Certainly, the enemy could suddenly attack some of the fortifications which are insufficiently supplied, seize them and occupy them. But if the United States only have places and forts which they can easily supply and defend, they would certainly have the advantage. I’ll even say that they cannot do without them.
In fact, America’s grandeur is primarily based on trade, but trade requires vessels to go to foreign countries. It needs to receive foreign vessels in its ports. It needs to begin to establish a navy to protect its coasts and the merchant marine. It therefore needs shipyards, stores, all kinds of warehouses, everything, most of which needs to be collected in the same place for mutual aid.
But if these sites are exposed, the enemy could come destroy these works. That will make all the work and expenses useless. N.B. let’s remove all the difficulties. If the fortified ports of the United States could be impregnable, the warnings would be useless. Nobody would doubt that having them was a great advantage.
But, we might ask, can we have impregnable places? Can we make them? Undoubtedly, if absolutely necessary, there is no impregnable place. If we want to suppose that the attacking force were in condition and resolved to sacrifice the number of men, the quantity of munitions, money, etc. necessary to do so. But the means of all forces are limited. They can sacrifice 3, 4, 6, 10,000 men, if you want, and the time and everything necessary in proportion. But they would not sacrifice 15, 20, 25,000 men if this loss would not be rewarded by the taking of the city.
Therefore, if a place is fortified in such a way as to require a greater loss of men and other things than the attacking force is willing to make, it is clear that the place is impregnable for them. It is in this sense that the United States can have them and even have only them. This is how.
In Europe, we estimate that it requires an army of eight or nine times stronger than the garrison to besiege an ordinary place, that is fortified according to the common principles of the art and which does have any particular advantage of location,
Thus, a garrison built for 4000 men at a mediocre site can only be besieged by an army of more than 30,000 men. But what European power could send an army of 30,000 men to a single location in America? Certainly not the British.
But that is not all. I was speaking about a location such as our fortified cities of Europe, most of which were not originally destined to be fortifications, which are not in favorable locations or whose sites haven’t been optimized. Their initial fortifications were constructed in the infancy of the art and then improved according to circumstances, sometimes according to certain principles sometimes others.
But here, where there is nothing constructed or on a hill 10 or 11 miles long, we can select the most advantageous sites. I am convinced that we could have some places which, with very few supplies, would truly not fear any European power.
According to all this, I therefore propose the United States fortify well three ports: one in the North, another in the South, and a third between the two. The reasons for this distribution are self-evident (note C). The sites would be entirely enclosed and in a state to sustain a regular siege by land. On the other hand, I don’t know which places would be most suitable for their construction. Maybe Boston and Charlestown would be suitable. For the place in the middle, we could think of Philadelphia.
But Philadelphia would require much work and expense. It is very close to the North River which offers a very strong settlement or one which could easily be made so. I do not speak here of New York because I do not know it well enough. On the other hand, I believe, given its location, it will always belong to whoever is master of the sea.
But if the works we are constructing now at West Point were constructed solidly and with suitable modifications, instead of field works, the North River above this location all the way to Albany could provide a safe harbor for this state’s entire navy.
But we must assure that it is only a refuge. A warship or a few frigates at the mouth of the river would suffice to prevent your ships from exiting and thus render them totally useless. That is the flaw of all the ports on the rivers which are large enough for ships to remain there without being master of the shores.
Boston and Charlestown, supposing they are otherwise suitable, would not have this defect. I would desire therefore that the third fortified port not have it also. It should go straight to the sea. I hope that the coasts of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia offer some convenient locations. That’s what needs to be studied.
Now we have another thing to consider. Suppose that we have three well-fortified ports where most of our merchant vessels, privateers, frigates, allied fleets have nothing to fear from the enemy in time of war, that they are always well supplied and have, in themselves or nearby, sufficient people to defend them, would we do nothing at all for the safety of the others?
Would we leave such cities exposed so that little enemy fleets could reach them without difficulty, take or burn the vessels there and even ravage the cities? Certainly not! But here are the principles which should guide us in this matter.
We have said that the inconvenience of constructing many fortifications in a sparsely populated land, compared to its extent, is that the enemy could find a way to seize some of these fortified locations, allowing them to remain in the region much more easily.
But if we could fortify these sites in such a way that our fortifications would give us the means to block an enemy from capturing them and not allow them to occupy them safely, it is clear that we would have attained the goal.
It is only a matter of knowing whether the matter is possible. It is certainly not everywhere, at every site, but it is at many. Let’s assure that we want to put ourselves in safety here from naval forces, fleets. Any fortification which would prevent warships from entering a port, to land nearby, would achieve our purpose without then being turned against us.
For example, I’ll cite Philadelphia. The forts which were nearby would have prevented the British from going up river to the city and when they took possession of it by land, the forts would serve them nothing to remain there. Also, they destroyed these forts. Therefore, that is the touchstone by which we would test the deployment of the fortifications for the sites under consideration.
