Germany had rejected military mining by 1914, it was nevertheless able quickly to revive its capability through the availability of fortress troops which could be attached to its field army. There seemed no alternative but to mine on the Western Front as a means of breaking the strong field defences. Germany dominated mining during 1914 to 1915 and continued to maintain supremacy against France throughout the war. The British mining success was the result of the willingness to divert considerable manpower resources and the ability to recruit and integrate civilian specialists into the BEF. If ever there was an example of an individual making a difference it was Sir John Norton Griffiths who, through his force of personality and influence, ensured that full use was made of available technical expertise. Norton Griffiths also pushed for mining to be used on a large scale, which required the reforms carried out in early 1916 whereby control of mining was vested in the General Staff and at Army level in the BEF. This ensured that the potential advantage which the BEF gained from mining was directed towards the largest possible tactical goal. However, having assembled the means to carry out mining operations, the BEF had difficulty in making effective use of it and in 1916 lacked the skill and experience to conduct complex operations. Symptomatic of this were both the superior ability of the Germans to take mine craters compared to the British, and the tragedy of 1 July 1916.
German control of mining remained at divisional level and the British success at Messines in June 1917 can be ascribed in part to the British adoption of the tactical control of mining at Army level, with an Inspector of Mines at GHQ. The German failure to do so allowed local considerations to prevail over mining policy, and the failure to enforce in-depth defence where this would have negated much of the British mining effort. The German failure also stemmed from inability to create units which were as effective as the British by channelling the right manpower into the units, to provide them with as good equipment, to give mining priority and to allow the tunnelling companies to run themselves effectively. There seemed no need for the German pioneers to relinquish control of units which were carrying out a long-established activity which they knew well how to do. Among the British there was both a more serious knowledge vacuum and also a tradition of amateur soldiering, which allowed in particular the civilian middle classes and skilled workers a foothold into the military caste. For this reason it is impossible to imagine a Norton Griffiths figure being tolerated in the German army.
The nineteen mines undoubtedly contributed to the victory of Messines and this was rightly regarded by the miners as their greatest success, where their efforts were properly used and integrated into the heart of the attack plan. The Germans were not, as has been claimed, intending to withdraw from the ridge. However, by mid1917 the effectiveness of mining was becoming diminished by the use of in-depth defence by the Germans. Messines was a bite and hold battle, albeit on a large scale, which was a prelude to further operations in which mining could play no part. It was part of a process of wearing down the Germans and of convincing them that, no matter how they changed their tactics, the British had the will and the means to overcome their defences. The key to the operations which followed Messines, however, was the integration of artillery with infantry, tanks and aircraft - in short the all-arms battle – which restored a degree of mobility and momentum to operations. The invention of this type of battle was the military revolution which occurred during 1914–18. Military mining was expanded by mass mobilisation and technology to a scale and intensity which was without precedent but, at the moment of its zenith, it had become obsolete. The scaling down of mining in 1917 by Germany and France, and subsequently also Britain, indicates that it did not have a role in future operations. The integrated battle was the key to breaking the deadlock of the Western Front, but mining served a purpose in rendering vulnerable powerful linear defence lines. In retrospect some may say that it was not worth the effort, but at the time there seemed no alternative.
The wasted British effort of Russian saps during the Somme was also largely due to lack of experience of operations. Open and closed sapping was tried and rejected by the French during 1915 and employed with mixed results at Gallipoli. The lack of use to which the Russian saps were put on the Somme has led to assertions about their missed potential. The idea of troops disgorging from tunnels which had been driven across no man’s land undetected by the enemy remains a fantasy of fiction writers. That they were not attempted as a means of crossing no man’s land after 1916 suggests that no one at the time seriously believed that such a method was feasible. To understand what might have been on the Somme we should look at the Battles of Vimy and Arras, where tunnels were used as a means of concealing and protecting troops prior to the attack immediately behind the jumping-off positions. At Arras most of the tunnels driven up to the front line and into no man’s land were rendered useless by the German withdrawal. Trench warfare, after all, involved highly developed field defences and not the permanent fortresses against which mining had been traditionally used.
The most extensive role for underground warfare in the inter-war period was in the French Maginot line defences, which were carefully prepared against mining attack and incorporated countermines with seismomicrophones. The British reformed Tunnelling Companies in 1939, resurrecting the same numbers as had been used in 1915–18, but they never regained their role. Some retained their tunnelling function in Gibraltar, while others were used in bomb disposal where shaft-sinking was required. The German Atlantic Wall defences incorporated tunnelled accommodation but relied principally on concrete for resistance to bombardment. The most important use during the Second World War of underground defences was for civilian protection against air raids, and this continued in the Cold War era with defence against nuclear attack. In 1953 a plan was conceived to drive a half-mile tunnel from the American to the Russian sectors of Berlin in order to tap cables carrying signals traffic between the HQ of Soviet Forces in Berlin and Moscow. The Americans drove the tunnel and the British task was to tunnel upwards and install a tap chamber adjacent to the cables. No.1 Specialist Team RE was formed with the purpose and relearnt the technique of spiling from the 1920s military mining manual in order to work silently through the sandy soil. The chamber was created without detection and the tap operated for almost a year until betrayed by a double agent.1 In Vietnam the North Vietnamese famously used tunnels for refuge and to infiltrate American defences, and it required the formation of special US and Australian units to combat them. Perhaps the closest to the defences based on the underground quarries in France is the Tora Bora complex of tunnels, bunkers and fortified caves in Afghanistan. Originally constructed with funds from the US Central Intelligence Agency to aid Mujahedeen resistance to Soviet invaders, this reputedly became a refuge for Osama bin Laden and 1,000 Taliban fighters. In siege situations, tunnels continue to be used not by the attackers but by the besieged, as at Sarajevo in 1993 or Gaza in 2009. British military mining in Gibraltar, which had begun in 1782 with the initiative of Sergeant Major Ince pr
oposing tunnelling through the rock to create gun batteries in the cliff face, ended with the disbandment of the Specialist Team RE in the mid-1990s.
In 1915 the military mistrusted miners and in particular their reputation for industrial militancy. Miners are physically tough and will disregard personal danger but look after their mates, on whom they are wholly reliant. They have their own codes of behaviour and are mistrustful of outsiders, and are in turn liable to be feared by the rest of society. Those soldiers who allowed them freedom to work as they wished discovered that they had much in common, and reaped the rewards.
Notes
Chapter 1
1. Kenneth Wiggins, Siege Mines and Underground Warfare, (Shire, Princes Risborough, 2003), pp. 10–11.
2. Wiggins, ibid., pp. 18–19.
3. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History, (Jane’s Publishing Company, London, 1980), pp. 524–5.
