The British torched both the White House (then commonly called the Executive Mansion) and the Capitol Building when they occupied Washington, D.C., in August 1814. All that remained of each building was a shell. The president did not move back into the White House until 1817, and members of Congress did not meet again in the Capitol until two years later. (White House: Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812. Capitol: Ink and watercolor by George Munger. Library of Congress)
President Madison dispatched his opening address to Congress on September 20. Hoping to put the best face on events, he brushed aside British victories in order to focus on American triumphs. But he could not deny that a crisis was at hand. “It is not to be disguised,” he said, “that the situation of our country calls for its greatest efforts.” Appealing to the spirit of ’76, Madison expressed confidence that the American people would “cheerfully and proudly bear every burden of every kind which the safety and honor of the nation demand.”125
Madison was not optimistic about the prospects for peace, and he gave force to this point in mid-October by sending a bundle of diplomatic documents to Congress. These documents, just received from the nation’s peace envoys in Europe, showed that, while the United States had dropped its own demands, Britain would not restore peace without certain concessions. The British demanded the creation of an Indian reservation in the Old Northwest, territorial concessions in northern Maine and present-day Minnesota, American demilitarization of the Great Lakes, and an end to American fishing privileges in Canadian waters. These terms demonstrated that the two nations were still far apart and that an early end to the war was unlikely.126
Response to the Crisis
Given the deepening crisis, all Republicans agreed on the need for forceful measures. “I am deeply impressed with the importance of the present crisis,” said Joseph Varnum of Massachusetts, “and the importance of the adoption of strong and energetic measures.” “If ever a body of men held the destinies of a country in their hands,” John C. Calhoun told the House, “it [is] that which [I am] now addressing.”127 The only problem was that Republicans could not agree on the best way to meet the crisis. The administration favored extreme measures—raising an army by conscription and creating a national bank—but these proposals stirred so much controversy that neither became law. Although congressional Republicans had shown signs of closing ranks in the previous session, at the height of the war crisis they remained divided.
Federalists also conceded that a crisis was at hand. “I admit the distress of the nation exists to the full extent stated,” said Senator Jeremiah Mason of New Hampshire. “We see and feel it, and have too much reason to believe it will soon become universal. The crisis demands all the wisdom and virtue of the country.”128 But like the Republicans, the Federalists were also divided. In the hope of working out a common policy, congressional Federalists held a grand strategy meeting at Crawford’s Hotel. The meeting revealed much difference of opinion over whether to support the war. A committee was appointed to study the matter, and it issued a report just after the British peace terms were made public. The report declared that the character of the war had changed and urged Federalists to support bills to raise men and money.129
Federalists from the middle and southern states responded favorably to the report. Appalled by the British terms, most now agreed that it was their duty to support the war. Alexander Hanson, the target of the Baltimore mob in 1812, rose in the House to denounce the British terms and to pledge his support for “the most vigorous system of honorable war, with the hope of bringing the enemy to a sense of justice.”130 Other Federalists from the middle and southern states joined in the cry, calling the British terms “arrogant,” “inadmissible,” “humilating,” and “disgraceful.” Most agreed with the Alexandria Gazette that whatever the war’s origins it had “from the arrogance of the enemy, become a war of necessity.”131
Federalists in New England, however, took a different view. They were more appalled by the views of their friends to the south and west than by the terms themselves. Most agreed with the Boston Gazette that, having declared war and failed, the United States must now pay the price.132 “I have uniformly thought that G. Britain might justly demand Some indemnity,” declared Timothy Pickering.133 “We shall have no objection here to better terms,” added Harrison Gray Otis of Massachusetts. “But I religiously believe, that 90 out of every 100 men in this State would if left to themselves prefer treating on the proposed basis at least, to the continuance of the war one day.”134
Bipartisanship Fails
Although Federalists seemed to be deeply divided by the crisis, the breach in their ranks was more apparent than real. No sooner had Federalists from the middle and southern states proclaimed their support for the war then they began to drift back into New England’s camp. “The opposition,” said one Republican, “continues as malignant and unreasonable as ever, with a few honourable exceptions only.”135 This was partly the result of New England’s influence, which was always a potent force in party councils, but other factors played a role, too.
