by Tom Clancy
Example #2: Fast-Breaking Crisis
Our next example of SF is a response to an actual crisis or conflict. As you might expect, this kind of mission requires a somewhat larger response.
Suppose an ally somewhere—or simply some nation we care about—is threatened. Clearly, a U.S. response is called for, and is quickly put into gear. The regional CINC establishes a Joint Task Force (JTF), and begins to assemble his forces for deployment to the crisis area. An order goes to the theater SOC commander, and a decision is made to deploy an SOF force to support the JTF. Included is an order to move a full SF battalion into the theater to establish a forward-operating base (FOB) for SOF units.
Since all SF units have rapid-response deployment plans, and packages ready to go at a moment’s notice, things then begin to move very quickly.
First, a full SF battalion is assembled and made ready to deploy to their FOB site. Meanwhile, other units from USASOC and SFC have been working hard to support them.
Almost as soon as the deployment order for the battalion arrives, the group commander authorizes the movement of the ODC (battalion command team), and makes a request for certain USASOC and support units. Among these is a battalion “slice” package of communications personnel and equipment from the 112th Signal Battalion, USASOC’s own unit for keeping in touch. There will also be a team of support and logistics personnel from USASOC’s 528th Special Operations Support Battalion. The USASOC leadership will also probably arrange for a package of helicopters from the 160th SOAR, and perhaps a contingent of military police and/or engineers from XVIII Airborne Corps.
Because these units are needed to build the bare FOB prior to the arrival of the battalion’s three SF companies, all of them will be dispatched to the FOB site via USAF transport aircraft before the first SF team member is sent.
Once the lead units arrive in the host nation, things get very busy. The real challenge is to prepare the FOB for the three companies that will probably arrive in just a few days. The first problem is to find a site. Permanent facilities like barracks or aircraft hangars make ideal FOBs, but the groups are ready to resort to tents if necessary. Whatever the accommodations, the lead elements of the SOF task force has to work fast, if they are to get into the fight in time.
The next few days are a frenzy of activity, as each unit exercises its own special talents: The MPs and engineers establish a perimeter and begin to work on the force protection plan; the 112th Signals Battalion team starts setting up a communications center, wiring the FOB for phones, and setting up the computer network; and the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion force sets up their logistical and support functions, including mess arrangements, sanitation facilities, and suitable sleeping quarters for all that will be coming.
The FOB begins to come to life when the communications center is activated ... normally within hours. Because of the need to support mission planning, receive intelligence data, and control teams on missions the number of SATCOM and HF radio circuits is much larger than we saw in Example #1. The FOB usually has between eight and twelve circuits of each type, which creates a farm of antennas outside the communications center. As might be imagined, supplies of good electrical power are as important as food and water, and the engineers have to work hard to supply it.
Once they’re in-country, the individual SF companies set up their own facilities, including the ODB company headquarters and ODA teams. Their communications packages will probably be at least as large as those from the FID mission, and can operate alongside the FOB’s comms setup.
The idea in general is to rapidly build up a base from which missions supporting the needs of the JTF commander can rapidly be generated. To help the JTF staff in their tasking, a small SF cell known as a Special Operation Command and Control Element (SOCCE) is established at JTF headquarters to act as a conduit for orders and information to and from the FOB.
If everything has been properly done, the SF battalion will be installed in its FOB and ready to go within two to three days. By this time, the FOB will probably have begun planning their initial missions in support of the JTF. Normally these will be SR missions, designed to put trained eyes onto priority intelligence targets for the JTF commander.
The first SR missions are usually launched within ninety-six hours of the arrival of the first ODAs. If possible, mission rehearsals will be run, and then the teams will be dispatched via the SOAR aircraft or other available transport. At the same time, more SR missions will be planned, as well as the first Direct Action operations in support of the JTF commander’s overall engagement strategy. By this time—if the influx of American units has not deterred the hostile forces—there may be open conflict in the theater.
Meanwhile, as they get eyes onto the targets of interest, the SR teams are sending in data from behind enemy lines. These data—combined with intelligence from satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, radio intercepts, and other sources—allow the JTF commander to decide how he will react to the intentions of the enemy.
If the hostile forces have not yet initiated combat operations, then the JTF commander will probably order the SR teams to continue to watch and report (the SR teams will rotate out periodically).
If the enemy has started shooting, the SF battalion switches into high gear. DA missions will be deployed to destroy enemy infrastructure (bridges, communications, etc.), to hunt down WMDs and the personnel qualified to employ them, and possibly to initiate UW operations behind enemy lines (contact will be made with opposition groups that will be supported in a guerrilla campaign). This can, of course, take quite some time to accomplish.
These operations will continue until a resolution to the conflict occurs and both sides come to a peace agreement. Even then, the SF mission will probably continue long after other conventional units have gone home. For example, the JTF commander will probably want to use the SF teams to monitor compliance with an armistice or cease-fire agreement. The SF teams might also be called upon to set up relief efforts for refugees, or to begin training demining teams. Even after the FOB is torn down and the battalion rotated back to home base, it is likely that the JTF commander will still want some SF muscle in his theater, and a company-sized deployment might be sent.
