Cyrnus, we seek out thorough-bred rams, asses and horses, and everyone wants to choose from good stock. But the noble man does not hesitate to marry the low-born daughter of a low-born man, if he provides much wealth; nor is a woman ashamed to be the wife of a wealthy, low-born man, but prefers to be rich instead of honourable. For they worship wealth. The noble is married to the low-born, the low-born to the noble. Wealth has mixed up the breed. Therefore do not be amazed, Cyrnus, that the breeding of our city is degenerating; for nobility is mixed with worthlessness.
(Theognis, Elegies, II. 183–92)
Although Theognis is commenting on the situation in Megara, possibly as late as the middle of the sixth century (c.550), it is clear from the political reforms of Solon, which substituted wealth for birth as the criterion for holding high office at Athens (see Chapter 5), that this change was well under way by the end of the seventh century.
Theognis’ poetry suggests that in many cities any qualms that the aristocrats may have felt about inter-marrying with these entrepreneurs and sharing political power with them were assuaged by the thought of the accompanying increase in personal wealth. However, there were in some cities wealthy men who either were on the fringe of or not part of the ruling aristocracy, and who were excluded from a share in government. It is in these circumstances that the economic cause of tyranny can be perceived, which is reinforced by the implicit suggestion of Thucydides:
As Greece became more powerful and acquired still more wealth than before, tyrannies were established in the majority of cities, their revenues increased.
(Thucydides 1.13.1)
In this context it is significant that the earliest known tyranny (apart from Pheidon’s) was established at Corinth, which was the wealthiest and most commercially advanced city in Greece in the archaic period.
The eighth century (799–700) had seen Corinth exploit the success of the Euboeans, who had established trading posts at Al Mina in the east and Pithecusae in the west (see Chapter 2), by being the pivotal point on this trade route of western metals and eastern luxury goods which is highlighted by Thucydides:
For the Corinthians, founding their city on the isthmus, have always had a trading centre, since the Greeks from inside and outside the Peloponnese, communicating with each other more by land than by sea in the past, had to go through their territory. So they became powerful through their wealth, as has been shown by the ancient poets, for they called the place ‘Wealthy Corinth’. And when the Greeks took a greater part in sea-faring, the Corinthians obtained a fleet and removed piracy; and by providing a trading centre both by land and by sea, they made their city powerful from the resultant revenues.
(Thucydides 1.13.5)
The voyage around Cape Malea at the foot of the Peloponnese was so dangerous that traders on the east–west trade route preferred either to drag their small ships across the Corinthian isthmus or, more usually, to trade at Corinth: thus making the city with its two harbours the most important trading centre and earning a substantial revenue from the imposition of tolls (Strabo 378). In addition, the Corinthians were prolific in their production of pottery for export, and presumably other goods that have not survived the ravages of time. The foundation of their colonies at Corcyra and Syracuse and the transportation of non-Corinthian colonists in their ships ensured that the bulk of trade and of supplies for the western colonies originated from or passed through Corinth, and was transported in Corinthian ships. Thus the growth of trade, shipping and manufacture ensured that there were many other beneficiaries, apart from the ruling aristocracy, of these wealth-creating opportunities in Corinth.
The chief cause of tyranny in Corinth was the refusal of the ruling aristocracy, unlike Megara, to admit these wealthy entrepreneurs into its ranks and give them a share in government; this situation was exploited by Cypselus and led to his tyranny, followed by that of his son Periander and his grandson Psammetichus (c.658–c.585). Corinth’s rise to economic preeminence had been masterminded by the aristocratic Bacchiads who were an exclusive family, maintaining this exclusivity by forbidding marriage outside their family. Diodorus, using Ephorus as his source, states that the whole of the Bacchiads were the governing class, and that individual members of the family would take it in turn to be the king for a year. Although Corinth had benefited from their leadership, the last years of their reign appear to have been less successful. Thucydides (1.13) mentions the earliest Greek sea-battle (of which he had knowledge), which was fought between Corinth and Corcyra around 664. He gives no information about the result or the cause of the battle, and even the date is suspect. However, the main point of relevance is that Corinth was at war with one of its major colonies, which was strategically important for the western trade route. In addition, the Corinthians may have been defeated in a border war with Megarians: there is the memorial of Orsippos of Megara, dated to around 700, which praised his success in driving out hostile invaders from his homeland. The rise of Argos under Pheidon in the second quarter of the seventh century may also have caused problems for Corinth. Criticism of their foreign policy failures, exacerbated by their exclusive retention of power, inevitably led them to suppress dissent and increased their unpopularity in the last period of their rule. Thus the stage was set for their overthrow.
