“Are we ready?” Paul turned and asked Daneel 1, whose cube was floating not far away.
“Yes, Dad, I believe we are,” Daneel 1 replied grimly. He floated a little higher above the table.
“Everyone! Attention, please!” he said in an amplified voice.
The side conversations in the room died away.
“As you know, the enemy has elected to pursue a Nuclear Blackmail option, a version remarkably similar to our NB Scenario Number 5, as we played them in our Mars war-game simulations,” the Scottie reported. “As you also know, the NB Scenarios were first envisioned by Dad, but even he thought of them only as an act of extreme contingency, to counter the ultimate desperation by Errabêlu. Because of Dad’s foresight, we do have prepared responses in case one of the NB options was employed against us. Make no mistake; without having played those war-games simulations and identifying potential responses, we would have stood no chance in preventing the deaths of millions of human beings. But with the experience we now have, we might have that chance. I will now turn the time over to Valerie 42. Commander?”
Another Scottie cube, halfway down the table, floated forward.
“As all of you know,” Valerie 42 said with a soprano voice, her holographic image that of a striking auburn haired woman, “Oliver Clarke has threatened to nuke a number of cities, including Lancaster, the largest city of any size closest to Mojave, Dad’s hometown, as one of his first targets.” Valerie 42 paused for a moment. “The first question for us to answer, of course, is whether or not this is a bluff. Does he truly have the weapons to carry out this threat? I will leave that question to Daneel 10 to answer. The next question is a bit more complicated. As we know, nuclear weapons, especially American nuclear weapons, are engineered with strong safeguards built-in. They utilize PALs, short for Permissive Action Links. The details are complex but essentially, without the proper codes, the nuclear devices cannot be detonated. So the next question becomes, assuming Clarke has the weapons, can he detonate them? Again, I will have to defer this question to Daneel 10. Daneel?”
Valerie returned to her ‘seat’ while Daneel 10 floated to the front of the room.
“So, as Valerie asked, question number one,” the Scottie said without preamble. “Does Clarke have the warheads? As you know, my department in MIB was given the assignment of locating and tracking all of the nuclear weapons in the world. We have been working on that task ever since the simulated war games ended back on Mars.”
He turned slightly to face Paul. “Dad, I know that time is short so let me just lay the bad news out for you right now. Clarke may very well have nuclear weapons in hand. At this point in our tasking, we can’t tell you that he doesn’t.”
Paul frowned in disappointment but not surprise. He was half-way expecting this negative report. On the other hand, Capie didn’t look convinced.
“Why not?” she asked. “Can’t you just check to see if any country is missing a few such weapons? I mean, don’t they keep a pretty tight control on that sort of thing?”
Daneel 10 nodded. “Yes and no, Mom. Let me explain and I’ll start with the United States first. From 1946 to 1989, the United States manufactured more than 70,000 nuclear warheads of 65 different models.”
Capie gasped. “That many? Really? I didn’t know. Haven’t they dismantled most of those?”
“Yes, they have,” replied Daneel 10. “Especially the ones built before 1970. For the most part, those older warheads were inefficient designs anyway and no longer served a viable purpose. You see, the early weapons were designed to target mostly cities. They had a high CEP or Circle of Error Probability. That’s another way of saying that the early weapons weren’t very accurate. But then, with yields in the megatons and sometimes tens of megatons, they didn’t have to be accurate. As the saying goes, close only counts in horseshoes, hand grenades, and H-Bombs.
“But later, starting in the very late 1960’s and continuing through the 1980’s both the US and Soviet military planners went through a slow but significant paradigm shift. They still targeted cities, but those became of secondary importance. Instead, the accuracy of the new delivery systems—the ICBMs and the submarine launched ballistic missiles along with the new cruise missiles—began to allow targeting of strictly military targets. Each country could, and each did, start targeting the other side’s delivery systems, such as missile silos, nuclear air-bases, and where possible, ballistic missile submarines. The idea was to take out the enemy delivery systems before they could be used in a nuclear exchange. The improved accuracy of the delivery systems gave both sides that increasing capability.”