Example #3: Major Regional Conflict
This is a worst-case scenario, where a major crisis has escalated into a full-blown war, or as they call it inside the Beltway, an MRC. Such a conflict requires a minimum deployment of a full group and the establishment of an additional level of SOF command and control. This is called a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) headquarters, which is tied to the theater commander’s own HQ (and is normally located in a friendly neighboring country). The JSOTF looks a lot like an FOB, and has similar facilities, communications resources, and personnel. The difference is that the JSOTF is designed to coordinate SOF units on a theater level. It would not only task and command an entire SFG, but might also handle operations planning and support for the Ranger Regiment, SEAL Teams and Special Boat Squadrons, or USAF SOC aircraft.
Normally, the JSOTF will be commanded by a colonel or brigadier general, with the theater SOC or SFG commander in charge. Very few people know how to command and control such large, mixed formations of SOF units, and the JSOTF job is not taken lightly.
Meanwhile, the deployment of the SF battalions will move forward as in the preceding scenario, except that each will be located separately (clustering such units makes a too tempting target). Missions will also be run as in that scenario, except that there must be greater coordination with the other component commanders to avoid unpleasant situations and “blue-on-blue” incidents.
The communications requirements, especially for SATCOM resources, will be enormous. In fact, some commercial SATCOM time may have to be bought to handle housekeeping traffic that does not have to be classified or encrypted.
The rest of the scenario will depend on the nature of the contingency and the requirements of the JTF/theater commander (though in many respects
it will follow the pattern of Example #2 writ larger and with higher stakes). However it proceeds, you can count on the SF/SOF units to be deeply engaged throughout the process from start to finish.
Getting Ready: Training for the “Big” One
If you think education is expensive ... try ignorance!
Unknown Schoolteacher
In the U.S government, the new year begins on the first day of October, which is the first day of the new fiscal year. On this day the financial books of the old year are closed, and new funds begin to flow. On this day also most new military operations and missions officially begin (usually designated with the fiscal year and a code number).
It is not coincidental that October happens to be the month when major training exercises are launched. (The negative coincidence has to do with the flow of money. Because training tends to get cancelled to pay for “contingencies” that can break out anytime, it makes sense to schedule training as early as possible during the fiscal year.)
The largest exercises take place at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. Most SFGs will get a rotation to one or the other, though not to both. The 3rd and 5th SFGs (with their African, Mideast, and Persian Gulf missions) tend to take part in NTC, while the 1st, 7th, 10th, 19th, and 20th tend toward JRTC. (Interestingly, SFGs participate in few overseas exercises, since real-world missions take up all their overseas time ... and help keep them sharp.)
Because the point is to mimic as closely as possible real situations our military men and women might expect to face, exercises tend to be large and complex. Meaning: I won’t be able to give you more than a taste of the world of Special Forces training. I did, however, spend quality time with soldiers from the SFGs during some of their more important training events. And I trust that the taste will fairly represent the whole meal.
A note: Army unit commanders and personnel build their entire yearly schedules around preparing for their major training rotations (the occasional real-world contingency is almost an afterthought ... though not entirely). They’re the “final exams” for a command tour, and can make or break a career.... Even so—paradoxically—commanders love them!
And a caution: In order to protect SF soldiers during their downrange missions, I must be careful about revealing their identities. Thus, with the exception of commanders of SF battalions or groups, SF soldiers will be identified by pseudonyms.
JRTC 99-1: The Odyssey of ODA 745
For over a decade, the Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center has been training units and soldiers in the art of infantry warfare. Originally located at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, it was relocated in 1993 to Fort Polk, Louisiana (where there is far more room). Here amid pine forests and swamps, units from all over the Army receive the finest force-on-force training in the world.
This is not idle talk. Many of the best new ideas and concepts for training military personnel have come out of Fort Polk. To name two: the use of third-party personnel (neutral, civilian, nongovernmental, and peacekeeper) and of what are called “adaptive scenario methods” (nonscripted random events, variable threat levels, and the like). These have been applied by other services and commands in their own exercises. Already U.S. Atlantic Command has used many of the JRTC’s adaptive scenario methods to improve the quality of their own Joint Task Force Exercises (JTFEXs)72—the huge wargames that are run to certify the deployment readiness of Navy carrier battle groups (CVBGs), amphibious ready groups (ARGs), and Marine Expeditionary Units—Special Operations Capable (MEU [SOC]s).
The JRTC staff have additionally developed training scenarios in preparation for such operations as peacekeeping in Bosnia and humanitarian relief in Haiti; they have set up exercises that were used to demonstrate which former Warsaw Pact nations were ready for NATO membership under the Partnership for Peace (PFP) Program;73 and they have increased the number and visibility of SOF operations during training rotations (so conventional force leaders and units can better understand the capabilities of SOF units and learn how to work better with them). Finally, they have developed a greater focus on public—and therefore media—visibility.
