There had also been some difference of opinion in the past among the islanders themselves about what the thrust of development strategy should be. In general terms the expatriate British were against further exploitation; Falkland islanders of longer standing believed some development was essential for the survival of the islands’ economy. Lord Shackleton believed that development should begin with those island-based projects that had the most potential. Later initiatives, such as exploiting living resources and hydrocarbons offshore, could use the islands as a resources base.
During the last 15 years Antarctica has become targeted by the tourist industry, to the extent that ships from Argentina and Australia travel to areas that are navigationally unsafe. Charts, very much part of the rôle of HMS Endurance, remain few and far between. Surveys are made around large tabular icebergs, but if the iceberg is firmly aground the survey will not be completed until the iceberg breaks up or moves. It is not rare for ships to become impaled on rock pinnacles. The mapping of the area is of paramount importance for the safety of tourist vessels and the supply ships which support research.
A significant level of Falklands tourism began with an awareness created by the Conflict. In 1980 onshore tourist facilities amounted to one hotel and one guest house. The small cruise ships, World Discoverer and World Explorer, called fairly regularly at Stanley, and occasionally there were short-haul passenger vessels from Argentina and Chile.
The failure of successive governments to match the economic aspirations of Argentine society was high on the nation’s political agenda in the early 1980s. The Junta was well aware of the propaganda as well as practical value of a firm foothold in the South Atlantic. And the Argentine claim to the islands should not only be seen in terms of disputed historical precedents. Several generations of Argentines had been brought up to believe that the Malvinas were their property. Negotiations had repeatedly failed to find any satisfactory solutions. The 1982 Conflict hardened the attitude of the British government. It was difficult to discuss sovereignty before 1982: it is almost impossible now.
Before the 1961 treaty was ratified Britain claimed an Antarctic sector of some 60 degrees, roughly south of Cape Horn round to an area south of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. A similar area was claimed by Argentina, and Chile also had a claim within the sector. To the east there was a large sector claimed by Norway and another by Australia, who also claimed a second smaller sector. New Zealand and France also had claims to smaller sectors. The New Zealand sector ice shelf has since become important as the staging base for US exploration.
Much of the continent is covered by an ever-mobile ice sheet up to four kilometres thick. The main areas worth considering in an exploitation context are the continental margin and the area beneath the ice shelves. A 1978 study of world oil resources suggested that Antarctica was likely to hold oil fields of more than 700 million tonnes. Equally it was clear that, because of the harsh Antarctic environment, nothing less than these giant deposits would be economically viable. There was also evidence to suggest that large fields were most likely to be found in the West Antarctic continental margin. Perhaps most promising of all was the Weddell Sea area. Significantly, this is within transport aircraft range of South America. Thought was also given to the logistics of an oil operation using the deep water harbours of the Falklands and South Georgia.
The treaty powers began in the early 70s to anticipate the day when mineral exploration and exploitation would begin. One political dimension of this was the OPEC oil crisis, and the subsequent rationing imposed in many western countries. This, in turn, raised the question of what mineral exploitation may do to the environment.
There was also reciprocal fear and distrust. No country wanted to break the Treaty, but neither could they afford to be left at the starting post. The moratorium agreed in 1975 was essentially an expression of status quo until such time as the tactical, political and environmental problems could be resolved.
The conclusion, as quoted by Quill in A Pole Apart was: ‘To urge their nationals and other states to refrain from all exploration and exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources while making progress towards the timely adoption of an agreed régime concerning Antarctic mineral resources. They will thus endeavour to ensure that, pending the timely adoption of agreed solutions pertaining to exploitation and exploration, no activity will be conducted to explore or exploit such resources. They will keep these matters under continuing examination.’
One response concerned the discordant voices sounding from several of the treaty countries. A widely held view in the US was that the moratorium achieved little but the delay of important decisions.
A number of companies put up the cash for a circum-polar seismic study to operate throughout the deep south. In 1978 Gulf Oil sought official US blessing for a consortium to begin the work. The proposal was turned down because Washington did not want to be caught with dirty hands. But, since that date, a number of countries have made geophysical surveys of their own.
Many of the treaty powers have become more hawkish in what they see as the pursuit of national interest. It is significant that this hardening of attitude comes largely from the energy-dependent countries. It has been said that nothing makes nations as covetous as oil.
Even though the extraction of hard rock minerals now seems distant this eventuality must be seriously considered. The claimant states must therefore devise some tangible benefit from mineral extraction on their territory over and above what others may gain. This could be disguised in a variety of ways, perhaps even as a contribution to environmental protection.
The thoroughness of my briefing from the British Antarctic Survey in 1980 made me at least reasonably informed about what to expect at the Antarctic bases. But this was not just to enable me to take an intelligent part in the conversation. One of my jobs would be to report on the progress of projects undertaken by the various nations established in ‘the British Sector.’
More emotive at the time were the prospects that faced the Falklands. In 1976 Lord Shackleton led a report on the economic value and prospects of the islands. The report commented that the geological knowledge of the area to the east of Argentina had increased steadily, though much of the knowledge had been obtained from areas up to 100 miles from the Argentine coast, and not in the area to the north and west of the Falklands. Opinions therefore varied about the prospects for the oil in the South West Atlantic.
