Beyond Endurance: An Epic of Whitehall and the South Atlantic

by Nicholas Barker

  They ate it sitting on the deck, or in the dining hall where the chairs and tables were stowed or lashed down. If the ship had a really good roll those sitting down would slide right across the deck. The skill was to take your ‘pot mess’ with you rather than give it to somebody else to wear.

  Those who didn’t know the ways of the sea didn’t usually do too well in Endurance in rough weather. Any ship in a Force Ten is bad. In Endurance it’s hell. But I learnt a new trick. I could fall forwards without bending my knees, touch the floor, and then return to the vertical all in one movement. It’s impossible on land, but easy on Endurance.

  Not everything was light-hearted during that work period. Even in calmer waters I was finding life confusing. I had now been accused in absentia of stirring up further trouble that had been picked up by television. Until I received the videotape and checked with the Lords’ Hansard I was unable to comment beyond telling the truth: I knew absolutely nothing about any further publicity. I later learnt that an attempt had been made to bring together a cross party group of MPs and Peers who shared the view that a Military presence in the Falklands should be maintained. I was delighted but could claim no part of the inspiration for this initiative. With this on my mind I wrote to Admiral Cox in an attempt to counteract wild accusations, and to restate part of my case for the retention of Endurance and also to inform him of the illegal landings on South Georgia.

  Coincidentally, at almost exactly the same time, and for the first time in the history of the dispute, Argentina set a time limit for the resolving of the sovereignty question. On January 27 the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a Bout de Papier to the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires. This set out in detail Argentina’s claim. There was nothing surprising in this, apart from the conclusion that a Permanent Negotiating Commission should be established. This would, according to the Argentines, meet in the first weeks of each month alternating between London and Buenos Aires. Its remit would be to solve the dispute peacefully, definitely and rapidly. The Commission was to have a twelve-month duration and it would be open to denunciation by either side at any time and without prior warning to the other side.

  This was the start of the process of escalation at the beginning of 1982 that led to the Argentine invasion. There was also corroborative evidence from other sources of a significant hardening of the Argentine position. General Galtieri, who had replaced Viola on 22 December, jested that ‘the Junta had come to full agreement that a negotiating position had been agreed for a test period.’ It remained to be seen, however, if negotiations got anywhere at all. At the same time Argentine Press comment at the beginning of the year indicated that relations between the two nations were in steep decline. Within the Joint Intelligence Centre at Whitehall these comments were seen only as an attempt to create more diplomatic pressure.

  Jesus Iglesias Rucco, a columnist for La Prensa predicted, ahead of the Foreign Ministry’s Bout de Papier, that the Argentine Government would specify strict conditions and time limits for the continuation of negotiations. This final olive branch, he suggested, would be withdrawn if the British failed to respond adequately. Rucco had close connections with the Argentine Navy and the Foreign Ministry. There were similar reports in the Buenos Aires Herald and the Latin American Weekly.

  It should have been abundantly clear that Britain had less than 12 months to put forward an effective response. Ambassador Williams suspected that the new Argentine timescale for negotiation might be related to the 150th anniversary of British Falkland rule. In this he was proved to be perfectly correct.

  In the 1970s these kind of reports had been treated as a litmus test of the perceived threat. Indeed the Argentine Press Campaign in 1976 had been seen as quite an important indication of what may follow. By the early part of 1982 press warnings were quite specific. Unless the British moved promptly and purposefully towards an agreement an Argentine Military adventure was inevitable.

  The Bout de Papier was analysed by the Foreign Office. ‘Although toughly worded,’ concluded Franks, ‘little of the substance of the paper was regarded as new. The greater part of it was seen to be a reworking of the communiqué in July, 1981. The new element was the proposal for a Permanent Negotiating Commission working to a timetable of one year.’

  Both countries quickly re-established their Falkland sovereignty intentions. The British Government reminded the Argentine that ‘We wish to find by negotiation an early and peaceful solution to this dispute that can be accepted by all concerned, namely the British and Argentine Governments and the Government of the Falkland Islands.’

