In my view Anaya was certainly the nasty bastard of the three. I had called on him in Buenos Aires and I can’t say I was particularly impressed or unimpressed. But I knew from his demeanour that he did not like the British. I also knew that he had written (at some stage of his London appointment) a contingency plan for capturing the Malvinas.
So, with this gang of pirates in charge of Argentine fortunes, little encouragement was needed to think about exploiting a situation. One distinct possibility was an invasion of Chile which would perhaps resolve another territorial ambition, the disputed islands in the Beagle Channel.
But the decommissioning of Endurance must have looked like the removal of the last significant obstacle to ‘recapturing’ the Malvinas. Pressure to move quickly came from an urgent need to divert attention within Argentina from a disastrous economy. The Malvinas operation, when compared to an attack on Chile, must have seemed a low-risk strategy guaranteed to win enormous popular support.
I kept in touch with the developing situation in Buenos Aires. The Anglo-Argentines were particularly interested in the reaction to the Endurance decision. Through them I received many translated newsprint cuttings and tapped the changing mood of the Anglo-Argentine community. It was one of high anxiety and alienation. The early years of the Conservative Government had demonstrated that budgetary controls for a wide range of Government Departments had become progressively more stringent. Added to that, the trend was increasingly towards more but smaller departments and inevitably departments within departments.
1. The Author
2. ‘Red Plum, as Endurance was called, was not an easy ship to control’ (p.30). On station in the South Atlantic.
3. ‘The new embassy was to be led by Anthony Williams, a diplomat with a distinguished career record’ (p.28). Here he is returning my call at Buenos Aires.
4. Royal Marine guard of honour commanded by Lt Keith Mills being inspected by His Excellency the Governor and Commander in Chief Falkland Islands, Mr Rex Hunt.
5. I welcome Captain Moya, CO of the submarine base at Mar del Plata on board Endurance, (see p.62).He was soon to lose one of his main assets, the Santa Fe, at the hands of the helicopter in the rear of this picture.
6. Life on board Endurance, Christmas, 1980. The youngest sailor swaps roles with the Captain for the day…
7. ….David Attenborough (see p.47) and A B ‘Taff’ Jones would like to do the same.
8. ‘The idea was to place of a copy of Moby Dick and a Penguin chocolate bar close enough to him to help capture the scale’ (p.63).
9. ‘The plan was to dig a large hole in the surface to install a fleximeter’ (p.52). Assisting the Scott-Polar Institute in measuring the movement of icebergs.
10. ‘The helicopter hit the ground with violent forward momentum at speed and tipped up on its nose’. (p.102)
11.‘… and most of all Sir Ernest Shackleton… as always, we had duly paid our respects at his Grytviken graveside’ (p. 105). Left to right: Lt Cdr Mike Green, Mrs Hunt, Lt Cdr Andy Lockett, Rex Hunt, Lt Cdr Arthur Ainsley, the author.
12. ‘The hut is tiny, but superbly neat and tidy’ (p. 132). Lord and Lady Buxton on South Georgia.
13. Annie and Cindy come on board. Seen here with the author and Surgeon-Lieutenant Neil Munro (see p. 132).
14. ‘…surveying the area around the British Atlantic Survey Base at Rothera’ (p.129).
15. Guerrico and Bahia Paraiso off Leith, South Georgia (see p. 168).
16. HMS Antrim (right) and RAF Tidespring in Cumberland Bay (see p. 175).
17. HMS Plymouth (see p. 175).
18. The author countersigning Captain Astiz’s surrender document on board HMS Plymouth at Leith, South Georgia, watched by Captain David Pentreath and selected members of his ship’s company (see p. 196).
19. Left to right: Blue Rover (Captain J. D. Roddis), Saxonia (Captain H. Evans) and Endurance (see p.202).
20. HMS Endurance’s main armament!
21. Royal Marines boarding a Wessex 3 on Endurance prior to the recapture of Southern Thule.
22. The QE2 unloading stores and men in South Georgia. (Note low cloudbase at right background.)
23. The surrender of Southern Thule aboard HMS Endurance (see p.212). Right to left: Captain A. R Overbury (RFA Olmeda); Commander A. Morton RN (Yarmouth); Captain Nick Barker; Captain Chris Nunn (OC ‘M’ Coy, 42 Commando, RM), Captain Alan Stockwell (Salvageman) and members of the ship’s company.
24. HMS Endurance detachment back in business on Southern Thule.
25. United Towing’s tug Salvageman (Captain Alan Stockwell) alongside ARA Santa Fe (see p. 216).
26. The Red Plum and those who sailed in her.
27. A day at the Palace.
28. Goodbye old friend.
29. Retreat to the sticks.
The annual budget round was described by one commentator as ‘The Rats’ Birthday Party’. Each year the cake becomes progressively smaller and the most tenacious rodents grab the larger portions and hide as many crumbs as they can. The impact of this is twofold. The weaker rats, or those who cannot adequately defend their position, are faced by starvation. Driven in this way, ultimately nobody understands or even cares about the purpose of the game any more. They know only how to play it.
