Politically too, the growing presence of the clergy was in evidence as a result of the manipulated elections of 2002 under President Musharraf. This allowed the coalition of religious parties called the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI-F), to join the provincial government in October 2002. A spin-off for Musharraf was that he could frighten the West into supporting him by citing the coming into power of the MMA and potential growth of fundamentalism. By a sleight of hand, he was able to confuse the Pashtun-dominated areas of northern Balochistan with the Baloch territories in the south. As the International Crisis Group (ICG) puts it, ‘… reliance on the Pashtun religious parties to counter the Baloch opposition has strengthened Islamist forces at the cost of the moderate Baloch’. It noted that ‘The international community, particularly the US and its Western allies, seemed to ignore the domestic and regional implications of the Balochistan conflict, instead placing their faith in a military government that is targeting the anti-Taliban Baloch and Pashtuns and rewarding pro-Taliban Pashtun parties.’12
What the Pakistan leadership under Musharraf did not realize was that in an attempt to curb Baloch nationalism, they unleashed the genie of radicalization and sectarianism in a hitherto secular province through the increase in the number of Deobandi madrassas. In the process, in the long term, sectarianism was reinforced in Pakistan.
Growth of Sectarianism
Sectarian militancy and violence in Balochistan—part of the wider sectarian conflict in Pakistan—has risen exponentially over the last decade. Although sectarianism is not indigenous to Balochistan, according to one study, sectarianism is growing in all the Baloch districts and especially in the districts of Mastung and Lasbela. The prime targets of sectarian violence in Balochistan has been the Shia community, particularly the Shia Hazaras, at the hands of the LeJ which is an anti-Shia, anti-Iran terrorist group.13 Some Brahvis have reportedly joined the sectarian groups and are being used to target the Shia Hazaras and the Baloch nationalists.
As noted by Ali Dayan Hasan, ‘… there has also been a complex and contradictory but close historical relationship between the state and the LeJ both in Balochistan and beyond.’14 Several strands testify to this official backing: their ability to hold public rallies despite being banned;15 sectarian attacks taking place in areas with a strong Frontier Corps (FC) presence;16 taking off passengers from buses, identifying Shias and then killing them, all of which takes time. As has been well put, ‘Sectarian violence has increased because of a clear expansion of operational spaces for violent sectarian groups to function within. Methods used in the recent sectarian incidents show that the groups operate with confidence and without fear of being caught.’17 Such ease of operations would be possible only when the terrorists know that ‘… the police and the courts don’t have the capacity to investigate, prosecute and convict sectarian killers’.18 Clearly, therefore, sectarian groups are deliberately being allowed to function by the state.
Over the years, Mastung has emerged as the main centre of sectarian militancy. Perhaps the largest Sipah-i-Sahaba seminary outside southern Punjab is in Mastung, in the heart of the territory controlled by the Raisani tribe. This serves as one of the bastions of religious extremism in the province. Mastung was once a strong centre of Baloch separatists but is being taken over by sectarian groups. The killing of twelve Islamic State (IS)/Daesh terrorists by security forces in Mastung in 2017 is evidence of this development. Mastung is also a strategic point for targeting convoys of Shia pilgrims going to Iran.19 The trail of most of the attacks on Hazara Shias in Quetta, which have claimed hundreds of innocent lives over the last decade, leads to this district. Despite several LeJ terrorists being killed in a crackdown by security agencies, the surge in violence indicates that sectarian networks are still capable of launching high-profile terrorist attacks. Meanwhile, Pakistani sectarian militants have also found sanctuaries in Afghanistan, allowing them to move about freely on both sides of the border and making it much harder for Pakistani law enforcement agencies to track them down even if they had the will.