  The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires delivered this message on 8 February. In a letter of 3 February Anthony Williams reported to the Foreign Office that ‘all the indications were that Admiral Anaya, probably with President Galtieri’s full agreement, had got into the driving seat and had ruled, in effect, that a test period should be allowed to see if negotiations got anywhere.’ The Ambassador repeated that the period allowed may be up to the 150th Anniversary.

  On 9 February an editorial in the English language Buenos Aires Herald drew attention to the apparent willingness of the new Argentine Government to accept the risks that any serious attempts to ‘recover’ the Falklands and the Beagle Channel Islands might entail. The Malvinas approach would certainly be far tougher than anything seen so far. The editorial also referred to talk about the pros and cons of simply invading the islands and informing the world that justice had belatedly been done. The judgement was that an invasion would be unnecessary. However, unless the dispute was resolved in the only reasonable way (by transferring the islands to Argentina) a more messy and damaging solution would be found.

  On the eve of the talks of 15 February Lord Carrington observed:

  In principal the idea of setting up working groups to look at particular aspects of the dispute had considerable appeal since it was in the Government’s interests to maintain a dialogue in order to avoid the difficult and costly consequences of a breakdown. But it would be necessary to resist the unrealistic timetable of work proposed by Argentina. It would also be difficult to carry the Islanders since they would be most reluctant to agree to any discussion on sovereignty with the Argentines and Argentina would accept nothing less.

  The British Delegation would make it clear at the outset of talks that any future decision reached on the negotiation would be strictly ad referendum but the tougher attitude being shown by the new Argentine Government, together with the strong disinclination of the Islanders to envisage any change in the status quo, narrowed the options. I expect there will need to be a further discussion of the Falklands in the Defence Committee in March.

  The Prime Minister commented, ‘It must be made clear to the Argentines that the wishes of the Islanders are paramount.’ This view was hardly consistent with the withdrawal of the Naval presence.

  After each side had set out its position at the talks the British Delegation presented a working paper on the framework for a Permanent Negotiating Commission. Subsequent discussion was concerned with the detailed arrangements for the Commission. Meanwhile the Argentine Delegation pressed for a substantive response to its proposals within a month, and for the Commission to meet for the first time on 1 April. The talks concluded with the agreement of an informal working paper setting out the purpose of the Permanent Negotiating Commission and agreeing the issue of a brief general communiqué. The purpose of the Commission as stated in the working paper was:

  To be moving towards a peaceful and comprehensive solution of the dispute. It was to be presided over by Ministers who would direct its work and decide on the agenda. The paper also recognised that the British Delegation might include Islanders.

  By agreement the joint communiqué gave no details of the informal working party. Its substance was that ‘the meeting took place in a cordial and positive spirit. The two sides reaffirmed their resolve to find a solution to the sovereignty dispute and considered in detail an Argentine proposal for proc
edures to make better progress’. The respective Governments were to be informed accordingly.

  Following the issue of the communiqué, the Argentine Delegation returned to Buenos Aires. The Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately issued a unilateral communiqué which, contrary to what had been agreed in New York, disclosed the full scope of the discussions.

  On 3 March Mr Luce sent a personal message to Enrico Ros referring to the agreement that the discussions should remain confidential until Governments had been consulted. He said that the communiqué and residual press comment had created more difficulty and an unhelpful climate for continuing the negotiation process. He added, ‘I am deeply disturbed by what might be interpreted as threats and that it would be very difficult to make progress. There was a clear understanding that the issue could only be resolved through peaceful negotiation.’

  So far as I could see the talks in New York were a flop. I found this frustrating because I had by now lost count of the times I had been told that this really was going to be the beginning of a permanent solution to the Falklands dispute. New York, it was now clear, was little more than another vehicle for procrastination.