In October Monroe publicly called for pushing the war into Canada again, telling Congress that this was the best way to secure the friendship of the Indians, protect the coast, and win peace.136 “The great object to be attained,” Monroe told Major General Jacob Brown, “is to carry the war into Canada, and to break the British power there, to the utmost practicable extent.”137 Monroe’s plans convinced many Federalists that (as one New Englander put it), the “character of the war [had] not changed” and the administration was still “eager for conquest and aggrandizement.” “The Notion of some Federalists,” concluded Gouverneur Morris, “that this War had become defensive . . . must vanish with Mr Munroe’s late Declaration that their Object is to conquer Canada.”138
Federalists were alienated not only by the administration’s military strategy but also its political exclusiveness. There was a good deal of speculation, even among New Englanders, about the possibility of Federalists joining the cabinet. The Federalist caucus that recommended supporting the war had called for “an entire change of the Heads of Departments,” and establishing a bipartisan cabinet was a common theme in Federalist speeches and editorials.139 Some Republicans responded favorably to these overtures. George Hay told Monroe that the president “ought to accede to the proposal of the federalists in relation to the cabinet,” and many other Republicans—including some in Congress—agreed.140 But the president demurred. According to Hanson, Madison thought it would be “a passport to the Presidency” if he acknowledged the talents of any Federalist by appointing him to the cabinet.141
In late November, after Vice President Elbridge Gerry died, Federalists tried to install Rufus King as president pro tem of the Senate. Often mentioned as a potential cabinet member, King was well regarded by both parties. Even Republicans, said a Federalist, considered him “the very Oracle.”142 Senate Republicans, however, refused to elevate him to so high a post. With the vice presidency vacant and Madison once again ailing, Republicans were unwilling to put a Federalist next in the line of succession.143 According to a letter from Washington published in a Federalist paper, “Mr. Madison had declared, that the democratic party would be put down, if Mr. King was chosen,” and “Mr. Eppes had declared . . . that ‘he would assist to TAR AND FEATHER the democratic Senator who dared vote for Mr. King.’”144 Annoyed by these rebuffs, Federalists murmured that the administration had no interest in conciliation and that the war was still a party war. “The delusion has vanished,” said a Federalist paper. “The call to union means nothing.”145
Exasperated by the administration’s war strategy and politics, Federalists from the middle and southern states were already deserting the war movement when a new set of British terms was submitted to Congress on December 1. These showed that Great Britain was willing to restore peace on the basis of uti possidetis, which meant that each side would retain whatever territory it held.146 If these terms wer
e acceded to, the United States would lose eastern Maine but little else. This was a settlement that Federalists everywhere could live with, and doubtless many Republicans could, too.
Fearing the impact these dispatches might have on the war spirit, Republican congressmen at first tried to suppress them, and when they were published, the National Intelligencer professed to believe that the prospects for peace were still “very faint.”147 No one was fooled, least of all the Federalists, most of whom thought peace was near. According to a New Hampshire Republican, “informed men of both parties in this part of the country” expected peace within a few months.148 The result was a flood of peace rumors that continued until the war was over.149
Heartened by the news and unwilling to encourage the administration to hold out for better terms, Federalists from the middle and southern states closed ranks behind their friends from New England. “The war-pitch,” recalled a Republican congressman, “fell as much at Washington as it did in London. The salutary apprehension of October turned to hopeful confidence in December. The nerve of opposition was strung afresh.”150
The Capital Stays in Washington
Although partisanship played an important role in this session (as it did throughout the war), the first issue that Congress faced was not a party issue at all, but a sectional one—the question of relocating the nation’s capital. Many northerners saw the destruction of Washington as an opportunity to move the capital from the crude city in the wilderness on the Potomac to a more cosmopolitan and comfortable setting in the North. “The removal of the seat of government,” said John Quincy Adams, “may prove a great benefit.”151 City officials in Philadelphia, anxious to regain the capital they had lost in 1800, promised suitable accommodations, and most congressmen appeared to be favorably disposed.152 “The Majority Seem determined to go,” said Nathaniel Macon, “& Philadelphia Seems to be the place.”153
On September 26, Jonathan Fisk of New York introduced a resolution calling for the appointment of a committee to study the expediency of temporarily moving the capital. Fisk, doubtless thinking of New York or Philadelphia, favored “a place of greater security and less inconvenience” and “a place more connected with the moneyed interest of the nation.”154 But southerners, fearing that any move might become permanent, claimed that abandoning Washington would set a bad precedent and would be unfair to those who had invested in the city. “If the Seat of Government was once set on wheels,” Macon warned, “there was no saying where it would stop.”155
The French minister graciously agreed to vacate the Octagon House so that the president might use it when he returned to Washington after the British had burned most of the public buildings. President Madison signed the Treaty of Ghent on the top floor of this house. The building still stands and is now owned by the American Architectural Foundation. Although open to the public, its significance as the president’s temporary residence is not well known. (Library of Congress)
Fisk’s resolution was approved, and a committee was appointed to study the matter. Although the committee recommended against removal, the House rejected this recommendation on a close vote when Speaker Langdon Cheves of South Carolina stunned nearly everyone by voting for removal.156 “The reason for this vote,” he said, “was, that this District could not be defended except at an immense expense.”157 A bill was accordingly prepared that provided for moving the seat of government to Philadelphia for the duration of the war. Only two concessions were made to the opponents of removal: money was appropriated to rebuild Washington and a pledge was made to return to the city after the war.158
When the bill was put to a vote in the House, it was defeated by a nine-vote margin, largely because several Republicans (including three from Pennsylvania) succumbed to executive influence.159 After defeating this bill, Congress approved another that merely provided for rebuilding Washington.160 A companion measure authorized the purchase of Thomas Jefferson’s 10,000-book library, which was the largest private collection in the nation. The British had burned the congressional library, and the ever-needy Jefferson offered his as a replacement. Appraised at $23,950, this collection became the basis for the modern Library of Congress.161
Defeat of Conscription
With the location of the capital resolved, Congress turned to other matters more directly related to prosecuting the war. On October 17 Monroe submitted a report to Congress outlining his recommendations for raising troops.162 He estimated that 100,000 men would be needed to prosecute the war successfully in 1815. Since the regular army was believed to contain only about 30,000 men, it would be necessary to raise 70,000 more. Monroe rejected militia as too costly and inefficient. Instead, he called for raising 40,000 volunteers for local defense and 30,000 regulars for use against Canada.
