Roosevelt had already provided Churchill with the best possible argument for placing a British political representative at Eisenhower’s side. On New Year’s Day, while the Macmillan appointment was being discussed, Roosevelt described his attitude on North Africa to Churchill, making explicit what had already been implicit. “I feel very strongly that we have a military occupation in North Africa and as such our Commanding General has complete charge of all matters civil as well as military,” the President said. “We must not let any of our French friends forget this for a moment.” If they did not “play ball,” Roosevelt warned, “we will have to replace them.” This interpretation gave Eisenhower enormous power and made it imperative that the British have some political influence with him.10
If the President’s policy alarmed Churchill, it distressed Eisenhower. He did not want all that power, not only because it brought extra problems with it but more because he feared it would lead to a showdown between Giraud and himself. If Giraud refused to continue to co-operate and withdrew his support, it would force the Americans to take on the “man-wasting” job of providing civil administration for North Africa. Further, it could mean the withdrawal of French troops guarding the lines of communication and require large Allied replacements. Instead of active assistance from the French, Eisenhower feared that there would be “probably passive resistance à la Gandhi or possibly resumption of French fighting against Americans and British ‘pour l’honneure’ [sic].”
Eisenhower received a copy of the President’s telegram from the War Department and could not reveal that he had seen it. Still, he felt he had to act. In a note to Smith, he wondered if Murphy could work up a cablegram to the State Department, “but not on the basis of the President’s telegram,” pointing out the facts of the situation. Eisenhower also wanted Murphy to confer with Macmillan “to determine upon a course of long-distance education that might make our governments understand … actualities.” Finally, he thought he might send “a very personal and secret telegram” to Marshall, warning him that if AFHQ disregarded the “Allied” principle, there was a “very definite possibility that we shall have to retreat hastily out of Tunisia.”11
Eisenhower turned to Marshall for help, and the Chief saw to it that Eisenhower’s wishes were taken into account in Washington. Not even Marshall could guarantee anything, however, for the stakes were too high. North Africa itself was immensely valuable, and in addition whoever controlled Algiers and Tunisia at the conclusion of hostilities would have the inside track to take over in France. No one—not Churchill, not Roosevelt, not De Gaulle, not even Giraud—was going to allow the future of North Africa and France to be decided upon the basis of the military requirements of what was, if the truth be told, a secondary campaign on the eastern coast of Tunisia.
Eisenhower recognized this. On New Year’s Day he told his old friend in OPD, Colonel Charles Gailey, that no matter what was done in his theater, “it is bound to remain one in which intrigue and crosscurrents of opinion are always going to prevail and, in many cases, will be most difficult to combat.” But as far as possible Eisenhower wanted to eliminate the long-range political considerations and concentrate on the battle. His personal responsibility was to drive the Germans out of Tunisia and his duty required him to recommend to his government whatever action he thought necessary to accomplish this task.12
Fortunately, Eisenhower would soon have an opportunity to meet face to face with Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall, and his other superiors, for they were all coming to Casablanca for a conference. Then, one would hope, they could see the problems for themselves.
Roosevelt and Churchill and their staffs arrived in Casablanca the second week in January. Marshall came to the meeting hoping to close down operations in the Mediterranean and to revive ROUNDUP. As Ian Jacob put it, he regarded “the Mediterranean as a kind of dark hole,” and feared that the British would want to go on after Tunisia had been cleared to an invasion of Sicily and then Italy. All this would delay the major invasion of France. But Marshall was arguing from a position of weakness. One of his fellow American Chiefs, Admiral King, was interested mainly in the Pacific, while another, General Arnold, participated in discussions only when the air forces were mentioned. The President rather liked the idea of invading Sicily and Italy.
