Malik Siraj Akbar, a Baloch writer and the editor of an online newspaper in English on Balochistan’s issues, and living in exile in the US, was quoted as saying, ‘The Western media covers the whole Afghanistan–Pakistan region with a special focus on the ‘war on terror,’ Islamic fundamentalism and issues of religious terrorism. There is scant realization that the Baloch nationalist movement is absolutely different from the Taliban movement. In fact, the Baloch movement is the antithesis of the Taliban and Islamic movements,’ said Akbar. He added that the Western media often sees the Baloch movement as a ‘by-product’ of the war in Afghanistan, or treats it as a domestic Pakistani issue.15
The HRCP has also documented the condition of the journalists. Almost every journalist that met the HRCP team complained of threats that they had received from intelligence agencies. A few of them narrated incidents in which they were picked up and then released a day later, after having been warned. Journalists complained that persons claiming to be representatives of the secret services threatened to kidnap their family members unless they succumbed to their demands.16
The HRCP lamented that the national media ignored Balochistan issues in its coverage. Moreover, newspapers had lost their national character and had become regional in news coverage. The news that appeared in Jang, Quetta, did not appear in other editions of the newspaper. There was no representation of Balochistan in the media at the national level. The incidents of enforced disappearance, targeted killings and tortured bodies found on the streets were not reported in mainstream newspapers and electronic media. In Balochistan the media was seen as biased along ethnic and sectarian lines. The Hazara-Shia community in Balochistan also complained that the media did not report the rampant target killings of their members.17
This was not only because of the number of journalists who had been killed in the province in connection with their work but also because media persons were forced to navigate threats emanating from multiple quarters in order to stay alive. As the Dawn noted, ‘There are feuding tribes with shifting allegiances, extremist organizations and ruthless insurgent groups, as well as instruments of the state, including the Frontier Corps, intelligence agencies and the military; all of which want to use the media to further their agendas.’ What this means for the media is an impossible balancing act of trying to please one group without displeasing a mutually hostile group. Thus, ‘journalism in Balochistan, especially where local papers are concerned—and about Balochistan in the case of national dailies—has thus been virtually reduced to a farce’. Not surprisingly, self-censorship is widespread; human rights violations go unreported; and editorializing is extinct in the local papers, since no editor can hope to express a point of view and survive.18
In an interview with the Diplomat, Hamid Mir, a famous anchor in Pakistan, shared his ordeals during a reporting trip to Khuzdar in Balochistan in March 2013 in the wake of the killing of Abdul Haq Baloch. He called this as one of the scariest days of his life. According to Mir, a deputy inspector general of police asked him why he had endangered his life by visiting Khuzdar. He then asked Mir to sit in his vehicle. No sooner had he done so, the vehicle was surrounded by a group of armed men. What was shocking was that the high-ranking police officer appeared confused and helpless and requested the militia, known as the ‘death squad’ in Balochistan, not to harm Mir. He was allowed to go after he agreed to give coverage to a few females, supposedly widows of soldiers. The entire episode happened close to a security check post.19
Fateh Jan, who now lives in a refugee camp in Germany and previously worked as a journalist in Balochistan, told the Diplomat, ‘I have witnessed my colleagues being killed by the religious extremist group and a banned terrorist organization Baloch Musalla Difa Tanzeem (BMDT). They have killed Munir Shakir, Javed Naseer and Khan Mohammed. They all worked with me.’ In a worried tone Jan added, ‘I had a good career back in Pakistan with a promising bright future. But no career is worth dying for, so I left Pakistan to have a safe and sound life. Though I am living in a refugee camp in Germany, I am safe here.’20
The separatists too have been guilty of pressurizing the media. In 2011 a pamphlet by the Balochistan Liberation Front was delivered to several Quetta-based journalists. It warned them against becoming a part of the ‘dirty game’ being played by Pakistan’s security forces against the Baloch freedom movement. ‘Do not try to cover up the Pakistani security forces’ black deeds against the Baloch. Do not also try to play down the forces’ losses at the hands of the BLF,’ it said.21 In October 2017, according to media reports, the Balochistan Liberation Front and the United Balochistan Army (UBA) threatened action against local newspapers if they refused to publish their points of view. This led to the forcible shutting down of twenty-four press clubs and warning to hawkers and distributors against selling newspapers. The affected dailies were Azadi, Tawar, Intekhab, Bolan, Jasarat, Jang and Dawn. Hawkers and distributors stopped newspaper circulation in Baloch-majority districts, including Pasni, Turbat and Gwadar. This situation continued for several months.22
VI
ENDURING INSURRECTION
16
The Separatist Challenge
We have a distinct civilization, we have a separate culture like that of Iran and Afghanistan. We are Muslims but it is not necessary that by virtue of our being Muslims we should lose our freedom and merge with others. If the mere fact that we are Muslims requires us to join Pakistan, then Afghanistan and Iran, both Muslim countries, should also amalgamate with Pakistan ... Pakistan’s unpleasant and loathsome desire that our national homeland, Balochistan, should merge with it is impossible to concede. It is unimaginable to agree to such a demand ... We are ready to have friendship with that country on the basis of sovereign equality but by no means ready to merge with Pakistan … We can survive without Pakistan. We can prosper outside Pakistan. But the question is what Pakistan would be without us? … We want an honourable relationship, not a humiliating one. If Pakistan wants to treat us as a sovereign people, we are ready to extend the hand of friendship and cooperation. If Pakistan does not agree to do so, flying in the face of democratic principles, such an attitude will be totally unacceptable to us, and if we are forced to accept this fate, then every Baloch son will sacrifice his life in defence of his national freedom.1
Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo
BIZENJO’S REMARKS WERE TO PROVE prophetic. Festering alienation has been transformed into violent insurgency periodically in 1948, 1958, 1962, 1973–77 and since the early 2000. The response of the state to each insurgency has fuelled the next.
