So, it was no small thing for Marcellus to win election as the second plebeian consul for the year, and when the augurs indicated that the gods were angry, something had to be done. His critics had him over a barrel. Ultimately, there was no debating that Marcellus’ election violated precedent – no one could deny that. As such, there really was little Marcellus could do. Violating the received will of the gods was not a viable option, certainly not when the augurs had identified a problem and the interpretation that Marcellus had caused the offense had gained momentum. It is noteworthy in this context that Cicero would much later refer to Marcellus as augur optimus (‘the best of augurs’) while writing at the same instant that ‘[Marcellus] used to say that, if he wished to execute some maneuver which he did not want interfered with by the auspices, he would travel in a closed litter.’84 This was not an illogical claim on Cicero’s part. The gods and humans, the Romans seemed to believe, played a very strictly legalistic game. If one did not see the signs of the gods’ displeasure, they, strictly speaking, did not exist.85 The obverse of this reasoning was also true – the augurs agreed an ill omen from the gods had been delivered. Marcellus had shown himself to be interested in following the will of the gods and following tradition of a sort – hardly the sort to cross them now. ‘He abdicated the office’ was Livy’s only comment on the outcome. The patrician Quintus Fabius Maximus became consul to replace Albinus.86
What are we to make of this episode? Certainly, it strains the credulity of those with modern political sensibilities to assume the whole episode – from the hearing of the thunderclap to Marcellus’ abdication – was completely above board. Surely, one might suspect, Marcellus’ enemies – those who had initially managed to prevent him having a military command for the year, those who had inspired complaints that Marcellus had been given busywork to keep him away from the elections – must have manipulated the religious beliefs of the Romans to engineer his embarrassment? It hardly calms suspicions to note that Fabius Maximus was an augur too,87 the very one whose family monopoly of ties to the cavalry and whose very temple to Honos were undermined by the claims of Marcellus less than a decade earlier. He was an augur and he replaced Marcellus as consul. Did Fabius, a senator of considerable influence, take a lead position in determining that a bad omen had indeed been sighted and that the omen was because of Marcellus’ election? The timing of the thunder seems very convenient. Was the whole episode a plan by Marcellus’ opponents to stop him from a major innovation in the constitution?88 It is illuminating to remember that Fabius was a patrician and by simple arithmetic, Marcellus had taken an office that had always been reserved for patricians. If allowed to stand, Marcellus’ innovation could potentially limit the number of consulships available to patricians severely. This was not a precedent that Fabius would likely have willingly tolerated. Certainly not from a rival who had already shown his willingness to claim what might be seen as unorthodox privileges in the past. None of this proves conclusively, of course, that Fabius had a hand in this, but he had means, motive, and opportunity.
In this instance, Marcellus had broken with convention and opponents rallied to stop him. They had leverage in their obstruction. Regardless of the reality of the omen, a questionable enough electoral innovation would have made many pause. Omens indicating flaws in elections, not to mention flaws in all sorts of public business, were not that rare. The Roman state, as far as Romans were concerned, depended on the good will and material support of the gods for its prosperity, and it was critical that the laws of the gods be obeyed for that good will to be maintained. It is a bit misleading to cast the objection solely as the plot of a group of politically motivated rival senators potentially taking advantage of a religious technicality. Such a view runs the risk of misunderstanding the inseparability of the public religion and politics in the Republic and, indeed, in all ancient societies. The public religion protected the commonwealth; pleasing the gods helped ensure a prosperous state, angering the gods meant courting disaster. There is no need to suppose any distinction between the political and religious stances of Marcellus’s enemies on this point. His enemies did not want him to be consul or even to have a military command. They assumed, as do most of us in such situations when we feel animosity to others, that they were justified in their opinions of Marcellus. Why, then, would they think the gods disagreed? Rather, the thunderclap for Marcellus’ enemies simply confirmed what they already believed; Marcellus was unworthy. In the end though, it is highly unlikely that all the senators who raised the point that the gods were angered were enemies of Marcellus.