We will ask ourselves, supposing that the enemy somehow captured these places, whether it would be convenient for them to destroy our fortifications. When we think they must do so or, in a word, that they would be useless, we will conclude that our fortifications are well-placed.
These are the principles according to which we would fortify all the other ports or important places on the American coast (except our three large ports). In this manner, supposing the worst case scenario which is that the Americans, for some reason, were not prompt and did not have the means to use the constructed works to repulse the enemy, we would at least have the pleasure of seeing that our works would be totally useless to them.
However, there is still a problem with what I propose in this memoir. Perhaps the plan of three well-fortified ports that might be the cradle of this continent’s Navy, which encompass all the arsenals etc. might go against the rights of the different states. Each of these states being sovereign, doesn’t it belong to them alone to provide for its defense as it sees fit, to build forts or not? In sum, to construct such fortifications as it pleases? Wouldn’t the construction of three fortified places arouse the jealousy of the other states against the three which possess them?
I don’t know if these inconveniences are true or false. I don’t know enough about the Constitution of the United States to make any judgment on that. All that I can say is that I believe that the strength of the United States depends on its interior union, that in regard to war, the 13 states should consider themselves as one. It would then be easy to show this truth, but I will content myself only with making it in regard to fortification.
The general Congress should not meddle, in any way, in the construction of fortifications of the continent; that each state in particu
lar, having only limited means, be charged with working to its defense as it sees fit and you will soon see a multitude of little fortifications constructed, defective in many ways.
As it will not join forces with the neighboring states, many of these fortifications will become useless or even detrimental to the state where they are located or to neighboring states.
Instead, without considering the borders separating the states, considering the United States as a single power, a general plan of defense of the continent is formulated according to the knowledge of the country, then any constructed fortification would be infinitely better placed or many fewer would be constructed. They could all have the necessary conditions for grandeur, strength, etc. and thus contribute more effectively to the defense of the continent in general. That is the goal which we propose.
Note A—The present time does not give us proof of what I just proposed. We fear that the enemy would head to Boston by land as well as by sea; and as this city is not in the state of defense, the Continental Army is obliged to detach itself from New York and divide itself so that at least part of it might go to New England, in time of need, to join with the local militias to save the capital.
Several considerable drawbacks arise from this division. First it is clear that if Boston were sufficiently fortified to hold out for a fortnight, the Continental Army would have the time to arrive. Consequently, it would no longer have reason to be hindered in its operations.
It could change its position and make movements only after the real movements of the enemy without hindering itself by its feints, by the rumors which spread and even by the appearances which support them. What I just said about Boston should also be understood about all other important locations.
Note B—As long as the United States do not have any navy, it is necessary that the fleets of their allies protect them against those of their enemies. But can the friendly fleets come in this region if they cannot find safe harbor, ports where they will have nothing to fear either from the land or from the sea, where, after a long navigation, after combats, they might resupply, refresh themselves and find all sorts of stores to do that.
Note C—If the United States currently had a port in the South capable of receiving the French fleets, isn’t it evident that they would acquire large facilities for expeditions against the British Isles?
Note D—The three fortified locations that I proposed in this memoir would be the natural residences of the Continental troops engaged in time of peace. They would find an occasion to perfect the service and maintain military spirit.
These three sites which would contain the largest part of the navy, the troops, the stores, etc. and which would always be under the immediate direction of Congress would prevent any ambitious plans of the different states, would fortify the general government and restrain the bonds of political union.
“Memoir presented to Congress by Monsieur du Portail,” translated by Norman Desmarais. Benjamin Perley Poore, Faucher de Saint-Maurice, and Jean Gervais Protais Blanchet, Collection de manuscrits contenant lettres, mémoires, et autres documents historiques relatifs à la Nouvelle-France: Recueillis aux archives de la province de Québec, ou copiés a l’étranger (Québec: Impr. A. Cote et Cie, 1883–1885), 4:438–45.
15. Kite, Brigadier-General Duportail, 260.
16. US Continental Congress et al., Journals, 25:74n; Washington, Writings, 26:480n.
17. Washington, Writings, 26:479–80.
18. Kite, Brigadier-General Duportail, 261.
19. Kite, Brigadier-General Duportail, 261.
20. US National Archives and Records Service, Papers of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789 (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, 1971), RG188, item 169, 9:370.
21. Elizabeth S. Kite, “General Washington and the French Engineers Duportail and Companions,” Records of the American Catholic Historical Society of Philadelphia 44, no. 4 (December 1933): 332.
22. Founders Online, “George Washington to Antoine-Jean-Louis Le Bègue de Presle Duportail, 23 September 1783,” https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-11845; Washington, Writings, 27:161–62.
23. Founders Online, “To George Washington from Antoine-Jean-Louis Le Bègue de Presle Duportail, 30 September 1783,” https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-11871.
24. US Continental Congress, Papers, vol. 8, no. 78, folio 61.
25. US Continental Congress, Papers, vol. 2, no. 19, folio 167. Duportail’s letter of October 6 is in US Continental Congress, Papers, vol. 8, no. 78, folio 31. See also US Continental Congress et al., Journals, 25:669.
