On November 29, Chairman Peter B. Porter read the Foreign Relations Committee’s report. It was a stinging attack on British policies—focusing on the Orders-in-Council but also mentioning impressment—and a ringing plea for action. In the face of British wrongs “so daring in character, and so disgraceful in their execution,” the report called on Congress to summon forth “the patriotism and resources of the country.” Toward this end, the committee recommended six resolutions that called for filling the ranks of the existing army, raising additional regulars and short-term volunteers, authorizing the use of militia, fitting out the navy, and permitting merchant vessels to arm for defense.21 In his supporting speech, Porter said that the report was to be understood as a forerunner to war and that only those who favored war should vote for the resolutions. “Do not let us raise armies,” he said, “unless we intend to employ them.”22
The House approved each resolution by a large margin, the majorities ranging from 75 to 112.23 The only proposal that generated any opposition, the arming of merchantmen, was attacked as a half-way measure that was premature and also dangerous because it might lead to war with several nations. But even this resolution was approved by a 97–22 margin.24 “There appears to be a greater degree of unanimity in the national legislature,” said one Federalist, “than I have observed on any important question, since the conclusion of the revolutionary war.”25
Appearances were deceptive, however, for different factions in the House supported the resolutions for different reasons. The War Hawks supported them as a prelude to war; commercial Republicans, because they had long advocated stronger defense measures. Some Republicans—the “scarecrow” party—hoped that the mere threat of war would frighten the British into concessions. According to one critic, they believed “that it [would] not be necessary to employ, or even raise the force contemplated.”26 The Federalists, on the other hand, supported the resolutions to avoid the charge of being under the influence of “British gold” and to uphold their traditional commitment to preparedness. “We hope to avoid being amalgamated with [the] British,” said one Federalist. These are “measures of the old federal school,” added another.27
The adoption of the resolutions indicated that a large majority in the House favored war preparations. Members of the Senate were of a like mind, and between December 1811 and April 1812 Congress enacted a war program. The Federalists offered little resistance and even supported some of the bills, but dissidents (particularly in the Senate) stymied the administration on several key proposals.28 As a result, the war program that emerged was not exactly what the administration had wanted.
Five of the measures were designed to support a land war. The most important provided for completing the existing 10,000-man army (whose ranks were barely half full) by raising the bounty for new recruits from $12 to $31 plus 160 acres of land.29 The other measures provided for raising 25,000 additional U.S. Regulars and 50,000 one-year U.S. Volunteers, authorized the president to call out 100,000 militia for up to six months’ service, and appropriated $1.9 million for the purchase of arms, munitions, and other military supplies.30
The administration disliked the additional army bill because it was too ambitious. Convinced that sufficient regulars could not be recruited in time for a summer campaign, Madison and his advisers planned to rely on short-term volunteers and militia.31 But Senator Giles preferred regulars, and he persuaded Congress to raise the authorized level of the army to 35,000 men.32 Even worse, Congress voted to give the states (rather than the national government) authority to appoint the U.S. Volunteer officers. This threatened to decentralize the war effort. It also prompted some congressmen—Federalists and Republicans alike—to insist that the new troops were actually militia who could not legally serve abroad—even in Canada.33 The administration also failed to secure the authority it sought to arm and classify the militia. Southerners had long favored legislation of this sort because their citizen soldiers were so poorly armed and organized. Northerners, on the other hand, were reasonably satisfied with existing arrangements and hence opposed any innovations.34 The House defeated one bill to arm and classify the militia and tabled another to arm the militia.35
Resistance to Naval Expansion and New Taxes
The measures designed to support a maritime war also ran into trouble. Armed with facts and figures from the Navy Department, Langdon Cheves introduced a bill from the House Naval Committee that called for building ten new frigates. A long-term construction program, Cheves argued, would be relatively inexpensive and would benefit farmers and merchants alike.36 Cheves was supported by some Republicans as well as by the Federalists. Josiah Quincy delivered a speech on behalf of naval expansion that former Federalist John Adams called “the most important . . . ever . . . uttered” in the House and that even the anti-navy Philadelphia Aurora considered “ingenious.”37 “If you had a field to defend in Georgia,” Quincy said, “it would be very strange to put up a fence in Massachusetts. And yet, how does this differ from invading Canada, for the purpose of defending our maritime rights?”38
Most Republicans, however, were opposed to naval expansion, believing that a fleet was a costly and dangerous expedient that would be overwhelmed by the British navy. “We cannot contend with Great Britain on the ocean,” declared Adam Seybert of Pennsylvania. “Our vessels will only tend to swell the present catalogue of the British navy.”39 Most Republicans agreed with Seybert, and Cheves’s frigate proposal was voted down by a three-vote margin. James Lloyd offered a similar proposal in the Senate, but it lost by a six-vote margin.40 The House also rejected proposals to build ships-of-the-line and a naval repair dock.41 Instead, Congress passed a bill that provided merely for fitting out the existing frigates, purchasing ship timber, and assigning Jefferson’s gunboats to those harbors that were most exposed.42 A bill to build additional coastal fortifications was approved, too, although only after the Senate had slashed the proposed $1 million appropriation in half.43