Still, a citizen assembly had granted Marcellus the authority of a consul for the year and there had been no irregularities in that procedure. The senate dispatched Marcellus to the army at the Claudian camp in order to keep Nola secure. Fabius took command of the dictator Pera’s forces and Gracchus of the slave volunteers, both of which were wintering at Teanum.89 In this, the fourth year of war, the Roman military efforts in Italy continued to focus on Campania and on a series of marches, countermarches, sieges, and relief efforts focused on controlling the critical strategic forts and towns that dominated the countryside. Casilinum had fallen to Hannibal’s siege in the winter or early spring. There seems to have been no major effort to recover the city this year, however. Marcellus’ primary activities that summer focused on garrisoning Nola and launching punitive raids from the city into neighboring Samnite and Hirpini territory, both peoples having allied with Hannibal after Cannae.90 The raids were highly effective, according to Livy, driving both peoples to complain to Hannibal that he was leaving them wholly defenceless.91 According to Livy, Hannibal returned to the region of Nola to check Marcellus’ predations on the lands of his allies and another indecisive battle was fought between the two commanders. This second battle at Nola, however, has been doubted by a number of historians who suggest Livy or his sources had mistakenly duplicated the authentic battle episode from the year before. Whatever the case may be, at the end of the summer Nola held, the Samnites and Hirpini were perhaps doubting the wisdom of siding with Hannibal, and Marcellus, in compliance with the consul Fabius’ orders, released all his soldiers for the winter except those needed to garrison Nola.92
At the end of the year, Fabius came to the Campus Martius field outside the city of Rome and announced the elections for next year’s officials. The consular elections this year produced another curious irregularity. In the late third century, the century that voted first for consuls was chosen by lot; it was considered a distinction to vote first, and it was not uncommon for the first century’s picks for consul to be elected. Perhaps subsequent centuries liked the idea of picking a winner. The young men of the Aniensis tribe – as opposed to the century of older men from that same tribe – picked Titus Otacilius Crassus and Marcus Aemilius Regulus to be consuls. Fabius, the presiding consul, however, strongly rebuked the tribe for selecting these two men. If Livy’s constructed speech is boiled down to its essence, Fabius criticized the military qualities and successes of both men and ordered that the junior Aniensis century be called upon to vote again for more suitable candidates. This was not a common phenomenon, to say the least. Interfering in consular elections, particularly by the presiding consul, would have been a habit dangerous to the Republic, for it would put too much power into the hands of the consuls. It appears Otacilius at least was aware of Fabius’ grave impropriety and sputtered that Fabius was trying to architect an extended consulship. Fabius, however, would not brook any challenge to his consular authority. He reminded Otacilius that they were both outside the city limits of Rome, and as such, that his lictors still carried the axes in their fasces. To translate: Fabius as consul outside the city could lawfully execute a Roman citizen, even Otacilius, with just a word of command to his axecarrying lieutenants. Otacilius ceased his public protest, the junior Aniensis tribe voted again, and Fabius and Marcellus were elected consuls for 214.93 It would be interesting to know how Fabius felt about Marcellus being elected this yea
r. Did his plan backfire? Likely Fabius was pragmatic about these matters. If he did wish Marcellus to be kept from the highest honours, he must have realized with the events of the previous year that he could not do so with any certainty. Marcellus, for his part, cannot have played any large part in Fabius’ manoeuvre. He was with the army in Campania and elected in absentia.94
Marcellus had remained in the field in the winter and returned to protect Nola early in the spring of 214 when the city leaders requested his help.95 Most of Marcellus’ time and energy for the season were invested in Nola again, since Hannibal had returned to the region from the south and there continued to be concerns about the city’s loyalties. Fabius, on the other hand, prepared to retake Casilinum. He sent word to Marcellus asking whether he could assist or Fabius should seek aid from Gracchus at Beneventum. Marcellus left part of his force to guard Nola and joined Fabius at Casilinum. The two Roman armies must have tested the city walls for assault, for some Roman soldiers close to the walls of Casilinum were wounded. According to Livy, Fabius and Marcellus hotly debated whether to continue the siege in light of the Roman causalities. Fabius advocated lifting the siege rather than committing additional time and resources. Marcellus, on the other hand argued that withdrawing in failure would needlessly tarnish their reputations.96 The whole debate seems a bit formulaic since, conventionally, the historical tradition emphasized that Marcellus was audacious and Fabius cautious. This may have been an instance where the Livy chose to illustrate the sword and shield of Rome metaphor through an improvised debate. Certainly, Casilinum’s location along the Appian and Latin Ways was hardly insignificant, the Romans had persevered despite suffering terrific casualties in the past, and there is no clear evidence of great casualties here other than a vague reference. Most importantly, though, the commanders maintained the siege regardless of whether there had been any formal debate on doing so.