The British, by contrast, were solidly in favor of extending operations in the Mediterranean. They were better prepared to present their case in other ways, too. They sent out in advance to Casablanca a 6000-ton liner equipped as a headquarters and communications vessel, complete with technical details on all possible aspects of any proposed operation. It was, in fact, a floating file cabinet. “What was completely lacking in the American party,” Jacob noted, “was any kind of staff who could tackle the problems that were bound to arise in the course of the conversations.” They “had left most of their clubs behind.”13
The result was inevitable. The Allies agreed to push operations in the Mediterranean in 1943, making the first objective after the fall of Tunisia the invasion of Sicily. This meant that the men and equipment needed for ROUNDUP would come to North Africa and it would be 1944 before a cross-Channel attack could take place. Admiral King, who wanted to get the European war over with so he could turn full force on the Japanese, was furious. He growled that the invasion of Sicily was “merely doing something just for the sake of doing something.” Sicily led nowhere and its conquest would accomplish nothing of significance. Going into Sicily meant avoiding an invasion of France, but there was no CCS agreement on the matter of the Mediterranean versus cross-Channel strategy, no agreement on what to do after the capture of Sicily, no agreement even on what to do about Italy once Sicily fell.
The decision was a serious blow to Marshall, and even more to his staff. OPD was bitterly disappointed. Generals Albert Wedemeyer and John Hull and Colonel Gailey, who represented OPD at the conference, returned to Washington feeling that they had suffered a major defeat. “We came, we listened, and we were conquered,” as Wedemeyer put it.14
Eisenhower had great sympathy for the members of OPD. Six months earlier he had been in the same position, arguing for the same strategy they had advanced and, like them, losing to the British. Now, however, he had changed his strategic views. The build-up in North Africa was so vast that it seemed to him to be foolish to waste it, and he generally agreed with the British views. Still, he knew how Handy and the rest of the OPD staff felt, and after the conference he wrote them a long letter trying to soften the blow. “Frankly, I do not see how the ‘big bosses’ could have deviated very far from the general course of action they adopted,” he declared. If operations in the Mediterranean ceased and the Allies pointed toward ROUNDUP, then for the most part the Allies would be inactive in 1943. That was intolerable.
Eisenhower’s main fear was that OPD would develop an attitude of bitterness toward the British. He pleaded with Handy to refuse “to deal with our military problems on an American vs. British basis.” He said he was not so naïve as to hope for complete objectivity, “but one of the constant sources of danger to us in this war is the temptation to regard as our first enemy the partner that must work with us in defeating the real enemy.” He asked Handy to be frank and honest with the British and to avoid a purely national attitude. “I am not British and I am not ambidextrous in attitude,” Eisenhower concluded. “But … I am not going to let national prejudice or any of its related evils prevent me from getting the best out of the means that you fellows struggle so hard to make available to us.” He said the problem was “never out of my own mind for a second.”15
Tactical questions, not coalition strategy, were Eisenhower’s main concerns at Casablanca. He arrived on January 15, had lunch with Marshall and King, then went to a meeting with the CCS. Mountbatten, Dill, Wedemeyer, Somervell, and other staff officers also attended. Eisenhower gave, from memory and without the aid of notes, a detailed account of operations in North Africa. Alexander followed with an account of Eighth Army operations. He said Mon
tgomery was on the verge of driving Rommel from Libya, but after that a period of stagnation would ensue until Montgomery could repair the port of Tripoli and restore his supplies. He expected Rommel to stand on the Mareth Line, a defensive position in southern Tunisia prepared earlier by the French.