There is also a more sinister design behind the Islamization process. According to Naseer Dashti, the distinct secular identity of the Baloch is part and parcel of their nationalist aspirations. Dilution of the secular identity would adversely impact their political resistance to the efforts of the Pakistan state to ram a Pakistani identity. This would be just the first step in the Baloch acceptance of the exploitation of their resources at the altar of ‘Muslim brotherhood’.20
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan also noted that unlike in the past, ‘… religious fanaticism was not merely being exported to the province from elsewhere, it was now being bred in Balochistan. A growing network of madrassas had contributed to aggravation of inter-sect tensions. There were fears that the security forces were patronizing militants and Quetta was being turned into a haven for militants.’21 As a result, in the past decade or so, the advent of extremist militants had led to unprecedented sectarian bloodshed in Balochistan. In trying to pit religious extremism against Baloch nationalism, the state could be making a huge mistake. The transnational agendas of the extremist groups could pose an even bigger threat to the state.22
While evidence on the ground is thin, the government has been trying to show a linkage between the Baloch groups and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. For example, the then interior minister Rehman Malik declared in the Senate that the two groups ‘had been related to each other for five years’.23
Overall, though some Baloch have been used for sectarian killings, so far Baloch nationalism has proved to be stronger and Islamization policies have not really succeeded where ethnic Baloch have been predominant. Yet, Islamization continues to be a significant element of Islamabad’s strategy. The intention of the state in the Pashtun and the Baloch areas is clearly to use Islam to curb both Pashtun and Baloch nationalism.
Daesh and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
The Balochistan government has frequently claimed that the Daesh did not operate within the province and debunked claims by the group. However, the violent activities of the Daesh have been gradually increasing. It carried out a suicide blast prior to the July 2018 general elections during a large political rally in Mastung on 13 July 2018 killing more than 130 people. Among the martyred were the younger brother of former Balochistan chief minister Aslam Raisani and Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) candidate Nawabzada Siraj Raisani.24 The Mastung massacre negated the claim of the army that the backbone of terrorism had been broken. Prior to this attack, Daesh had claimed responsibility of a devastating attack against lawyers in Quetta in August 2016 and a shrine in Kuzdar in November 2016.
While both the Daesh and TTP have a covert presence in Quetta, elsewhere in Balochistan their operations differ based on ethnic identities. Thus, the Daesh is believed to largely exist in the Baloch-dominated districts of Mastung and Kalat while the TTP networks appear to be concentrated in the Pashtun-majority districts of Chaman, Qila Abdullah, Pishin, Zhob and Qila Saifullah. The terrorist roots of the two groups also differ: the Daesh terrorists are largely drawn from militant sectarian groups, notably the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and splinter groups violently focused on minority Muslim sects since the 1990s. The TTP, on the other hand, is comprised of runaway militants from the tribal areas, whose aim is to target security personnel and political figures.25 However, these are not water-tight compartments and there is overlapping. Thus, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi has also established nexus with the Jaesh-e-Islam and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.
Zikris
The term Zikri is derived from the Arabic word Zikr (remembering and recitation). The origin of the Zikri sect and their belief system is not well documented because almost all their religious and historical records were obliterated due to oppression during the rule of Mir Nasir Khan in the eighteenth century. Whatever information available is from the few preserved religious works, oral traditions and the writings of non-Zikris.26
The Zikris are the followers of Syed Muhammad Jaunpuri, who is considered to be the Mahdi. According to Ibn Khaldun, the renowned Arab sociologist-historian, ‘It has been well-known (and generally accepted) by Muslims in every epoch, that at the end of time a man from the family (of the Prophet) will without fail make his appearance, one who will strengthen the religion and make justice prevail.’27 According to Inayatullah Baloch, ‘… though neither the Koran nor hadith supports this popular Muslim belief, nevertheless, the concept of the Mahdi remains part of Muslim traditions, though Shias and Sunnis differ in their formulation of it. In fact, there is a long list of individuals in Muslim history who have claimed to be the promised Mahdi.’28
