The American Military

by Brad D. Lookingbill

  French and British commanders called for the “amalgamation” of forces into the existing structure of the European armies. However, Pershing refused to permit feeding them into the Allied lines under foreign flags. While maintaining the integrity of his command, he considered suggestions to disperse his troops to other sectors as an affront to national pride. Echoing the sentiments of the commander-in-chief, he insisted upon an “independent army” led by American officers. After all, the U.S. entered the war as an “associate power” rather than as an Allied nation. Following a series of tense negotiations over the “amalgamation” controversy, Pershing eventually permitted a handful of American units to serve as emergency reinforcements in the French and British trenches.

  Assessing the operations on the Western Front, Pershing scorned the “bite-and-hold” tactics that accompanied warfare in the trenches. Instead, he insisted that the AEF train for large-scale assaults with a tactical emphasis on rifle fire, artillery support, and individual initiative. Touting American superiority, he dismissed the Allied reluctance to engage in “open warfare” against German troops. Victory was achievable, he maintained, “by driving the enemy out into the open and engaging him in a war of movement.” While bolstering the Allied armies, Pershing's headquarters laid the groundwork for fighting the war the American way.

  Because gas attacks claimed many Allied casualties on the Western Front, Americans feared chemical weapons perhaps more than other munitions in the German arsenal. Only 30 miles from enemy lines, the AEF began distributing gas masks with a tight nose clip and uncomfortable mouthpiece based upon a British design. The Army soon established a separate Chemical Warfare Service to provide training and equipment. Nevertheless, over one-fourth of all American casualties by the end of the war resulted from gases delivered by artillery shells.

  With the logistical system of the Army in disarray, the War Department attempted to rush as many Americans as possible to France. General Tasker H. Bliss, who succeeded Scott as the Army Chief of Staff in late 1917, ramped up the training program, but Wilson sent him to the Supreme War Council in Versailles that November. General Peyton C. March became the new Chief of Staff in early 1918, when he began to overhaul the General Staff system for the entire Army. Unfortunately, the decisions made in Washington D.C often clashed with Pershing's views on the other side of the Atlantic.

  Throughout 1917, the Allies remained on the defensive in Europe. With Italian forces overrun by the Austrians, the Central Powers held the upper hand. Championing “peace, land, and bread,” the Bolshevik takeover in Russia later resulted in a separate treaty with Germany. The German high command began to concentrate the bulk of their forces along the Western Front, where they outnumbered the French and the British. While American gunners fired their first hostile shot of the war on October 23, the shelling, sniping, and raiding of the “Boches” shook their morale. The AEF persevered that winter, but General Robert Bullard, the new commander of the 1st Division, noted in his diary: “Alas, I think we came too late.”

  The Atlantic Lifeline

  Even though the accomplishments of the U.S. Navy seldom achieved great acclaim, maritime operations remained vital to the AEF. The “unrestricted” submarine warfare of Germany threatened to sever the transportation and communication links between the U.S. and the Allied Powers. Attempting to sink 600,000 tons of shipping per month, German U-boats maintained a torrid pace for attacks in 1917. Without the safe movement of American troops and supplies across the Atlantic Ocean, the armies of Great Britain and France faced doom.

  While president of the Naval War College, Admiral William S. Sims journeyed across the Atlantic in early 1917 to meet with British admirals in London. He encouraged the Royal Navy to focus on developing an elaborate convoy system, but prominent officers voiced opposition to his recommendation. After becoming the commander of U.S. naval forces operating in European waters, he insisted that the “mission of the Allies must be to force the submarines to give battle.” Instead of patrolling 3,000 miles of ocean, the convoy escorts – especially the destroyers – would wait for the enemy to come to them.

