Figure 1.2. Middle East Sympathies, Full Trend (From Saad, “Americans’ Sympathies for Israel Match All-Time High.” Copyright © 2013 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved. The content is used with permission; however, Gallup retains all rights of republication. This graph is an interpretation of data compiled by Gallup, Inc. However, Gallup, Inc. had no part in the creation of this graphic interpretation.)79
Trends in Sympathy, Blame for Violence, and Commitment to Peace
Although there is a clear predisposition to sympathize with Israel over the Palestinians, levels of sympathy fluctuate according to which side is perceived to be more committed to peace. Thus, with the onset of the first Palestinian uprising – intifada – sympathy for Israel fell to 37 percent in May 1988, while sympathy for the Palestinians rose to 24 percent as the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist and renounced terrorism. In August 1989, 46 percent of Americans held an unfavorable view of Israel, compared to 45 percent who had a favorable view.76 Yet during the 1991 Gulf War, when Israel was under rocket attack from Iraq, sympathy for Israel doubled, while sympathy for the Palestinians collapsed to 8 percent after the PLO refused to condemn terrorist attacks on Israel and sided with Saddam Hussein.77 Sympathy for the Palestinians rose again to more than 20 percent when the PLO signed the 1993 Oslo Accords, with this level of support holding relatively steady until the collapse of the Oslo process in 2000. Still, even during the 1990s when the peace process was in full swing, three times as many Americans sympathized with Israel over the Palestinians.78
The collapse of the Oslo process, the onset of the suicide bombings, and 9/11 had a major impact of the levels of sympathy as the number of neutrals declined, and support for Israel consistently reached more than 50 percent for the first time. From 2000 until 2010, sympathy for Israel over the Palestinians rose by more than 20 percentage points to 63 percent, a record high.80 The biggest jump in sympathy came in 2005–2006, following the disengagement from Gaza and the Second Lebanon War. In contrast, from 2001 to 2009 around 75 percent had an unfavorable view of the Palestinian Authority; only 15 percent had a favorable view.81
These shifts in the level of sympathy correlate with shifting perceptions of each side’s behavior regarding peace. At the beginning of the peace process in the second half of 1991, when the George H. W. Bush administration was in conflict with Israel over settlements and when many Arab states attended the U.S.-sponsored Madrid peace conference, Americans were almost evenly divided over who was a bigger obstacle to peace, Israel or the Arab states. Similarly, in 1997 and 1998, when the Clinton administration was in conflict with the Benjamin Netanyahu government, Americans were again almost evenly divided on attributing blame to Israel and the Palestinians for problems in the peace process.82 However, when the Oslo peace process collapsed and the violence of the second intifada ensued, the American public perceived the Palestinians as mainly responsible. In polls by Harris, Newsweek, and NBC from the start of the violence in October 2000 until its peak in the spring of 2002, less than 15 percent blamed primarily Israel, while around three times that number blamed primarily the Palestinians.83 In 2006 and 2009, about four times as many thought that the radical Islamist groups Hezbollah and Hamas were primarily responsible for the Second Lebanon War and the Gaza War, respectively.84 Finally, in 2010, five times more Americans thought that Israel was more committed to reaching a peace agreement than the Palestinians.85
A Palestinian State, Settlements, and Jerusalem
While Americans have consistently sympathized with Israel over the Palestinians, their positions on core substantive issues has been more evenhanded. In the 1990s, at the height of the Oslo process, about 40 percent favored the establishment of a Palestinian state, with about 20–25 percent opposed. Despite the collapse of the Oslo process, support for a Palestinians state rose between 2001 and 2003 reaching 58 percent. This rise paralleled the first official U.S. endorsement of Palestinian statehood by President George W. Bush in September 2001 and the promotion of the U.S.-backed Road Map in 2003 which also called for the creation of a Palestinian state. Israel accepted the Road Map with a number of conditions.86 Overall, support for the ultimate creation of a Palestinian state, in principle, has become well established. But support for establishing a state in practice has been more conditional. In several polls conducted by Newsweek at the height of the suicide bombings in 2001–2002, respondents were asked whether they supported the creation of a Palestinian state at this time – and a plurality opposed it.87 Similarly from 2005 to 2011, a clear majority thought that a Palestinian state should be established only after the Palestinians end terrorism and accept Israel’s legitimacy.88 Yet at the same time an increasing majority of the public has also opposed Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank and Gaza: 52 percent in 2002, 62 percent in 2010.89 On Jerusalem, things are less clear. Since the 1990s some polls have shown a preference for Israeli sovereignty over all of Jerusalem, others for sharing or dividing the city between Israelis and Palestinians.90
U.S. Policy and the Peace Process
According to Gallup and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs polls, between 1998 and 2010 around three-quarters consistently stated than the United States should be evenhanded in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Of those who did express a preference, 1–4 percent preferred the Palestinians and roughly 15–25 percent preferred Israel.91 The National Survey of Religion and Politics came up with a similar figure for the 1990s; however, between 2001 and 2008 it found that the number who thought the U.S. should give Israel preference had risen to 40 percent.92 Specifically, in the spring of 2002 during Operation Defensive Shield, according to several CBS polls, 40 percent thought the U.S. should support Israel, between a quarter and a third thought the U.S. should say and do nothing, and 11–16 percent thought the U.S. should criticize Israel publicly.93 Similarly, in the 2006 Lebanon War and the 2009 Gaza War about 40 percent thought the US should take Israel’s side, while 1–2 percent less thought the U.S. should say or do nothing. Less than 10 percent thought the U.S. should publicly criticize Israel.94 In other words, in the abstract the public seemed to prefer an evenhanded approach, especially in the 1990s when the peace process was in full swing. However, once the peace process collapsed and Israel faced suicide terrorism perpetrated by Islamist extremists, a large chunk of the American public evidently felt that the U.S. should side with Israel, as it was fighting a common enemy. In parallel, again in an abstract sense, Americans are willing to pressure Israel, including withholding aid especially if Israel is viewed as unrelenting it its opposition to peace.95 However, in practice, in 2001–2002, there was far more support for pressuring both sides, rather than just Israel.96 Moreover, since the Second Lebanon War opinion was clearly in Israel’s favor. Thus, in 2007–2008, a plurality thought more pressure should be applied on the Palestinians; this rose to nearly 50 percent in 2013.97
