Eisenhower made no public defense of his actions. He did answer a number of the incoming letters of criticism, carefully pointing out that Patton was too important to lose. In each case he asked that the letter be regarded as strictly personal.6 He advised Patton to keep quiet, since “it is my judgment that this storm will blow over.” In the end partly because other events took news priority, it did.7
But meanwhile, Marshall was not as sure as Eisenhower about the wisdom of giving Patton command of an army in OVERLORD. It was not that the Chief of Staff was afraid of adverse publicity, but rather that he had made his own selections for the top positions and had not included Patton. Marshall’s plan was to give Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair the army group, with Bradley and Devers commanding the armies, or to put Devers in command of the army group, with Bradley and Hodges under him. McNair, he said, had the great advantages of “extreme firmness, expert knowledge of artillery and infantry combined action, perfect loyalty and dependability,” while Hodges “is exactly same class of man as Bradley in practically every respect. Wonderful shot, great hunter, quiet, self-effacing. Thorough understanding of ground fighting, DSC, etc.” McNair’s only drawback was his deafness.8
Marshall not only disagreed with Eisenhower’s personnel selections; he objected to Eisenhower’s tendency to gut Mediterranean headquarters and the casual way in which he proposed to transfer to Algiers men who had been working in the United Kingdom, especially Eakers and Devers. Such wholesale shifting of personnel would create serious problems in AFHQ, and Marshall thought both Eakers and Devers should be left where they were, with Spaatz remaining in the Mediterranean. Marshall thought Smith too should stay in Algiers until at least February 1944, in order to help Wilson get oriented.9
Eisenhower disagreed with everything Marshall proposed. He thought it was logical to take Tedder and Spaatz to England with him because he was anxious to have for OVERLORD senior commanders who were experienced in the air support of ground troops. Eaker’s experience had all been in the area of strategic bombing. The technique of air-ground co-operation “is one that is not widely understood and it takes men of some vision and broad understanding to do the job right. Otherwise a commander is forever fighting with those air officers who, regardless of the ground situation, want to send big bombers on missions that have nothing to do with the critical effort.” If Spaatz and Tedder went to England, there would be nothing for Eaker to do there. He should, therefore, report to Algiers to head the air effort in the Mediterranean.10
With regard to Devers, Eisenhower said he had “nothing whatsoever” against him, a less than candid remark, “and thought I was recommending him for an important post.” Eisenhower said he knew Marshall had great confidence in Devers and if the Chief wanted to leave Devers in England “I have no doubt that I will find a useful job for him.” But Eisenhower did want experienced commanders leading the American armies in OVERLORD, or so he said, and Devers had no experience. Still, Eisenhower insisted on Gerow as a corps commander, and Gerow had no experience.
Nor would Eisenhower give up Smith. He wanted to send Smith on to London within the next few days so that he could check the present organization there. Smith could return to Algiers later and stay for a week or so after Eisenhower left in order to clear up details, but then Eisenhower wanted him to return to London to get to work. Eisenhower said he had conferred with Wilson, who was bringing his key staff people with him, and was sure he could handle all major problems without Smith. “I regret that you found anything disturbing in the recommendations I made,” Eisenhower concluded, “but, frankly, they are the best I could evolve considering the jobs to be filled and the experience and qualifications of the several individuals that could be shuffled around.”11 He was, in short, gently reminding Marshall that OVERLORD was now his responsibility and that he wanted to hand-pick the team to carry it out.
At this point great confusion set in. The reason was that Eisenhower’s messages were crossing Marshall’s, and vice versa, because Marshall had gone on an extended trip to the Pacific.12 Shortly after Christmas, Marshall got back to Washington. “Appears that we have gotten into complete confusion regarding future assignments …,” he wired Eisenhower. He said he had “followed a confused trail while traveling in the Pacific” and was just now catching up with some of Eisenhower’s messages. He was willing to accept Eisenhower’s proposals in toto.13 “The message was like the sun breaking through the fog,” Butcher recorded. “When Ike received the good news … his whole demeanor changed.”14 Marshall even agreed to bringing Devers down to Algiers as American theater commander.