Moderates and Separatists
The Baloch nationalist movement is not a single, unified one. The nationalists can be grouped into two categories: (a) the moderates who seek maximum provincial autonomy within Pakistan. They believe in the political process—dialogue and participation in elections—to achieve their demands; (b) The separatists who seek independence from Pakistan. For them, the time for a political process—a dialogue with the government—or taking the parliamentary route is long over. They have put their faith in militant means to achieve their objectives. Given the centralizing policies of the government, both moderates and separatists have a common meeting ground in asserting a distinct Baloch identity and expressing frustration with Pakistan over its failure to acknowledge the historical identity of the Baloch people.
In fact, given the popularity of the insurgency, even the moderate elements have had to adopt a harder line—at least rhetorically—or else lose the support of their constituencies. As early as 2006, former chief minister of Balochistan—Balochistan National Party elder statesman Attaullah Mengal—had to declare that ‘the days to fight political battles are over.’2 Later, he told Abida Hussain, a politician from south Punjab, that his heart still beats for Pakistan. He hoped that the heart of his sons and grandsons would beat in the same way, but he suspected that their hearts were souring and the assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti was a wound inflicted on the hearts of all Baloch, includi
ng himself.3 In January 2006, Nawab Bugti, a former governor and head of the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP), had said: ‘The denial of democratic rights and economic deprivation have compelled people to take up arms. It is war now.’4
The difference between the ideologies of the two groups is that the Baloch political parties continue to pin their hopes on a political solution and on a constitutional path. The militants, on the other hand, faced with continued suppression and betrayals by the Pakistan state, have taken to violence to prevent further extraction of resources and to raise the economic cost for Islamabad in trying to do so. Consequently, pipelines and installations have become prime targets, disrupting gas supplies all over the country. The variance between the militants and the nationalist parties, said Sardar Akhtar Mengal, was that the former ‘do not think they can achieve anything through democratic and constitutional means’, while the ‘Baloch nationalists are still optimistic about engaging in the democratic process, they are increasingly frustrated’.5
The students, perhaps, best represent the dilemma. The HRCP reported in 2011 that student groups in particular were insistent that the Baloch had no option but to demand independence from Pakistan. Many of the political groups did not support violence as part of the struggle for independence, but were very clear that the struggle was legitimate and that their right to self-determination should be a part of the political discourse on Balochistan. There were, however, those who felt that violence was justified as part of the struggle for an independent Balochistan in the face of aggression and repression by the security forces in the province. The representatives of one such group that met with the mission were extremely bitter because of what they saw as ‘the injustices by the Punjab’.6
The Moderate Case
Major grievances of the moderate Baloch nationalists include the following:7
(i) Pakistan’s political system is not democratic and representative of the people, but is dominated by a single ethnic community—the Punjabi;
(ii) The Baloch are not represented in the power structure at Islamabad;
(iii) Institutions of the state are perpetrating excesses against the Baloch people, political activists in particular, leading to their killings, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances and humiliation;
(iv) The Islamabad establishment is not trustworthy as it has backed out of its promises time and again and killed Baloch leaders, including Akbar Bugti;
(v) The Baloch do not have control over their resources and Punjab has been exploiting them for decades;
(vi) Balochistan needs political autonomy and control over natural and economic resources, and not a mere financial relief package; and
(vii) The Pakistani establishment is patronizing the Taliban movement and has helped them establish their sanctuaries in Baloch areas with a view to pitting them against the Baloch.