There are two accounts of the rise of Cypselus: one from Herodotus and one from later writers (e.g. Diodorus) but ultimately based on Ephorus. Herodotus’ version is much more concerned with the oracles foretelling Cypselus’ future success and his survival as a baby than about the means by which he became tyrant. Labda was a lame daughter of the Bacchiads, whom no one wished to marry due to her infirmity. Therefore she was allowed to marry outside the family and took as her husband a man of distinction in Corinthian society, Eetion. When Labda failed to conceive, Eetion went to the Delphic oracle to consult the priestess who addressed him immediately as follows:
Eetion, no one honours you although you are worthy of honour. Labda is pregnant and will bear a great rock. And it will fall on the ruling men and will bring justice to Corinth.
(Herodotus 5.92.2)
The Bacchiads had already received an earlier cryptic oracle about their overthrow, which they had failed to decipher, but when they heard this oracle, all became clear. They attempted to kill the baby which escaped death by being hidden in a jar or chest (‘cypsele’) – hence the source of his name (or the legend). Herodotus tells this part of the tale in leisurely fashion, but resorts to brevity when dealing with his seizure and exercise of power. According to Herodotus, Cypselus was a violent ruler and was succeeded by his son, Periander, whose rule began mildly but soon became even more brutal than his father’s.
The version of Ephorus (contained in the work of Nicolaus of Damascus, the historian of Augustus) concentrates more on how Cypselus rose to power. Having been sent abroad as a baby, he returned to Corinth in manhood and became very popular owing to his virtuous character and behaviour which contrasted starkly with that of the Bacchiads. He was elected ‘polemarch’ (war-leader), treated debtors with great consideration, thereby increasing his popularity, formed a faction, killed the last reigning Bacchiad and became tyrant. He exiled the Bacchiads, confiscated their property and:
he recalled the exiles and restored citizen rights to those who had been deprived of them under the Bacchiads … Cypselus ruled Corinth mildly, having no bodyguard and enjoying popularity among the Corinthians.
(Nicolaus of Damascus FGrH 90.57)
This version, at first sight, appears more convincing than Herodotus. However, the fact that the polemarch (war-leader) in this account had only civil functions, which was the norm from the fifth century onwards, and that the other details of Cypselus’ rise to power and of his treatment of his enemies reflect more accurately the internal factional strife of the fifth and fourth centuries, strongly suggests that Ephorus has grafted contemporary political behaviour onto the bare bones of the original story.
Nevertheless, there is enough in Ephorus to
suggest that there is a core of truth in his version. In the first place, it emphasizes the popularity of Cypselus among the Corinthians, which was a necessary pre-requisite for any successful coup; this is in keeping with Herodotus’ account of Cypselus’ miraculous escape as a baby from death at the hands of his enemies, which type of story is traditionally associated with heroes not villains, and further weakens Herodotus’ attempted presentation of Cypselus as a conventional brutal tyrant. Furthermore, the fact that he had no need of a bodyguard – so untypical of tyrants in general – must in all probability mean that he had the willing support of the middle-class hoplites who may even have helped to overthrow the Bacchiads. The goodwill of the people would be ensured not only by the mildness and justice of his rule, which stood in clear contrast to the later Bacchiad regime, but also by his entrepreneurial supporters who would now have access to positions of political and commercial influence. If it is right that Corinth was being less successful than before in the last years of the rule of the Bacchiads and that there was serious dissatisfaction with their direction of economic policy by these entrepreneurs, then the conduct of economic policy under the tyrants would have resolved their grievances.
