The Roman alliance system was strong and flexible, based upon a series of bilateral treaties between Rome and other Italian states. Once a state became part of the Roman alliance, its sole treaty was with Rome, keeping Rome at the centre of the whole system. One of the fundamental treaty relationships was that which granted Latin status to an ally. After the difficult struggle known as the Latin War, the Romans imposed a settlement in 338 on the defeated Latin states. Essentially, these states were given various degrees of citizenship with or without the right to vote. This meant, among other things, that each state was obligated to provide Rome with soldiers and to follow Rome’s lead in foreign policy. Members of these states with so-called ‘Latin Rights’ could also intermarry and trade with Romans and had the right to move to the city of Rome itself and exercise full citizen voting rights. Throughout the Republic, Latin rights were given to various states, most often to those that were culturally Latin, including colonies of Roman and Latin citizens that were founded during the Republic.10
The second form of treaty relationship existed between Rome and its allies, the socii. The exact terms of treaties between Rome and each socius must have varied. The general terms are believed to be based upon those established in the Foedus Cassianum, a treaty crafted in 495 and quoted by the first century historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus:
Let there be peace among the Romans and all the Latin cities as long as the heavens and the earth shall remain where they are. Let them neither make war upon one another themselves nor bring in foreign enemies nor grant a safe passage to those who shall make war upon either. Let them assist one another when warred upon, with all their forces, and let each have an equal share of the spoils and booty taken in their common wars. Let suits relating to private contracts be determined within ten days, and in the nation where the contract was made. And let it not be permitted to add anything to, or take anything away from these treaties except by consent both of the Romans and of all the Latins.11
The core, then, was a military alliance complete with the provision that spoils of war be shared among Roman and allied soldiers.12 Over the century before Hannibal’s invasion, this alliance had proved strong enough to secure Roman control over Italy, then allow Rome to wage war successfully against Carthage. This was the alliance system that Hannibal seems to have targeted.
By the end of 218, Hannibal began his legendary trek across the Alps and into Italy. The march was costly; by the end, his large army was reduced to half its size, perhaps 20,000 African and Spanish infantry, and 6,000 cavalry. Marching south, Hannibal encountered the legionary forces in north Italy now commanded by Publius Scipio, who had made his way there quickly from the Rhone. At the Ticinus, a river which branches north from the western end of the River Po, Roman and Carthaginian forces had their first battle, limited almost entirely to cavalry. Hannibal deployed his heavier cavalry in the centre of his formation with the swifter Numidian light cavalry on the flanks.13
Scipio, on the other hand, deployed Gallic cavalry in his font line, with the Romano-Italian cavalry in support. He also followed the common Roman tactic of deploying light infantry along with the cavalry. Unaided, light infantry would generally fare poorly against cavalry. Unlike close-order heavy infantry soldiers, who held the psychological advantage against cavalry so long as they stood their ground, light infantry tended to fight in an open order. While this open formation allowed light infantry to dodge missile weapons – arrows, sling bullets, javelins, etc. – more easily, it also made them quite vulnerable to cavalry. It took an unusually determined individual to stand and receive charging. However, light infantry provided an excellent complement to cavalry, particularly against enemy cavalry. In this role, the light infantry served as a quick-moving defensive line that anchored the charges and wheels of their mounted comrades, providing protection. They could also form around downed troopers and provide support in other ways. If the Roman cavalry pinned its opponents into a stationary battle, something the Roman cavalry had a penchant for, the light infantry could go on the offensive, working their way into the battle, dodging between the horses, and causing harm to the enemy.14
When the two forces engaged, the Carthaginian horses swiftly drove the Roman light infantry back, forcing them to retreat through the gaps between the cavalry squads. Then the cavalry forces engaged front-to-front. For a time, the Roman forces held their own, but the Numidian cavalry on the wings ultimately flanked the Romans and launched a devastating attack on the Roman rear line. The Romans fled from the battle and Scipio shifted his army into a defensive posture, camped in a strong position on high ground.15 Hannibal clearly did not wish to assault the Roman position. At the same time, the Carthaginian army was able to roam the countryside freely, while the Roman forces were dug in. Hannibal used this freedom to his advantage, marching to Clastidium and persuading the Italian commander there to surrender the Roman grain depot.16 Provisions like these were both critical and in short supply for Hannibal’s army throughout its stay in Italy, so the acquisition of the Clastidium granaries was a significant victory.