Monroe saw no difficulty in raising the volunteers since their duties would be confined to the locality in which they were raised. Recruiting additional regulars, however, would not be easy. Monroe presented several options but made it clear that he favored the most extreme, a conscription plan that called for dividing all eligible males into classes of 100 men each and requiring each class to furnish four recruits, with replacements in case of casualties. Each recruit would receive the standard land bounty from the government, but any cash bounty would have to come from other members of his class.
Anticipating criticism, Monroe argued that “the conservation of the State is a duty paramount to all others” and that the militia provided a precedent for compulsory service.163 Monroe pointed out that several states had employed draft schemes during the Revolution and that New York had adopted a similar system in 1814.164 He also said that his proposal was modeled after a plan drawn up by Secretary of War Henry Knox in 1790. Although this plan never became law, it had the blessing of President Washington.165
There was little enthusiasm for Monroe’s plan and little likelihood that it would become law. Hoping to forge a consensus behind a compromise proposal, Senator William Bibb of Georgia drew up a bill that provided for using Monroe’s system of classification and draft to raise 80,000 militia for two years’ service. The men would serve under officers appointed by the state, and their service would be restricted to their own or an adjoining state. Bibb’s bill offered military exemptions to those men who provided recruits for the regular army, but otherwise it did not raise regulars. Instead, it raised militia for long-term local service.166 The bill pleased neither those Republicans who wanted to carry the war into Canada nor the Federalists, who were horrified by any scheme that savored of a French-style conscription.
The bill was reported to the Senate from committee by William Branch Giles on November 5.167 Republican Joseph Varnum, who told a friend that “no Man can entertain a more despi[c]able Idea of Mr. Giles’ Militia Bill than I do,” delivered a long speech against the measure, detailing its technical flaws.168 Varnum called the proposal “extremely impolitic” and claimed that it was based on “unusual and arbitrary principles” and that it was “totally incompetent to effect the object” for which it was designed.169 Federalists joined in the attack, challenging the bill’s constitutionality. Robert H. Goldsborough of Maryland said that raising troops in this manner was “a palpable and flagrant violation of the constitution,” and David Daggett of Connecticut claimed that the measure was “not only unconstitutional” but “unequal, unjust, and oppressive.”170 In spite of these objections, the Senate passed the bill by a comfortable margin.171
The debate then shifted to the House, where young Charles J. Ingersoll, a Pennsylvania Republican, praised the bill: “You may call it by what odious ugly name you will—conscription or what not—but it is the only sufficient, the only republican, the only fair, the only equal plan for applying the physical means to the end of common military defence and protection.” Ingersoll asserted that “vast improvements have taken place in the military art” in the past twenty years. All of Europe had adopted these improvements, “and this country will be left lamentably behind in the march of mankind, un
less, like the rest, it adopts them too.”172
Ingersoll’s appeal to European precedents was unlikely to win over any Federalists, although proponents of the bill did offer them a sop by lowering the term of service to a year. The limitation on local service was also dropped in the hope of winning the support of the Canadian enthusiasts. In addition, in case any state failed to comply with the law, the president was authorized to call directly on militia officers. In this form the bill passed the House and was returned to the Senate.173 The two houses, however, were unable to resolve their differences, and on December 28 Rufus King took advantage of light attendance in the Senate to propose indefinite postponement. His motion carried by a one-vote margin.174 According to one Republican, “Prospects of peace, contrivances of party, and differences of opinion in the dominant party” all conspired to kill the measure.175
One of the reasons that Republicans did not insist on conscription was that Federalists in New England were talking openly of resistance. “Our Citizens,” said a Connecticut Federalist, “are not yet prepared to submit to a conscription Law, or to advance all their resources to support a war of Conquest.”176 In Massachusetts, people at a large public meeting adopted a resolution pledging to bid defiance to the law: “WE DARE NOT SUBMIT, AND WILL NEVER YIELD OBEDIENCE.”177 Daniel Webster called on the New England states to nullify the measure—“to interpose between their citizens & arbitrary power”—and Republicans in the Connecticut legislature joined with Federalists in denouncing the bill and in urging the governor to call a special session if it became law.178 Since the bill died in the Senate, New England’s defiance was never put to a test.
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