It could be suggested that the opinions of these students and young liberal bloggers will soften as they mature – the life-cycle effect. Many young people have more extreme liberal-Left opinions that change altogether as they get older. However, there was no shortage of student radicalism on American campuses in the late 1960s and early 1970s, yet then more educated Americans sympathized with Israel more than average, unlike today. Aside from the life-cycle effect, there is also a well-documented generational effect, whereby basic orientations formed in response to key events and generational experiences in earlier life continue to inform opinions thereafter.245 Opinion polls seem to indicate that the generational effect has become more pronounced since 2001.
In this case, for the older generation of liberals supporting Israel was about supporting the weak against the strong and about righting an historical wrong. It was also about implementing a shared political vision, as Israel was run by secular, social democratic kibbutzniks. However, for younger generations growing up after 1967, it is the Palestinians who are cast as the underdog. Moreover, since the late 1970s, Israel has been run primarily by center-Right governments. Finally, the Holocaust has far less resonance; victims of genocide in Rwanda and Sudan demand attention. This is particularly important for liberal interventionists, traditionally the liberals most supportive of Israel. Indeed, the person most identified with liberal interventionism in the Obama administration, Samantha Power, while not hostile to Israel, has at times advocated positions closer to the dovish Democrat approach to the peace process.246
Moreover, especially for liberals who came of age in the shadow of 9/11, the 2003 Iraq War seems to be a constitutive event affecting their attitudes toward Israel and the Middle East. When liberals rejected U.S. foreign policy in Iraq, they also came to reject policies associated with that stance, notably robust U.S. support for Israel.247 In the case of Yglesias, a look at 2002 entries in his blog demonstrates that he was far more supportive of Israel248 than he was later on. By his own admission, his stance changed in the wake of the Iraq War and the Second Lebanon War, which appeared to him as a rerun of Iraq.249 A senior congressional Democrat also noted how the Iraq War had a negative impact on Democratic opinion toward Israel in Congress, with many being influenced by the charge that Israel and its American supporters were responsible for the war.250
Conclusion
Democrat and liberal opinion as a whole sympathizes more with Israel than with the Palestinians, albeit by less than the national average. Although Democrats and liberals are significantly more divided over the peace process than Republicans, they share a consensus centered on three basic positions: they support the peace process and a two-state solution, they oppose settlements and are critical of the Israeli Right; and they think that the U.S. should be actively engaged in trying to resolve the conflict. The section below brings together the findings of this chapter and the previous one to directly compare liberal and Democratic attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict with those of Republicans and conservatives.
Partisan and Ideological Differences
There are certain common themes shared by liberal and conservative approaches that are favorable to Israel. First, they tend to favor an internationalist approach to grand strategy, one which is relatively more willing to use military force. Second, they think that the Arab-Israeli conflict is not the central cause of anti-Americanism and instability in the Middle East. Third, they tend to believe that cultural and ideational factors are very significant in political life. In contrast, liberal and conservative approaches that are relatively unfavorable to Israel tend to favor a defensive grand strategy. They also tend to the view that U.S. policies, notably excessive support for Israel, play a critical role in empowering anti-Americanism and engendering instability in the Middle East. Finally, they tend to emphasize the role played by material power in political life.
The key point is that the first set of attitudes is much more common among Republicans than among Democrats, while the opposite is true of the second set of attitudes. Consequently, differences over the Arab-Israeli conflict increasingly run parallel to the growing partisan-ideological divide. This is symptomatic of the fact that Republicans and Democrats have also become increasingly divided over how to view the Middle East as a whole. For example, double the number of Republicans, as compared to Democrats, believed that “Islam encourages violence more than other religions.” As is illustrated in Table 3.7, whereas in 2002, the partisan gap was 11 percentage points on this question by 2011, it had become a divide of 30 points. Furthermore, as of 2012, while Republicans were overwhelmingly concerned that the U.S. might take too long to act against the Iranian nuclear program, Democrats were divided over the issue, with 44 percent fearing the U.S. might act too quickly (see Table 3.8).
Table 3.7. Agree That “Islam Encourages Violence More Than Other Religions” (%)
* * *
2002200520082011
Republicans 33 57 61 59
Democrats 22 43 39 29
* * *
Data from Pew Research Center252
Table 3.8. Main Concern Regarding U.S. Policy to Iran’s Nuclear Program (%)
* * *
2012Act too quicklyTake too long to act
Republicans 17 75
Democrats 44 42
* * *
Data from Pew Research Center253
These divides have clear implications for attitudes toward Israel. Hence, while a majority of Republicans thought that the U.S. should support Israel if it attacked Iran to stop its nuclear program, a majority of Democrats thought the U.S. should remain neutral (see Table 3.9). More generally, for Republicans in 2010, the most positive thing about Israel was that it “stands by the United States as an ally and fights against Islamic extremists,” whereas for Democrats, the most positive things about Israel was that it “supports a two-state solution where both Israelis and Palestinians can live in peace.”251
Table 3.9. “If Israel Attacks Iran to Stop Its Nuclear Weapons Program, What Should the U.S. Do?” (%)
* * *
2012Support IsraelStay neutralOppose Israel
Republicans 62 33 3
Democrats 34 57 7
* * *
Data from Pew Research Center254
Since the collapse of the Oslo process and 9/11, this difference explains why Republicans and conservatives sympathize with Israel by much larger margins than do Democrats and liberals (see Tables 3.10 and 3.11). Indeed, this sympathy gap has doubled since the 9/11 from around 20 percentage points to around 40 percentage points. Meanwhile, among young liberals the preference for Israel over the Palestinians is at its narrowest and support for U.S. pressure on Israel at its highest. This indicates that the partisan divide over the Arab-Israeli conflict could well widen in the future.