Prior to this battle, the Senate had received word that Hannibal was in Italy. The consul Sempronius Longus was recalled from Sicily where he had been preparing to invade Africa. By the time Sempronius reached Rome, reports had reached the city of the defeat at the Ticinus, and the consul was sent to reinforce Scipio’s army. When he arrived, he found Scipio’s army still safely ensconced in its defensive fortifications on high ground and Hannibal’s camp several miles distant. Once the two Roman armies combined, an expeditionary force of light infantry and cavalry patrolled the countryside, looking to hamper Carthaginian movements. One day, perhaps 4 December, the Roman forces engaged in a significant skirmish, checking the Gallic and Numidian cavalry forces. Carthaginian reinforcements arrived to tip the balance. Sempronius opted to commit all of his light infantry and cavalry to the engagement. Hannibal refused to escalate further, or at least did not do so, and the Roman forces got the better of their opponents that day.17
The next day, Hannibal’s Numidian cavalry lured the Romans out of their camp before they had eaten their breakfasts. Sempronius, buoyed by his success the day before, ordered his cavalry to take the lead and the rest of the army to follow. In their pursuit of the Numidians and the main Carthaginian army, they crossed the River Trebia, the waters high from heavy rains and, since it was in the winter, no doubt quite cold. Cold and wet, hungry and exhausted, the Romans engaged Hannibal’s forces. Hannibal’s cavalry drove the Roman cavalry off and his infantry attacked the exposed Roman flanks. When a Carthaginian reserve force emerged from its hiding place in a shallow stream bed and attacked the Roman rear, the Roman infantry crumbled and routed.18 Ten thousand legionaries made their way to safety. The fate of the rest of the army, which potentially numbered between 30,000 and 40,000 soldiers, is unclear.19
The next year (217), the senate determined to face Hannibal in the field again and sent the consuls, Gaius Flaminius and Marcus Servilius Geminus, with full consular legions to engage Hannibal. The battle of Lake Trasimene was the result, where the Roman infantry were surprised and trapped on the lakeside, forced to choose between a death by iron or water. Reeling from two major defeats in half a year, the Romans named Fabius Maximus Verrucosus dictator. Fabius adopted a strategy of attrition, shadowing Hannibal’s army and hampering its movements, while avoiding pitched battles. These tactics gave the Romans time to regroup in 217.20
It is in the context of the elections for 216, held presumably in the autumn of 217, that Marcellus’ name surfaces in Livy. After noting the consuls Marcus Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus and the praetors charged with judging suits between citizens and foreigners, Livy reports that two additional praetors were elected, Lucius Postumius Albinus and Marcellus. The former was assigned a military command in Gaul, while Marcellus was charged with command in Sicily – later in Livy’s account it appears this included command of a fleet. Livy went on to note that Marcellus, along with most
of the other candidates, was elected in absentia.21 In other words, Marcellus was not present at Rome as a candidate for election. This raises a number of questions that, unfortunately, cannot be answered with any certainty.
First of all, where exactly was Marcellus during the elections? The most reasonable implication of noting that a candidate was elected in absentia is that he was away on official business, which at that point would likely have meant a military command. But if Marcellus held any magistracy in 217, there is certainly no mention of it in any source. It is more likely that he was on some business as a member of the senate, perhaps even as a propraetor or some such rank, though what exactly that business might have been remains hidden, and there is no evidence to support such a position. Second, why was Sicily a land and naval province? The strategic importance of Sicily at the time is unquestionable, but, so far as our sources suggest, the only theatres of war were Italy and Spain. Perhaps the Roman senate wanted to be ready to attack Africa, as it did in the first war, should it appear advantageous, but it is difficult to imagine that the senate anticipated expanding Roman military operations in this way after the losses at Trebia and Trasimene. More likely, senators reasoned that the Carthaginians might invade Sicily and wanted to bolster the Roman province. Finally, did Marcellus actually submit his name for election to the praetorship or was he elected without announcing any desire for the office on his part? Unfortunately, there is no way to know and both options are plausible.