Syed Muhammad was born in Jaunpur, UP, India in 1443 and was a great Sunni scholar. He claimed to be the last Mahdi and either he or one of his disciples founded the Zikri sect. Zikri scholars claim that the Mahdi lived in Makran where he spent most of his time in zikr at the Koh-e-Murad.29
According to Inayatullah Baloch, the principal tenets of the Zikri doctrine are; (i) while the Prophet preached the doctrine of the Koran in its literal sense, it remained for the Mahdi to further elucidate its meaning; Syed Muhammad Mahdi was in fact the interpreter (Sahib-e-tawil) of the Koran; (ii) Prophet Mohammad is the last prophet and Syed Muhammad is the last Mahdi; (iii) the Kalima to be modified with a new Kalima, ‘There is no god but Allah. Muhammad Mahdi is his messenger’; (iv) instead of namaz (prayer), people should recite Zikr (a formula of repeating the various names of Allah); and (v) the fast of Ramazan should be replaced with a monthly seven-day fast. Thus, Zikri doctrine deviates from orthodox Muslim belief but Zikris consider themselves to be true Muslims.30
The city of Turbat in Kech, Makran, is the Zikri holy city where they have built the Koh-e-Murad. According to the Zikris, this is a shrine but some orthodox Muslims charge that the Zikris consider it to be a Kaaba, akin to the one in Mecca. The places of worship of the Zikris, both temporary and permanent, are known as zikarana or zikrkhanah.31 Not surprisingly, the Zikris attach religious significance to sites in Balochistan for which they have developed a special veneration. Their rites of worship are mostly conducted in Balochi. Consequently, Zikri poets and religious scholars have enriched Balochi literature.32 For them, Balochistan, especially Turbat, is the ‘Gul-e-Zamin’ (flower of the earth). This patriotic attitude on the part of the Zikri Baloch is held by many to be the forerunner of modern Baloch nationalism.33
In the past, the Zikris had faced persecution under Mir Nasir Khan in the eighteenth century. In modern times, such persecution was very evident under the Zia-ul-Haq dictatorship. In 1978, several religious-political parties organized the Tehrik-e-Nabuat (movement for the finality of the prophethood) in Balochistan and launched an aggressive campaign against the Zikris. Over the decades, as religious extremists established themselves in Balochistan, persecution has only increased. For example, in 2014, at least six Zikris were massacred in Awaran, and slogans have appeared in the province warning the Zikris to ‘convert’ or die, signed off by an outfit calling itself Lashkar-i-Khorasan.34
The Zikris largely inhabit Makran, Lasbela and Karachi. In fact, Makran’s population is composed of two Muslim sects—the Namazis (Sunnis) and the Zikris. Prior to 1947, it was estimated that Zikris formed about half the population of Makran. Some have estimated that in the 1990s, the Zikri population in Makran had declined to one-third or one-fourth of the total. According to Inayatullah Baloch, the principal Baloch subgroups belonging to the Zikri sect are the Sajdis, the Sangurs, the Rais, the Darzadas, the Meds and the Koh-Baloch. In addition, some followers of the Zikri faith are also found among the Baloch nomads in the Khuzdar and Kharan regions of eastern Balochistan.35
The Baloch Students Organization (BSO)36 has been in the forefront of defending the religious rights of the Zikris. It has organized political rallies to mobilize popular support against sectarianism in and around Makran. They have also highlighted Baloch cultural principles as Balochness (Balochiat) and the Baloch code of honour (Balochmayar) that demands that Baloch defend religious minorities and weak groups. They have also published and distributed pamphlets underlining the Zikri fervour for Balochistan. Thus, despite hurdles created by fundamentalists and at times the state, the BSO has won the support of the majority of Makran’s Sunni Baloch in defence of the religious rights of the Zikris.37
Hazaras
Hazaras are Shia Muslims38 who had migrated from Afghanistan after being persecuted in the Hazarajat area of Afghanistan during the late nineteenth century and later in the 1990s. The nearly half a million Hazaras are mainly confined to Quetta, where they are dispersed around two main areas of the city: Hazara Town and Mehrabad and with the second biggest concentration in Mach. In Quetta, they are among the most developed communities, being educated, hard-working and with impressive women’s literacy figures. The Hazara women work in hospitals, schools and universities.
