Chittenden dispatched Brigadier General Jacob Davis to New York to execute the order. When Davis arrived in Plattsburgh, he was arrested for sedition, and a group of Republican officers sent Chittenden an open letter refusing to obey his order.71 Denouncing the governor’s proclamation as “a gross insult,” the officers said: “An invitation or order to desert the standard of our country will never be obeyed by us.”72 Although the officers insisted that the proclamation had been circulated among the troops without effect, many soldiers had already returned home. The campaign was over, and the remaining men were soon discharged anyway.73
The matter, however, did not end here. A Republican paper called Chittenden’s recall order “the most scandalous & unwarrantable stain on the political history of America” and suggested that the governor be tried for treason.74 Several weeks later Solomon Sharp of Kentucky introduced a series of resolutions in Congress calling for Chittenden’s prosecution. The governor’s proclamation, said Sharp, “was in direct violation of the statute, which makes it penal to entice the soldiers in the service of the United States to desert.”75
Although Congress took no action on Sharp’s proposal, Harrison Gray Otis introduced a resolution in the Massachusetts legislature promising to support the people of Vermont in “their constitutional rights whenever the same shall be in danger of infringement from any quarter.”76 This resolution was tabled, although it elicited sharp reproofs from both New Jersey and Pennsylvania. We view “with contempt and abhorrence,” said the New Jersey legislature, “the ravings of an infuriated faction, either as issuing from a legislative body, a maniac governor, or discontented or ambitious demagogues.”77
There was further trouble in 1814. In April Major General James Wilkinson asked Chittenden to call up troops to protect American positions on the eastern side of Lake Champlain. Chittenden responded by ordering 1,000 men to Vergennes and 500 to Burlington.78 But these troops—like their fellow citizens in Massachusetts—deeply resented being reorganized into 100-man companies. In Vergennes, the officers—Federalists and Republicans alike—were slow to muster their men and were reportedly “very lavish with their furloughs.” According to an observer, the officers were only interested in their pay and popularity and the men were “undisciplined & insubordinate.”79 The situation was no better at Burlington. Here the men were so incensed by the reorganization scheme that they refused to be mustered. Instead, they simply “discharged themselves.”80
Later in the year, when the British threatened Plattsburgh, Chittenden endeared himself to Republicans by urging Vermonters to volunteer for service in New York. After the battle was over, he issued a proclamation announcing that the character of the war had changed and urging everyone to unite in the country’s defense.81 The state, however, continued to insist on its prerogatives to officer the militia. Shortly after Chittenden’s proclamation was issued, the Vermont council adopted a resolution proclaiming that the militia could serve only under their own officers.82
Defense Costs in New England
While all five New England states feuded with the federal government over the militia, the problem was most serious in southern New England because of mounting defense costs there. In Massachusetts, the cost ran about $200,000 a month and eventually totaled $850,000; in Connecticut the monthly bill was $50,000 and the final cost close to $150,000; and in Rhode Island the monthly figure was $15,000 and the total more than $50,000.83 In discharging these bills, state officials could expect little help from Washington. Government agents were so strapped for funds that they could not even supply those militia units that were in federal service.84 Moreover, the administration made it clear that it would neither advance money nor promise reimbursement for any militia serving under state officers in violation of federal rules. These expenses, the secretary of war said, “are chargeable to the State, and not to the United States.”85
With little prospect of securing federal aid, state officials turned to local sources. But raising money in wartime New England was no easy task. The federal tax burden was already heavy and still growing at a time when the region was in the throes of a depression. With business so slow, only Rhode Island, whose economy was cushioned by a healthy textile industry, was bold enough to impose new taxes, and then only to the extent of $25,000.86
Unwilling to raise taxes, New England officials looked to their banks for relief, but these institutions could provide only limited aid. The suspension of specie payments in the middle and southern states had put such a premium on specie that speculators were buying up New England bank notes in order to redeem them for cash. This forced the banks to retrench, which meant they could not meet the states’ needs. In Massachusetts only $631,000 of a $1 million loan offering was taken; in Connecticut, only $50,000 of a $500,000 offering, and in Rhode Island, only $23,000 of a $100,000 offering.87
The financial situation in Connecticut was particularly chaotic. The state was inundated with depreciated New York bank paper, which drove specie and Connecticut bank notes out of circulation and created an acute shortage of legal money.88 Some businessmen issued their own currency, but these notes were easily counterfeited and of doubtful value.89 For most people, finding enough legal currency to pay their debts and taxes was difficult, if not impossible. “The People cry for relief,” said one Federalist. “All say something must be done.”90 The state finally authorized the payment of taxes in New York notes and permitted Connecticut banks to issue special notes—known as “facilities”—that did not have to be redeemed until after the war. The banks were also allowed to issue notes whose face value was less than a dollar.91
New England’s defense problem was not unique. Other states were also forced to pay for defense measures in the last year of the war.92 “So far as regards the common defence,” Rufus King concluded, “the Genl. Govt. has deserted its duties.”93 Virginia ran up the largest bill. Extensive British operations in the Chesapeake forced the Old Dominion to advance the federal government close to $1 million, and the state’s Federalist congressmen insisted that Virginia was “in the most deplorable situation.”94 Unlike New England, however, Virginia officials had ready access to cheap bank paper and a firm promise of federal reimbursement. The financial crisis was therefore less acute. In New England, on the other hand, Federalists bitterly complained that the administration had squandered its resources in Canada while leaving the region defenseless.95
Other Federalist Grievances
The defense problem was one of New England’s chief grievances in 1814, but it was not the only one. Ever since Jefferson’s presidency, Federalists had been critical of Republican foreign policy. Virtually all Federalists agreed that the rejection of the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty, followed by the enactment of commercial sanctions and the declaration of war—in short the whole policy of confrontation with Great Britain—was disastrous. The costs of this policy, in blood and treasure, had mounted steadily since 1807, and yet (except for the belated repeal of the Orders-in-Council) the nation had little to show for its sacrifices. Indeed, by 1814 any hope of winning concessions from the enemy had all but vanished.
