Table 6.5. Marital Status and Attachment to Israel 2000 (%)
* * *
Marital StatusVery/Somewhat AttachedVery Attached
In-married 78 52
Intermarried 41 15
* * *
Data from United Jewish Communities, National Jewish Population Survey 2000–2001. (From Ament, Israel Connections and American Jews, table 7. Reprinted with permission from Jonathon Ament and the Jewish Federations of North America.)
Figure 6.2. Alienation from Israel: In-Married and Intermarried, 2007 (From Cohen and Kelman, Beyond Distancing, p. 15. Reprinted with permission from Steven M. Cohen and Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropies.)
Age
Among the biggest gaps in attachment are those between the oldest and youngest.30 According to a 2007 survey, among the over-65s those highly attached to Israel vastly exceed those with low attachment. Among the 35–49 cohort, the low-attached vastly exceed those with high attachment. Among the under-35s, the gap in Israel attachment widens further.31 This is illustrated in Figure 6.3. Similarly, other studies indicate that only about a third of the young view caring about Israel as very important to their Jewish identity.32
Figure 6.3. Attachment to Israel of Young Non-Orthodox, 2007 (From Cohen and Kelman, Beyond Distancing, p. 8. Reprinted with permission from Steven M. Cohen and Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropies.)
Partisanship
More than two-thirds of American Jews either identify as Democrats or lean toward the Democratic Party, while about a fifth identify as Republicans or lean toward the Republican Party. This partisan split overlaps with the religious divide as a clear majority of the non-Orthodox side with the Democrats, while a majority of the Orthodox side with the Republicans. Indeed, just like the Orthodox, Jewish Republicans are more emotionally attached to Israel than Jewish Democrats, as is illustrated in Table 6.6.33
Table 6.6. Party Identification and Attachment to Israel, 2013 (%)
* * *
Very/Somewhat AttachedNot very/Not attached
GOP 84 15
DEM 65 35
* * *
Data from Pew Research Center34
To sum up, while a large majority of American Jews are attached to Israel, there are significant gaps in the level of attachment. The Orthodox, the affiliated, the in-married, Republicans, and older Jews are all more attached to Israel than nonreligious, intermarried, unaffiliated, Democrats, and younger Jews, respectively. To a significant extent this divide mirrors a wider polarization, as younger non-Orthodox Jews are much more likely to be unaffiliated and intermarried, while the Orthodox are the most likely to be in-married and affiliated. In both cases, the first group retains a strong sense of Jewish peoplehood, which includes a strong sense of commitment to Jews worldwide, especially in Israel. In contrast, the second group has a weaker sense of Jewish peoplehood, a more individualistic Jewish identity, and consequently this group feels less obligated to Jews outside America, including Israel. According to some, this attachment gap signals that American Jews are gradually distancing themselves from Israel. This issue is addressed below.
Are American Jews Growing More Distant from Israel?
