The Anti-Israel Left: Progressive Postcolonialism
Identity, Roots and Grand Strategy
There are two overlapping elements within the anti-Israel Left. First, there is the progressive tradition. In the twenty-first century it has been present among supporters of Ralph Nader’s presidential bid and on the left of the Democratic Party, where it is more prominent among the liberal base than among party elites – where it is marginal. Their most vocal spokesman in the media was Michael Moore. The second element is postcolonialism, which is strong in academia, notably in the humanities and Middle Eastern studies, inspired by the work of Edward Said and Noam Chomsky. These approaches are popular within social movements and many human rights NGOs.58 They are also prevalent in the leading progressive magazine the Nation and the radical newsletter CounterPunch, as well as getting a hearing at mainstream liberal websites such as the Huffington Post, which carries anti-Zionist bloggers like Mondoweiss.
For progressives and postcolonialists, America needs to minimize its “imperialist” intervention abroad and concentrate instead on reducing poverty at home. In the 1930s they were strongly represented in the Keep America out of the War Coalition. Back then, many of them argued that there was little moral difference between the British Empire and Nazi Germany. Indeed, hostility was more focused on the British Empire, as they were strong supporters of nationalist movements under colonial rule; irrespective of these movements’ lack of democratic credentials.59 In 1948 the former Democratic vice president Henry Wallace formed the Progressive Party. It argued that American imperialism provoked a defensively orientated Soviet Union. The party opposed Truman’s policy of containment, which it declared benefited only Wall Street. Soviet oppression and aggression were never condemned. After Truman won the 1948 election, progressivism declined. But the protest movement against the Vietnam War led to a resurgence – notably inside the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) movement. The Democratic presidential candidate in 1972, George McGovern, represented the progressive outlook. He referred to the U.S. bombing of Vietnam as the most barbaric action taken by any country since the Holocaust.60
Later, the Carter administration drew on postcolonialist ideas, emphasizing “North-South relations.” Postcolonialism grew out of the Non-Aligned Movement and the intellectual milieu of the New Left in the late 1960s. Its axiom is that “many of the wrongs, if not crimes, against humanity are a product of the economic dominance of the north over the south.”61 In the 1960s and 1970s they supported violent resistance of anti-imperialist forces in the Third World, even if such forces were antidemocratic. Since the 1990s, its strategy has focused on nonviolent resistance such as boycotts, divestment, and sanctions (BDS), though it does not always condemn Palestinian terrorism. It uses a quasi-Marxist analysis that transfers the old class division of European society into a new race-based class division between colonizers and the colonized.62 In the post–Cold War era, progressives and postcolonialists opposed intervention in Bosnia and saw 9/11 as “blowback” – a consequence of anger generated by U.S. imperialism, including support for Israel. Some were willing in theory to use of force in Afghanistan. But their demand that any operation not lead to any civilian casualties rendered this meaningless. They also vehemently opposed the 2003 Iraq War.63
Israel and the Palestinians
In the aftermath of the Second World War, progressives were generally supportive of the fledgling State of Israel. The Holocaust cast the Jewish people as the quintessential victims of Fascism, while Israel itself was led by social democrats and was the home of the kibbutz. Thus, the leading progressive magazine, the Nation, supported the creation of Israel. The turning point was the Six Day War. Suddenly, Israel was no longer the underdog and it was now allied with the “imperialist” U.S. At the same time, the Palestinians came to be viewed as the victims of Western “imperialism” and Israeli “colonialism.” As of 2010, progressive elites were the only subgroup of Americans where sympathy for the Palestinians reached double figures (27 percent); although the Arab-Israeli conflict has not been a major political priority for American progressives.64
