In his report of March 21, 1949, Berry recommended a series of actions in Greece and surrounding countries to prepare the groundwork for a successful campaign to replace the government in Albania. They included the victory of the Greek National Army against the remnants of the Communist opposition in the Epirus region; a government in Athens not bristling with hostility toward Albanians; cessation of factional fights among the various Albanian émigré groups and their unity in the fight against the Communist regime; a series of actions aimed at weakening the government in Tirana, primarily through propaganda means and increased infiltrations into the country from the Greek frontiers; and, finally, a clarification by the US policy-making establishment of the desired endgame in Albania, followed by the necessary actions to accomplish it.
Berry cautioned Wisner that the operation’s success in Albania would not come easily, in spite of the low esteem in which the Albanians held the Hoxha government. He urged avoiding over-optimism and carefully preparing for success the hard way.
As an astute observer of the Balkans, Berry knew that the British considered the area to be in their sphere of influence and would learn quickly of any moves by the Office of Policy Coordination to organize Albanian refugees. Berry suggested that “the tentative plans be outlined to the British in Washington and that an effort be made to secure their passive cooperation—but no more.”7
Berry’s analysis of the situation and his outline of proposed actions in Albania served as catalysts for the young OPC, which had been formed just months earlier, in September 1948. Now that it had a concrete target and a reasonable chance of success, its activities became more focused and goal-oriented. In fact, through the end of 1949 and beginning of 1950, the Albanian project was the major interest of the OPC as a whole. Wisner himself and George Kennan, head of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department and the OPC’s main customer, regarded the activities against Albania as the most urgent and sensitive operation being planned by the US at the time.8
* * *
After submitting his report to Wisner, Berry set out to unify the different groups of Albanians in exile to fight the Communist regime. His initial inclination was to build up the strength of one group to the point where it could assume leadership of the émigré community, then, push the other groups to support this lead group until the ouster of the Communists from Albania, when they could hold a plebiscite to determine the form of government that the Albanian people themselves desired. The choice of one group over the others meant in reality choosing between the heads of the three principal Albanian parties: Frashëri, Zog, and Vërlaci.
Frashëri was the least objectionable choice, although given his character and advanced age of seventy years, Berry considered him a figurehead rather than an active leader of the day-to-day activities, a role better suited for one of his subordinates. Frashëri and his close followers shared the belief that Hoxha government couldn’t be overthrown without a serious struggle. The Soviet authorities would resist strongly any attempt to bring about a revolution in Albania. The Communist controls in the country were so strict that the resistance movement could not germinate inside Albania. In their opinion, the best guarantee for success was a considerable supply of arms and ammunition in the hands of an expeditionary force of Albanian nationals prepared and launched from abroad.
Zog reaffirmed ceaselessly that he wished to take an active part in fighting the Communists in Albania and that he would be willing to leave to the Albanian people the decision as to whether he should rule the country again. Nevertheless, he had shown little willingness to strike an agreement with his former political enemies and make good on his fine words. In Berry’s opinion: “Zog’s friendship with King Farouk, the prestige of his former position, his considerable personal wealth, plus his capacity for intrigue, made Zog, despite of the relatively small number of his followers, a power to be taken into consideration when weighing the sources of influence behind any Albanian revolutionary movement.”9
Berry and others in the OPC briefly considered involving Vërlaci and his BKI followers but rejected the idea for two reasons. First, the State Department objected to their past involvement with quisling governments. Second, the Office of Special Operations (OSO) was already using Vërlaci and his people for intelligence-gathering purposes in joint operations with Italian Naval Intelligence. Although nominally part of the CIA, the OPC in its early day operated autonomously and considered the OSO more a competing organization than an ally.
* * *
On April 30, 1949, Berry and Robert G. Miner, political attaché in Athens, met with Mithat Frashëri in Piraeus, Greece, aboard the Turkish passenger ship Istanbul. Frashëri was en route to Italy from Turkey. After exchanging preliminary remarks regarding the situation in the Balkans and Albania, Berry informed Frashëri in confidence that the United States would look with favor on the formation of a united front of Albanian refugees headed by Frashëri himself. Such a front would include all anti-Communist refugee groups, irrespective of political opinions. Frashëri’s Balli Kombëtar would provide the nucleus of the movement but accommodate all other Albanian patriots abroad in opposition to the Hoxha regime.
Berry urged Frashëri to follow the example of refugee leaders from other Soviet-dominated countries, like Bulgaria and Hungary who had achieved some success in creating a degree of unity among their followers and had thereby secured the moral right to be spokesmen of their people. He hoped a united front of Albanian refugees might achieve the same kind of success. Berry told Frashëri that he would convey similar views to Zog and his entourage in the immediate future. He believed that Zog would support a united front under the conditions outlined, given his public declarations during the war of his willingness to let the question of the regime lie dormant pending a plebiscite and his recent private declarations to the same effect.
