The Cruise of the Essex
The United States frigate Essex (46 guns), Captain David Porter commanding, had better luck although ultimately she too was captured. Porter was never happy with the Essex, calling her “the worst frigate in the service.”194 She was a poor sailer, and Porter made her worse by overloading her with guns. Nevertheless, he made the most of his cruise in the ship. Rounding the Horn in late 1812, the Essex became the first American warship to sail in the Pacific. For over a year Porter cruised in those waters, destroying British whale ships, taking prizes, and living off the enemy. “The valuable whale Fishery there is entirely destroyed,” he reported, “and the actual injury we have done [to the British] may be estimated at two and a half millions of dollars.”195 Porter greatly overestimated the value of the British losses, but there is no denying that he did enough damage to get the attention of the Admiralty.196
In late 1813 the British dispatched a squadron of three ships under the command of Captain James Hillyar to track down the Essex and destroy her. Two of the British ships, the Phoebe (46 or 53 guns) and the Cherub (26 guns), caught up with the Essex at Valparaiso, Chile. Porter could have destroyed the Phoebe when she docked next to the Essex in port, but preferring to respect Chile’s territorial waters, he sought to persuade Hillyar to fight a duel at sea. Even though the crew of the Essex goaded the British with insulting songs, Hillyar refused the challenge. Instead, the two British ships cruised beyond the harbor, waiting for an opportunity to act in concert against the American vessel.197
On March 28, 1814, Porter made a run for the sea, but a sudden squall destroyed his topmast, forcing him to seek sanctuary in a small bay. Although the Essex was in Chilean waters, the Phoebe closed to take advantage of the American ship’s distress, and the Cherub soon followed. After a hard-fought contest, the Essex was forced to strike her colors. Porter bitterly assailed the British officers, not only for refusing a duel but also for attacking the Essex while she was in a crippled state in neutral waters. He also accused the British of continuing their fire after the Essex had struck her colors. The British denied any wrongdoing and accused Porter of conniving in the escape of his crew after surrendering. On both sides, the fog of war rather than bad faith probably accounts for the charges.198
Two smaller American warships also fought duels with the British. On August 14, 1813, H.M. Sloop Pelican (21 guns) defeated the U.S. Brig Argus (20 guns) off the coast of Ireland. After this loss, the Navy Department urged its smaller cruisers to stick to commerce raiding. On September 5, another American brig, the Enterprise (16 guns), fought the British sloop Boxer (14 guns) off the coast of Maine. The two vessels exchanged broadsides for over an hour before the British ship struck its colors. Both ship commanders were killed in the engagement.199
Privateering: Success Beyond the Blockade
With most of the American fleet bottled up in port or simply overmatched by the British, privateers had to shoulder a heavier burden, though the pickings were slimmer than they had been in 1812. It was difficult to find prizes on the open seas because most British merchantmen now traveled in convoy. The captain of one privateer reported “vexing the whole Atlantic” without sighting a single enemy vessel.200 To find prizes, privateers had to cruise in the British West Indies or near the British Isles because in these waters merchant ships traveled without an escort.
The most spectacular cruise was made by the True-Blooded Yankee (16 guns), a small vessel fitted out by an American citizen in Paris. On a thirty-seven-day cruise in waters around the British Isles, this ship took twenty-seven prizes, occupied an Irish island for six days, and burned seven vessels in a Scottish harbor.201 “She out-sailed everything,” marveled a British naval officer; “not one of our cruisers could touch her.”202 The Scourge (15 guns) and Rattlesnake (16 guns) found equally good hunting in the North Sea. Between them they took twenty-three prizes, which were sent into Norwegian ports for condemnation. The Scourge made another successful cruise and then took additional prizes on her way home.203 Still another privateer, the Decatur (7 guns), captured the H.M. Sloop Dominica (16 guns) by boarding in one the bloodiest engagements of the war.204 Other privateers also enjoyed successful cruises in 1813, and this species of warfare continued to bedevil the British, especially in their own waters.
End of the Campaign
The outcome of the campaign should have occasioned no surprise: the American victories on land and the British victories at sea accorded with the general strengths of the two nations. Although Americans could be justly proud of their triumphs, final victory continued to elude them, and now, more than ever, time was running against them. In October 1813 Great Britain’s allies had defeated Napoleon in the decisive Battle of Leipzig. Coupled with the British triumphs in Spain, this foreshadowed Napoleon’s downfall. With these victories behind them, the British began diverting men and material to the New World, and this changed the whole complexion of the American war. Having failed to conquer Canada in 1812 or 1813, the United States would not get another chance. When the campaign of 1814 opened, the British were on the offensive.