What is clear, however, from the elections for 216 is that it cannot be assumed, however reasonable it seems, that the Romans elected their consuls even during times of war solely because of their perceived military experience and success. While Lucius Aemilius Paullus had been consul in 219 and earned a triumph against the Illyrians on the Balkan side of the Adriatic, similar things could be said about other men of consular rank, including Marcellus. Marcus Terentius Varro, however, had no such distinction, coming from a new family to politics and having only a praetorship before this office. When the ranks of potential candidates included men such as Fabius Maximus and Marcellus, there were far more illustrious choices than Paulus and Varro if voters were motivated solely by the military records of their candidates.
The elections for 216 may have brought hope for a change in the trend of defeats. As it happened, there was still worse to come for the Roman armies – the disastrous defeat at Cannae. Hannibal’s infantry in that battle numbered perhaps 40,000 – he had supplemented his forces with Gallic allies. The exact size of the Roman army was debated even in the ancient world. Polybius explicitly states the Romans had eight legions of 5,000 citizen soldiers each at Cannae and that these troops combined with the allied infantry brought the Roman force up to 80,000 infantry. Livy, on the other hand, notes two conflicting traditions, the one recorded by Polybius and a rival account that said the total number of Roman and allied infantry amounted to somewhere between 50,000 and 55,000. Both Polybius and Livy agree that there were about 10,000 Spanish, Gallic, and Numidian cavalry in Hannibal’s army; the Roman cavalry forces were presumably somewhere between 4,000 and 8,000, depending on how many legions one supposes the Romans fielded and whether each had the normal sized cavalry contingent.22
On the day of battle, the citizen cavalry deployed on the right wing next to the river, the Italian allied cavalry deployed on the left wing, and the Roman infantry occupied the centre. The consul deployed the maniples of the Roman legions, according to Polybius, so that they were much deeper than wide and closer to each other than normal. While this could theoretically give higher morale and greater penetrating power to the columns, the practical result that day was that the infantry had far less room to maneuver and engage in their typical function of rotating maniples in and out of combat. In front of the entire force, Varro positioned the velites.23
The Spanish and Gallic cavalry deployed opposite the citizen cavalry, while the Numidian cavalry faced the Italian allies. Because the Spanish and Gallic contingents numbered significantly more than 4,000, they outnumbered the citizen troopers on the right flank by at least 2:1 and perhaps by considerably more. The key to the cavalry battle at Cannae was the restricted space in which the Roman cavalry on the right wing operated. On their left stood the heavy infantry, packed in an unusually close and deep formation. On their right was the river, and they deployed close to it. Their primary task was to guard the flank of their army rather than to assault the enemy flank. Hannibal’s significantly larger cavalry force also probably forced the cavalry along the river to focus on defence. The right wing was important enough for the consul Aemilius to command it.24
As it happened, Hannibal’s Spanish and Gallic cavalry drove the Roman horsemen back, cutting them down as they went. Once the cavalry along the river were decimated, Hannibal’s troopers rode past the right flank of the Roman infantry, wheeled across their rear, and attacked the Italian allied cavalry, already engaged with the Numidians. The allied cavalry units scattered under the dual attack. Finally, the Spanish and Gallic horses turned his forces once more and assaulted the rear ranks of the Roman infantry. While these cavalry engagements occurred, the Roman infantry drove back the centre of the Carthaginian line, only to find itself enveloped by the wings of the Carthaginian infantry. Attacked on the flanks by infantry, the rear by cavalry, and compressed into a tighter space than normal anyway, the demoralized Roman infantry were hemmed in, then slaughtered.25 It was a disastrous defeat. The commander Varro survived, but the consul Aemilius Paullus died leading the Roman cavalry on the right flank. The exact number of Romans slain that day is unclear, but a good guess is somewhere in the range of 40,000 – a horrific figure even by modern standards.26 The damage to the political classes was perhaps even more severe when it came to the percentage of casualties. According to Livy, those among the dead included both the quaestors attached to the consuls, Lucius Atilius and Lucius Furius Bibulcus, twenty-nine military tribunes, several ex-consuls, ex-praetors, and ex-aediles (amongst them Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Marcus Minucius, who was Master of the Horse the previous year and, some years before that, consul), and in addition to these, eighty men who had either been senators or filled offices qualifying them for election to the senate and who had volunteered for service with the legions.27 This amounted to roughly a third of those who were or would have been senators within the next few years slain in one day.