Frashëri responded that he was entirely in agreement. He would undertake chairmanship of the united front and invite all non-Communist elements to come together, particularly certain personalities from the BKI and other independents. He desired that Zog and his entourage join, but Zog had to declare publicly and unequivocally that he considered his royal prerogatives suspended pending the free plebiscite in liberated Albania.
Concluding the conversation, Berry assured Frashëri that the United States was very interested in the plight of the Albanian people and that the proposed union of the refugee groups was an important first step toward improving their situation. But he repeatedly stressed to Frashëri the confidential nature of the views exchanged during their discussion, which he should not share with others. Frashëri should present the idea of the united front to his supporters as coming from himself and express his hope that the United States might look with favor upon the formation of such a united front of Albanian exiles.10
* * *
Encouraged by how quickly they had reached an understanding with Frashëri, Berry and Miner traveled from Athens to Egypt where, on May 5, 1949, they met with Zog at his villa in Alexandria. Queen Geraldine, who was half-American on her mother’s side, was present in the meeting and served as an interpreter. Berry gave Zog the same outline he had provided Frashëri regarding the desire of the United States to see a united front of all anti-Communist Albanians abroad that would garner its leaders the moral right to be the spokesmen for their people. He informed Zog of Frashëri’s position—that he favored such a united front and would work actively toward its formation—and encouraged Zog to adopt a similar attitude, conveying the American opinion that Mithat Frashëri should be the front’s leader and that his group should form the nucleus of the movement.
The United States hoped for Zog’s wholehearted support in endorsing the front and encouraging his followers to participate. He could make a significant contribution to the unity of Albanians abroad by stating in a public declaration that he welcomed a united front under the chairmanship of Mithat Frashëri, that the question of the future regime of Albania would be determined in a plebiscite b
y the free Albanian people, and that in the meantime he was suspending his royal prerogative.
Zog accepted most of what Berry asked for. He declared himself strongly in favor of the formation of the anti-Communist united front, agreed to leave the choice of the future regime to the Albanian people, accepted that Frashëri should be the front’s leader, and stated that he would support the movement. He suggested that Frashëri should secure representatives from the Legaliteti and BKI parties and ensure that the committee would have two Muslims, one orthodox, and one Roman Catholic leader in order to represent the religious diversity of the Albanian population. He agreed to help on all of these points and to make a public declaration along the desired lines at the desired time.
With regard to the suspension of his royal prerogatives, however, Zog said that to do so would be unwise as well as disloyal to his pledge to the Albanian people. Such action, he said, would jeopardize the continued recognition of Albanian anti-Communist (royalist) diplomatic missions in Egypt, Turkey, and elsewhere. More fundamentally, he felt it would be equivalent to laying aside the duty that the Albanian National Assembly had placed on him before the Italian fascist occupation, which was to represent the nation abroad until its liberation.11
At the meetings with Frashëri and Zog, Berry brought a written statement that represented the American point of view, which he communicated verbally during the meeting. Miner, serving as note taker, summarized and added to this statement the words of the Albanian side. At the end of the meeting, Berry asked his Albanian interlocutor to read the consolidated statement in order to make sure there were no misunderstandings and that it represented accurately all essential points covered in the conversation. Frashëri signed the statement on the same day that the conversation took place. Zog on the other hand played for time and offered to sign the original when he had received a copy for his files.
Berry and Miner returned to Alexandria on June 14, 1949, bringing with them two copies of the minutes of the previous meeting, which Zog signed. Zog also provided a second statement with points to be included in a public declaration that would be released soon after the announcement of the united front. The draft declaration included all the points that Zog and Berry had discussed and agreed upon in their previous meeting.
Minutes of meeting between Zog I, King of the Albanians, and Burton Y. Berry, on assignment for the CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination, in Alexandria, Egypt, on May 5, 1949
Berry and Miner returned to their hotel satisfied that the outcome of their discussions with Zog had been positive, although it had taken them six weeks to get from him what they had received from Frashëri in one afternoon. So they were surprised when Zog sent word the next day that he wanted to see them again. At his seaside villa, they found Zog much more noncommittal than in their previous meetings. After thinking things over, he said, he wanted to qualify the position documented in the statements he had signed just the day before. He now made his declaration of support conditional on three additional points, which were to be included in and considered part of the entire agreement that he had reached with the Americans.
First, given that constitutionally he represented the legitimacy and legality of Albanian power, Zog said he desired to be kept informed and consulted on all the key questions arising before the executive committee of the united Albanian front, through the mediation, if necessary, of competent American authorities. Second, in accordance with the same principles of legitimacy and legality, he took upon himself the responsibility of creating a provisional government completely neutral of any political bias that would organize the plebiscite following the liberation of Albania; this government would operate under the supervision of the Allies, if they considered it useful. Lastly, he said he had sanctioned the choice of Mithat Frashëri as president of the executive committee because of his full confidence in Frashëri’s patriotism. However, if Frashëri resigned or was no longer able to function in this capacity for any other reason, Zog requested that he be consulted on the choice of his replacement or on any subsequent changes in the membership of the executive committee.12 To keep the momentum going, Berry took these points under consideration without delving into their subtleties, which Zog would exploit in the months to come as he attempted to extend his control on the nascent anti-Communist movement.