The Malvinas Basin was seismically surveyed by BP in 1979 and test drilling had taken place near the vicinity of Rio Gallegos off the Argentine coast. This had been done under contractual arrangements with the Argentine oil company YBF and had so far yielded seven hydrocarbon finds, of which about half were believed to be natural gas.
A US geological survey was anything but conclusive. But they did estimate that the area to the north and to the west of the Falklands could provide nine times the oil deposits of the North Sea. If this was so, it would be the largest untapped source of oil in the world. Even if this US optimism is combined with the guarded pessimism of the British and Argentine oil companies, the area would still be of great economic significance. Shackleton also believed that oil would have to be found in considerable quantity throughout the Malvinas Basin.
Despite an increasing weight of evidence suggesting that it was only a matter of time before competing nations joined the world’s greatest oil rush, the Ministry of Defence did not consider the Falklands to be of any strategic importance. The British government held a similar view. Even in 1982 the resource potential of the South Atlantic was not a reason for going to war. It has often been said since that the reason Mrs Thatcher’s decision to take on the Argentines had much to do with the known resources of the area. This is categorically and utterly untrue.
As part of my briefing I was told that the South Atlantic’s mineral and hydrocarbon resources were far less likely to be exploited in the short term than the living marine resources. Indeed in the years running up to the Con
flict one of the main sources of onshore income was the sale of stamps. In 1980 this amounted to £700,000 – more than 20 per cent of the GNP.
There was always the scope for agriculture and diversification, but an equal reluctance to develop beef farming beyond the needs of local consumption. 20,000 sheep carcasses were disposed of annually. The cost of butchering and cold storage has been prohibitive. This could change if the sheep meat industry shared its freezing and shipping facilities with a significant fishing industry. For the time being, however, wool is likely to remain the mainstay of the economy. The yearly clip amounts to over 2000 tonnes, taken from 650,000 sheep which are mainly of the Polward or Corriedale type with a mixture of Romney and Merino blood. The fact that each animal grazed (in 1982) approximately four acres indicated the scope for improvement. There were various schemes, such as the Grassland Trials Unit, that were seeking to improve the quality of grazing. Wool output has been falling since 1975 and revenue from this has not been reinvested. It is also probably true to say that new attitudes need to be established before a proper infrastructure can be maintained.
There were also only forty-one Falkland Farms ranging from 5000 to 400,000 acres. The twenty-three smallest farms owned just 13 per cent of the sheep. The five largest owned 43 per cent. The Falkland Island Company, then owned by Coalite, had seven farms and 45 per cent. Shackleton believed some of these ‘monopoly’ farms should be divided and owned by existing islanders, or people interested in settling on a long-term basis. In effect this meant transferring ownership from absentee landlords to people with a truly local interest. He recommended that the ‘new’ farms should be units of 12 to 15 thousand acres. But it was recognized that it would be difficult to establish new farm buildings and access roads, and to find suitable owner occupiers.
The lack of roads and tracks is a major problem. The islands of Lewis and Harris in the Outer Hebrides are probably most comparable, although the infrastructure was rather more civilized and developed. The Falkland Islanders relied on tracks rather than roads. These networked the farms before leading inexorably to Port Stanley. There was a road of sorts leading from the capital to Stanley airport. Mount Pleasant did not exist at that stage.
The islands’ population was then approximately 2000. The view of many local pundits was that significant development could only come through enhanced infrastructure.
The major role of HMS Endurance was as the guardship to the Falkland Islands and British interests in the Antarctic. In effect this made her an important diplomatic tool in the Southern Hemisphere. This may have been considered fairly insignificant in terms of our wider defence commitments in 1981. The decision of John Nott to withdraw the guardship appeared to give carte blanche to Argentina. In turn this made the Endurance pivotal in what followed.
From Denis Healey in 1966 to John Nott in 1981 financial pressures appeared from all sides. Successive reviews and studies were carried out, always with the primary objective of cutting expense, but not commitments.
It is generally fairly easy for a Secretary of State to determine the rôle of the other services. Political exigencies almost predetermine what this should be. The RAF are usually deployed primarily as air support to the Army. It is rather more difficult to establish a tangible rôle for the Navy: politicians are less inclined to invest in ‘contingency scenarios’. Partly because of this, there was never much doubt that John Nott’s ‘rationalization’ of defence policy would hit the Navy hardest. He followed the NATO minimalist line on strategy and had no difficulty in accepting that the long-standing commitments of the Army and Air Force should remain. He was far less convinced by the Navy’s (necessarily) more convoluted reasoning. But he accepted advice that the emphasis of anti-submarine effort (by which the Navy set much store) should shift to nuclear-powered submarines and shore-based aircraft. He appeared to discount the importance of the amphibious rôle.
In May, 1980, Keith Speed, Minister for the Navy, resigned in protest at the decisions he saw as inevitable. The ensuing document: ‘Defence Policy: the Way Forward’ imposed a severe cut in the Royal Navy force level. Only two carriers were to remain, specialized amphibious ships were to be reduced, destroyers and frigates were to be heavily cut and manpower was to be commensurably diminished. In effect the Royal Navy was to become ‘a contribution to NATO’. Anything beyond the NATO area was discounted or not seen as a significant threat.