Eisenhower now had Bradley, Patton, Smith, Spaatz, and Tedder. Churchill had decided to leave Alexander in the Mediterranean, under Wilson, and had chosen Montgomery to command the British land contingent in OVERLORD, so most of the high command was now set. On the question of the second American army commander, Eisenhower preferred to wait. He did ask Marshall to send Hodges over to England early so that he could “live by Bradley’s side during the … planning and preparation and … actually accompany him into the operation.” Eisenhower would determine later whether to move Bradley or Hodges up to army group command. He promised Marshall that “in no repeat no event will I ever advance Patton beyond army command.” As far as McNair was concerned, he was definitely out—his deafness was too big a handicap to overcome.15
With the personnel chosen, Eisenhower could turn to organization. Smith went to London right after Christmas to have a firsthand look at the setup there, and he was quite disturbed at one or two things that he learned. The CCS had made Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory the air commander in chief, which put him in command of the tactical air forces for OVERLORD. Tedder had been named deputy Allied commander without portfolio. Smith wired Eisenhower, “I personally believe that Tedder should be the real Air Commander and your advisor on air matters, which Mallory now considers himself.” Smith was even more worried about a rumor he had heard that the BCOS intended to submit to the CCS for approval a directive to Eisenhower on the organization of his air forces. Smith urged Eisenhower to insist that no CCS directives be issued until Eisenhower and Tedder had arrived in England and become familiar with the entire situation there.16
Eisenhower sent a quick answer to Smith, saying he agreed entirely “on the necessity for preventing higher authority from dictating details of our organization,” and telling Smith he could present this view to the BCOS as strongly as he wished.17 He then wired Marshall, “I most earnestly request that you throw your full weight into opposing the tendency to organize in advance the sub-echelons of the OVERLORD operation in such a way as to tie the hands of the command.” He believed that the AFHQ staff had learned some lessons about proper organization in the Mediterranean that might be of value in organizing OVERLORD. “I think it a tragedy to give us such rigid directives as to preclude the application of those lessons.”18 Marshall agreed, and the problem of air organization was left to be settled later.
There were, meanwhile, problems in the Mediterranean that needed wrapping up. The CCS had ordered Eisenhower to prepare an outline plan for Operation ANVIL, the invasion of southern France, which was to be staged simultaneously with OVERLORD. On December 24 his staff finished a draft. Eisenhower forwarded it to the CCS on the twenty-eighth, with the warning that he was not ready to give it his approval until he had examined OVERLORD plans in detail. He added that Wilson had not seen the ANVIL outline and as Eisenhower’s successor he of course might wish to make changes in it. The plan itself called for a three-division assault under U. S. Seventh Army, with the initial assault in the Toulon area.19
Eisenhower’s attitude toward operations within the Mediterranean, meanwhile, had undergone a marked shift. Whereas formerly he had repeatedly requested permission to retain landing craft and special units that had been marked for OVERLORD, now he looked with extreme disfavor on similar requests from Alexander. In late December, for example, Alexander asked to be allowed to retain the 50
4th Airborne Regimental Combat Team of the 82d Airborne Division for use in SHINGLE, an amphibious assault he planned to make at Anzio.20 Eisenhower refused. “Our demands against OVERLORD resources have been so numerous and oft repeated,” he declared, “that I am unwilling to put up another.”21 Alexander remonstrated and Eisenhower, perhaps beset by a guilty conscience, gave in. SHINGLE was scheduled for late January, and Eisenhower said Alexander could keep a paratrooper regiment until it was completed. Alexander had also wanted to keep some LSTs longer than scheduled, but on that point Eisenhower was adamant. “There can be no repeat no flexibility in the release date of all those destined for the U.K.,” Eisenhower ordered.22
It was, somehow, fitting that the last problem Eisenhower had to deal with before leaving the Mediterranean concerned French politics and involved some of the same personalities who participated in the uproar over the Darlan affair. In the third week in December De Gaulle decided the time had come to settle accounts with some of the Vichy administrators who had opposed him. He placed Boisson, Peyrouton, and Flandin under arrest, and rumor had it that he intended to have them shot. Eisenhower heard of De Gaulle’s action while he was at the front visiting troops. It came as a complete surprise and left him “profoundly disturbed,” especially with regard to Boisson, who had acted for so long as a loyal subordinate. Eisenhower radioed Murphy in Algiers and told him to let the FCNL know that he was deeply concerned and hoped the matter would not be pushed to the point of holding a trial for treason, much less a firing squad. He also had Smith fly to Algiers to confer with Murphy and Macmillan.23
Eisenhower, who was improving all the time in dealing with the French, was most worried about a possible overreaction from the Prime Minister or the President. Events proved his fears justified. Churchill wanted to offer the three arrested Frenchmen political asylum and send a strong warning to De Gaulle. Roosevelt went farther. He cabled Eisenhower, “Please inform the French Committee as follows: In view of the assistance given the Allied armies during the campaign in Africa by Boisson, Peyrouton, and Flandin, you are directed to take no action against these individuals at the present time.”24
Everyone in the Mediterranean thought the President’s peremptory order went much too far. Eisenhower told Smith to see to it that it was softened. Smith talked with Churchill, who was in Algeria, then with Macmillan, and on his own decided to withhold delivery of the President’s message. As Smith cabled Marshall, the President’s directive would be regarded by the FCNL as an ultimatum. De Gaulle would certainly reject it, which would be “a direct slap at the President, which the United States could not accept.” The only alternative then would be to withdraw recognition of the FCNL and stop French rearmament. That would be disastrous, since Eisenhower was counting on French manpower for ANVIL and for future operations in Italy, not to mention help from the Resistance in France itself.25