  By the summer of 1917, the first trans-Atlantic convoys began crossing the ocean with immediate success. As hundreds of vessels cruised together, the sinking rate for Allied shipping declined significantly. Without a convoy, the rate of loss was as high as 25 percent. By the end of the year, the rate had dropped to no more than 1 percent. Large quantities of grain, oil, and meat from the U.S. reached British and French lines just in time to avoid massive starvation or widespread mutiny. In fact, officials in Washington D.C. predicted boldly that “wheat will win the war.” To the delight of American merchantmen, German U-boats found it no easier to locate a convoy than to chase one ship sailing alone. If attacked, then the convoy escorts turned the tables on the underwater menace.

  Holding the civilian post from 1913 to 1921, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels favored convoying outside of British control. His ban on alcohol on board warships may have inspired the idiomatic phrase “Cup of Joe” for coffee. His Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William Benson, cherished a vision of America standing apart from the world with a battle fleet second to none. The Navy under their management grew to over 2,000 ships, which ranged in class from submarines to dreadnoughts.

  To man the fleet, the Navy Department amassed almost half a million personnel in uniform. The state-of-the-art machinery required a higher caliber of crews, who desired the vocational training and technical skills associated with naval careers. Over 11,000 female Yeomen, or “Yeomanettes,” served as secretaries, clerks, translators, draftsmen, recruiters, and nurses. Working at military installations in the U.S. and abroad, a few even designed camouflage to help protect the ships at sea. With the officer corps dedicated to the concept of a “big navy,” most of the fleet safeguarded American coasts, commerce, and transports. Under the U.S. flag, the sailors effectively kept the “doughboys” from swimming with the fishes.

  The U.S. desperately needed more transports, which prompted the creation of an emergency merchant fleet. Under the auspices of the War Shipping Board and Emergency Fleet Corporation, the federal government confiscated, purchased, and chartered 700 vessels. Ferrying men and supplies over long distances, the fleet swelled to 3 million tons while losing only 200,000 tons. Nevertheless, chronic shortages and conflicting priorities constantly plagued U.S. shipping during the first year of American belligerence.

  While suspending the capital ship-building program, the U.S. invested naval resources in anti-submarine warfare, or ASW. As the number of destroyers increased to 51, the construction time fell to just 70 days. With greater technical virtuosity, light cruisers reached speeds as fast as 29 knots while escorting convoys. A variety of surface ships hunted submarines using hydrophones and depth charges. As a pet project of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, a “splinter fleet” of wooden sub-chasers began to probe offshore in search of German U-boats lurking near shipping lanes. By 1918, British and American vessels were sinking enemy submarines faster than German factories were able to build them.

  Meanwhile, the U.S. laid a mine barrage across the North Sea to block German access to the Atlantic. Owing to a superior design, American mines employed longer antennae better suited to detonation by electrical impulses. While sinking only four submarines, they damaged countless others and bedeviled the German crews. They forced most U-boats to operate closer to German bases, although several continued to maneuver around or under the barrage.

  Naval aviation contributed to the anti-submarine campaign, which included tactical bombings of German bases. At the beginning of the war, the Navy Department planned to build 700 aircraft. Eventually, they amassed more than 2,000 planes to conduct blocking operations. Navy and Marine pilots trained to strike targets in continental Europe, but the Northern Bombing Group operated only during the final weeks of the war. Performing reconnaissance and scouting missions with great success, aviators flew seaplanes, dirigibl
es, and British-built de Havilland biplanes on thousands of sorties against German U-boats.

  In a desperate move, German U-boats went to America to disrupt trans-Atlantic shipping. On June 2, 1918, they sank six vessels off the New Jersey coast, including the passenger steamer Carolina. For almost four months, they turned the nation's eastern shoreline into a war zone but never seriously impacted maritime commerce.

  Given the utter failure of “unrestricted” submarine warfare, the Germans did not successfully attack any convoys of transports. In fact, U.S. ships sped across the ocean with few delays. With cargo and men pouring into the Western Front, the Atlantic lifeline rescued the Allied armies from possible defeat by the Central Powers.