The Transatlantic Divide over the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Public Opinion
Americans are far more supportive of Israel than other Western democracies. Between 2002 and 2010 at least double the number of Americans had a favorable opinion of Israel, compared to publics in the UK, France, Germany, and Spain (see Table 1.1).
Table 1.1. Favorable Opinion of Israel (%)
* * *
U.S.UKFranceGermanySpain
2002 58 29 23 29 14
2004 59 24 22 21 13
2005 69 27 26 29 19
2007 63 30 40 27 18
2010 68 19 21 – 23
* * *
Data for U.S. is from Gallup and data for Europe is from surveys by Greenberg Rosner Quinlin Research for the Israel Project; a DYM Institute survey undertaken for Casa Sefarad Israel and surveys conducted for the Anti-Defamation League.98
The transatlantic divide was similarly apparent regarding attitudes to the conflict. The American public sympathized more with Israel by very wide margins. In contrast, in the UK, France, and Spain, a plurality sympathized more with the Palestinians. The Germans
were the partial exception in Europe; but even so, the margin by which they preferred Israel was much narrower than among Americans (see Table 1.2).
Table 1.2. Margin of Sympathy with Israel over the Palestinians (%)
* * *
U.S.UKFranceGermanySpain
2002 +28 −11 −17 −2 –
2006 +35 −5 0 +19 −23
2007 +38 −13 −11 +9 −16
2013 +39 −16 −4 +2 –
* * *
Data from Pew Research Center99
Between 2001 and 2004, both Americans and Western Europeans were about evenly divided as to whether the Palestinians were serious about reaching a peace agreement with Israel. However, there was a big transatlantic divide regarding Israel. At least 70 percent of Americans thought Israel was serious about reaching a peace agreement. In contrast, in eight out of ten Western European countries, a majority thought Israel was not serious about peace.100 In the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and the 2009 Gaza War, between a half and two-thirds of Americans thought Israel’s military action was “about right” or “had not gone far enough” – just under a quarter thought it had gone too far.101 In the UK, the opposite was the case.102 Similarly, in late 2009 to 2010, more than half of Americans thought the Palestinians were mainly to blame for the failure to reach peace, compared to about a fifth who blamed mainly Israel.103 Again, UK opinion was a mirror image.104
Transatlantic differences were narrower when it came to policy, but they were still significant. In both the U.S. and Europe a very large chunk of the public preferred that their own country remain neutral in the conflict. However, among those who thought that their country should take sides, there were clear differences. As we saw above, five to six times more Americans thought their country should side with Israel rather than with the Palestinians. In contrast, in the UK and France, opinion was either evenly divided or pro-Palestinian.105 The divide was even more pronounced regarding the question of which side should be pressured more. Thus in 2011, in nine Western European countries, more than twice as many, thought that the focus of pressure should be Israel, rather than the Palestinians. The opposite was the case among Americans.106
Finally, there was also a major transatlantic divide on Israel’s strategic significance. In 2003, the six countries which Americans viewed as the greatest threat to world peace were: North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. In a 2003 survey of fifteen EU countries, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan were also among the top six countries viewed as the greatest threat to world peace. Despite these parallels, there was a major divide over Israel. Europeans viewed Israel as the number one threat to world peace, while Americans put Israel in ninth place, just ahead of America itself.107
Political Culture and the Transatlantic Divide over Israel
This transatlantic divide over Israel is largely explained by differences in political culture. First, as demonstrated above, Puritan Protestant theology is an important foundation of support for Israel in the United States, and America remains far more Protestant and far more religious than Western Europe. About half of Americans say religion is very important in their lives, and a similar amount attend a place of worship once a week compared to a fifth or less in Western Europe.108 In some Protestant European countries, notably England, there was a history of support for Zionism grounded on the Bible.109 However, due to secularization this outlook has been almost completely marginalized. Meanwhile, predominantly Catholic countries with a relatively high percentage of religious people, like Spain and Poland, are among the European countries least supportive of Israel.110
Second, there is significance to the fact that Americans are more patriotic than Western Europeans. In the late 1990s around three-quarters of Americans were proud of their country, compared to about a half of the British, a third of the French, and a fifth of the Germans. Similarly, four-fifths of American youth felt that they wanted to do something to serve their country compared to about a half of the British and the French, who were the most patriotic in Western Europe.111 There is also a significant stream of European thought that views nationalism as one of the main causes of the two world wars and that therefore seeks to supersede nationalism via European integration. This is important in the Middle East context, because Israel emphasizes its self-definition as the nation-state of the Jewish people, the legitimacy of which the Arabs and Palestinians reject. This leads some federalist Europeans to view Israel’s insistence on its national identity in a negative light and as a factor inflaming the Arab-Israeli conflict. Still, national identity remains much stronger than any European identity in Western Europe,112 and in any case, given that Palestinian and Arab claims are also based on nationalism, the role of this factor should not be exaggerated.