The Distancing Thesis
Since the latter half of the 1980s many observers have claimed that American Jews are growing more distant from Israel. According to Steven Cohen and Ari Kelman,35 distancing from Israel is related to generational change in the nature of American Jewish identity. In the past, American Jewish support for Israel was underwritten by the sense of belonging to a common people summed up in the old United Jewish Appeal slogan: “We Are One.” Consequently it is no surprise that the younger generation of non-Orthodox Jews – which is more individualistic and less inclined to feel a strong sense of ethnically based Jewish peoplehood – is also less attached to Israel than older generations.36
This generational change in identity, it is argued, has been reinforced by a shift in generational experiences of Israel. The generations that grew up at the time of the Holocaust and the founding of the State, along with those whose defining experiences were the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, share an image of an embattled heroic peace-seeking Israel, a democratic and progressive David surrounded and mortally threatened by a malevolent and fanatical Goliath – the Arabs. In other words, the three factors that underlay the transformation of Zionism into the American Jewish consensus – a strong sense of Jewish peoplehood, a high level of threat perception, and an image of Israel as an expression of their liberal values – remained in place. In contrast, for those who came to maturity in the 1980s and after, things are different. Their defining experiences regarding Israel include both Lebanon Wars (1982, 2006) and both Palestinian intifadas (1987–1991, 2000–2005). These conflicts were perceived by many as morally and politically complex with Israel viewed as the stronger party, no longer under existential threat. In this vein, the founding editor of the Jewish magazine Moment, Leonard Fein, and a former editor of the New Republic, Peter Beinart, have argued that young liberal Jews have been turned off Israel due to the rise of the religious Right in Israel, hawkish Israeli policies towards the Palestinians, and the supposedly noncritical positions adopted towards these issues by the American Jewish establishment.37
Evidence for Distancing
In 1981 more than 80 percent of American Jews felt that Israel’s destruction would be a personal tragedy; in 2007 just under two-thirds felt this way, while the number who disagreed almost trebled from about 10 percent to 28 percent. Moreover in 2007, less than half of Jews under the age of thirty-five felt that Israel’s destruction would be a personal tragedy, compared to more than three-quarters of the over-65s (see Figure 6.4).38 These numbers are reinforced by evidence from focus groups conducted in 2002 and reported in Israel in the Age of Eminem, which concluded that young Jewish adults’ “association with Israel is frighteningly weak and ill-defined.”39
Figure 6.4. Young Non-Orthodox – Percentage Agreeing That “the Destruction of Israel Would Be a Personal Tragedy” (From Cohen and Kelman, Beyond Distancing, p. 9. Reprinted with permission from Steven M. Cohen Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropies.)
In addition, polls consistently indicate that a majority of American Jews think Israelis are too nationalistic and militaristic.40 Following the First Lebanon War, in 1983 surveys showed that nearly half of American Jews and American Jewish leaders were often troubled by Israeli government policies related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.41 Similarly in 2005, another poll revealed that a majority is sometimes disturbed by Israeli policies; almost half is sometimes ashamed by those policies, and 39 percent are sometimes “alienated” by Israeli policies.42 In 2010 there was a large gap in the responses of younger and older Jews to the flotilla incident, in which nine people died when Israel sought to prevent pro-Palestinian activists from breaking its naval blockade of Gaza. Among the over-60s, the incident made almost a third feel more attached to Israel and only 4 percent less attached. In contrast, among the 18- to 29-year-olds, 16 percent felt more attached and 16 percent less attached.43 Meanwhile, focus groups conducted in 2009 indicated that many Reform Jews find Israel’s policies towards liberal Jewish movements alienating.44
Trends in Jewish philanthropy have also been interpreted as indicating distancing.45 In the 1990s, the community shifted its financial resources away from Israel, investing the majority of its money inside the U.S. Whereas in 1967, more than three-quarters of the federations’ UJA campaign was earmarked for Israel; the proportion dropped to less than 50 percent in 1990 and to about a quarter in 2004.46 At the same time, it is also more difficult to mobilize American Jews as a whole than in the past.47 Membership in the largest Zionist organization, Hadassah, has fallen by 20 percent in recent decades from 385,000 to around 300,000. In 1987 the organized Jewish community succeeded in mobilizing an estimated 250,000 people to attend a rally in Washington, DC, in support of the right of Soviet Jewry to immigrate to Israel.48 By contrast, in April 2002, more than a y
ear after the start of the second intifada and at the height of the wave of suicide terror outrages, they managed to bring only a crowd of 50,000–100,000 to Washington for a rally in support of Israel.49
Evidence for Continued Attachment
On the other hand, there is strong evidence that American Jews continue to be strongly attached to Israel. According to the annual AJC surveys of American Jewish opinion, in the first decade of the twenty-first century nearly 75 percent consistently felt that caring about Israel (see Figure 6.5) was an important part of their being Jewish, and about the same percentage felt close or very close to Israel.50 Moreover, an extensive 2010 survey found that in contrast to the focus groups reported in Israel in the Age of Eminem, American Jewish college students were very attached to Israel and their attitudes to Israel were closer to those of their parents than to non-Jewish students their age.51
Figure 6.5. Caring about Israel (From Sasson, Kadushin, and Saxe, Trends in American Jewish Attachment to Israel, p. 12. Reprinted with permission from Theodore Sasson and the Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies.)