Subsequent events, however, suggest that the two commanders did have a decided difference of opinion about how to conduct operations at Casilinum. Livy’s account is a bit puzzling in that he seems to be compressing events: ‘While sheds and all other kinds of siege-works and apparatus were being brought up, and the Campanians were begging Fabius for permission to go to Capua in safety, after a few had left the city, Marcellus occupied the gate by which they were leaving.’97
Probably the best way to untangle this rushed account is to separate the three parts in time. Therefore, while the Roman forces began to prepare the siege works needed to take the city, some of the Campanians within the garrison at Casilinum seem to have negotiated with Fabius that they be allowed to leave the city and travel under safe conduct to Capua. Presumably, Fabius agreed, else it is difficult to explain why the Campanians began leaving the city. Why he would have done so is not clear since these Campanians were returning to Capua, still an ally of Hannibal. Perhaps Fabius reasoned that the defection of these Campanians would weaken Casilinum more than they would strengthen Capua. Certainly, this would make sense of Livy’s report that Fabius thought the city too difficult to be worth taking at that moment in time. Marcellus, however, seems to have been left out of these negotiations, or at least did not receive any word of them. Any number of scenarios might explain this. Marcellus must have been elsewhere – there was much to do to prepare for a siege after all – when Fabius was approached. Perhaps Fabius did not see fit to communicate the arrangement to Marcellus. Perhaps events happened so quickly that Fabius did not have time to communicate with Marcellus. Or perhaps Fabius did communicate with Marcellus and counted on him to obey, since Fabius was an elected consul for the year.
Regardless of whether and how the arrangement was communicated, though, Marcellus clearly had very different ideas about how the Campanians should be handled. To their horror, Marcellus and his soldiers occupied the gate from which they began to depart and began slaughtering those inside the city gates indiscriminately. Marcellus felt no sense of mercy for those in the city. Indeed, his force moved from the gate into the city and continued to attack. Meanwhile, a few Campanians escaped the city – perhaps fifty – and sought the protection of Fabius. Fabius, true to his word, sent them under armed escort safely to Capua.98 He must not have been part of any plan with Marcellus to betray the Campanians. Rather, it seems that the two commanders acted without any sort of cooperation. This episode suggests several important things about Marcellus. First, that he had little remorse for enemies. Though Livy hides it in the brevity of his description, Marcellus had decided to subject the inhabitants of Casilinum, a rebel city, to a rampage of killing, making them an object lesson in the penalties for disloyalty to Rome. He was hardly alone among Romans in believing that no fate was too harsh for an enemy and that all who resisted in any way during a time of war were enemies. At the same time, though, Fabius did not share these ideas about Casilinum, so it appears that this stance may have been part of Marcellus’ particular world-view. Second, Livy’s brief description of the episode at Casilinum seems likely to have glossed over a serious inability of the two men to work together. Not only did the left hand not know what the right was doing, the left actively challenged the right. Combined with the other traces of problems between the two men, it becomes increasingly reasonable to conclude that Marcellus and Fabius were, if not complete political enemies, probably bitter rivals.
* * *
A careful analysis of Marcellus’ activities from the aftermath of Cannae to 214 indicates that his political career was supercharged by the demands of the war. He had built a strong reputation based upon military achievements before the beginning of the Hannibalic War. This reputation was greatly magnified by his victory over Hannibal at Nola. By 215, he was powerful enough to challenge the restriction against two plebeian colleagues in the consulship. Yet despite his abilities and growing prestige, he suffered delays in his early career and attempts to exclude him from a command and elections in 215. Even the exceptional success of winning election as the second plebeian consul of 215 was ultimately checked when the augurs declared a flaw in the auspices. There was a limit to how much even as successful an aristocrat as he could innovate to his own advantage. As we shall see, the years from 214 to 210 would catapult Marcellus even farther past his peers in terms of honours and prestige, yet he would face even greater political challenges designed to limit his laurels.
