The Senate, which had been waiting for the House to act, now took the initiative. On December 2 Rufus King reported a bill from committee that incorporated a bank along the lines favored by Dallas. The bill passed the Senate by a three-vote margin but was narrowly defeated in the House when Speaker Cheves voted against it.228 Calling the proposed bank “a dangerous, unexampled,” and even “a desperate resort,” Cheves claimed that it would never achieve the ends for which it was created.229
The House subsequently reconsidered this vote and then sent the bill back to committee. Federalists Richard Stockton and Thomas Oakley pledged to vote for a modified bank bill and expressed confidence that “they would be joined by a majority of their political friends.”230 The committee produced a bill that once again provided for a small, autonomous bank—one that was free from government control, did not have to loan the government money, and could not suspend specie payments. In addition, it did not have to commence operations until 1816. In this form, the bill won the support of both parties and was approved by large majorities in both houses.231 Not everyone was happy with the bill, but most preferred this bank to Dallas’s version or to no bank at all. As Daniel Webster put it: “We were obliged to make a bank or let Dallas’s plan go.”232
The bill was sent to the president on January 23, 1815. Dallas, who considered Congress so unmanageable that he was already contemplating resigning, was incensed. “I asked for bread,” he said, “and [Congress] gave me a stone. I asked for a Bank to serve the Government during the war; and they have given me a commercial Bank, to go into operation after the war.”233 Taking Dallas’s views to heart, Madison vetoed the bill. The proposed bank, he said, would not “answer the purposes of reviving the public credit, of providing a national medium of circulation, and of aiding the Treasury.”234
Chastened by Madison’s veto, congressional Republicans met in caucus and decided to resurrect the original bill—the one favored by Dallas.235 Accordingly, on February 6 James Barbour reintroduced this bill in the Senate. Republicans refused to send the bill to committee, claiming that the matter already had been discussed enough and that everyone understood the issues. After beating back a series of amendments, Republicans pushed the bill through the Senate by a two-vote margin. The House also refused to commit or amend the bill, but before a vote on the measure could be taken, news of peace arrived. This gave the bill’s enemies an opening. The bill was first tabled and then postponed indefinitely by a one-vote margin. This killed the project for the session.236
A New Enemy Trade Act
Another issue that Congress had to grapple with in this session was trade with the enemy. On September 22, Republican James Fisk of Vermont, whose own state was as guilty as any, offered a resolution to strengthen the enemy trade act of 1812.237 The House approved the resolution, but for the next two months Congress devoted its attention to other matters, waiting for the administration to take the lead on the trade issue. Finally, on November 19, Dallas sent a report to the House outlining the government’s enforcement problems and recommending legal remedies.238
Armed with Dallas’s report, the House Ways and Means Committee drew up a new enemy trade bill, which Eppes introduced in early December.239 This bill gave government officials more extensive powers than any previous trade restriction, including the enforcement act of 1809 and the embargo of 1813. According to the Federal Republican, “The Bill contains novel, extraordinary, and dangerous provisions, at war with the principles of our free constitution and the established rights of the citizen. It creates a swarm of irresponsible petty tyrants, spies and informers who are clothed with powers exceeding those, of the highest officers of the government.”240
The bill authorized customs officials to search without warrant any land or water craft or any person suspected of trading with the enemy and to seize any goods suspected of being illegally imported or of being on their way to the enemy. With a warrant, customs officials could also search any building suspected of containing goods which were likely to be shipped to the enemy or which might have been imported from enemy territory. Inspectors were classified as customs officials, and all such officials were empowered to raise posses and were rendered virtually immune to damage suits. The penalties established in 1812 for trading with the enemy were increased, and no one was permitted to visit the enemy without a presidential or gubernatorial passport.241
Federalists offered a host of amendments to the bill, and when these failed, they tried to prevent a quorum by absenting themselves from the House.242 But Republicans mustered enough votes to push the bill through both houses, and the president signed the measure into law on February 4, 1815.243 The new law never received a fair test, however, because it expired two weeks later with the restoration of peace. The law was extreme, but whether it would have worked may be doubted. The enforcement machinery of the customs department remained primitive, and people living on the frontier were determined to keep profitable avenues of trade open. In the contest between the government and smugglers, most of the advantages still lay with the latter.
End of a Long Session
By the time Congress adjourned on March 3, 1815, the crisis the nation faced had passed, but only because peace had been restored. During the long session, legislation had been adopted to raise the land bounty, permit the recruitment of minors, establish a volunteer corps, accept state troops into federal service, create a board of naval commissioners, build commerce raiders, curtail trade with the enemy, issue treasury notes, and authorize additional loans and taxes.