Third, differences of strategic culture inform the divide over Israel. In 2004, more than half of Americans agreed that the best way to ensure peace is through military strength, compared with about a quarter of Europeans. In parallel, 82 percent of Americans believed that under some conditions war is necessary to obtain justice, compared with 41 percent of Europeans.113 Israel employed force extensively to combat suicide bombings during the second intifada, as well as conducting wide-ranging military operations against Hezbollah in 2006 and Hamas in 2009. Given the transatlantic divide over using military force, it is not surprising that Americans have been more supportive of Israel’s use of force. Notable European leaders who were more inclined to support the use of force, such as the former Spanish prime minister José María Aznar and former British prime minister Tony Blair, who supported the 2003 Iraq War, were also more supportive of Israel.
Fourth, as was demonstrated above, Americans’ commitment to Israel is informed by the Holocaust, and there is a difference in the way Europeans and Americans relate to the Holocaust.114 Whereas only about a quarter of Americans agree with the statement that “Jews still talk too much about the Holocaust,” more than 40 percent of Europeans surveyed agreed with the same statement.115 Notable European leaders, who were especially sensitive to the Holocaust, were more likely to be pro-Israel – for example, Per Almark, the former deputy prime minister of Sweden, and Tony Blair, the former British prime minister, who instituted a national day of Holocaust remembrance in the UK.
Fifth, the classical liberal foundations of the American creed continue to differentiate American political culture from its European counterpart. America’s lack of an inherited class structure explains the relative weakness of paternalistic conservatism and socialism in the United States, as well as the absence of major political parties representing those ideologies, in contrast to Western Europe.116 Moreover, support for the radical Right and the radical Left is stronger in Western countries with a history of authoritarianism,117 which the U.S. lacks entirely. This is important, because the main sources of hostility toward Israel on both sides of the Atlantic come from the Old Right and especially the radical Left, both of which are stronger in Europe than in America.
The Old Right has a paternalistic approach to the lower classes. Historically, it supported social welfare either out a sense of moral responsibility and/or as a means of defending its material interests and privileged position in an attempt to weaken the appeal of social revolution. Similarly, the Old Right tends to adopt a paternalistic attitude towards the Palestinians. In order to protect the material interests of their states, which are connected to oil, they tend to support the Arab side. This tendency is especially strong in Britain and France, where it serves as a means to deflect Arab resentment against their prior imperial role in the Middle East.118 Aside from this, much of the Old Right is characterized by anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitic attitudes are significantly higher in Europe than in the U.S.,119 and according to a major survey of the five thousand Europeans in ten countries, the most extreme anti-Israel sentiments strongly correlate with anti-Semitic attitudes.120
The American Old Right, often referred to as paleoconservatives, will be discussed at length in the next chapter, but it is
important to point out that the Old Right has been in decline in both Europe and the U.S. for some time. In contrast, the New Right/neoconservatives have embraced classical liberalism and democracy with vigor. Against this background, modern conservative leaders such Margaret Thatcher and José María Aznar have admired Israel’s democracy and economic innovation, viewing it as an outpost of Western values.121 More generally, conservative opinion on both sides of the Atlantic is more supportive of Israel than those of the Left.122
Indeed, it is on the Left, especially the radical Left, that Israel has been most unpopular. There is a long history of Far Left anti-Zionism. In the early twentieth century, much of radical left-wing politics was anti-Zionist. Most extreme was Marxist-Leninism, which deemed that revolution and assimilation were the answer to anti-Semitism; Jews had to assimilate to be “progressive.” In general, Marxist-Leninism viewed national self-determination of oppressed peoples as progressive, with one exception – the Jews. Therefore, because it asserted Jewish collective survival, Zionism was deemed “reactionary.”123
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