Eisenhower asked Alexander what Rommel’s position would be if the Eighth Army captured Tripoli and Fredendall captured Sfax. Could Eighth Army keep Rommel engaged so that the forces at Sfax could neglect their right flank and turn toward the north? Alexander warned Eisenhower that if Rommel found hostile forces at Sfax he “would react like lightning and his plan would be the best possible.” Brooke thought it “might be unfortunate” if Fredendall arrived at Sfax just at the time that Montgomery reached Tripoli and was immoblized for lack of supplies. The upshot was that Eisenhower decided to call off Fredendall’s offensive because his newly organized II Corps was not strong enough to stand up to German attacks from both sides. Instead, Eisenhower proposed to build up his mobile forces in southern Tunisia and prepare to hit Rommel’s rear when the Germans made their stand at the Mareth Line.16
Apart from grand strategy and politics, the Casablanca meeting provided the CCS with an opportunity to make needed organizational changes. On Eisenhower’s suggestion the Chiefs separated ETO from North Africa. More important were the changes the CCS made in North Africa. With Eighth Army coming up to southern Tunisia, it was necessary to provide a new structure that would cover both Eisenhower’s and Alexander’s forces. The CCS decided to place Alexander under Eisenhower and to provide for co-ordination by making Alexander Eisenhower’s deputy in charge of ground operations. Tedder would become commander in chief, Mediterranean Air Forces. Cunningham remained as commander in chief of the naval contingent. Eisenhower was Supreme Commander. These changes would take place when Eighth Army reached the Tunisian border.
Marshall was happily surprised. Since the British had the preponderance of force in the Mediterranean, he thought they would insist on subordinating Eisenhower to Alexander. There were two major reasons why they did not. First, Eisenhower had a functioning Allied headquarters, Alexander did not. Under the arrangement, AFHQ would continue to function, and Brooke especially was most impressed by AFHQ. Thanks to Eisenhower, he felt, “there was remarkably little friction at [AFHQ] between the staff officers of the two nations.…” Second, Brooke felt he was losing nothing and gaining much. Unimpressed by Eisenhower’s handling of the campaign to date (“he had neither the tactical nor strategical experience required for such a task,” the CIGS said of Eisenhower), Brooke felt that by giving Alexander command of the ground forces he could take advantage of Eisenhower’s strength in molding an integrated staff while at the same time avoiding his weaknesses on the battlefield. “We were carrying out a move which could not help flattering and pleasing the Americans,” he declared, “in so far as we were placing our senior and experienced commander … under their commander who had no war experience.…”
The move also allowed the British to achieve a return to a situation in which day-to-day operations would rest with Alexander, Cunningham, and Tedder, operating as co-equals. As Brooke put it, “We were pushing Eisenhower up into the stratosphere and rarefied atmosphere of a Supreme Commander, where he would be free to devote his time to the political and inter-allied problems, whilst we inserted under him one of our own commanders to deal with the military situations and to restore the necessary drive and co-ordination which had been so seriously lacking.”17
Eisenhower was sure he could make the new system work. For one thing he had a long talk with Alexander and was impressed. What Churchill called Alexander’s “easy smiling grace” and “contagious confidence” charmed Eisenhower, as it did everyone else. Eisenhower’s relations with Cunningham were close and friendly, and he was delighted to have Tedder to run the air forces. Other generals who were still lieutenant colonels on the permanent list, as Eisenhower was, might have looked at the distinguished and awe-inspiring line-up of Alexander, Tedder, and Cunningham and shuddered at the thought of leading them. When all together in full uniform, they looked the personification of British tradition and habit of command. But Eisenhower thought only that these were men of proven ability who had a great deal to offer. He intended to work with them, not by imposing his will but through persuasion and co-operation, and draw on their talents. He was confident he could do it and become the Supreme Commander in fact as well as in name.
The rosy glow did not last long, as there was an almost immediate test of strength. On January 20 and again on the twenty-second, the CCS issued directives as to how and what his subordinates were to do. The first concerned air force organization, which was set forth in some detail, and included the statement that “further details will naturally be left to the Air Commander-in-Chief.” The second concerned organization for the invasion of Sicily. It directed Alexander to take charge of planning details, telling him to “cooperate” with Cunningham and Tedder in executing the project. It also said that in Tunisia Alexander should “coordinate the operation of all three armies.…”18
These directives left Eisenhower “burning inside.” He dictated a “hot message challenging such intrusion into the organizational set-up of an Allied Commander,” saying that the tendency was to dull the principle of unity of command. Smith pleaded with him to moderate the message, and Eisenhower let his chief of staff rework it and tone it down.19
Eisenhower felt that both planning and organization were his responsibility and should be under his control. He wanted Alexander to command, not to “coordinate,” but he also wanted Alexander to limit himself to handling the troops in contact with the enemy. Strategic reserves and rear-area troops were, he believed, directly responsible to him. He had other objections. “As far as I am concerned,” he told Marshall in reference to the directive that said Tedder would create his own organization, “no attention will be paid to it. It is my responsibility to organize to win battles and while I do not anticipate, ever, any difficulty with a man of Tedder’s ability, it is still quite evident that only a man of [Air Chief Marshal] Portal’s turn of mind would have thought of inserting such a statement.”