Most of this was familiar to Paul, but he could tell by Capie’s sour expression that it was news to her.
“But with so many warheads, couldn’t they hit both types of targets?” she asked.
“Theoretically, yes. In reality, it wasn’t likely,” Daneel 10 answered. “You see, once the missiles started flying, it was problematic how long such a war would last. There were already far more nuclear warheads than there were ways to deliver them. And with each side targeting the others silos, bombers and submarines first…well, I think you see the point. With the increasing accuracy and the change of primary targets, neither side needed warheads in the megaton range anymore, especially when they were losing interest in cities as primary targets. Indeed, when they were targeting silos, the mushroom cloud from a 5 or 10 megaton detonation interfered with any follow-on warheads ability to target and hit another silo in the same general area.”
“Oh, I never thought about that,” Capie said. “Though it makes sense, in a ghoulish sort of way.”
Daneel 10 nodded then went on. “Since the warheads could now be smaller, this provided the option to put more warheads on a single missile. Which the United States did by deploying the first Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle or MIRV capable ICBM in 1970, the Minuteman III. That missile carries three warheads, which could each be independently targeted, meaning it could hit three separate targets from one missile. Since then, the missiles have continued to be more accurate and to carry more MIRVs. Naturally, with the introduction of MIRV warheads, the old multi-megaton warheads became obsolete and newer ones had to be designed and built, although, in a few cases, the old ones could be upgraded to do the job. That explains, to some degree, why the United States built so many warheads.”
“You still haven’t told me why we can’t quickly find out if any weapons are missing or not,” Capie complained with a grimace.
“I’m getting there,” Daneel 10 said. “Now, in the United States arsenal of nuclear weapons, there are three categories. The current crop of warheads is in the first such category, known as Active Service. These are the warheads in current deployment, all connected to ICBMs, cruise missiles or other delivery systems. And yes, these weapons are tightly controlled. If one or more of them went missing, it would be noticed immediately—if not sooner.
“The second category is known as the Hedge Stockpile. This includes warheads that are fully operational but kept in storage, ready to be mounted to a missile or loaded in a bomber or whatever, if something happened to a warhead in Active Service. The warheads in this category are also pretty tightly controlled, but not as tightly as those in Active Service. I would think that an intelligent clever wizard could steal a few such warheads from the Hedge Stockpile and they wouldn’t be missed for days, perhaps weeks at a time.
“The last group is known as Inactive service. These are warheads that are on their way to retirement and being eventually dismantled. Most of them have had critical components removed. In other words, they aren’t operational but, with enough time and additional components, could be made operational again, if they were needed. This is the group of warheads that most concerns me. These are the older, in some cases, larger warheads, less closely watched, and thus easier to steal. These weapons are stored in a lot of different locations, and thus harder to inventory. I believe that any competent wizard, with some sleight-of-hand, cou
ld steal almost any of these warheads that he wanted, and create the paperwork to imply that it exists but is simply stored somewhere else.”
Daneel 10 looked at them soberly. “If Clarke stole American warheads, these are the ones he would have taken. They offer him three advantages. First, they are easier to steal. Second, he could choose some rather large warheads, in the multi-megaton range, which would be better suited to a large metropolitan area such as Los Angeles. And third, the vintage warheads are easier to arm and detonate.”
Again, Capie blinked and shook her head. “Why would they be easier to arm and detonate?” she asked.
“Because of the nature of the launch and arming codes required,” Daneel 10 replied. “You see, up until the early 1960’s, none of the US warheads required such a code to launch or arm them.”
Even Paul’s jaw dropped at that one. “None of them?!” Capie and Paul asked, simultaneously.