Roosevelt calmed down, took the advice, and on December 26 told Eisenhower to make a milder protest, saying merely that the United States “views with alarm” the reports of the arrests.26 On the President’s message Eisenhower penciled a heartfelt “good.” On December 30 he called on De Gaulle, who wanted to discuss the liberation of Paris. The Frenchman wanted a guarantee from Eisenhower that the first troops into the capital would be French, and made it clear that if Eisenhower satisfied him on that point he would take good care of Boisson and the others. Eisenhower acquiesced, and De Gaulle then promised to delay the trial of the three Vichy administrators until after the FCNL had given way to a properly constituted national assembly in France. Eisenhower asked Marshall to “convey to the President my earnest recommendation that this assurance be accepted as satisfactory.” Marshall did so, Roosevelt agreed, and Eisenhower was able to leave the Mediterranean with the satisfaction of knowing that his policies toward the French had helped surmount another crisis.27
Through the second half of December Eisenhower and his staff were anxious to get to London and go to work on OVERLORD. They were losing interest in Mediterranean problems. They had to hang on, however, until the new year, when the shift would take place. (There had been some talk about waiting until Rome fell, as that would be a fitting climax to Eisenhower’s career in the Mediterranean, but the Allied armies failed to make any progress and the proposal was quietly dropped). Eisenhower decided to spend the last few days of the old year in Italy, not only to say his good-bys but to have the satisfaction of having established an advance command post on the continent of Europe.28
The new headquarters were in the Caserta Palace north of Naples. Butcher found a palatial hunting lodge for Eisenhower’s personal use and he was proud of his discovery. Eisenhower arrived on Sunday afternoon, December 19. Butcher had filled him with stories about the attractive features of the place. Eisenhower had hardly entered when an aide came running downstairs—there was a rat in the general’s bathroom. Eisenhower took personal command. Pulling a revolver, he marched into the bathroom and fired four shots. All missed. Butcher finally killed the rat with a stick. They then got onto the elevator, where they became stuck and stood around for half an hour waiting to be freed. The fireplace in Eisenhower’s bedroom did not work and there were lice in the beds. Butcher’s laconic comment was, “It’s a tough war.”29
Two days later Eisenhower made an extended trip to the front. It rained most of the time and he was thoroughly miserable when he started back for Naples. A seven-hour drive through the rain and fog did not help his mood. Smith was with him, and Eisenhower asked Smith to join him for dinner. The chief of staff was just as disgruntled as his boss and he grumbled that he would rather not. Eisenhower had a violent reaction. He said Smith was discourteous. No subordinate, he shouted, not even the chief of staff, could abruptly decline his commanding officer’s invitation to dinner. Smith threatened to quit. Eisenhower said that would be just fine. He added that he felt like telling Churchill that he had reconsidered the Prime Minister’s request to leave Smith with AFHQ and that Smith could stay in the Mediterranean. Both men were sullen for a while, but Smith finally calmed down and apologized. Eisenhower did also and said the incident would be forgotten.30
That Eisenhower could so completely lose his temper with Smith only illustrated how tired he was and how badly he needed a rest. Marshall had recognized this early in the month, and after he got back to Washington began urging Eisenhower to come to the States and take a furlough. Eisenhower begged off, saying there was too much work to be done. Marshall finally made it a direct order. “You will be under terrific strain from now on,” he pointed out. “I am interested that you are fully prepared to bear the strain and I am not interested in the usual rejoinder that you can take it. It is of vast importance that you be fresh mentally and you certainly will not be if you go straight from one great problem to another. Now come on home and see your wife and trust somebody else for 20 minutes in England.”31
Eisenhower capitulated. He decided to fly to the United States and take two weeks off. He left at noon on the last day of 1943. Just before departing the Mediterranean for the last time he told a friend, “I have put in a hard year here and I guess it is time to go.”32
CHAPTER 23
Epilogue: Eisenhower on the Eve of OVERLORD
Eisenhower was occasionally given to reflecting on his good fortune. As he left Algiers for his furlough he may well have thought about his rapid rise in the Army. An obscure colonel two years earlier, his name was so little known that it appeared in the newspapers as “Lt. Col. D. D. Ersenbeing.” Now he was preparing to command one of the greatest military operations in history. Luck had clearly played a large role in his success, but there were other factors, including his appearance, his personality, and most of all his abilities.
Physically, he gave the impression of being a big man. Although he was only a little over the average in height and weight, he dominated any gathering of which he was a member. People naturally looked at him. His hands and his facial muscles were always active. Through a gesture or a glance, as much as
through the tone of his voice or what he was saying, he created a mood that imposed itself on others. A bald, shiny pate, with a prominent forehead and a broad, grinning mouth, made his head seem larger than it was. He had a wonderfully expressive face and it was impossible for him to conceal his feelings. His smiles, his grimaces, his anger, were all easily noticed. The whole face was always involved. It reddened when he was upset, lit up when he was happy. He could no more hide his emotions than he could his natural generosity and kindness.
His hands were large and knotty but well formed. They flashed through the air or jabbed at a listener. He would fold and unfold them, or thrust one into a coat pocket, then pull it out again. When he was making a series of points he would unconsciously hold up one hand, spread it, and then with the index finger of his other hand enumerate his points one by one, usually starting with the little finger and ending up with the climax on the index finger.
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