Table 3.10. Partisanship and Sympathy for Israel over the Palestinians: Pro-Israel Margin (%)
* * *
RepublicansDemocratsPartisan Gap
1993–8/2001 +43 +25 +18
2002–2006 +61 +27 +34
Gaza War 2009 +64 +24 +40
2011 +73 +33 +40
* * *
Table 3.11. Ideology and Sympathy for Israel over the Palestinians: Pro-Israel Margin (%)
* * *
ConservativesLiberalsIdeological Gap
1993–8/2001 +41 +20 +21
2002–2006 +56 +19 +39
Gaza War 2009 +52 +12 +40
2011 +65 +19 +46
* * *
Data for both tables from Gallup and Pew Research Center255
In addition, on the substance of the conflict, there is an opinion divide. A clear majority of Democrats and liberals favor the establishment of a Palestinian state and oppose settlements, while Republicans are equivocal on those issues (see Table 3.12). Similarly, among Republicans and conservatives, a majority support taking Israel’s side in the conflict, while a large minority prefers neutrality; among liberals and Democrats these positions are reversed. Given these di
fferences, it is hardly surprising that liberals and conservatives have different narratives concerning the peace process. In the 1990s the conservative discourse was divided over its merits, while the thrust of liberal discourse was very supportive. In the 2000s the conservative discourse overwhelmingly blamed the Palestinians and Arab side for the failure of the peace process and put the onus on them, while the liberal discourse was divided over whom to blame and where to put the onus.
Table 3.12. Partisanship and Attitudes toward the Establishment of a Palestinian State (%)
* * *
RepublicansDemocratsPartisan Gap/Divide
Favor Oppose Favor Oppose
2002 42 38 (+4) 44 28 (+16) 12 Gap
2009 39 43 (−4) 59 22 (+37) 41 Divide
* * *
Data from Gallup256
Thus, while sympathy for Israel remains bipartisan, there is a clear partisan-ideological gap regarding the magnitude and intensity of that sympathy. Even more significantly, attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict have become increasingly divided along partisan and ideological lines, and there are clear political consequences that result from this. Thus, a Republican administration, especially a more conservative one, will have a predisposition to lean toward Israel’s side in the conflict. In contrast, a Democratic administration, especially a more liberal one, will have a predisposition towards evenhandedness in the conflict, including a greater likelihood of pressure focused on Israel – that would make U.S. support for Israel, in effect, more conditional.
Part II Protestants
4 Evangelicals and Christian Zionism: Standing with Israel
To stand against Israel is to stand against God.
—Rev. Jerry Falwell1
Introduction
One of the most talked-about elements of America’s relationship with Israel is the rise of evangelical support for Israel. Critics view this group as a “bunch of crazy extremists” working to block peace and induce Armageddon.2 Their defenders claim they are driven less by end-times theology and more by a sense of being commanded by the Bible to support the “Children of Israel,” and that they express this through financial and political support for Israel in general, as opposed to the Israeli Far Right.3 This chapter will address these issues by analyzing the nature and extent of evangelical support for Israel. The chapter begins by examining what evangelicals believe and the relationship between evangelicals and American politics in general. Following this, the historical development of Christian Zionism is outlined and the reasons for contemporary evangelical support for Israel are analyzed. Subsequently, the approaches of the evangelical public and elites towards the Arab-Israeli conflict are presented and their influence over U.S. policy assessed, along with their relationship to the wider pro-Israel lobby and the American Jewish community.
Evangelicals and Fundamentalists
Definitions
The term evangelical refers to a religious movement within Protestantism formed in the eighteenth century. The deliberate use of the term in twentieth-century America dates from the formation of the National Association of Evangelicals in 1942, led by Billy Graham. Today, this movement has three irreducible characteristics: being “born again,” which involves submitting to the authority of Jesus and accepting that one is saved solely by faith in him; belief in the authority of the Bible as the actual word of God; and sharing faith – either through missionary work or charitable activities known as “lifestyle evangelism.” Evangelicals have been willing to engage with modern culture and society, far more than Fundamentalists.4
The term fundamentalism comes from a series of essays published in the 1910s called “The Fundamentals,” which became the statement of a movement to return to the fundamentals of traditional doctrine regarding the inerrancy of the Bible, the creation of the world ex nihilo, the virgin birth, and the bodily resurrection. The movement developed in reaction to the great wave of theological modernism which overtook much of American Protestantism as it came to accept the findings of critical biblical scholarship. After the Scopes “Monkey Trial” in 1925, Fundamentalists split from mainline Protestant denominations that had fallen under control of the modernists, and they withdrew from politics until the 1970s. In contemporary terms, Fundamentalism can be understood as a movement within evangelicalism that maintains the same core beliefs but more militantly holds to a literal interpretation of scripture and separatism.5 Belief in biblical prophecies concerning Armageddon and the Second Coming is especially pronounced among fundamentalists.6 Fundamentalists are often referred to as conservative evangelicals or as the Christian Right.