While some progressives retain sympathy for Israel, postcolonialists are unequivocally anti-Israel. The West, and by extension Israel, are viewed as essentially reactionary, while the status of the Third World, including the Palestinians, as victims of colonialism makes them essentially progressive.65 In this vein the Black Power leader Stokely Carmichael referred to “white Israel’s” oppression of the “colored Palestinians.”66 Hard-core Postcolonialists, view Israel as illegitimate and favor dismantling or destruction of the Jewish state.67 In contrast, progressives like Jimmy Carter and George McGovern accept Israel’s right to exist and support a two-state solution. This has been the dominant progressive position. The distinction between the minority of one-staters and the majority of two-staters is significant. However, both groups sympathize more with the Palestinians, because they are perceived as the victims68 and both frame the conflict in the same way, as comparable to the displacement of Native American peoples and apartheid. Progressives clearly place the fundamental blame for the conflict on Israel. Correspondingly, they place the overwhelming onus for concessions on the Israelis.69 They argue that the US should pressure Israel into making concessions;70 consequently, they have been very hostile to the pro-Israel lobby.71
In line with their general tendency to single out the West for opprobrium while whitewashing Third World dictatorships,72 the progressive-postcolonial discourse was characterized by the demonization and singling out of Israel combined with the whitewashing of Israel’s enemies. Thus, in the first decade of the twenty-first century the leading human rights NGO, Human Rights Watch, heaped disproportionate criticism on Israel;73 a fact recognized by the founder of HRW himself.74 On the one hand, Jimmy Carter alleged that Israeli actions towards the Palestinians were worse that the Rwandan genocide!75 On the other hand, Carter whitewashed Hezbollah as interested only in ending the occupation and conducting good works in the community.76 At the extreme, anti-Israel prejudice flirted with anti-Semitism by comparing Israel to the Nazis77 including on the popular Daily Kos website.78
In addition, Islamist extremism was downplayed or viewed as a form of resistance to imperialism and as a function of internalized “Orientalist” traits for which the West is ultimately to blame.79 In 1979, Princeton law professor Richard Falk argued that Khomeini’s “entourage of close advisers is uniformly composed of moderate, progressive individuals … who share a notable record of concern for human rights.”80 In March 2009, Falk then serving as United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories published a report on the Gaza War that concluded that Israel’s operation constituted “an unprovoked assault,” “a war crime of the greatest magnitude,” and a “crime against humanity.” Meanwhile in 2010, Professor Judith Butler determined that “understanding Hamas, Hezbollah as social movements that are progressive, … that are part of a global Left, is extremely important.”81 Table 3.1 summarizes and compares the different approaches toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict among liberal elites.
Table 3.1. Elite Liberal Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict
* * *
Robust liberal internationalismDovish democratsProgressive postcolonialism
Grand strategy Centrist; Interventionist Anti-military intervention Isolationist
Roots of instability and anti-Americanism Indigenous to the Middle East
Arab-Israeli conflict secondary U.S. policies in the Middle East
Arab-Israeli conflict primary Extraneous to the Middle East
Blowback vs. U.S. “imperialism”
Israel in U.S. strategy Asset (esp. if supports the peace process) Liability (neutral if supports peace process) Liability
Ideology, theology, prejudices Critical friendship with Israel
Support liberals on both sides Many identify more with Israel Flirts with anti-Semitism at extreme
Sympathize with the
“victims”
Taking sides Pro-Israeli Center-Left Evenhanded Pro-Palestinian
Strategy toward the conflict Equivocal re Interim/Permanent deal Heavy U.S. pressure for permanent deal BDS: Impose pro-Palestinian settlement
Outline of peace settlement Palestinian State
1967 Borders +/−
Divided Jerusalem
vs. settlements
vs. “Right of Return” to Israel Palestinian State
1967 Borders +/−
Divided Jerusalem
vs. settlements
vs. full implementation “Right of Return” Palestinian State/One State
vs. settlements
Pro “Right of Return”
Blame for the conflict Mainly Palestinian/Arab extremists
Also Israeli ideological Right Both sides Israel
Morality Palestinian Terror worse Palestinian Terror worse
But increasingly equivocal Moral equivalence/Israel worse
Onus for concessions Both sides Both sides, Israel more Israel
* * *
The Liberal Discourse: Narrating the Rise and Fall of the Peace Process
This section surveys the elite liberal discourse regarding the peace process since the early 1990s. The survey is based on relevant articles in the major highbrow liberal magazines: the New Republic (TNR), the Nation, the Atlantic, the New York Review of Books (NYRB), American Prospect, Mother Jones, Dissent, and Salon.82 Also surveyed are the articles of liberal columnists Thomas Friedman of the New York Times and Richard Cohen of the Washington Post, both of whom wrote the largest amount of opinion pieces on the subject in their respective newspapers throughout the period.