Even more controversial were the administration’s plans to finance the war. Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin hoped to use tax revenue to pay for the government’s normal operations and loans to defray the cost of the war.44 The details were presented to Congress in January 1812. Gallatin earlier had estimated that regular expenses for 1812 would be $9.4 million, which could be met from current revenue and a small surplus in the Treasury. To finance war-related expenses, he now recommended a loan of more than $10 million. Moreover, because a disruption in trade was expected to reduce government revenue at a time when interest charges on the national debt were climbing, Gallatin recommended raising the customs duties and reviving the Federalist internal taxes that had been repealed in 1802.45
Gallatin’s report was a great shock to most Republicans, few of whom had given any thought to internal taxes. These taxes had contributed to the defeat of the Federalists in 1800, and many Republicans feared that reviving them would undermine their popularity and put a damper on the war spirit. “I cannot think it will necessary at present to resort to direct taxes & stamp acts,” said William Plumer. “This was the very course that proved fatal to John Adams’ administration.”46
Fearful of the consequences, House Republicans would not even print the report, and Gallatin was subjected to sharp criticism.47 One congressman accused him of “treading in the muddy footsteps of his official predecessors” and of trying “to chill the war spirit.” “If reports are true,” said another, the British minister’s carriage “is frequently seen at Gallatin’s house at such hours of the night as honest men are asleep.”48 A Clintonian paper suggested that Gallatin’s aim was to “‘frighten the war-hawks,’ and blow up the cabinet,” and other papers accused him of treachery or apostasy.49 Many assured their readers that the war could be won without additional taxes.50
As unpalatable as the tax issue was, the War Hawks realized that it could not be sidestepped. Hence, in mid-February Ezekiel Bacon, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, introduced a series
of proposals to implement Gallatin’s program. A bill to borrow $11 million stirred little debate and easily passed both houses.51 The tax resolutions, however, provoked vigorous opposition even though they merely took the sense of the House and specified that no new duties would be imposed until after war had been declared. There was considerable support for postponing the subject altogether, which prompted one Federalist to wonder whether “the war [would] float the taxes, or the taxes sink the war.”52 In the end the resolutions were approved, which was a triumph for the administration.53 Members of the House “have got down the dose of taxes,” Madison said. “It is the strongest proof they could give that they do not mean to flinch from the contest to which the mad conduct of G[reat] B[ritain] drives them.”54
On paper the Republican war program was impressive. True enough, Congress had refused to endorse either naval expansion or immediate taxation and had failed to arm and classify the militia or give the president authority to appoint the U.S. Volunteer officers. Nevertheless, those measures that were adopted were more far-reaching than any since the Quasi-War. In less than four months, Congress had adopted measures to fill the ranks of the existing army, raise additional U.S. Regulars and Volunteers, call out the militia, purchase ordnance, fit out the navy, build coastal fortifications, and borrow money. Although not exactly what the administration had wanted, the program was nevertheless a giant step in the direction of war.
President James Madison (1751–1836) headed the nation during the War of 1812. He was not a strong leader and was unable to impose his will on either Congress or the country. As the chief architect of the restrictive system, he preferred peaceful methods for upholding the nation’s rights in the war-torn world, but by 1812 he had concluded that more forceful measures were needed. (J. A. Spencer, History of the United States)
The Henry Affair
The War Hawks hoped that their legislative program would promote patriotism and prepare the American people psychologically and militarily for war. President Madison hoped for the same result, and he used the powers of his office to stimulate the war spirit further. On March 9, 1812, as the war program was nearing completion, the president informed Congress that a British plot to incite disunion in New England had been uncovered. The central figure in this plot was a handsome, if simpleminded and pretentious, Irishman by the name of John Henry.55
Born in 1777, Henry had immigrated to the United States in 1798. After spending several years in New England, he had moved to Montreal, apparently to pursue the fur-trading business. In 1808 he took a business trip to New England and sent back reports on the state of affairs to British officials in Canada. The following year Sir James Craig, the governor-general of Canada, commissioned Henry to make another trip to New England. War seemed imminent, and Craig wanted more information, particularly on the prospect of exploiting Federalist opposition.
After returning from his second mission, Henry received £200 (about $900) in compensation. Regarding this sum as wholly inadequate, he spent the next two years in England and Canada seeking additional remuneration. He reportedly asked for £32,000 (around $130,000) but would settle for an office yielding £500 (roughly $2,000) a year. Disillusioned with his lack of success, he fell in with a French rogue who styled himself Count Edward de Crillon but who was actually a clever con man named Paul Emile Soubiran. Crillon persuaded Henry to try to sell his correspondence to the United States government. The two adventurers came to America, secured a letter of introduction from Governor Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, and then proceeded to Washington.56 There they persuaded the administration to buy the documents for $50,000—the entire budget of the secret service fund. The bargain was sealed on February 8, 1812, but the documents were kept under wraps for another month to give Henry time to leave the country.