Admiral Hill, summed up the situation: ‘Admiral Leach had the unenviable task of trying to explain the policy to the men and women of the Royal Navy and to keep up morale.’
Another problem we faced was implicit in the nature of Whitehall. A ship, or a squadron of ships, may work for a number of different ministries all of whom are equally keen to defray costs elsewhere. The ensuing paper chase inevitably makes life more difficult and slows down the process of decision making. Later, for instance, when I became Captain Fishery Protection the main political battle was to maintain Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries funding for what was a Naval commitment. And, when the Fishery Protection Squadron was involved with oil platform protection, or helping the Customs in their battle against imported drugs, this became a Home Office problem. At times I found myself involved in circuitous arguments and discussions with half a dozen departments represented around the table.
Much of the same applied to Endurance. She was a Naval ship employed on Foreign Office, Ministry of Education and MOD tasks. This later made arguing the case for her survival, and that of her successor, a minefield of fiscal complexities.
But there is no doubt that the sovereignty issue created most of the friction. At the heart of any sovereignty debate is the indisputable fact that the Falklands people are of British descent and do not wish to be part of Argentina. It was fundamentally on that basis that the Government of 1982 decided to deploy the Task Force.
All the claims and counter-claims are questionable and history is a poor advocate for any and all of the claimants. What matters is the status quo: the islanders are people of British descent who do not wish to be part of Argentina. But emotional flames were fanned by General Peron in the years following 1948. Even so, protests remained low key until the matter was brought to the United Nations in 1964.
Argentina’s claims to the Falklands, and other disputed territories, tend to occur when the country’s internal political situation is most unstable. Peron was the first to play the Falklands card. A long line of military dictators, all the way to Galtieri, have followed this lead. Peron arguably had the greatest impact on shaping Argentina for the second half of the 20th century. In 1946 this almost unknown army officer took advantage of his position within the Junta to introduce three new elements into Argentine politics. First, a well-organized trade union movement loyal to him alone. Secondly, an expansionist economic policy which produced hundreds of new jobs. Thirdly, he instilled a virulent spirit of anti-imperialism directed mainly at the United States. The formula was so successful that he managed to sustain his position for nine years. Even after his exile, Peronist policies gradually became indistinguishable from those of the powerful Radical Party. The legacy of the Peron movement is clearly evident in Argentina today. The man himself has become as much part of the national mythology as the ‘fact’ of the legitimate Argentine claim to the Malvinas, and the methods he used to seize and maintain power have become a model for a more subtle approach to dictatorship.
Following the Conflict a distinguished Argentine historian, Dr Carlos Escude, wrote: ‘Myths in Argentina’s political culture are taken to be unquestionable truths which lead to the implementation of self-defeating policies. When disaster befalls as a result of these policies the conviction that Argentina is a victim of fraud and conspiracy becomes even more deeply rooted.’ Escude argues that Argentina’s policy is less flexible than Britain’s. He calls for realism and reconciliation. He warns his countrymen: ‘Our outrage does not deserve to be taken seriously. When lack of realism engulfs not only the policy making, but also moral judgemen
t, there can be little hope for a country’s future.’
Britain had recognized the independence of the United Provinces as early as 1824. Neither that recognition nor the treaty of Amity, Trade and Navigation of 1825 made any mention of the Falklands.
Spain did not recognize the independence of her former colonies until 1859. This in turn was 48 years since the Royal Governor of Montevideo had withdrawn his garrison and settlers. This all adds to the weight of evidence against the Spanish inheritance claim. Argentina is hardly the sole heir to the inheritance and Spain could not legitimately bequeath any territory she did not possess.
The Buenos Aires Government was the most ambitious of the former colonial governments. Its boundaries with Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay were formed more by armed force than negotiation. This policy continued following the establishment of the Federal Republic of Argentina in 1853, 20 years after the British had re-established their Falkland settlement.
The United Nations Resolution of 1968 could have been a watershed in the sovereignty argument. Resolution 2065 called for Argentina and Britain to proceed without delay with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the dispute. But a succession of dogmatic Argentine governments and an equal amount of muddled thinking at Whitehall mitigated against any sort of solution.
During the seventeen years that followed six clear initiatives were taken. In each case there was little or no agreement. Inevitably further initiatives were stillborn. The clearest and most conciliatory communiqué of intent was issued in 1968. This statement was again highlighted by Lord Franks’ enquiry following the Conflict. It said: ‘The Government of the United Kingdom, as part of such a final settlement, will recognize Argentina’s sovereignty over the islands from a date to be agreed. This date will be agreed as soon as possible after (1) the two governments have resolved the present divergence between them as to the criteria according to which the United Kingdom shall consider the interest of the islanders would be secured by the safeguards and guarantees to be offered by the Argentine Government. (2) the Government of the United Kingdom are then satisfied that those interests are also secured.’
Beyond Endurance: An Epic of Whitehall and the South Atlantic Page 3