Chapter 7
The Last Embargo
By the time the Thirteenth Congress convened for its second session on December 6, 1813, there was a note of apprehension in the air. Despite the victories in the Northwest and Southwest, the news from the other fronts was uniformly bad. Canada was still in British hands, the British fleet was in American waters, and British troops moved freely about the Chesapeake. The tide of war appeared to be turning against the United States. “The result of the last campaign,” lamented a Republican, has “disappointed the expectations of every one.” “In spite of some gleams of success,” added a Federalist, “We are further off our object than at first.”1
Fortunately, the president had fully recovered from his summer illness and was again able to steer the ship of state. “The little president is back, and as game as ever,” said one of his supporters.2 In his opening address to Congress, Madison announced that the British had rejected the Russian mediation offer. Putting the best face on events, he enumerated American victories and insisted that “the progress of the campaign has been filled with incidents highly honorable to the American arms.” He also pointed out that “the privations and sacrifices” necessitated by the war were offset by “improvements and advantages of which the contest itself is the source.” Among these were the development of manufacturing and a permanent increase in the defense establishment. In short, “the war, with its vicissitudes, is illustrating the capacity and the destiny of the United States to be a great, a flourishing, and a powerful nation.”3
Britain’s Peace Initiative
Madison’s optimism was strained though not entirely unwarranted, for on December 30 a truce ship arrived with the first good news from Great Britain since the repeal of the Orders-in-Council. Although the British had rejected the Russian mediation proposal, they offered to open direct negotiations with the United States. The president accepted this offer and nominated John Quincy Adams, James A. Bayard, Henry Clay, and Jonathan Russell to serve on the peace commission. When Madison later learned that Albert Gallatin was still in Europe, his name was added to the list, too.4
There was some opposition in Federalist circles to Clay, who was considered too strong a War Hawk, and to Russell, who was variously described as “a bankrupt merchant” and “a time-serving wretch.”5 Nevertheless, it was a strong commission, and the Senate confirmed each nomination by a large majority. Since the negotiations were expected to take place in Sweden, the Senate also approved Russell’s nomination as United States minister to that country. This was an important victory for the administration because the Senate had rejected this nomination by a large majority the previous summer.6
Personnel Changes
The appointment of the peace commissioners necessitated other changes in the government. With Clay’s departure, the House had to pick a new speaker. Friends of the administration backed Felix Grundy, while opponent
s supported Langdon Cheves. Both were War Hawks, but Cheves was a known enemy of the restrictive system, and he won, 94–59. The voting was secret, but Cheves apparently garnered the support of the Federalists and dissident Republicans as well as some of the regular Republicans.7
Since all now conceded that Gallatin had forfeited his position in the cabinet, members of the Senate urged the president to fill this vacancy, too.8 Secretary of the Navy William Jones, who was overseeing the Treasury Department, was anxious to be relieved of the extra duties anyway. “I am as perfect a galley slave as ever laboured at the oar,” he told a friend; “the duties of both [offices] have become intolerable.”9 Unable to persuade more capable men to take the post, Madison offered it to Senator George W. Campbell of Tennessee.10 Although Campbell was an able politician, he lacked the necessary skills for so demanding a job. Jonathan Roberts claimed that he “wanted promptness of action, & more knowledge of finance,” and William Jones concluded that he was “entirely out of place in the Treasury.”11 The appointment had the added effect of depriving the administration of an important ally in Congress. “He will be much missed in the Senate,” said Nathaniel Macon. “I am at a loss to guess, who now will be the defender of the administration in the Senate.”12
Madison also had to appoint a new attorney general. The attorney general was not a full-time executive officer but simply the government’s legal counsel. He was not expected to live in Washington nor to give up his private legal practice. In early 1813, however, the House passed a bill requiring the attorney general to reside in Washington. Although the bill ultimately died in the Senate, by this time incumbent William Pinkney, who had a lucrative legal practice in Baltimore, had resigned.13 This was a significant loss to the administration: Pinkney was an accomplished statesman who was considered by many to be “the first Lawyer in the Nation.”14 As his replacement, Madison chose Richard Rush of Philadelphia. Rush was a brilliant young attorney and a rising star in the party, but he lacked Pinkney’s stature and experience.15
The president also replaced his postmaster general. Although this was not a cabinet-level position, the postmaster general had enormous patronage—over 3,000 postmasterships—and none of his appointments required Senate or even presidential approval. The man who had held this job since 1801 was Gideon Granger, a Connecticut Republican who in recent years had quietly doled out patronage to opponents of the administration. Since postal officials often read the mail that passed through their hands, these appointments caused regular Republicans considerable dismay.16 Granger also had supported Clinton for the presidency and was considered by many to be an opponent of the war. Indeed, one War Hawk described him as “a violent peacable man, and a strong anti-Madisonian.”17
When the postmastership in Philadelphia fell vacant in early 1814, regular Republicans in the state urged the appointment of Richard Bache.18 The president himself urged Bache’s candidacy, but Granger chose Michael Leib, an anti-administration senator.19 This elicited a vigorous protest from Pennsylvania. Harrisburg merchants complained that with Leib as postmaster they could not safely transmit money to Philadelphia, and a Republican editor insisted that even the governor was reluctant to use the mails.20 Madison finally dismissed Granger and appointed Governor Return J. Meigs of Ohio in his stead, although not before Republicans in Congress had initiated a full-scale investigation into postal matters.21 “The fall of G------r,” said a New York senator, “will deprive the faction hostile to the Administration of their most efficient man, who has for seven years past been engaged in thwarting the measures taken by the Government.”22