  The Joint Intelligence Committee was still demonstrating a lack of interest in the problem. I believe that this was a sad reflection on the sort of people who had been appointed to the JIC. Their vision was simply not wide enough. I had taken the view for some time that key Civil and Military people with a track record of unblinkered thinking should have been drafted into this important area. The Franks Report blamed the JIC, but it was not entirely their fault. There can be little doubt that those responsible for putting out the alert were at least complacent, and at worst incompetent.

  In Endurance we suspected that Argentina had two operation plans. ‘Azul’, renamed ‘Losario’, was under the control of Admiral Lombardo and under the orders of Admiral Anaya. This suggested a full amphibious assault on the Falklands in the Summer of 1982. We now know that detailed planning of ‘Azul’ commenced in December 1981 which was entirely consistent with the warnings we had despatched to London. The second plan, ‘Alpha’, was an incursion into South Georgia designed to test British resolve.

  The latest communiqué from Buenos Aires had been an even clearer sign of trouble, even after Dr Costa Mendes had doctored it to avoid alerting British Intelligence. Indeed the increased volume of Argentine sabre rattling had been discussed in a Joint Intelligence Committee meeting assessment as early as July, 1981. The Foreign Office minute of their assessment clearly told Ministers that they now had either to negotiate in good faith on lease-back or fortify the Islands against likely invasion. Lord Carrington failed to get the message across. Could it be that a characteristically intransigent Margaret Thatcher had dissuaded John Nott and Lord Carrington from taking any positive action?

  But on 3 March Mrs Thatcher annotated a note on the breakdown of the New York talks, saying ‘we must make contingency plans’. Five days later she asked John Nott about deployment. It would appear that nothing was done. But as nobody was pressing her, she can perhaps be forgiven for not pressing in return. In the event Lord Callaghan’s later comment is hard to dispute. He said, This was a war that never needed to happen if proper precautions had been made.’

  Following provocation from Rex Hunt and myself, the Buenos Aires Military Attaché, Colonel Love, had written a letter to London which was perhaps one of the clearest warnings yet to the Joint Intelligence Committee. In essence he told them that ‘something might happen’. Again this was either ignored or dismissed.

  By mid-March Joint Intelligence Committee assessment and Operation ‘Azul’ collapsed together. Anaya and Lombardo were at loggerheads following accusations of double dealing. Anaya had started the clock running on the second operational plan, ‘Alpha’. Marines would be landed on South Georgia under the cover of Davidoff’s scrap metal operation. It was, in effect, a backdoor invasion of the Falklands. When Lombardo was told to proceed with ‘Azul’ in January (this was the July invasion plan) he had asked Anaya to promise to cancel ‘Alpha’. His thinking was that any incursion on South Georgia would force Britain to reinforce the Falklands and to deploy a submarine to forestall an invasion. The invasion, he reasoned, had to be bloodless in order to win international acceptance. It was, he said, ‘Impossible to have South Georgia in April and the Falklands in July.’

  In the end Anaya’s self-confidence was his undoing. He allowed the South Georgia plans to go ahead. Throughout this sabre rattling it is difficult to believe that the MOD did not counter the invasion threat by the deployment of a nuclear submarine.

  The film team we had embarked at Mar del Plata was well aware of the region’s politics in general and of the escalation of the Falklands dispute. The team leader, John Tippey, also had considerable experience of Naval life and had served in the last war. When hostilities began it all seemed terribly familiar to him. His brief was to film the Navy in Antarctica. Indeed he did the job so well that the final edit, 40 minutes of 35 millimetre celluloid, won a number of prizes and considerable critical acclaim. Unusually, too, for a film that was essentially intended for Naval training, it broke through to limited general release and enjoyed something of a cult status on the cinema circuit. Certainly some of the scenes of Endurance in the ice were outstanding. The stills taken by Bob Mahoney, who is still very much a friend of the ship, have found pride of place in the homes of many Antarctic aficionados. His skill is such that he captures the ever-changing mood not just of the people, but of the extraordinary land and seascapes that surround them. He is one of the great photographic exponents of scale and perspective.