  No-Man's-Land

  What began as a war of rapid movement became a stalemate on the Western Front. From the winter of 1914 until the spring of 1918, most of the battles occurred between multiple parallel trenches zigzagging for 400 miles through Belgium and France. Accompanied by lice and rats, millions of soldiers lived in the muddy, filthy excavations. When daring to look over the top through periscopes, they saw the carnage of “no-man's-land” for hundreds of yards. Mine craters, metal shards, unexploded duds, and barbed wire scarred the desolate landscape between the opposing lines. The stench of rotting flesh and human excrement mingled in the air with chlorine, phosgene, and mustard gases. Time and again, massive firepower drove patrols back to the trenches with an unforgettable sense of futility and loss.

  Figure 10.3 World War I on the Western Front

  On March 21, 1918, the trenches along the Somme River fell to Ludendorff's “storm troopers,” who split a seam in the British and French lines. British forces rallied to prevent the capture of Amiens, while the German offensive stalled within weeks. In early April, another offensive struck a narrow front east of the Lys River to form a salient. Despite claiming a tactical victory, the Germans failed to sever the Allied armies as planned.

  Though narrowly averting disaster, the Allied leaders attempted to strengthen the combined armies with the appointment of a supreme commander. Accordingly, General Ferdinand Foch of France was tapped to “coordinate the action of all the Allied armies on the Western Front.” As a gesture of support, Pershing made a pledge: “Infantry, artillery, aviations, all that we have are yours; use them as you wish.” However, British Field Marshal Douglas Haig continued to lobby for the “amalgamation” of all available units within his army. “A better procedure,” Pershing countered, “would be for the Allies to amalgamate their weakened divisions into a lesser number and let the American divisions take their proper places in the line.” In exchange for British transportation, he offered Haig thousands of incoming troops from the U.S. for “training and service” near the front. Of course, the AEF commander insisted that they assemble in the British and French sectors under the Stars and Stripes.

  In the French sector near Saint-Mihiel, General Clarence R. Edwards commanded the 26th “Yankee” Division of the AEF on April 20. Following an enemy barrage of artillery shells, 1,200 German troops raided the village of Seicheprey. The defensive lines of the 26th Division broke immediately, while the American officers botched the counterattack. The AEF suffered 669 casualties, including 81 dead and 187 captured or missing in action.

  The “doughboys” of the AEF regained their footing at the village of Cantigny, a strong point held by the German army. Known as the “Big Red One,” Bullard's 1st Division defended 3 miles of trenches while preparing for an offensive mission. At dawn on May 28, Colonel Hanson Ely led the 28th Infantry Regiment on an assault that featured heavy artillery, machine guns, flamethrowers, mortars, tanks, and aircraft. They swept up a steep ridge to Cantigny, where the Americans secured the village against German counterattacks. The French largely abandoned the area to fight elsewhere, but divisional gunners under General Charles Summerall blasted the enemy with shell and shrapnel fire. Three days later, the intense combat ended with Ely's troops taking control of the heights. The Germans lost 800 dead and another 755 wounded and captured, whereas the Americans counted 199 fatalities in addition to 667 wounded and captured. Although Cantigny smoldered in ruins, the AEF achieved its first victory on the battlefield.

  As the German army rolled toward the valley of the Marne, Pétain looked to the AEF for assistance near Château-Thierry, some 50 miles east of Paris. General Omar Bundy's 2nd Division held defensive positions astride the Paris–Metz highway west of the town. In addition to the Army regulars of the division, the 5th and 6th Marine Regiments formed a brigade under the command of General James G. Harbord. As U.S. forces assumed responsibility for holding the line near Hill 142, French troops retreated to the rear in early June. Marine Captain Lloyd Williams remarked: “Retreat? Hell, we just got here!” While absorbing an artillery barrage, Americans repulsed a series of German thrusts with marksmanship and determination. Before halting their advance, the Germans moved though the poppy fields into Belleau Wood. On June 6, the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines took Hill 142, where a neatly dressed wave overwhelmed the enemy machine-gun positions.