Second, the expression of American Jewish attachment to Israel has always ebbed and flowed. It has always peaked in times of crisis and war: 1947–1948, 1967, and 1973. Yes, in the 1990s with the peace process underway, the American Jewish community did shift some of its resources and attention away from Israel. However, the collapse of the Oslo process, coupled with a massive wave of suicide terrorist attacks against Israelis, generated massive American Jewish solidarity with Israel. Given the sense of crisis, Israel became, once again, more central to the American Jewish agenda. Solidarity with Israel was evident at the 2001 AIPAC conference, which set new records for attendance and money raised for Israel.52 AIPAC’s membership soared from 55,000 to 100,000. Survey evidence indicated that 10 percent of Jews became more involved with Israel, 20 percent among the under-35s.53 Attendance at the annual Salute to Israel Parade, which had been declining, shot up to record levels, with more than 100,000 participating and many more cheering from the sidelines.54 During the Second Lebanon War in 2006, when Hezbollah launched thousands of rockets against targets in northern Israel, the United Jewish Communities (UJC) pledged $350 million in emergency aid, and the annual General Assembly of the UJC shifted its agenda to focus on Israel.55
Third, the decline of large top-down, centralized organizations that directed fundraising and political advocacy has been compensated for by increased bottom-up direct engagement with Israel. Alongside the mainstream organizations, a spate of private organizations have sprung up that are playing a major role in advocacy, such as the Israel Project, Stand with Us, Israel 21C, the David Project, and Honest Reporting. Meanwhile, many more American Jews visit Israel and get their information about the country direct from English-language Israeli sources available over the Internet. American Jews have also developed direct transnational political ties with ideologically kin organizations in Israel, including direct philanthropic donations. For example, far-right parties in Israel have extensive ties with the ZOA, while American Friends of Peace Now and Meretz USA have extensive ties with their Israel counterparts.56
In parallel, the decline of Israel-based philanthropy via centralized communal organizations does not mean less money is being donated to Israel. In fact, this decline has been compensated for, as Jews increasingly give directly to projects and organizations in Israel.57 Between 1990 and 2000, such donations increased by 400 percent, totaling more than $2 billion. Between 2001 and 2006 they increased by a further two-thirds. In 2008, the Israeli nonprofit sector collected an estimated $1.5 billion in contributions from foreign donors and foundations, most of it from American Jews.58
Fourth, increased criticism of Israeli policies does not necessarily indicate distancing. The Orthodox, who were most vociferous in criticism of left-wing Israeli governments, were also the sector that felt closest to Israel.59 On the other side of the religious spectrum, the Reform movement has become more Zionist. In 1978 Rabbi Eric Yoffie established the Association of Reform Zionists of America, and in 1997 the movement’s Miami Platform determined that aliyah (immigration to Israel) is a very important means of fulfilling Jewish identity. Yoffie was President of the Union for Reform Judaism (1996–2012), and a strident critic of Israeli settlements. Thus, increased public criticism of Israeli policies does not represent distancing, but rather the replacement of a heroic idealized image of Israel with a more sober and mature form of engagement.60
Fifth, 80–90 percent consistently assert that Israelis are peace loving and democratic.61 Despite the anguished response to the flotilla incident from some liberal Jewish commentators,62 American Jews overwhelmingly blamed pro-Palestinian activists. For the overwhelming majority, including young Jews, the incident did not affect their feelings of attachment to Israel.63 The American Jewish mainstream wishes Israel to continue to be both a Jewish and democratic state; this indicates a closeness to Israel, since maintaining this balance is the core consensual value of Jewish Israelis. The mainstream supports Israel as a homeland and safe haven for Jews. They support its maintaining a Jewish majority by encouraging Jewish immigration, preserving the Law of Return, and retaining national symbols that represent the Jewish majority. At the same time, they aspire to maximize Israel’s liberal democratic character, and here there are criticisms of Israel, especially on the issue of religion and state.64 This is nothing new; after all, a foundation of Brandeis’s American Zionism was that Zion should be shaped by liberal values.