In the first place, Cypselus and Periander set about exploiting the economic opportunities of north-west Greece. They founded colonies at Leucas, Anactorium, Ambracia and Apollonia, and also helped to found Epidamnus with Corcyra, which would imply that the tyrants had healed the former rift with their colony. These colonial foundations were not only protective staging posts on the western trade route to Italy, but also provided access for Corinthian manufacturers and traders to the interior of north-western Greece, which allowed them to acquire raw materials such as timber and flowers for perfume production, and to trade in Corinthian manufactured goods such as the bronzes found at Trebenishte. In addition, the friendship of Miletus, a former enemy in the Lelantine War in the last third of the eight century, was carefully cultivated to gain access to the markets of the eastern Mediterranean; and support for Athens, by judging in their favour in the dispute with Mytilene about the control of Sigeum, brought the Athenians within their trading sphere and away from Aegina’s, Corinth’s commercial rival. This forging of good diplomatic relations for trade purposes was also undertaken with non-Greek rulers: presents were sent to Alyattes of Lydia and Periander’s successor was named Psammetichus after the king of Egypt, Psamtek.
An economic cause for the overthrow of aristocratic government at Corinth can justifiably be argued, especially as Corinth was the most commercially sophisticated city of the seventh and sixth centuries. The Corinthian outlook, with regard to manufacture, was markedly different to the rest of the Greeks.
All the Greeks have adopted this attitude [i.e. a bias against trade and manufacture], especially the Spartans, but the Corinthians have the least prejudice towards craftsmanship
(Herodotus 2.167)
It was probably due to this commercial attitude that the economic motive for tyranny was so predominant in Corinth. However, it was not only the entrepreneurial class whose economic grievances could lead to the rise of tyranny; the class of poor small farmers, who had not emigrated and whose livelihood was being threatened by the competitive imports of the new colonies, also looked to the tyrant for economic salvation. The economic problems of the poor and their effect upon the political process will be discussed in Chapter 5, which deals with Solon and his reforms.
Cleisthenes of Sicyon: the ethnic cause
Ethnic differences among the Greeks, revealed in their dialects and customs, were sufficiently pronounced to cause political problems at different times in their history. When the Athenians and their allies (mainly Ionians) were founding the Delian League in 478/7 (see Chapter 10), their choice of Delos as the League centre was highly significant since Athens, the islands and Ionia had previously held an Ionian festival there; this emphasis on their shared Ionian kinship was useful recruitment propaganda, highlighting their ethnic and cultural difference from the Dorian Spartans, who had been so unwilling to commit themselves militarily to the liberation of the Ionian Greeks from Persia. Ethnic divisions were felt yet more strongly in the Peloponnese, where the differences between the original Achaean Greeks and the Dorian invaders (see above under ‘Pheidon of Argos: the military cause’) were accentuated by the reduction of these pre-Dorians to a form of serfdom. The most renowned example was the ‘Helots’ of Sparta, whose numbers were dramatically increased in the seventh century by the Spartan conquest of Messenia, but there were other groups in a similar position: the ‘naked ones’ at Argos, ‘the dusty-feet’ at Epidaurus and the ‘sheepskin-cloak-wearers’ at Sicyon. However, it is also clear that many non-Dorians were admitted to citizenship by their conquerors. Apart from the three traditional Dorian tribes found throughout the Dorian states – the Dymanes, the Hylleis and the Pamphyloi – there often existed a fourth tribe, bearing a different name in different states (e.g. Aigialeis in Sicyon), which contained these non-Dorian citizens.
Although many states did achieve a degree of ethnic harmony, the evidence of the events in Sicyon under the tyranny of Cleisthenes reveals the tensions that probably existed below the surface in a number of states, as can be identified in the political struggles between the pre-Dorian Pisatans and the Dorian Eleans (see above under ‘Pheidon of Argos’). Orthagoras was the founder of the tyranny at Sicyon around the middle of the seventh century, and the story of his rise to power contains the same fairy-tale elements as Cypselus’ (Diodorus 8.24). Aristotle’s assertion (Politics 1315b) that the tyranny of Orthagoras and his successors lasted for a hundred years due to the mildness of their rule, their respect for the law and their concern for their subjects’ welfare is very convincing, especially as similar qualities underpinned the successful tyranny of Cypselus. Little is known about Orthagoras’ immediate successor(s), but Cleisthenes (c.600–570) attracted the attention of Herodotus by his overtly ethnic policies.