As little as three years ago, SOF operations in support of conventional units during JRTC rotations were not openly discussed with the public or media personnel. This has changed. U.S. Army Special Operations Command and Special Forces Command (with no little urging from the JRTC/Fort Polk commanding officer, Brigadier General Sam Thompson) have come to realize that a little openness can’t hurt.
It is in this context that I headed down to Fort Polk in October 1998. Here I would experience the SOF operations of a JRTC rotation, the first of FY99 (JRTC 99-1).
This was the first major exercise of the year for Special Forces, and a major force-on-force training event by the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Special Forces Group (2/ 7th SFG). The 2/7th SFG would be the major SOF component supporting a larger conventional unit exercise by the 1st Brigade of the 10th (1/10th) Mountain Division. According to the exercise scenario, the 2/7th SFG would establish a forward operating base (FOB) on the Fort Polk reservation, then train, package, and deliver executable SF missions in support of the 1/10th Mountain. These would involve a wide range of SF capabilities, including Special Reconnaissance (SR), Direct Action (DA), and Civil Affairs (CA), and their outcome would directly affect the conditions encountered by the 1/10th Mountain. This direct linkage between conventional and SOF operations is designed to better reflect the real-world synergism of the two forces.
Tuesday, October 6th—Fort Polk, Louisiana
I flew commercially into the England Municipal Airpark, in Alexandria, Louisiana, about fifty miles from the town of Leesville and Fort Polk.
As I headed my rental car west on Louisiana Route 2874 out of the airpark, I could see the marshalling area for the 1/10th Mountain, already filled with vehicles, tents, and personnel, while helicopters from a nearby pad buzzed around and about. All were getting ready for their movement in a few days into the JRTC “box” (the Fort Polk force-on-force exercise area).
On arriving at the Fort, I checked in with old friends Paula Schlag and Dan Nance at the Public Affairs Office (PAO), then made a short office call on Brigadier General Samuel S. Thompson III (the JRTC/Fort Polk commanding officer and a Vietnam-era Special Forces soldier).
Sam Thompson is a major reason for the recent success of JRTC, and he works hard to improve on that record, as well as keep his post healthy and busy. All over the base you can see the fruits of his work, from improved base housing to new roads and other infrastructure.
Fort Polk has changed and grown a great deal since the 1993 move down from Fort Chaffee. Though the central Louisiana locale is nothing if not off-putting. (It’s fifty miles from anything like civilization; until last year there was not even a Wal-Mart in the town of Leesville. There are no AOL access numbers there, the weather runs the gamut from uncomfortable to miserable, and the countryside is crowded with alligators and four types of poisonous snakes.) Yet this is one of the most advanced and exciting classrooms in the world.
Following my chat with General Thompson, I drove over to the headquarters of the Special Operations Training Detachment on the north side of the post. SOTD, which is headed by Lieutenant Colonel Mike Rozsypal, is the control-and-observation element that watches over the SOF parts of JRTC exercises. Staffed by a highly experienced team of observer/controller personnel (they used to be known as referees), SOTD supervises and evaluates SOF units at both JRTC and NTC, and makes possible the smooth interface between SOF and conventional units and operations in force-on-force training exercises.Lieutenant Colonel Mike Rozsypal, USA. As head of the Special Operations Training Division at the Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center (located at Fort Polk, Louisiana), Rozsypal is charged with supervising the execution of Special Operations exercises during training rotations.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
The SOTD team has the toughest job in the entire J
RTC O/C pool. Unlike conventional units, SOFs do not necessarily stay in the “box”—or even on the Fort Polk reservation—during rotations.
Though the reservation devotes over 100,000 acres of usable land to its exercise space (the total post acreage measures almost 200,000 acres) this sandbox is too small for SOF units to play on. To fully accommodate the variety of targets, terrain, and scenarios necessary to make full use of SOF units, SOTD has made arrangements to use other facilities as far away as California and the Carolinas, thus providing SOF participants with the elbowroom they would find in a real-world military theater of operations. This diversity of facilities and locations is a wonderful thing for the SOF units, but it places a huge burden on SOTD and the JRTC range support personnel.
During an exercise, SOTD O/Cs might start the day before dawn in coordination meetings at Fort Polk, travel all day to a distant field site, and then work all night supporting an SOF unit conducting SR or DA missions hundreds of miles away from Fort Polk. It’s tough work for Lieutenant Colonel Rozsypal and his troops, but it has greatly improved the readiness of SOF units for large-scale contingency operations.
Lieutenant Colonel Rozsypal himself is a tall, thin, soft-spoken Texan, with a gravelly voice. When I arrived at SOTD, he introduced me to his staff, then led me into the conference room in order to lay out the ground rules he expected me to follow during the coming operation.
Since I was to be flagged as both “press” and an SOTD O/C, I was, as far as Mike Rozsypal and his crew were concerned, an O/C in every way but the paycheck ... as long as I followed the O/C rules.The imaginary Aragon Island, which is used for operations at the U.S. Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Though JRTC is based at Fort Polk, Louisiana, operations can run over the entire Aragon area.