The Liberal Discourse in the 1990s: The Heyday of the Peace Process
In the 1990s the liberal discourse was heavily concentrated in the Nation, which gave voice to the progressive-postcolonial approach, and TNR, which gave voice to the approach of robust liberal internationalists, also expressed by Thomas Friedman and Richard Cohen. The other magazines’ coverage of the issue was extremely sparse. TNR, Dissent, Thomas Friedman, and Richard Cohen were very supportive of the peace process, albeit with the regular expression of concerns and criticisms of both sides. They praised the Rabin government and urged it to constrain settlements and confront settlers whom they viewed as a threat to the peace process and Israeli democracy.83 Criticism of the Palestinian side, especially in the New Republic, peaked following the spate of suicide bombings in 1995 and 1996. But ultimately they remained committed to the peace process.84 One important figure, Marty Peretz, the owner of TNR, was more hawkish. He never believed that Arafat was genuinely committed to peace.85 He was hostile to the settlements, but unprepared to divide Jerusalem or commit to a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights.86
In any case, Friedman, Cohen, and Dissent remained very critical of the Israeli Right, strongly supporting Shimon Peres over Benjamin Netanyahu in the 1996 election.87 Netanyahu’s victory was referred to as a “disaster”88 and a “tragedy.”89 They advocated U.S. pressure on Netanyahu.90 They also argued that mainstream American Jewish organizations should take a stronger stand in favor of the peace process and were critical of right-wing supporters of Israel in the U.S.91 Nonetheless, they gave Bibi some credit for agreeing to further withdrawals and promoting a partition plan.92 Nor did they place the onus for concessions only on Israel. They strongly criticized Arafat and the Arab states for demonizing Israel in their state-controlled media and for their refusal to speak out loudly and clearly against terrorism in Arabic. They argued that Arab leaders were not doing enough to demonstrate to Israelis that their concessions would lead to genuine coexistence.93
The Nation supported the 1993 Oslo Accords,94 but it also gave significant space and legitimacy to Palestinian opposition – which argued that the peace process constituted a nauseating sell-out95 – including two cover stories by Edward Said.96 When Hamas carried out a spate of bus bombings, the dominant response in the Nation was that it was ultimately fault of the occupation and that only further Israeli concessions would end the violence.97 Still, the magazine continued to support the peace process.98
The Collapse of the Peace Process and the Rise of Hamas and Hezbollah, 2001–2009
The collapse of the peace process and 9/11 led to a massive surge in the quantity and intensity of liberal comment on the peace process. Whereas in the 1990s the liberal discourse was basically united in support of the peace process; following the collapse of the peace process and 9/11 it became characterized by deep divisions. Robust liberal internationalism provided the basis for the dominant narrative in TNR, Dissent, the Atlantic, the columns of Richard Cohen and Thomas Friedman, and the blog of Jeffrey Goldberg. The progressive-postcolonial approach dominated in the Nation. While in American Prospect, Salon, and the NYRB, the dovish liberal approach dominated, and after 2006, these magazines moved closer to the progressive approach.
The Narrative of Robust Liberal Internationalism and Critical Friends of Israel
Israel has tried, over and over again, to make peace with a recalcitrant and unforgiving enemy.