26. Kite, Brigadier-General Duportail, 272.
27. US Continental Congress, Papers, vol. 2, no. 36, folio 237; US Continental Congress et al., Journals, 25:695.
28. Washington, Writings, 27:201–2.This draft was signed by Washington, but it has a marginal note that is impossible to know whether it was copied on the letter sent. If an organization, such as the one adopted by Congress for time of peace, it should refer to this memorial, but that is not decided at this time.
29. Founders Online, “From George Washington to François-Claude-Amour, marquis de Bouillé. 23 March 1783,” https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-10897.
30. Founders Online, “From George Washington to Antoine-Charles du Houx, baron de Vioménil. 23 March 1783,” https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-10905.
31. Kite, Brigadier-General Duportail, 275.
32. US Continental Congress, Papers, item 78, vol. 1, no. 19, folios 95–97; US Continental Congress et al., Journals, 25:771; 26:42–44. Duportail’s letter is in US Continental Congress, Papers, vol. 8, no. 78, folio 43. Armand’s letter is in US Continental Congress, Papers, no. 164, folio 489.
33. Kite, Brigadier-General Duportail, 275–77.
34. US Continental Congress, Papers, vol. 2, no. 19, folio 171; US Continental Congress, Papers, vol. 8, no. 78, folio 505; US Continental Congress et al., Journals, 26:42–43; Washington, Writings, 27:280.
CHAPTER 10
1. Archives of the Montgomery County Historical Society.
2. Deed recorded at the Montgomery County Courthouse, Norristown, Pennsylvania, quoted in Elizabeth S. Kite and Peter S. Duponceau, “General Duportail at Valley Forge,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 56, no. 4 (1932): 350.
3. Deed recorded at the Montgomery County Courthouse, Norristown, Pennsylvania, quoted in Kite and Duponceau, “General Duportail,” 350.
4. Deed recorded at the Montgomery County Courthouse, Norristown, Pennsylvania, quoted in Kite and Duponceau, “General Duportail,” 350.
5. Kite and Duponceau, “General Duportail,” 352.
6. Kite and Duponceau, “General Duportail,” 352–53.
7. M. Auge, Biographies of Montgomery County Men (Norristown, PA: n.p., 1879).
8. Serge Le Pottier, Duportail, Ou, Le Génie De Washington (Paris: Economica, 2011), 275.
9. Kite and Duponceau, “General Duportail,” 353.
10. The papers connected with the settlement of the estate of General Duportail are kept on file in the office of the Register of Wills, Montgomery County Courthouse, Norristown, Pennsylvania.
11. Kite and Duponceau, “General Duportail,” 354.
12. Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 1789–1873 (January 7, 1841): 87.
13. US Congress, Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 23 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1905); US Government Printing Office, United States Congressional Serial Set, vol. 377 [95] (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1841).
14. Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States, 1840–1841 (February 12, 1841): 269; Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States, 1841–1842 (December 29, 1841): 104; Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 1789–1873 (December 22, 1841): 47.
15. Jo
urnal of the House of Representatives of the United States, 1841–1842 (August 24, 1842):, 1395; Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 1789–1873 (January 19, 1841): 114; Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 1789–1873 (January 28, 1842); Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 1789–1873 (July 28, 1842): 129; Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 1789–1873 (August 23, 1842): 596.
GLOSSARY
abatis. Sharpened branches pointing out from a fortification at an angle toward the enemy to slow or disrupt an assault.
accoutrement. Piece of military equipment carried by soldiers in addition to their standard uniform and weapons.
bar shot. A double shot consisting of two half-cannonballs joined by an iron bar, used in sea-warfare to damage masts and rigging.
bastion. A fortification with a projecting part of a wall to protect the main walls of the fortification.
bateau. A light flat-bottomed riverboat with sharply tapering stern and bow.
battalion. The basic organizational unit of a military force, generally five hundred to eight hundred men. Most regiments consisted of a single battalion that was composed of ten companies.
battery. 1. Two or more similar artillery pieces that function as a single tactical unit. 2. A prepared position for artillery. 3. An army artillery unit corresponding to a company in an infantry regiment.
bayonet. A long blade that can be attached to the end of a musket and used for stabbing.
blunderbuss. A short musket with a large bore and wide muzzle capable of holding a number of musket or pistol balls, used to fire shot with a scattering effect at close range. It is very effective for clearing a narrow passage, door of a house or staircase, or in boarding a ship.
bomb. An iron shell, or hollow ball, filled with gunpowder. It has a large touch hole for a slow-burning fuse that is held in place by pieces of wood and fastened with a cement made of quicklime, ashes, brick dust, and steel filings worked together with glutinous water. A bomb is shot from a mortar mounted on a carriage. It is fired in a high arc over fortifications and often detonates in the air, raining metal fragments with high velocity on the fort’s occupants.
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