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While Berry and Minor laid the groundwork in Europe for uniting the Albanian émigré groups, James McCargar in Washington was busy preparing the overall plan for Albania, in collaboration with his boss, Franklin Lindsay. The plan called for three phases of operations. The first phase built upon the Berry’s work and culminated with the formation of the Albanian committee. The target date for the announcement of the committee was set July 1, 1949. The committee would include members of Balli Kombëtar and Legaliteti, as well as independents. The leader would be Mithat Frashëri, and it would be headquartered in Paris.
The second phase included propaganda activities to soften up the Albanian regime and the training of a cadre of Albanians for infiltration inside Albania. Propaganda activities started with the announcement of the committee and included broadcasts of Albanian-language programs by Radio Athens, Radio Salonika, and possibly Radio Ankara. The committee would engage in propaganda efforts of its own, including the publication and dissemination inside and outside Albania of a newspaper and pamphlets. Black propaganda operations included fade-ins of Radio Tirana, and the establishment of a transmitter for the committee that would purport to operate from inside Albania. Training activities were set to begin on July 15 in a two step fashion. First, ten Albanians handpicked by Frashëri or his deputies would be trained directly by American instructors. Representatives from this first contingent would then serve as trainers for another forty Albanians selected by a subcommittee of the national committee. These forty trained agents would form the commandos to be infiltrated in Albania. The purpose for the two step approach to training was to hide American direct participation in the operation from the commandos who would eventually participate in it, thus satisfying the plausible deniability requirements of the operation.
The third phase would begin with the infiltration of the forty agents trained during phase two into Albania between August 15 and September 1 using various means, including airdrops, beach landings, and overland border crossings. The objective of the agents was to establish communication, supply lines, and liaisons with existing resistance groups inside Albania and to facilitate their preparations for an uprising against the government, which would be the final step of the operation. The plan assumed that Albanians already in the country would man and lead the uprising, with the support of the forty infiltrated commandos. Supplemental plans were required if it became desirable and feasible to train and equip an Albanian brigade outside the country to support the uprising.
The last step of the operation, open insurgency against the Tirana government, would be taken only if a series of conditions and requirements were met, including: the successful completion of the first two phases of the operation; the Greek national army had established control of its northern borders and had provided clear assurances that it would not move into southern Albania in the event of disturbances in Albania; Tito was still in control in Yugoslavia and his spat with the Cominform continued; and, finally, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of State concurred that the uprising in Albania would not conflict with overall American policy at the time.
During the three phases on the operation, the Office of Policy Coordination and the State Department would follow carefully the Greek attitude toward Albania and make efforts to influence it as necessary. In particular, they would bring strong pressure on the Greek government to cease its public utterances of claims against Albanian territory and to make a statement immediately following the formation of the committee renouncing any territory claims on an Albania with a freely elected democratic government that did not interfere in Greek internal affairs. Throughout the operation,
the Office of Special Operations would be required to assist with intelligence gathering on Yugoslav actions inside Albania, Soviet and satellite arms shipments to Albania, and possible methods of interdiction.13
Carmel Offie, Wisner’s special assistant, presented the plan to several State Department officials, including George Kennan, head of the Policy Planning Staff, Robert P. Joyce, liaison with the OPC, and Llewellyn Thompson, head of the East European branch. They found the plan acceptable provided that the department clear the initiation of each new phase of its implementation. Offie had some personal history with Albania in his background. After the war, he had been nominated as an attaché at the US mission in Tirana, but the Communist authorities denied him an entry visa in 1946, branding him as an “intelligence executive,”14 although he was just a State Department employee at the time.
McCargar and Wisner presented the plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well. Wisner explained that although the operation would start small, with reconnaissance activities, he hoped these activities would expand in order to reach the ultimate objective, the overthrow of the Hoxha government. The joint chiefs listened quietly. The only question came from the chief of naval operations, Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, who wanted to know about Soviet vessel traffic in Albania. McCargar said that they had identified nine Soviet ships going into Durrësi recently.
McCargar later recounted what happened next: “This admiral looked at me. He didn’t say a word but he gave me a look that spoke volumes. I felt like such an ass because he had the whole bloody American Navy at his disposal. He didn’t need some pipsqueak from over in the CIA or the State Department to tell him there were nine Soviet ships in Durrazzo during the last four months. I was embarrassed and mortified.”15 The joint chiefs raised no objections and approved the operation but asked Wisner to keep them informed.
Operation Valuable Fiend Page 7