Daneel 10 nodded. “The military felt that it would hinder their ability to launch the weapons. They envisioned a sudden all-out nuclear surprise attack by the Soviets. Under such a scenario, there would literally be only minutes for them to respond. Obtaining the necessary codes and implementing them would probably take too long. It wasn’t until President Kennedy issued an Executive Order in the early 1960’s that the military was forced to implement the first security codes. By today’s standards, those first codes were a joke. They consisted of 3 digit combination locks, similar to a bicycle lock. A little later, they went to a 4 digit lock.”
Paul produced a wintery smile. “Those wouldn’t be much of a challenge to a wizard to bypass.”
Daneel 10 nodded again, in total agreement. “Over time, the Permissive Action Links were upgraded. All Active Service warheads now use Class F codes, which requires a 12 digit computer code and provides for some rather sophisticated options.”
Capie stared at the table. “So, he could have stolen earlier warheads, ones that would be relatively easy for a wizard to bypass the code and detonate. One with larger warheads.”
“It’s entirely possible,” Daneel confided to them. “Assuming he stole American warheads. On the other hand, he could have stolen Soviet warheads, which I believe to be even more likely.”
Capie sighed in discouragement and sat back in her seat. “Why is that, Daneel?”
“In the United States, it is frequently said that there are so many government agencies, that the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing,” Daneel explained. “But in the Soviet Union, even the fingers and thumbs have no clue what the other fingers and thumbs are up to. No one knows how many warheads the Soviets built, but it was decidedly more than the United States constructed. Not even the Russians know how many, but it is known that they probably manufactured fewer types. Probably. The breakup of the Soviet Union did not help the situation either. Some nuclear warheads ended up in client states such as the Ukraine. Some of those were shipped back to Russia. Others were not. The confusion factor is high. Very high.”
Capie rubbed her brow.
“Is there more?” Paul asked.
“A little,” Daneel 10 replied. “The Soviets tended to build larger weapons than the U.S. and for a longer period of time too. In general they were still making large multi-megaton warheads after the U.S. was downsizing theirs. In addition, first the Soviets and then the Russians have been slower to retire and dismantle their old warheads, even when they had no particular use for them anymore. In some cases, they simply stored them in warehouses and forgot them. Dismantling a warhead takes real money and for them, that has been a problem.”
The Scottie briefly sighed before continuing on. “And then there is the matter of the PALs and the codes. The Soviets were slower to implement any warhead safety systems. Those too cost money and slowed the deployment/response times. Instead, they preferred to control their warheads through procedures and bureaucratic interlocks. They put soldiers to watch the warheads, soldiers to watch the soldiers, and soldiers to watch the soldiers watching the soldiers. They didn’t begin using launch codes and other such security lockouts until the early 1970’s and their codes never reached the level of complexity that the Americans use.”
Paul shrugged and shook his head in exasperation. “So. Clarke could have stolen American warheads, but you think that he more likely stole Soviet ones instead.”
“That’s it in a nutshell, yes,” Daneel 10 agreed with a sad smile. “I think you have no choice, Dad, but to assume that he has them in hand and can arm and detonate them whenever he chooses.”
Paul turned to Daneel 1. “Have you started search teams yet?”
The Scottie nodded. “There are two entire divisions now in low Earth orbit and portions of a third. Of course, it would be easier if we knew which cities to search.”
Paul sat and thought a few moments. “We need more manpower than that. And even then, it will take time to be thorough.”
“True, Dad,” responded Daneel 1. “But I need your authorization to release the other units for the search effort.”
Paul turned back to Capie. “I apologize, dear. But we will probably need every Scottie to search for these warheads, including the units in Africa.”
She grimaced. “I understand completely. Do what you have to.”
“Daneel,” Paul said. “If we put every Scottie into the search effort, how long will it take to search every large city in the world for nuclear warheads?”
“According to our preliminary calculations, roughly 3.5 days, Dad,” the Scottie replied. “And that is only searching cities with populations of more than 500,000 people. If we could do active scanning, such as we used on Mars when we were looking for titanium and beryllium, we could search the entire world in less than two hours.”