Meanwhile, Marcellus was in command of the fleet at Ostia, the main port of Rome, and played a critical role managing the crisis that faced the Republic for the remnant of the campaign season. When news reached him about Cannae, Marcellus sent 1,500 soldiers from his command to help garrison Rome. Meanwhile, the senate hurriedly deliberated on the proper course of action under such dire circumstances. On the coast, the remnants of the Roman army that had fought at Cannae slowly gathered at the Apulian town of Canusium, approximately ten miles inland from Cannae.28
The senate instructed Marcellus to join the army at Canusium and relieve the consul Varro so that the latter could return to Rome and report. Accordingly, Marcellus sent ahead a legion south-east to Teanum Sidicinum in Campania. This town was located along the Appian Way, one of the most important Roman roads running from Campania into Samnium and then into central Apulia. Then he made the necessary arrangements to transfer command of the fleet to Publius Furius. In a few days, the transfer was complete and Marcellus hurried with a force to Canusium, perhaps collecting the legion at Teanum along the way.29
Meanwhile, fresh from their victory at Cannae, Hannibal and his troops first marched to Samnium, establishing a base at Compsa in the southern part of the region and less than 20 miles from where the Appian Way passed. He left his lieutenant Mago there with a portion of the army and instructions to bring the towns of the region over to the Carthaginian cause. Then Hannibal moved to Campania. This fertile coastal plain lay directly to the south-east of Latium and was a critical agricultural centre dominated by the powerful city of Capua. Capua remained loyal to Rome until the defeat at
Cannae; soon after this the Capuan senate decided to ally itself with Hannibal.30 Allying with Capua was a critical step for Hannibal to secure the loyalty of Campania, and its defection weakened Rome. Hannibal still needed, apparently, an acceptable port in western Italy through which he could receive supplies and soldiers from Spain, Sicily, and Carthage itself. Accordingly, Hannibal moved with his army to the Campanian port of Neapolis, near Capua, in the hopes of winning over the city.31 The leaders of the city refused to ally with Hannibal, however, and rather than bog his army down in a siege of the formidably defended city, Hannibal shifted his sights to the important inland city of Nola. Nola was one of the main urban centers in Campania, less significant than Capua and Neapolis, but critical to any strategy for controlling the region. The city was well fortified and approximately twenty miles from Capua, roughly in the center of Campania, perhaps offering slightly better access to Neapolis. There seems to have been considerable conflict within the city concerning the approaching Hannibal. The leaders of Nola wished to remain loyal to Rome, according to Livy, while the general populace wished to side with Hannibal.32
As Hannibal began operations in Campania, we find Marcellus stationed with his army at Casilinum, a town several miles north of Capua. This fortified settlement guarded the northern reaches of the Appian Way and the Latin Way, the two roads that ran straight from Campania to Rome itself.33 Marcellus must have positioned his forces there to hold the route to Rome once he determined that Hannibal had moved westwards from Cannae, first to Samnium, then Campania. The Nolan senate sent messages to Marcellus at Casilinum airing their concerns that the city walls would be betrayed to Hannibal in an act of treachery and asking him to come to Nola and reinforce the Roman loyalists.34 Nola, as Marcellus must surely have calculated, was too important to lose to Hannibal, since it was one of the main Campanian settlements, a fortified town at that, and one within striking distance of the road to Samnium.
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