This loss of a strategic overview, and a long-term strategy based upon it, made it very difficult to fight the battle for Endurance. Only those at the very top could even speak in that sort of language and we were denied access to them. The Foreign Office had put the case for maintaining a presence in the South Atlantic and this had been bluntly refused by John Nott. There were therefore no more cogs that could be purposefully turned in the Whitehall machine without direct access to the Prime Minister. Lord Shackleton had come to the same conclusion.
‘It will have to be a letter to the Prime Minister,’ he said, ‘and would be better coming from a Conservative peer.’
We agreed that Lord Buxton would be the ideal choice. Could he be persuaded to write to the Prime Minister? Mrs Thatcher, of course, was the only person in a position to take hold of the FCO and the MOD and, if necessary, the Dept. of Education, and shake out of them a method for paying for the ship.
Lord Buxton was wonderful. He suggested that I put together a draft which he could use as the basis of his letter. This I was more than happy to do. After kicking around the text between us for some time the final letter was despatched.
Dear Prime Minister,
I opened a debate recently on the Falkland Islands in which I broadly supported the Government’s line in holding discussions with Argentina, but I was disturbed to get confirmation from the Minister that HMS Endurance, the only ice patrol ship possessed by the Royal Navy, which protects all British interest in the Antarctic and the South Atlantic, is to be paid off in 1982. The purpose, apparently, is to save £4 million a year whereas the consequence could be the loss of literally billions of oil revenue for this and future generations in Britain.
Through the British Antarctic Survey Britain has for long been a leading influence in the Antarctic and the South Atlantic. This internationally recognized status gives Britain an option on future opportunities in the last undeveloped part of the globe. It would seem incomprehensible if we meekly fade out whilst most other nations are openly increasing their scientific and military presence.
The work of BAS is supported by two unarmed scientific vessels, the John Biscoe and Bransfield, and these are under continuous threat of reduction. But the important fact is the work and role of BAS cannot be sustained and protected without the presence and the service of HMS Endurance.
It is known that spectacular hydrocarbon prospects are likely to be realized in that part of the world. Can we really be the only nation in the world to throw away these prospects when we are already established there, effectively if slimly, sustained by HMS Endurance for which at present we have no substitute?
With regard to the Falklands, the British discussions with Argentina are strengthened
by our Naval presence; so without it we will have few, if any, cards left in our hand. It so happens that at this particular juncture, the Argentine political and economic situation is becoming progressively more critical. Providing Britain negotiates with some semblance of confidence and strength, there is a chance of our reaching an acceptable solution to the Falklands problem. But if we announce the withdrawal of Endurance, with no prospect of an immediate replacement, the British position would be weakened.
I believe that the electorate would not take kindly to the international humiliation which could well be possible if the Argentines see there is nothing to hinder their bullying of the Falklanders. In the debate, the Minister stated that the marines would remain in the Falkland Islands. Being familiar with the situation at first hand, I must ask you to believe that this is probably impossible without Endurance, or without a Naval presence of a specialized nature.
It has been stated that the role of Endurance will be fulfilled by other Naval units, but rare and occasional visits by other Naval vessels will not solve the problems to which I have referred above in any way. All the risks and dangers will remain; a continuous Naval, specialized presence is paramount.
A vital role which Endurance fulfils is the inspection of British Bases in the Antarctic, but she also keeps an eye on foreign bases within the Antarctic treaty area. As a converted merchant ship, painted in the accustomed Antarctic red, Endurance is not warlike in appearance and consequently attracts little diplomatic reaction when visiting South American ports; the appearance of grey warships, (which in any case cannot play the necessary role in ice areas) would create a different image and have many disadvantages.
I expect it would be ambitious to ask that the decision to scrap Endurance should be reversed, though I feel sure that the consequences could not possibly have been understood by people who have not been to that part of the world but I do implore you to decide that Endurance must remain in service until she is replaced by a modern and better equipped successor. A stay of execution is absolutely vital for this nation. It is vital if we are not to surrender our prospects to other countries and be left out of the rich prizes that must lie ahead for Britain if we stay.
I cannot contemplate that this Government, which I support, should be the one that scrapped Britain’s prospects in the Antarctic and the birthright of future generations.
Yours sincerely,
Buxton
The letter was dated 21 July, 1981, and at the same time Lord Buxton asked for agreement with several other people including Admiral of the Fleet Lord Hill Norton who sent him a letter agreeing with his assessment. I wrote to Lord Shackleton endorsing Lord Buxton’s letter.
On 19 August the Prime Minister replied to Lord Buxton:
Dear Lord Buxton,
HMS Endurance, like Protector before her, has been a familiar sight in the South Atlantic and Antarctic for many years and her annual deployments have allowed her to perform a number of useful functions.