The War Debate Renewed
Madison made few recommendations to Congress in his opening address, preferring to rely on special messages or informal conferences to make his wishes known. Once again, however, congressional action on war legislation was delayed by Federalist opposition. “There is every appearance,” said Jonathan Roberts, “that the minority will Contest every inch of ground—I look for one of the most procrastinated & angry debates . . . that has ever occurr[e]d in Congress.”23 Federalists renewed their attack on the Canadian strategy and denounced Republican demands that they support the war without questioning its justice or necessity. “It savors too much of the old tory doctrine of passive obedience and non-resistance,” said one Federalist. “It is repugnant to the genius of our free institutions.”24
House Federalists made two proposals to restrict the war to defensive operations. Daniel Sheffey of Virginia offered an amendment to an army bill that would limit the service of the troops “to the defence of the territories and frontiers of the United States,” and William Gaston of North Carolina submitted a resolution proclaiming that, “pending the negotiation with Great Britain, it is inexpedient to prosecute military operations against the Canadas for invasion or conquest.”25 Republicans were exasperated by these proposals. Thomas B. Robertson of Louisiana expressed “astonishment and indignation” at Sheffey’s amendment, claiming that he had never heard of “a proposition more fraught with mischief, more parricidal in its nature.”26 House Republicans closed ranks to vote down both proposals by large majorities.27
The Republicans tried to counter Federalist arguments by demonstrating that the war was defensive in character. John C. Calhoun argued that “a war is offensive or defensive, not by the mode of carrying it on, which is an immaterial circumstance, but by the motive and cause which led to it.”28 But Federalist Zebulon R. Shipherd of New York replied that if this were true then every war was defensive: “When a nation declares war it always complains that it has been injured; and, if the gentleman is correct, all wars are defensive.”29
Republicans also tried to blame the war on the Federalists, arguing that opposition to the government had encouraged the British to persist in their policies. “If that American feeling had prevailed everywhere which ought to animate the bosoms of every man,” said James Fisk of Vermont, “we should never have had occasion to go to war.” Fisk claimed that Federalist opposition was linked to British gold. “If you could open the secret archives of the enemy,” he said, “you would find that money has a little influence somewhere.”30 Felix Grundy also joined in the attack, renewing a charge that he had made in the previous session: “I then said, and I now repeat, that those who systematically oppose the filling of the loans, and the enlistment of soldiers, are, in my opinion, guilty of moral treason.”31
John C. Calhoun (1782–1850), a South Carolina War Hawk, was a strong nationalist in this phase of his career. An enemy of the restrictive system, he worked during the war to jettison those restrictions that remained on the books. After the war, he had a brilliant career as secretary of war before embracing states’ rights and becoming the South’s leading defender of slavery. (Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812)
The debate dragged on for weeks and even spilled over to routine appropriations bills, which was almost unheard of.32 “This is the [most] talking legislature, that I have Seen,” said veteran Congressman Nathaniel Macon. “Both Houses,” added the Washington National Intelligencer, “are engaged in an unlimited, and, it would almost appear, interminable Debate on the State of the Union.”33 The speeches were so long-winded and repetitive that attendance in the House dropped off sharply. “We have . . . some very moving Speeches,” said Macon wryly, “so much so that more than half the chairs are vacant and some times the stenographers are absent.”34 For those who remained the experience was tedious and frustrating. Twice John C. Calhoun almost engaged in duels with Federalists, and in general Republicans were less tolerant of Federalist opposition than they had been in the past.35
More War Measures
Raising troops was still a top priority with Republicans. Although the increase in pay and bounty the year before had attracted many new recruits, by the end of 1813 enlistments had slowed considerably. “It Seems to be general opinion,” said Macon, “that the recruiting of men by enlistment is every where nearly at an end.”36 Worse still, many of those who
had enlisted for five years in 1808–1809 or for a year in 1812–1813 would soon be discharged. If Congress did not act, there was a real danger that the army would simply melt away.
The secretary of war, John Armstrong, who had lingered in New York at the end of the last campaign, aired his views in an anonymous article published in the Albany Argus. Convinced that voluntary enlistments would never produce the necessary troops, Armstrong called for drafting 55,000 militia into the regular army. To command these troops, he recommended the appointment of a lieutenant general of “deep and comprehensive views”—no doubt thinking of himself.37
Congress had little faith in Armstrong and no interest in his conscription plans.38 Instead, congressional Republicans sought to bolster enlistments by raising the bounty again. Hitherto new recruits had received $40 in cash, a $24 advance in pay, and 160 acres of land. Thenceforth they would receive $124 in cash and 160 acres in land. To stimulate enlistments still further, Congress offered an $8 premium to anyone who secured a recruit.39 Federalists protested that amateur recruiting agents would overrun the country, but Robert Wright replied that the government needed some means to offset the “treasonable sentiments” of those who discouraged enlistments. “When every effort was used by the minority to defeat the recruiting service,” he said, “there ought to be a counter projet on the part of Government.”40
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