The killing of the Hazaras has been both systematic and sustained. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, ‘The targeting of the Shia Hazaras of Balochistan is one of the most violent and persistent persecution of any community in Pakistan on account of religious beliefs.’39 Not surprisingly, many have termed it ethnic cleansing while the BBC in 2013 had termed Quetta ‘hell on earth’. Since 2002, close to 3,000 Shias have been killed, most of them belonging to the Hazara community.40 It has forced many Hazara youth to flee the recurring violence by any means possible. A popular saying in Quetta is that a Hazara is born in Afghanistan, grows up in Pakistan and is buried in Iran.41
The following features of the situation are worth noting. First, targeted attacks on the Hazara have continued despite the deployment of a large number of security personnel. Second, the attacks themselves are coordinated and not random. This would indicate availability of sufficient advance information. Third, almost every family in the community has lost a relative in these attacks and there does not appear to be an end to the targeting. Fourth, despite Balochistan crawling with all shades of intelligence agencies, the roots of terrorism targeting the community have not been traced. All this raises questions about the failure and inability of the state to protect half a million people in Quetta.42 As the Dawn put it, ‘Clearly either the state is complicit or its security policies are flawed.’43
The Hazaras are easily identified and targeted due to their distinctive facial features. As a result of the targeted killings, Hazara women have started wearing purdah in order to hide their distinct features, something they had not done earlier. The men have taken to wearing sunglasses to prevent identification.44
Not surprisingly, the Hazara community feels under siege. Its leaders told a HRCP delegation in 2009 that ‘… security agencies and the government bore ethnic and sectarian biases against them and were protecting and patronizing the perpetrators of the crimes against them’. Expanding on this theme, they accused the police of not taking sectarian killings and crimes against the Hazara community seriously: no effort was ever made by the government to conduct an impartial inquiry into serious charges; the findings of the tribunals set up to probe the loss of lives in 2004 and 2008 had not been made public till then; no government or public official had ever condemned their targeted killing nor had come to offer condolences or any compensation to the victims’ families. The HRCP’s conclusion was that the community had lost trust in the provincial government’s ability to book the perpetrators of the murders.45
Sectarian considerations apart, the HRCP further noted the relative prosperity of the Hazara community due to the substantial remittances received from expatriates. This also accounted for the increasing crimes against the community. ‘It seemed a campaign had been launched to terrorize the community so that they left Quetta by selling their businesses and property at throwaway prices. Pamphlets had been left at their homes telling them to sell their houses and leave.’46
A HRCP mission that met the representatives of the Hazara community in June 2011 found that there was no change
in the targeting. They accused the banned groups Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi for such terrorist acts. More than eighty Hazaras had been killed in the 3 September 2010 attack on an Al-Quds Day procession in Quetta that had been allowed by the local administration.47 A Hazara community leader described one such terrorist attack to the HRCP delegation in 2012. According to him, in 2011, a bus full of pilgrims left Quetta for Iran. After crossing seven security check posts and 200 metres short of another check post, the bus was stopped in Mastung by armed men. Twenty-four Hazara men and boys were lined up and executed. It took five minutes to kill them all. Women and children were made to watch. This, according to him, did not happen even in Rwanda. Despite meeting everyone in the hierarchy from police officers to the president and prime minister, nothing changed. The political parties just joined the community for fateha and left. The inescapable conclusion was that the state was getting them killed.48
One other consequence of the killings is the impact it has had on the education of the next generation of Hazaras. Some years ago, there were around 250 Hazara students in the Balochistan University in Quetta. By 2013, there were only two or three left. The majority of the Hazara students in the university used to be girls because boys were usually sent to big cities outside Balochistan for education. Currently, there are no Hazara girls in the Balochistan University. All of the eleven Hazara faculty members have left the university. In view of the fear, there was a trend among the members of the community to seek asylum in Australia and other countries. Many ran considerable risks and travelled illegally by sea in rickety boats to get there. Despite the dangers, around 6,000 Hazaras had left for Australia.49
Pakistan- the Balochistan Conundrum Page 7