“But that would require an active scan,” Paul pointed out, shifting uneasily in his chair. “And it would be detectable and would alert Clarke. They would likely detonate at least one and possibly more of those warheads, to make us back off.”
“Yes, that is what we surmised could happen when we ran the war-game scenarios back on Mars,” Daneel I acknowledged.
“Please refine your calculations,” Paul requested, weighing his words carefully. “I think we should put out the necessary instructions and get everyone into space and start the search. Everybody except 1st Battalion, 4th Brigade, 2nd Division, II Corps. I would like to borrow them for a few hours, at least. You can have them back later.”
“What are you going to do?” Capie asked him, a puzzled frown on her face.
“We need to buy some time,” Paul answered her, reaching out to take her hand. “I’m afraid you are not going to like my plan. For that matter, even I don’t like it, but I don’t see many acceptable alternatives.”
Ω
The search method they referred to in the Situation Room, the method that the Scotties would be using to look for hidden nuclear warheads, was one they had developed during their war-game simulations back on Mars. They owed credit to Gerty 2 (2009 film Moon), one of several of their experts on nuclear engineering.
In her self-education on all things nuclear, Gerty 2 un-earthed a scientific discovery made at Purdue University, namely that the rate of decay of radioactive materials was not a constant, despite what Paul had been taught at high school and in college. Researchers at Purdue noted that the radioactive decay rates of silicon 32 and radium 226 were a smidgen higher during the day versus at night, and slightly higher when the Earth was closer in its elliptical orbit to the Sun than when it was father away.
Their theory, which the Scotties had laboriously confirmed, was that solar neutrinos were responsible. Variations in neutrino flux were determined to be the cause for a slight but measureable change in the decay rate of radioactive materials. It was this principle that the Scotties would exploit in their search technique for Errabêlu’s alleged nuclear weapons.
Neutrinos were nearly massless particles which only weakly interact with ordinary matter. Indeed, according to one scientif
ic estimate Paul had once read, an average low-energy neutrino could safely sail completely through 50 light-years of solid lead! How neutrinos, which had so little interaction with normal matter, somehow affected radioactive decay rates was a complete mystery to Earth’s physicists. And, too, for the Scotties as well. However, the process didn’t need to be understood in order to exploit it.
1st Brigade, 1st Division of II Corps were the first Scotties to move into search position, 360 miles directly over the Dodger Stadium, virtually dead center of the city of Los Angeles. The 360 mile distance put the Scotties as close to any Errabêlu wizards on the Earth’s surface as Paul dared allow them to be, lest the brigade’s presence be otherwise detected.
The Scotties spread out horizontally, spacing themselves a distance of 60 feet from each other, creating a huge circular disk. By way of WiFi connections, they coordinated creating a huge portal, reaching outward 4.3 miles in diameter.
The portal they created was very specific in intent. One end of the portal reached out, in a direct line with the sun, to a point just inside the orbit of Venus, 43.8 million miles from Earth. The spell which created the portal was highly singular, intentionally cast to allow only one type of matter to transit through: solar neutrinos. Nothing else, not even photons or radiation, was permitted. The level of solar neutrino flux at Venus was double that of Earth. Added to the normal neutrino flow arriving at Earth, the solar neutrinos coming through the portal tripled the amount now raining down on Dodger Stadium and the immediate area.
The Scotties reached out and cast a second spell, which created a giant convex lens around themselves. Again, the spell was very specific and affected only solar neutrinos. Adjusting the focal point of the lens, they were able to further concentrate the neutrino flux so that at ground level around the stadium, in a circle one mile in diameter, the flux level was 840% of normal. Outside the circle, the flux level dropped to zero, out to a diameter of 4 miles, under the “shadow” of the convex lens.
The Genie and the Engineer 3: Ravages of War Page 28