Convinced that Henry’s papers constituted “formal proof of the Cooperation between the Eastern Junto & the Br[itish] Cabinet,”57 Madison sent the documents to Congress. In a covering letter, he claimed that they showed that Britain had dispatched a secret agent to New England to promote disaffection and destroy the Union.58 This was an exaggeration. Although Henry was authorized to put disaffected Federalists in touch with officials in Canada, his primary mission was simply “to obtain the most accurate information of the true state of affairs in that part of the Union.”59
The National Intelligencer expressed hope that Henry’s papers would “become a bond of union against a common foe,” but their effect was just the opposite.60 Initially, Republicans greeted news of the plot with indignation, Federalists with embarrassment and chagrin. According to a Republican observer, when the letters were read in the House, one Federalist “began to kick and squirm,” a second “looked pale—walked the floor in haste,” while “great drops of sweat” ran down the face of a third.61 But closer examination soon revealed that Henry had implicated no one. He had shown his credentials to no one, and he had put no one in touch with British officials in Canada. According to one Republican, the Federalists at first “seemed astonished, but the next day they came to the house quite in a passion.” After a night’s reflection, they were “as mad as they could be.”62
When the House sought to question Henry, Monroe revealed that the Irishman had left the country and had been promised immunity from interrogation anyway.63 When the Senate asked if any Americans were implicated in Henry’s plot, Monroe conceded that the administration was “not in possession of any names.”64 Moreover, by tracing the Treasury warrants used to pay Henry, Federalists discovered that the documents had been purchased—rather than freely given, as Henry’s covering letter had implied. This only added to the Federalists’ outrage and to the embarrassment of Republicans.65
Federalists considered the whole affair a tawdry political gimmick. A Massachusetts congressman called the publication of the documents “an electioneering trick, calculated for the meridian of Massachusetts.”66 As if to prove him right, Republican newspapers tried to make political capital out of the affair, and one congressman expressed regret that the documents had not been made public sooner to help Republicans seeking office in New Hampshire.67
The Henry affair proved to be a tempest in a teapot. The letters were hardly worth $50,000 and scarcely a cause for war. It was common practice in those days for governments to use amateur spies to secure information from potentially hostile nations. Because of Canada’s weakness vis-à-vis the United States, British officials had employed secret agents on several occasions, and during the war scare that followed the Chesapeake affair in 1807, the United States had returned the favor.68 The real significance of the Henry affair was not that it demonstrated British perfidy or Federalist disloyalty but that it showed the administration’s determination to whip up support for its war policy. “We have made use of Henry’s documents,” Monroe told the French minister, “as a last means of exciting the nation and Congress.”69
The Pre-War Embargo
Just as the dust raised by the Henry affair was settling, Congress took another step toward war by enacting a ninety-day embargo. This measure was adopted at the insistence of the War Hawks, who considered it a forerunner to war. In mid-March Clay had urged the administration to recommend a short-term embargo to be followed by war unless the U.S. Sloop Hornet (20 guns), which was expected from Europe shortly, brought news of British concessions. The administration was unresponsive, but Clay kept up the pressure.70 Finally, on April 1, the president sent a message to Congress recommending a sixty-day embargo.71 A bill was rushed through Congress in three days, although the Senate extended the embargo to ninety days.72 Shortly thereafter, a non-exportation act was adopted as a companion measure.73 Together these laws prohibited American ships from clearing for foreign ports and barred the export of all goods and specie by land or by sea.
The War Hawks insisted that the embargo was designed to protect American property, that its purpose was to keep ships and cargoes in port pending a declaration of war. “It is to be viewed,” said Clay, “as a direct precur
sor to war.”74 But some Republicans supported the embargo as a coercive instrument—as a continuation of the old restrictive system.75 In addition, some members of the Senate voted to extend the embargo to ninety days because they saw the measure as a negotiating instrument or wished to put off war as long as possible.76
The proceedings on the embargo were conducted in secret, but someone (probably John Randolph) leaked word even before the bill was reported from committee. News of the measure soon spread to merchants in Baltimore—perhaps through the agency of Samuel Smith. Calhoun, who thought no one should enjoy an advantage from privileged information, notified Federalist congressmen of the measure, and they sent expresses to northern cities to alert their constituents. Hence, by the time the embargo actually became law, practically everyone in the country already knew about it.77
News of the embargo led to a flurry of activity as merchants in virtually every port rushed to get their ships to sea. Freight rates jumped 20 percent, and many vessels were wholly loaded in two days. In Philadelphia shipowners offered seamen $40 a month and in Baltimore as much as $50—which was twice the usual rate. Close to 140 ships cleared from New York City alone, and Boston, reported one merchant, “is all confusion and bustle—& no attention is paid to its being Sunday.”78 Republicans no less than Federalists took part in the frenzied activity. “In this hurly burley to palsy the arm of the government,” Niles’ Register conceded, “justice compels us to say, that all parties united.”79
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