Chapter 3
Syracuse
For the Mediterranean world there were few places more strategically important than Sicily. Its central location and proximity to Africa and Italy made it a gateway between the eastern and western Mediterranean. However important Sicily was to Roman and Carthaginian interests in the First Punic War, it was of even greater strategic value in the second war. The western part of the island was the logical choice for staging any Roman invasion of Carthage itself; the eastern part was just a brief sail to Italy for Carthaginian troop transports, and control of naval supply routes to all of western Italy could be influenced by whoever held the island. Re-establishing control over Sicily was critical if the Carthaginians had any hope of regularly supplying Hannibal with troops and supplies by sea. Still, the Carthaginians were unwilling or unable to commit any effort to regaining Sicily when Hannibal first invaded Italy, and the Roman province remained quiet for several years. The Romans were clearly prepared for an attempt on Sicily from early in the conflict, however, since they maintained a substantial garrison there, one that included the survivors of Cannae.
When Syracuse was plunged into chaos by an internal revolt, however, the Roman situation in Sicily degenerated rapidly. The Roman conflict with Syracuse began when Hiero, who had ruled Syracuse effectively for half a century, died of old age, probably sometime in early 215.1 Hiero’s grandson Hieronymus, only 15 years of age, took the throne. A considerable amount of political maneuvering and in-fighting took place during Hieronymus’ short reign as rival elements in Syracuse sought to gain control over the city. Additionally troubling to the Romans, Hieronymus initiated talks with the Carthagin
ians, providing them with the potential leverage to return to the island. Hannibal sent to Hieronymus as advisors the Carthage-born Epicydes and Hippocrates, both connected to Syracuse through their grandfather, who had been exiled from the city. Appius Claudius, the praetor stationed in Lilybaeum on the western end of Sicily, heard word of these political shifts and sent negotiators to Hieronymus. His reminders of the longstanding friendship between Rome and Hiero and attempts to patch the alliance met with rough handling; consequently Appius or his legates gave Hieronymus a warning and withdrew to observe how events played out.2 Soon, Hieronymus completed a treaty with Carthage that would divide Sicily roughly in half at the River Himeras, Carthage controlling the west and Syracuse the east. Shortly after, Hieronymus made claims to the entire island; the Carthaginians must have been humouring him. Additional Roman envoys came to Syracuse in response to this treaty, and though some of the royal advisors advocated maintaining their commitments to Rome, those wishing to join Carthage prevailed. Accordingly, the brash young king sent word to the Romans declaring that he would preserve Syracuse’s ties to Rome if the Romans granted all of eastern Sicily to Syracuse and paid Hieronymus back all the gold his grandfather Hiero had given as gifts to the Romans.3 It hardly needs to be said that this was something of a slap in the face to the Romans.
Hieronymus was assassinated after ruling for about thirteen months, according to Polybius,4 and this would have been some time in the summer of 214.5 He had been with his army in nearby Leontini, a dependent of Syracuse, when conspirators struck him down in the city streets. With the death of Hieronymus, Syracuse descended into revolution, if not outright anarchy. Two of the lead assassins, Theodotus and Sosis, hurried from Leontini back to Syracuse in order to establish a new, elected government before the allies of the deceased king clamped down. Adranadorus, the uncle of the Hieronymus, however, heard of the assassination of his nephew and pre-empted Theodotus and Sosis by sending troops to occupy strategic points throughout the city. The conspirators were undeterred, however, and gained the support of the city council and citizenry to form an elected government. Bolstered, they quickly persuaded Adranadorus to relinquish control over the strategic positions in the city and submit to the authority of the city council. Elections were soon held for executive magistrates, and Adranadorus was granted a leading office along with a number of the conspirators against the king.6
The Sword of Rome Page 10