When Sicyon was at war with Argos, Cleisthenes made clear his bitter hatred of Argos: he stopped the recitation of Homeric poems because they praised Argive deeds; and after his failure to remove the shrine of the Argive hero, Adrastus, from the centre of Sicyon (he was refused permission by the Delphic oracle), he persuaded the Thebans to give him the statue of Adrastus’ deadly enemy, Melanippus, built a shrine to his memory and transferred to him the religious festival and honours that had previously been conducted in honour of Adrastus (Herodotus 6.67). If these actions had been the sum total of his reforms, it could be explained as jingoistic anti-Argive propaganda to unite the Sicyonians against their common enemy, but his next action was of far greater significance, since it actually emphasized rather than glossed over the internal ethnic differences within the state of Sicyon:
Cleisthenes gave different names to the Dorian tribes (in Sicyon) so that the Argives and Sicyonians would not have the same names; and he especially mocked the Sicyonians, for he imposed upon them the names derived from ‘pig’ and ‘donkey’, omitting only the end of the words, but excluded his own tribe. He gave to them the name derived from his rule, and these were called the Archelaoi (‘the Rulers’), but the rest were called ‘the Pig-men’, ‘the Donkey-men’ and ‘the Swine-men’.
(Herodotus 5.68)
The Orthagorid dynasty was non-Dorian, but there is no evidence that Orthagoras and his successors before Cleisthenes had felt the need to pander to such prejudice. However, it is possible that by 600 the Sicyonian tyranny was beginning to experience the increasing unpopularity that was a common characteristic of all tyrannies in their second and third generations of rule; and that Cleisthenes was deliberately stirring up hatred among his own non-Dorian ethnic group and promising privileged treatment in order to rally support behind his tyranny. Aristotle (Politics 1316a) quotes the events at Sicyon as an example of one tyranny replacing another, with the implication that there was a difference between Cleisthenes and Myron, his predecessor; and this may reflect Cleisthenes’ use of ethnic prejudice as t
he crucial weapon in his pursuit of power. What is clear is that Cleisthenes was determined to present himself as the radical leader of the non-Dorians in Sicyon and that such an overtly ethno-centric position, especially at a time of war with a foreign enemy, must have promised attractive political rewards. The fact that the Dorian Spartans, after putting down the tyranny around the middle of the sixth century, did not attempt to reverse the insulting names of the Dorian tribes (they remained in force for another 60 years) is a sure sign of the strength of feeling and the influence of the non-Dorian element in Sicyon, and the need of the Spartans to retain their goodwill.
Conclusion
The limitations of the sources have made it difficult for the modern historian to identify definitively a common cause of the political phenomenon that swept most of the Greek world from around 650 to 510. Clearly the success of tyranny in one city would inspire other potential tyrants to attempt the same revolution in their own cities – we could use as a modern example the way that Mussolini’s fascist movement in the 1920s acted as an inspiration in the 1930s for Hitler in Germany and Franco in Spain. In addition, tyrants were willing to help other aspirants to seize power in the hope of gaining a like-minded political ally, such as Lygdamis of Naxos who sent military aid to Polycrates in his successful bid for the tyranny of Samos. The other key factors that played an important part in the rise of tyranny appear to be military, economic and ethnic; but, whereas there is sufficiently convincing evidence to identify these factors in the establishment of a tyranny in certain individual cities, it cannot be proved that these same factors were the causes of tyranny in the other Greek cities. In the case of the cities on the coast of Asia Minor, the majority of the tyrants after 546 were imposed by the Persians as their preferred form of government for controlling the Greek subjects of their Empire; and the successive tyrannies in Mytilene on the island of Lesbos, documented in the poems of Alcaeus, reveal that competition between the ambitious aristocratic factions was the primary cause of tyranny, until Pittacus was finally elected by the people (presumably the hoplites) as their chosen tyrant (Alcaeus fr. 348). Nevertheless, the prevailing military, economic and ethnic conditions in the seventh and sixth centuries provide strong circumstantial evidence that these factors were instrumental in the rise of tyranny, to a greater or lesser degree, in the different cities throughout Greece.
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 9