The whole affair represented “the inevitable trend of the British mind toward ‘committee’ rather than ‘single’ command,” and the “British tendency toward reaching down into a theater” from London to dictate events. Eisenhower did not think there was anything “vicious or even deliberate” in this attempt to by-pass him; it simply reflected British training and doctrine.
Eisenhower would never allow himself to be made into the chairman of the corporation, the man who maintained contact with the outside world while letting a board composed of Cunningham, Alexander, and Tedder run the show. The British wanted him to deal with the French and the U. S. War Department, while turning operations over to a committee of British generals and admirals. It would have been easy enough for Eisenhower to accept that role, to spend the war pacifying Giraud and De Gaulle, entertaining visiting dignitaries, holding press conferences, and announcing victories. But he was convinced that the British system was inadequate to the demands of modern war, that whatever decisions had to be made the Supreme Commander should make, freely, “under the principle of unified command.” He promised Marshall, “I will be constantly on my guard to prevent any important military venture depending for its control and direction upon the ‘committee’ system of command.”
Eisenhower’s personality reinforced his organizational views. As long as he was supposed to be the commander, he was determined to be the commander. “Manifestly, responsibility … falls directly on me,” he said.20 If the British wanted to change the system, let them do so openly, not through the back door. He, meanwhile, intended to act like a Supreme Commander. The structure that emerged from Casablanca seemed to him adequate and even logical. He would work through the existing structure—always making sure that directives like those of January 20 and 22 were resisted—and through the power of his personality see to it th
at Cunningham, Tedder, and Alexander recognized him for what he was, the Supreme Commander.
Eisenhower spent only one day at Casablanca. On January 16 he returned to Algiers and the more mundane problems of the battle in Tunisia. The next day Von Arnim launched an attack against the undermanned French sector, near Pichon. After heavy fighting the Germans secured numerous penetrations. On the eighteenth Eisenhower went to his advance command post at Constantine, moved reinforcements into the French sector, and ordered parts of the U. S. 1st and 34th Divisions into the line to relieve the French. He also reviewed with Juin, Fredendall, and Anderson the developments at Casablanca.21
When he returned to Algiers, Eisenhower wrote a memorandum for the AFHQ G-3, covering the results of his talks with the battlefield commanders. He wanted to know when AFHQ could get more tanks to Anderson, how much equipment could be gotten to the French and when, what was being done to improve the line of communication, when a mobile reserve could be established “so that a minor attack by Bosche” would be stopped, what was being done to co-ordinate air and artillery activity, and so on. To his G-3, Eisenhower wrote, “Supplies: Let’s pile them in—dispersed but handy. When we start we want to go to town.” He thought the use of camouflage had been “sadly neglected,” and concluded: “Alertness by ALL troops: We must STRESS this,” and “TRAINING—all the time—all the time!!”22
Nothing could be done immediately, and the French continued to reel under German armored blows. On January 21 Eisenhower made another quick trip to Constantine. He decided that with their inadequate equipment the French would never be able to stop the Germans. The only solution was to phase them out of the line by having Fredendall move north and Anderson south until the British and Americans had a common border. After spelling out the details of the necessary movements, he put Anderson in charge of the whole front.23
The Supreme Commander Page 21