  The next day, the Marine battalions pivoted toward the enemy stronghold of Belleau Wood. With his men outnumbered four to one, Gunnery Sergeant Dan Daly, who earned two Medals of Honor, urged them forward by asking: “Do you want to live forever?” They captured the village of Bouresches, but most of the dark forest, tangled undergrowth, and scattered ravines belonged to the Germans. Blistered and blinded from gas attacks, the Marines cleared the terrain by June 26 and earned the sobriquet, “Devil Dogs.” The Battle of Belleau Wood largely gave birth to the sense of institutional pride that inspired the Marine Corps for generations.

  All across the line near Belleau Wood, the soldiers of the 2nd Division proved their mettle in battle. To the right of the Marines, the 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments captured Vaux, a village near Château-Thierry. In a month of hard fighting, the entire division suffered 9,777 casualties, including 1,811 dead. With the Americans standing firm between the Germans and Paris, Allied confidence in the AEF soared.

  The Germans possessed enough strength for a final attempt to capture Paris by crossing the Marne, where the 3rd Division under General Joseph Dickman waited for them on July 15. The weight of their attack hit the 30th Infantry Regiment under Colonel Edmund Butts and the 38th Infantry Regiment under Colonel Ulysses Grant McAlexander. After French troops fell back, they left McAlexander's right flank exposed. Beset by firing from three directions, two American platoons fought to the last man. Dickman's division held the line for two days, which prompted their enduring nickname, “The Rock of the Marne.”

  Pershing continued organizing the AEF for major offensive operations, promoting General Hunter Liggett as well as Bullard, Bundy, and Dickman to corps commands. While Summerall took command of the 1st Division, Harbord moved to the head of the 2nd Division. The latter steered toward Vauxcastille on July 18, as the former drove against Soissons. With Americans to their left and to their right, the French Moroccan Division marched in the center against the German salient. Harbord advanced more than 8 miles in two days and captured 3,000 prisoners, but he lost almost 5,000 men. Summerall kept moving for five days, capturing 3,800 prisoners while absorbing 8,365 losses. Vexed by the aggressiveness of the Americans that summer, one German officer referred to their virulent attacks as “inhuman.”

  Thanks to the success of the Allied counterstroke, the British, French, and American divisions began to push the Germans eastward into Belgium. The German high command halted the offensive east of Château-Thierry and withdrew exhausted troops from the Marne. Offering his resignation, Ludendorff called it a “black day” for the German army. With U.S. forces rushing into “no-man's-land,” the balance of power tipped decisively against Germany.

  Cult of the Offensive

  From the start of the Great War, operations on the Western Front resonated with what came to be known as the “cult of the offensive.” Whatever the importance of logistics, training, and tactics, the initiative in
battle belonged to the armed forces able to muster the willpower to attack first. For the human element to stand a chance in the fatal environment, the attackers needed five times as many soldiers as the defenders. Irrespective of the odds, unimaginative commanders often hurled their infantrymen with rifles and bayonets against machine guns and field artillery. Showing disregard for hostile fire, the Americans simply called it “guts.”

  By August 10, 1918, Pershing patched together the “American First Army” to pinch out the Saint-Mihiel salient near Verdun. Occupied by the Germans since 1914, it was a 200-square-mile triangle jutting 14 miles into the Allied lines between the Moselle and Meuse Rivers. A network of railways stretched to the town of Saint-Mihiel, while barbed wire girded its perimeter. Foch dubbed it “the hernia.” Calling for Allied armies “to continue the offensive without cessation,” he initially agreed to Pershing's plan for sending his 476,000 men to clear out the 23,000 Germans inside the salient.

  After consulting with Haig and Pétain, Foch surprised Pershing with a different plan. Suddenly dismissing the importance of Saint-Mihiel, the supreme commander envisaged a “Grand Offensive” to attack along the whole length of the Western Front. The converging armies sought to envelop the strong defenses and to deprive the entrenched German troops of the ability to shift reserves along their interior lines. Hence, British forces would advance southeasterly from Cambrai, while combined Franco-American forces would press northward through the Champagne and Meuse-Argonne regions. With American columns split on either side of the French, two French generals would “assist” in commanding them. Once again, the autonomy of the AEF appeared in jeopardy.