Demography and Politics
From World War I until the 1990s mainline Protestants dominated the worldview of the U.S. political class and outnumbered evangelicals among the general population. Since the 1990s there has been a reversal of fortunes. Whereas in 1988, 59 percent of American Protestants were mainline and 41 percent evangelical, by 2008 these figures had reversed. In the first decade of the new millennium, a little more than a quarter of all Americans defined themselves as evangelical Christians.7 In parallel, there has been a big increase in the percentage of self-identified evangelicals in Congress, from around 10 percent in 1970 to more than 25 percent in 2004.8
Evangelicals can be divided into three main groups. About half of all evangelicals are traditionalists in theological terms and conservative in ideological terms. They are characterized by a high level of church attendance, and support for the Republicans and the Christian Right. They tend to be hostile to the theory of evolution, and they believe the world will end with the battle of Armageddon and the coming of the Antichrist. Leading figures have included Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and John Hagee. Second, there are centrist moderates who make up 30–40 percent of evangelicals. About half of this group identifies as Republicans, and slightly more than half are hostile to the theory of evolution and believe in Armageddon. Finally, theological modernists and ideological liberals compromise a little more than 10 percent of evangelicals. They identify more with the Democrats (44 percent) than the Republicans (33 percent), and only a minority believe in Armageddon.9 Leading figures include Jim Wallis, Tony Campolo, and Jimmy Carter. Although the smallest group, they do have some political influence; for example, Campolo was close with former president Bill Clinton, while Barack Obama chose to give his first major speech on religion in the public sphere at Jim Wallis’s Sojourners’ Call to Renewal conference in 2006.10
The Rise of the New Christian Right
The social change of the 1960s, alongside of Supreme Court decisions on prayer in schools, abortion, and sex education, led conservative evangelicals to return to politics. Subsequently, there was a resurgence of evangelicalism that helped to make the new Christian Right a mass political movement. The key political organization of the Christian Right in the 1980s was the Moral Majority, headed by Jerry Falwell, which had a membership of more than six million at that time.11 In the 1990s the Christian Coalition, headed by Pat Robertson, was the most important organization. In parallel, there has been a rise in evangelical identification with the Republicans. Up to the late 1960s a majority of evangelicals, especially in the South, identified with the Democratic Party. But as the Democrats moved leftward, so evangelicals began to move toward the Republican Party. By the late 1980s, evangelicals favored the Republicans over the Democrats by a narrow margin, and by the 2000s evangelicals had became the most important element of the Republican base, with more than two-thirds identifying as Republican or leaning Republican.12
The Development of Christian Zionism
For most pro-Israel evangelicals, religion is the cornerstone of their support for the Jewish state. Such people are known as Christian Zionists, namely a “Christian whose faith, often in concert with other convictions, emotions, and experiences, leads them to support the modern state of Israel as the Jewish homeland.”13
Restorationism and Premillennial Dispensationalism
From the fifth century until the sixteenth cen
tury, St Augustine’s replacement theology was dominant within Christianity. According to replacement theology, following the crucifixion, God’s covenant with the Jews was broken and all future related promises in the Bible have been rendered void or applicable to the new “Israel” – the Church. At the same time, the main theological position concerning biblical prophecy was amillennial, expecting the return of Jesus in a remote future; biblical passages with messianic overtones tended to be interpreted allegorically. The Reformation changed this. Protestantism insisted that the Bible itself was a source of authority and that any believer could correctly interpret scripture when inspired by the Holy Spirit. This led some to adopt a literalist reading of the biblical prophecies of Isaiah, Daniel, and the book of Revelation in the New Testament, which seemed to anticipate an imminent Second Coming. In contrast to replacement theology, such “restorationists” saw the Jews as continuers of the biblical children of Israel, heirs to the covenant between God and Abraham, and the object of biblical prophecies about a restored Davidic kingdom in the land of Israel. In their messianic scenarios, the return of the Jews to Palestine was the first step in the advancement of the messianic timetable, which would end with the Second Coming of Jesus. Subsequently, the Jews would remain a distinct nation, but be converted to Christianity. This restorationism flourished especially among the Puritans because they put greater emphasis on the Hebrew Bible than other dissenters.14
The Arab_Israeli Conflict Page 14