Equally disheartening, New England Federalists could see little prospect of winning control of the national government to effect significant policy changes. In spite of the Federalists’ wartime election gains, the Virginia Dynasty remained firmly in control. In addition, the Louisiana Purchase had brought vast new territories under American control, and the flood of immigration (which was only temporarily halted by the war) promised to populate these territories with Republican voters. For New England Federalists seeking a voice in national affairs, the prospects were bleak indeed.
Some Federalists in New England compared their plight to that of Americans in 1776 and saw a corresponding need for radical action. The press was filled with articles that echoed the spirit of ’76. Typical of these was an essay in the Salem Gazette that called for Massachusetts to sequester federal tax money, make a separate peace with England, and invite neighboring state
s to sign “a convention of alliance, amity and commerce.”96 Most New England Federalists, however, shrank from such extremism, hoping no doubt that the mere threat of action would force the national government to change its policies.
Call for a Northern Convention
Traditionally, Americans had dealt with crises by calling a convention.97 The Albany Congress (1754), the Stamp Act Congress (1765), the First Continental Congress (1774), and the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention (1787) were all convened to deal with crises. In New England there was recurring talk of calling a convention: first in 1808–1809, when the long embargo brought trade to a halt; then in the summer of 1812, when the declaration of war threatened to drive America into an alliance with France; and finally in early 1814, after a new embargo had been imposed.98
The demand for a convention in 1814 was particularly strong in the interior of Massachusetts. “The people in this part of the Country,” recalled one Federalist, “were much more excited than in most other parts of New England.”99 According to Noah Webster, the movement began in January when leaders in Northampton called a meeting of “the principal inhabitants” of Old Hampshire (which had recently been divided into three counties) to “consider whether any measures could be taken to arrest the continuance of the war, and provide for the public safety.”100 At a meeting held on January 19, Federalist leaders approved an address drawn up by Webster and circulated under Joseph Lyman’s name. Arguing that New England’s problems grew out of not just the war but defects in the Constitution, the address urged the towns in Old Hampshire to send memorials to the state legislature requesting “a convention of all the Northern and Commercial States . . . to consult upon measures in concert, for procuring . . . alterations in the Federal Constitution.”101
As a result of this address, the Massachusetts legislature was flooded with memorials—more than forty in all—which voiced similar complaints about the war, the restrictive system, executive tyranny, and the lack of New England’s influence in the Union.102 Eleven suggested a northern convention. Although the tone of most was moderate, a few bristled with extremism. The memorial from Newbury, for example, declared that people there were “READY TO RESIST UNTO BLOOD” to secure their rights.103
The memorials were particularly critical of the recent embargo, and there was considerable support in the legislature for taking action against this measure. Francis Blake announced that if the American constitution permitted embargoes, he preferred the British constitution “monarchy and all,” and Samuel Fessenden told cheering galleries that the state should legalize the coasting trade and raise an army to protect its rights.104 According to Samuel Putnam, it was “the settled determination not to petition Congress again,” and proposals to legalize the coasting trade and outlaw seizures made without a search warrant were “received with great unanimity.”105
Much to the dismay of the extremists, however, the moderates refused to condone any radical action. “You cannot sufficiently realize the embarrassments which the Politicks of the Boston Stamp have occasioned,” complained Putnam.106 The petitions were referred to a committee chaired by former United States senator James Lloyd, and a document was prepared—known as Lloyd’s Report—which condemned the war and the embargo. Although the report recognized the right of nullification, it argued that no action was necessary because the embargo was unconstitutional and therefore void. The report conceded that a convention might be called to deal with New England’s problems but recommended waiting until the will of the people had been registered in the spring elections. By skirting the issue of nullification and postponing a convention, Lloyd’s Report was a victory for moderation.107
The Federalists won the ensuing elections, but when the Massachusetts legislature met again in May 1814, the convention project was quietly shelved. The embargo had been repealed, which eliminated one source of complaint. In addition, Napoleon’s defeat had ended the war in Europe, and Great Britain’s offer to open direct negotiations with the United States had raised hopes for an end to the War of 1812 as well.108
Genesis of the Hartford Convention
In the summer of 1814, however, circumstances again changed. The negotiations with Britain were delayed, and when they did begin, the envoys found themselves deadlocked. In addition, the war moved closer to New England’s shores as the British occupied eastern Maine and stepped up their raids on the coast. Harassed by the enemy and abandoned by the federal government, New England officials watched hopelessly as their defense costs mounted. A crisis appeared to be at hand, and Massachusetts Federalists responded by reviving the project for a convention.109