  We did as much as possible to illustrate for the Buxtons the multi-rôle nature of Endurance as we ran along pre-planned lines and courses surveying the area around the British Atlantic Survey Base at Rothera. This included some tricky navigation in poor weather. It was also an opportunity for Aubrey and Maria to meet the assortment of characters that make up a ship’s company. In the case of Endurance, in part perhaps because of her very nature, this was markedly diverse.

  The humour from the senior ratings’ mess was often up to music hall standards. This sustained us particularly in the dark days that followed the invasion of South Georgia. I am sure that if we had gone for an enforced swim in those icy waters one of them would have popped up with some well known one-liners. ‘Scum always rises to the surface.’ ‘Now’t like a cold dip before breakfast.’ ‘Will someone pass me the soap?’

  My report of the approach to Rothera sums up the sort of varied experience we were having:

  In view of the excellent ice conditions it was decided to try to reach Rothera by the much shorter route passing inside Adelaide Island. On the morning of 6 March the ship entered Matha Strait and proceeded down towards Hanusse Bay. We encountered some pack ice which gradually became thicker. However, it was a beautiful sunny day and steady progress was maintained.

  The film crew enjoyed filming the ship working in the ice. Eventually a good clear lead was found inside Hanusse Bay and a helicopter recce was flown to investigate the narrows. The report was that they were blocked with thick fast ice.

  Our course had to be reversed and the pack ice renegotiated. As we took an outside route through an unsurveyed area the cry of ‘Breakers Ahead’ was heard. We had to go hard a’ starboard to avoid an uncharted shoal.

  This, as the Buxtons came to appreciate, was all part of the almost daily adventure of the Antarctic.

  There followed a concentrated period of ship survey work in the approaches to Rothera. The idea was to provide a new route to the base inside Jenny Island. The ship covered the deep water while the survey boat coped with the more hazardous sections round the island. The RRS Bransfield had grounded on one of the shoals in 1980.

  My report of 19 March continues:

  The weather remained favourable and excellent progress was made. However, by Wednesday 10 March the time available had run out and the detached survey party had to return on board. As
the ship started northwards the weather broke and the wind built up to force nine in the west. To avoid the heavy seas we took the inner route via the Pendleton Strait and the Le Maire Channel to the Eurlache Strait. In the Lemaire Channel winds were gusting up to 80 knots in the narrows. However, conditions eased overnight and I was able to visit at the Chilean base, Capitan Arturo Prat, on Greenwich Island.

  Later the same day we made another visit to the main Chilean Base – Présidente Frei – on King George Island. Lord and Lady Buxton were able to accompany me on both visits.

  The ice was beginning to set fast – our warning that time was getting short in the Antarctic Peninsula. The course was set north-east. Good speed was made with the assistance of the Weddell current and on Monday 15 March the ship was again off South Georgia.

  During the morning personnel of the Joint Services Expedition were re-embarked with all their equipment. The men looked wild and dirty, but very fit after three months in the field.

  In the afternoon the ship went round to St Andrew’s Bay and the Flight were able to complete the salvage and the disposal of the carcass of the Wasp which had crashed on landing during the first work period. In addition Lord and Lady Buxton were able to go ashore and call on their daughter, Cindy, who together with her assistant, Miss Annie Price, have been filming the King Penguin Colony since November.

  The ship spent the night at anchor off the Bay, going round to Grytviken the following morning to visit the British Antarctic Survey Base, and to deliver and collect mail and stores.

  The third work period has been blighted by continual bad weather. In spite of this all major objectives were achieved. These include establishing a fully surveyed channel into Rothera west of Jenny Island, although (due to defects to the boat transponder) not as much of the boat work was achieved as had been hoped. The stores for the Joint Services Expedition to Brabant Island were not landed in the preferred location, but the Expedition Leader, Commander Chris Furze, was more than satisfied with their eventual positions. Although the poor weather caused some frustrations the film crew were pleased with the material they gathered. Most of the British and Foreign bases in the Antarctic have now been visited with the exception of those in the South Orkneys. Lord and Lady Buxton very much appreciated their visit and the Navy can now be assured of even greater support in the House of Lords.