Based on these grievances, the key demands of the moderates are provincial control over the resources of the province, ending economic exploitation, insisting that development projects like Gwadar port are linked with local ownership and benefit, devolving genuine provincial autonomy to the province, empowering the provincial government so that crucial decisions on issues like law and order and mega projects are not monopolized by the military. For example, as a Baloch leader said, ‘We want to live as an equal partner in the federation, with our democratic rights respected, including the ownership of our resources; these resources belong to the people of Pakistan’.8
The growing disenchantment among the moderates is, however, visible. For example, according to the late Baloch leader Habib Jalib Baloch: ‘Our main demand is the right of self-determination and self-rule. We appeal to the United Nations and other international organizations to help us. We want peaceful resolution of our dispute with Pakistan and to avoid bloodshed. We urge the UN to send peacekeeping forces here to expel Pakistani forces from this region and then start talks for peaceful settlement of the issue.’9 Likewise, a HRCP mission that visited Balochistan in 2011 noted the absence of a political discourse amongst the political elements in the province. Some of them even told the mission that the time for politics was over, and ‘… now even within the province there was a polarization of views on whether politics in the context of Pakistan was of any relevance.’10
One reason for this, of course, is that due to political engineering under Gen. Musharraf, the alliance of religious parties known as the Mutahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) dominated politics in Balochistan between 2002 and 2008. Then, the major nationalist parties of the province boycotted the 2008 elections, which resulted in their non-representation in the national and provincial assemblies between 2008 and 2013. Due to this moderate political vacuum, the separatists who were opposed to parliamentary politics got greater legitimacy.11
Moderate Political Parties
The key moderate political parties are:
The Balochistan National Party (BNP). It was formed by Sardar Attaullah Mengal, the head of the Mengal tribe, as a result of the merger of Mengal’s own Balochistan National Movement (BNM) and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo’s Pakistan National Party (PNP). While Attaullah Megal’s son Sardar Akhtar Mengal now heads the party, the BNP’s Central Executive Committee has very few sardars. Its demands include maximum provincial autonomy, an increase in Balochistan’s share of revenue from provincial resources and limiting the federal government’s authority to four subjects: defence, foreign affairs, currency and communications. Akhtar Mengal had stated: ‘It is not the government’s writ that has been challenged. It is the writ of the people which is challenged’.12 Musharraf had targeted Akhtar Mengal who was imprisoned in November 2006 on terrorism charges. During the trial, he was subjected to humiliating confinement in the courtroom in a cage-like structure that prevented any contact with his lawyer.13
In 2012 Akhtar Mengal presented a ‘six-point agenda’ for the peaceful resolution of the Baloch conflict. These included: immediate suspension of all overt and covert military operations in Balochistan; production of all missing persons before a court of law; disbanding of all proxy death squads operating under the supervision of the Inter-Services Intelligence and Military Intelligence; allowing the Baloch political parties to function freely; and rehabilitation of displaced persons as a confidence-building measure.14 Following the July 2018 elections, the BNP-M decided to support the ruling party in Islamabad—Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)—on the basis of a six-point agreement. The key element of this was addressing the issue of missing persons on a priority basis.15
The National Party (NP). It was formed with the merger of the Balochistan National Movement and the Balochistan National Democratic Party. It is led by Abdul Malik Baloch who was the chief minister of the province from 2013 to 2015 in coalition with the PML-N. It is a moderate, centre-left Baloch nationalist party that claims to represent the middle class. It has usually participated in the electoral process but boycotted the 2008 elections. It strongly opposes the Central government’s projects in the Makran belt such as Gwadar port without Baloch participation, demands that the Baloch should have the right to control their own resources and to determine their own priorities, political and economic. With its educated, non-tribal cadre, the National Party is opposed to the sardari system. Yet, it rejects the Musharraf government’s claims that the sardars are solely responsible for all of Balochistan’s ills. Instead, the National Party places the blame for the crisis squarely on the military’s shoulders.16
The Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP). It was formed by Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti in 1990. The JWP’s support base is largely limited to the Bugti tribe. However, his defiant stand against the government in his later years had won him the support of many other Baloch. Defending Nawab Bugti, Sardar Akhtar Mengal insisted: ‘If Bugti was a turncoat, he would not be in the mountains; he could have made a deal (with Musharraf), which he did not’.17 After Bugti’s killing, he is seen as a martyr for the Baloch cause.
Baloch Haq Talwar. Like Nawab Bugti’s JWP, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri
’s Baloch Haq Talwar is also largely tribal in its membership and structures. However, the Marris have been at the forefront of the fight against military rule. As such, politics for them have taken a back-seat.
These four political parties—BNP, NP, JWP and Haq Tanwar—had joined together in 2003 to form the Baloch Ittehad or Alliance that demanded an end to military action and advocated Baloch rights within a democratic, federal, pluralistic framework. One of the Ittehad leaders, Dr Baloch of the NP, stated that the Ittehad would ‘stand the test of time’, stressing that when ‘we see trouble from outside our nation, we stand as one’. Admitting that the four parties ‘still had political differences’, BNP leader Akhtar Mengal said, ‘on the Balochistan issue, we are one’.18
Balochistan Students Organisation (BSO). It was formed in 1967. It represents the educated Baloch middle class and students and has emerged as an independent political force, with its demands for the Baloch youth and recognition of Balochi as a medium of instruction in the province. It is divided into four factions: BSO (Awami), BSO (Azad), BSO (Mengal) and BSO (Pajjar). These factions have, however, united in the face of the challenges facing the Baloch. Although the BSO is not politically aligned with any nationalist party, like them it strongly opposes military rule.19. It has been responsible for training and producing many nationalist leaders and is an important vehicle for entry into the nationalist movement.
The Separatist Case
The separatist case hinges on the following:
The Baloch territory and the people were forcibly integrated into Pakistan without the approval of the Baloch representatives;
Both the Pakistani state and civil society are not trustworthy and are inimical to the cause of the Baloch people. The parliament and the judiciary cannot be helpful in the Baloch cause;
Pakistan- the Balochistan Conundrum Page 26