On September 7, the day after breaking with Major General Dearborn over the command issue, Governor Strong summoned the Massachusetts legislature to a special session.110 According to Harrison Gray Otis, prior to the session, “a few influential members of the Legislature” met to discuss the possibility of a convention. Although Otis opposed the project, other Federalists argued that it was necessary to satisfy their “country friends.” Accordingly, the decision was made to summon a convention to obtain “security against Conscription, taxes & the danger of invasion” and to restrain “the tendency to excess.”111
The defense problem played a central role in the proceedings that followed. In his opening address to the legislature on October 5, Governor Strong focused almost exclusively on this issue. The special session was necessary, he said, because the war had “assumed an aspect so threatening and destructive” that the state had been forced to call out more militia than at any time in its history. “It is an obvious reflection,” the governor said, “that the limited sources of revenue which the state has retained in its own power, bear no proportion to the expenses hereby incurred.” If the state did not find relief, it would be “extremely difficult, if not impossible, to provide even in the first instance for the requisite expenditures.”112
The Massachusetts legislature responded to the governor’s address with a report drawn up by Otis. Echoing the governor’s complaints, the report said that the war had “assumed an aspect of great and immediate danger” and that the people could not continue to pay federal taxes and at the same time finance local defense measures. The alternatives were “submission to the enemy, or the control of their own resources.” The report also declared that the Constitution had failed to secure “equal rights and benefits” to New England. To remedy these problems, the report recommended calling a convention of New England states.113 This proposal was approved 260–90 in the house and 22–12 in the senate, and twelve delegates were chosen to represent the state in the proposed convention.114
When the Connecticut legislature met in mid-October, Governor Smith devoted his address exclusively to the defense problem. Because the federal government had withdrawn its support, he said, “we are left to defend ourselves against a formidable and exasperated enemy.”115 The state legislature responded with a report that concentrated on the same issue. In this “odious and disastrous war,” the report said, “the national government are dooming us to enormous taxation, without affording any just confidence that we shall share in the expenditure of the public revenue.” The report concluded by recommending that Connecticut take part in the proposed convention.116 The Connecticut house approved this recommendation by a vote of 153 to 36 and chose seven delegates to attend the meeting.117
In Rhode Island the concern over defense was no less pronounced. Both the governor’s address in November and the legislative report that followed focused almost exclusively on this issue. Governor Jones declared that the state was “as defenceless as at the commencement of the war” and that the federal government “refused to make the necessary advances for expenses which their own officers have ordered and approved.” Complaining of “great pecuniary embarrassments,” Jones said that even one half of the federal tax money collected in the state “would increase, in a very respectable degree our means of defence.”118 The legislature agreed. By a margin of 39 to 28, the Rhode Island house
voted to take part in the convention and chose four delegates to represent the state.119
Although New Hampshire and Vermont were also invited to the convention, Federalist leaders in both states opposed the project. However, two counties in each state chose a pair of delegates each to attend. Although one of the Vermont delegates was denied a seat because he represented a minority in a Democratic district, the other three were seated. This bought the total number of delegates to twenty-six.120
A Divided Public Response
Many moderates supported the convention at least partly to silence the extremists, and the prospect of a convention probably did reduce unrest. “It is the opinion of my best informed friends from the Country,” said Otis, “that a reliance on some effectual suggestions from that body, alone prevents a violent ferment and open opposition in many places.”121 Nevertheless, the demand for extreme action did not entirely subside. Francis Blake, who thought “the Legislature of Massachusetts should speak to the National Government in a voice as loud as thunder,” recommended that the state sequester federal tax money.122 Although no one in the legislature supported this proposal, innkeepers and retailers in Old Hampshire promised to withhold their federal taxes until after the convention had met.123 The people of Reading, Massachusetts, made a similar pledge. “Until the public opinion shall be known,” said a resolution they adopted, “we will not enter our carriages [on the tax rolls]—pay our continental taxes—or aid, inform or assist any officer in their collection.”124
Timothy Pickering, who described the convention as “the best hope of our best men,” deprecated “every thing which shall simply be put on paper” and called for bold action.125 Some newspapers echoed his cry. “Advance boldly,” said the Boston Centinel. “Suffer yourselves not to be entangled by the cobwebs of a compact which has long since ceased to exist.”126 The Centinel even suggested that a new nation was in the making. An article describing the appointment of the Connecticut delegates was headlined “Second Pillar of a new Federal Edifice reared,” and a story on Rhode Island’s action was entitled “Third Pillar Raised.”127 Josiah Quincy, on the other hand, had a much better sense of what the convention was likely to do. When asked what the result would be, he replied: “A GREAT PAMPHLET!”128
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