—Richard Cohen, the Washington Post99
When the Oslo process collapsed and violence erupted, robust liberal internationalists identified the Palestinians, and especially Yasir Arafat, as the primary culprit. Thus, Thomas Friedman labeled the conflict “Arafat’s War.”100 Criticisms were made of U.S. and Israeli policy, but ultimately they argued that had the Palestinians truly wanted a state based on 1967 borders, with Arab East Jerusalem as its capital, they could have had it. Their rejection of the Clinton Parameters and the suicide bombing campaign targeting Israeli civilians signified that the Palestinians had not really given up on the goal of destroying Israel.101
Arafat and the Arab states were once again criticized for their failure to prepare their peoples for peace and for their active discouragement of necessary Palestinian compromises. The demonization of Israel was viewed as a significant obstacle to generating legitimacy for the concessions required for peace. They drew attention to the hatred nurtured in school textbooks and wider Arab media and public statements by leaders, such as when Bashar Assad, standing next to the Pope, called for Christians and Muslims to unite against “Jews who betrayed Jesus and tried to kill Mohammed.” This was contrasted with the Israeli public’s willingness to pay the necessary price for peace.102
Another major factor underlying strong support for Israel was Palestinian terrorism. Terrorism was viewed primarily not as a function of desperation but as a strategic choice.103 The fact that more Palestinians were dying was deemed less significant than the fact that the Palestinians, unlike Israel, were deliberately targeting civilians.104 They were disgusted by the Palestinian public’s celebration of suicide terrorism involving their own children.105 As Richard Cohen put it, “One engages in the inhumane murder of civilians while the other strives, sometimes vainly, to retain its humanity.”106 Over the next decade, there was criticism of Israel’s military actions, but Israeli behavior was virtually always reckoned to be more ethical than that of its enemies.107
Overall this added up to a reframing of the conflict. From at least the first intifada until 2000, Arafat and Fatah had been given the benefit of the doubt, and the main stumbling block was deemed to be the Israeli Right. But after 2000, the main stumbling block was deemed to be on the Arab and Palestinian side.108 This shift was reinforced by 9/11, which was viewed not as a result of U.S. support for Israel but rather as an expression of radical Islam’s hatred of America’s liberal democratic values.109
Still, while they viewed Israel and the U.S. as sharing a common fight against radical Islamic terrorism,110 they argued that, unlike al Qaida, the Palestinians had legitimate grievances that needed to be addressed.111 So although they supported the construction of the security barrier in the West Bank, they criticized the route arguing that it should be closer to the pre 1967 border.112 Moreover, while they understood Israel’s military response to prevent terrorism
in Operation Defensive Shield, they urged the administration to be more proactive in promoting negotiations and tougher on Israeli settlements.113
While remaining supportive of genuine Palestinian moderates and extensive U.S. involvement in the peace process, they were divided about the merits of plans for a permanent settlement like the 2003 Geneva draft agreement and the 2002 Arab League plan.114 The disengagement from Gaza was viewed as a strategic defeat for the settlement movement, as well as a step toward a Palestinian state, with Sharon cast in the role of De Gaulle,115 though some argued that Sharon should have reached an agreement with the moderate Palestinian leader Abbas, instead of acting unilaterally.116 But others advocated an additional unilateral civilian withdrawal from many settlements in the West Bank, a proposal similar to that put forward by Ehud Olmert, the leader of the centrist Kadima party in the 2006 election.117
The rise to power of Hamas in Gaza and the Second Lebanon War against Hezbollah deepened their support for Israel. Hamas and Hezbollah were viewed as anti-Semitic extremists committed to Israel’s destruction.118 They completely rejected any moral equivalence between democratic Israel and its Islamist enemies and they supported a tough Israeli response,119 though not all Israeli actions.120 Leftists who focused their condemnation on Israel rather than Hamas and Hezbollah were dismissed as “useful idiots”121 who thought they were being humanitarian while actually serving the interests of antidemocratic forces opposed to a two-state solution.122 In contrast, they understood the rockets fired by Hamas and Hezbollah as detrimental to peace, since it undermined the Israeli public’s support for compromise by creating the impression that what Israel got in exchange for withdrawals from Gaza and Lebanon was not peace but war.123
The Arab_Israeli Conflict Page 11