It would be surprising therefore if the news that she is to be withdrawn from service in 1982, on her return from her next deployment, was not met with some disappointment. This said, it is important not to overestimate the ship’s rôle both in actual and potential defence of our national interests. She has only a limited military capacity being armed with two 20 millimetre Oerlikon guns and equipped with two Wasp helicopters.
She is not essential to our defence commitment to the Falkland Islands of which the Royal Marine Garrison provides, and will continue to provide, a tangible demonstration. The withdrawal of HMS Endurance from service will not impair our ability to maintain the operational effectiveness of the garrison.
I accept that the presence of HMS Endurance in this region for six months of the year helps to underline our commitment to the defence of the Falkland Islands but in re-appraising future Defence Programmes in order to insure that the several rôles that our forces undertake are carried out to best and most economic effect it has been necessary to take some hard decisions including a reduction in the number of service warships.
Against that background we have reluctantly to conclude that HMS Endurance’s primary task, when deploying in Antarctic waters, has been to conduct hydrographie surveys, and in this capacity she has been able to assist the British Antarctic Survey with their scientific and research programmes. To this extent her withdrawal from service will have some effect on the work of the British Antarctic Survey. It is, however, not the case that the rôle and work of BAS cannot be sustained without the presence of Endurance. BAS operate their own ships and are not dependent on HMS Endurance for maintenance and supplies.
You imply that BAS activities are in need of protection but, as I have said, Endurance’s ability to provide defence against a determined assault is limited, especially bearing in mind that for much of her six months’ deployment outside the UK she is at considerable distance from the BAS area of operation. In any case the scientific and research programmes being conducted by various countries in the Antarctic region have hitherto been undertaken in an atmosphere of friendly and peaceful co-operation and within the terms of the Antarctic Treaty. This as you know expressly excludes any measures of a military nature in an area south of latitude 60 south.
You were concerned that HMS Endurance’s withdrawal would prejudice our ability to secure maximum economic benefit from any possible mineral exploitation in Antarctica. A number of countries, as signatories to the Antarctic Treaty like us, lay claim to certain areas of Antarctica. It is in an avowed attempt to avoid military conflict in defence of such claims, and so to provide for the continued demilitarization of the region, that all the treaty partners are about to engage in negotiating a régime for the exploitation of mineral resources of the area within the framework of the treaty itself.
It is in our best interests that exploitation should proceed on an agreed basis rather than for individual countries to press their separate claims and so risk a breakdown of cooperation. Even if, despite our efforts, this were to happen and certain countries were to resort to the use of force for the furtherance of their objectives, it is not easy to see what significant role HMS Endurance could play in defence of our national interests.
As for our negotiations with Argentina our position is clear. We are in no doubt about the legitimacy of our sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and we are determined to ensure that the Islands’ territorial integrity is preserved. We shall continue to preserve the permanent Royal Marines Garrison at its present strength on the islands as a demonstration of our commitment. The Endurance on the other hand, has spent on average only some 30 days in Falkland waters each year.
I would not like you to think that the decision about HMS Endurance’s future was taken lightly. The annual visits by HMS Endurance are a feature of long-standing and I know that she will be missed but I hope what I have said will help you to put the decision in perspective and also to indicate the Government’s determination both to see to it that the interests of the Falkland Islanders continue to be upheld and to ensure that our important economic interests in Antarctica are successfully pursued.
Yours sincerely,
Margaret Thatcher
Lord Buxton wrote a short letter with a copy of his reply from the Prime Minister.
Dear Nick,
I regard it as the usual departmental stuff, but I am not discouraged because, either by accident or design, the letter makes no mention of my main request which was that an axing of Endurance should be deferred pending an appropriate replacement. I intend to send a robust reply as soon as possible but would be very grateful for your comments and I could perhaps come and see you briefly to get your guidance.
Aubrey Buxton
On 3 September I responded:
Dear Lord Buxton,
Thank you so much for your letter and indeed for all your help in this most important crusade. I could not be more grateful and I hope that one day some of those distinguished but faceless people in Whitehall will realize the pot
ential of the Antarctic before it is too late.
It confounds me that the FCO, DTI and Energy Ministries have not supported the cause. As you say the response from the Prime Minister is departmental claptrap, poorly staffed in my view. This may be because of the summer leave period.
Several points emerge from her letter. I will summarize them as follows.
Nobody has ever considered that Endurance is completely adequate for her several rôles in the Falklands and Antarctic waters. Indeed, far from being withdrawn for the service, she should be replaced.
The Prime Minister states that it is Government policy to ensure that our important economic interests in Antarctica are ‘successfully pursued’. Why does she therefore decide to withdraw our very cheap Naval presence when the other signatories are increasing their scientific and military presence?
It is possible that South Georgia could assume great importance as a forward base for oil exploration. If Endurance is withdrawn it is very possible that the Argentines will establish a base there first as they have already established a base on Southern Thule in the South Sandwich Islands.
Beyond Endurance: An Epic of Whitehall and the South Atlantic Page 10