Under normal circumstances, this might have been an impressive record of legislation, but given the crisis many people expected more. The administration had asked Congress for energetic and controversial measures, but these measures had divided Republicans and united Federalists. As a result, neither of the administration’s two key proposals—conscription or the national bank—had become law. “The efficient and manly measures proposed by the executive,” complained a Pennsylvania Republican, “were all either totally rejected, or frittered down into insignificance.”244
It was not simply that Congress failed to adopt key administration proposals. It was slow to take any action at all. Even though Congress had convened on September 19, no war legislation of any consequence was adopted until December, and the pace of action remained slow throughout the session. Most Republicans attributed the delays to the “inertia” of Congress, the “perverseness” of independents like Calhoun and Cheves, or the “turpitude of federalism.”245 “Our misfortune,” said Joseph Varnum, “is that we have a number of young Politicians who, although ardent & honest, Suffer themselves to be misled by the pla[u]sible Arguments of the Opposition.”246
The failure of Congress to take energetic action led to growing criticism in the press. The Worcester National Aegis accused Congress of “wasting two or three months in useless debate,” and the Boston Yankee echoed this charge.247 The New York National Advocate suggested that congressmen were “forgetful, or, at least, unmindful of the spirit that prevails among the people,” and the Philadelphia Aurora said that if the British had bribed Congress “that body could not more effectually have served their employer than has been done by procrastination and idle debate.”248
No doubt the record of Congress would have been more impressive if Republicans had been able to close ranks or win over the Federalists. But such was not to be. In spite of the crisis, Republicans remained divided, and in spite of their pledges of support, Federalists found few measures they could actually vote for. “Instead of uniting with the majority to defend the country,” complained a Republican newspaper, “they [were], if possible, more infuriate in their opposition than ever.”249
The specter of New England disaffection also weighed heavily on Congress. Two months into the session, Republican Charles J. Ingersoll openly discussed the objectives of a meeting in Hartford sponsored by New England Federalists. “Since we assembled,” he said, “a most alarming temper has appeared . . . among some o
f the Eastern States; and it is said to be intended, by the agitation of the Hartford Convention, to proceed deliberately to the disintegration of New England from the Union.”250 Although Ingersoll discounted the possibility of secession, many Republicans did not. Throughout this session, Republican leaders had to contend with not only a foreign war but also the possibility of domestic war. “A lowering sky begins to shroud the political horizon,” said the Hartford American Mercury, “and clouds black with uncommon vengeance over-hang us, and portend a dreadful storm.”251
Chapter 10
The Hartford Convention
The War of 1812 was one of America’s most unpopular wars. It generated more intense opposition than any other war, including the war in Vietnam. Although most scholars have focused on New England’s opposition, Federalists in the middle and southern states opposed the conflict, too. Except for two brief periods—one in the summer of 1812 and the other in the fall of 1814—the party presented a united front against the war.
Federalist Opposition
In Congress Federalists voted as a bloc on almost all war legislation. They unanimously opposed the declaration of war in June 1812, and thereafter they voted against almost every proposal to raise men or money, to foster privateering, or to restrict trade with the enemy. The only war measures they supported were those they considered defensive—mainly bills to increase the navy or to build coastal fortifications. “The Federal party,” said the Salem Gazette in 1814, “have steadily at all times . . . maintained that in time of Peace, as well as in War, the nation ought to be protected and defended by a Navy and by Fortifications.”1
The House took 305 roll-call votes on war-related measures between June 1, 1812 (when Madison sent his war message to Congress), and February 14, 1815 (when the peace treaty reached Washington). Federalists achieved an index of relative cohesion of 94.4 percent on these measures. Thus, on the average war measure, almost 95 percent of House Federalists voted together. The Senate took 227 roll-call votes on war-related measures, and here Federalists achieved a cohesion of 92.5 percent. Since a cohesion of 70 percent has traditionally been considered a sign of party solidarity, the record of the Federalists is extraordinary—surely the most remarkable record of bloc voting in any war in the nation’s history.2
Why did Federalists oppose the war? For one thing, they saw it as a party war designed to further the interests of Republicans and to silence the opposition—a view that was reinforced by the Baltimore riots in 1812 and the refusal of the administration to take Federalists into the cabinet in 1814. “I regard the war, as a war of party, & not of the Country,” said Rufus King in 1812. “The people are no more obliged . . . to approve and applaud the measure,” added the Philadelphia United States’ Gazette, “than . . . any other party project.”3
Federalists also feared that the war would throw the nation into the arms of Napoleon, who was variously described as “the great destroyer,” the “monster of human depravity,” and “the arch-Fiend who has long been the curse & Scourge of the European World.”4 The initial protests against the war, particularly in New England, often expressed greater fear of a French alliance than of the war itself. “The horrors of war, compared with it, are mere amusement,” said Timothy Dwight. “The touch of France is pollution. Her embrace is death.” French dominion, added William Ellery Channing, threatened not just the wealth, but “the minds, the character, the morals, the religion of our nation.”5