Finally, according to Theodore Sasson and others,65 the fact that older American Jews are far more attached to Israel than the under-35s does not indicate a generational decline in attachment. Rather it is related to life-cycle factors – as people get older, their outlook changes. Yes, surveys from the 1970s onward have indicated a consistent divide between the old and the young,66 but the levels of attachment for each age cohort have remained stable (see Figure 6.6). If there was a process of distancing, one would expect the level of attachment of older generations to decline over time, yet this has not occurred. This seems to indicate the importance of life-cycle factors, like marriage and having children, on attachment to Israel. In this vein, analysis of AJC surveys from 2000 to 2005 indicated that among the non-Orthodox aged 18–39, those married with children were twice as likely to feel very close to Israel than the unmarried or childless married; the latter group were also 50 percent more likely to feel distant from Israel.67
Figure 6.6. Close to Israel, by Age Cohort (From Sasson, Kadushin, and Saxe, Trends in American Jewish Attachment to Israel, p. 15. Reprinted with permission from Theodore Sasson and the Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies.)
Counteracting Distancing: The Rise of Orthodoxy and Increased Travel to Israel
Overall, American Jews are not distancing from Israel. There has been a process of generational decline in Israel attachment primarily among the non-Orthodox, the unaffiliated, and especially the intermarried, which derives from a decline in the sense of Jewish peoplehood. However, this generational decline is being offset by the growing proportion of young Jews who are Orthodox and the impact of the massive increase in travel to Israel among the young non-Orthodox. This is so even after controlling for self-selection by the level of Jewish involvement. The travel effect (see Table 6.7) has been driven by Birthright Israel (aka Taglit), which brought more than 200,000 young American Jews to Israel as part of a peer group trip in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In 2012 alone, 45,000 young American Jews completed the online registration process.68 Birthright participants were 23 percent more likely than nonparticipants to report feeling “very much” connected to Israel, and 40 percent of participants made a return trip to Israel.69 Return visits are significant, because for those who visited Israel twice, the age-related gap in Israel attachment disappears altogether.70 Travel to Israel also increases the likelihood of taking Israel’s side in the conflict, for example, regarding the flotilla incident (see Table 6.8).71
T
able 6.7. Travel to Israel and Attachment to Israel among Under-35 Non-Orthodox Jews, 2007 (%)
* * *
HighLow
Never visited Israel 19 42
One trip 34 17
Two or more trips 52 9
* * *
Data from Synovate, Inc.73
Table 6.8. Travel to Israel and Blame for 2010 Flotilla Incident (%)
* * *
Blamed Pro-Palestinian ActivistsDidn’t Know Whom to Blame
Never visited Israel 53 37
Visited Israel 70 22
* * *
Data from Knowledge Networks (KN)74
In fact, at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, there are signs of an increased connection with Israel among American Jewish leaders. Thus, among young adults in leadership positions in the Jewish community, 56 percent are alumni of long-term Israel programs, whereas only 30 percent of older leaders spent four months or longer in Israel. Similarly the proportion of young leaders who described their facility with Hebrew as excellent or good was twice as large as among older leaders (48 versus 21 percent).72 Clearly, then, there are political consequences to the demographics of Israel attachment. These are explored below.
Political Consequences
The Jewish Vote
The Arab_Israeli Conflict Page 22