Even after the danger of a French alliance had receded, Federalists continued to oppose the war because they considered it an “offensive” war aimed at Canada. Although willing to support a war to protect American commerce or to defend the nation’s frontiers, they refused to sanction the conquest of Canada. “Let it not be said,” Congressman Morris Miller of New York told the Republicans in 1813, “that we refuse you the means of defence. For that we always have been—we still are ready to open the treasure of the nation. We will give you millions for defence; but not a cent for the conquest of Canada—not the ninety-ninth part of a cent for the extermination of its inhabitants.”6
Timothy Pickering (1745–1829) of Massachusetts was one of a number of New Englanders who flirted with secession. Although he held advanced views on the plight of Indians and slaves and had ably managed several cabinet posts in the 1790s, he is best remembered today for his abrasive personality and his secessionist sentiment in the Age of Jefferson. (Engraving by T. B. Welsh and J. B. Longacre after a portrait by Gilbert Stuart. Library of Congress)
Even if the invasion of Canada succeeded, Federalists were convinced that the war would do more harm than good. “Whether we consider our agriculture, our commerce, our monied systems, or our internal safety,” declared the Alexandria Gazette, “nothing but disaster can result from it.”7 Nor did Federalists expect the nation to win any concessions from the enemy, certainly not on an issue as vital as impressment. “No war of any duration,” said James A. Bayard, “will ever extort this concession.”8
In sum, Federalists saw the war as a costly, futile, and partisan venture that was likely to produce little good and much evil. The best way to bring the conflict to an end, most Federalists agreed, was to oppose it. Hence they wrote, spoke, and preached against the war; they discouraged enlistments in the army and subscriptions to the war loans; and they vigorously condemned all who supported the war and worked for their defeat at the polls.9
The View from New England
Even though Federalists everywhere opposed the war, those in New England went the farthest. Because they were the dominant party, Federalists here did not have to worry about persecution or violence from an outraged majority. Moreover, they shared an abhorrence of the war—frequently grounded on religious principles—that was unmatched elsewhere (except perhaps in Maryland, where the Baltimore riots had radicalized the party). “Each man who volunteers his services in such a cause,” said a Massachusetts preacher, “or loans his money for its support, or by his conversation, his writings, or any other mode of influence, encourages its prosecution . . . loads his conscience with the blackest crimes.”10
Federalists in New England were also able to use the machinery of state and local government to obstruct the war effort. In Hartford, Federalists sought to end loud demonstrations by army recruiters by adopting a pair of city ordinances that restricted public music and parades.11 In New Bedford, Federalists denounced privateering and voted to quarantine all arriving privateers for forty days—ostensibly on medical grounds.12 And in Boston, the Massachusetts legislature threatened to sequester federal tax money if militia arms due to the state under an 1808 law were not delivered.13
New England Federalists made their opposition felt in other ways. In Massachusetts, after a Republican paper denounced Federalists for applauding naval victories in a war they opposed, Josiah Quincy sponsored a resolution in the state senate declaring that “in a war like the present . . . it is not becoming a moral and religious people to express any approbation of military or naval exploits, which are not immediately connected with the defence of our sea coast and soil.”14 The senate adopted this resolution, and it remained on the books until 1824, when Republicans expunged it from the record.15
In Connecticut, Federalists were accused of aiding the enemy in the “blue light” affair. In late 1813 a squadron of ships under Captain Stephen Decatur tried to slip out of New London harbor at night but was driven back by the British fleet. Decatur later complained that someone had signaled the British by flashing blue lights.16 Whether the signals were given by a British spy or an American citizen is unknown, but Republicans were quick to fix the blame on Federalists. It was “the blackest treason,” declared Niles’ Register.17 Connecticut Federalists demanded a congressional investigation to clear the air, but there was no way of ascertaining the truth.18 By then “blue light Federalist” had already entered the political lexicon. According to one Federalist, the phrase had become an “ornament or embellishment to a speech, such as Old tory, British gold, Henryism, &c
.”19
The Clash Over Militia
The most persistent source of conflict between New England and the federal government was over the control and deployment of the militia. This was no small matter because the militia played such a vital role in the nation’s defense. The militia problem, in turn, raised the larger issue of who was responsible for New England’s defense. Was it the federal government or was it the states? Federalists never found a satisfactory answer to this question, and the result was the Hartford Convention, a regional conference convened to air New England’s grievances.20
The New England militia units were among the best in the nation. They were well armed and well trained and had repeatedly distinguished themselves during the Revolution. The troops were organized in accordance with the uniform militia act of 1792, which meant that each company had 64 privates plus officers and musicians. Five companies made up a battalion, 10 constituted a regiment, 40 a brigade, and 80 a division. In actual practice there were variations to this pattern, but in New England, more so than elsewhere, the militia measured up to federal specifications.21
The first clash over the militia took place in the summer of 1812. On June 22, four days after the declaration of war, Major General Henry Dearborn, the army’s ranking officer in New England, ordered out forty-one companies of militia in Massachusetts, five companies in Connecticut, and four in Rhode Island. The War Department was sending the regulars in New England to the northern frontier and wanted the militia to garrison the empty forts that would be left behind. But to facilitate deployment and control, Dearborn asked for detached companies without a full complement of officers. This assured that the regular officer in charge of each post would retain control and would not be outranked by a militia officer.22
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