Legal reforms
In Aristotle’s account of Solon’s reforms, he highlights the three most ‘democratic’ features in the new constitution: first, the prohibition of debt involving the pledge of a person as security, and:
secondly, that it was possible for anyone who wanted to prosecute on behalf of those who were wronged; and thirdly, which is said to be the chief power of the people, there was appeal to the ‘dikasterion’ (the People’s Court).
(Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 9.1)
This ‘second’ legal reform marked a major change in the administration of the law. Previously, only the injured party could seek justice and compensation before an Athenian magistrate, by bringing a ‘dike’ (a private prosecution); if, for any reason, they could not bring the case, there was no way that they could seek legal redress. Solon had now established the principle that certain crimes affected not only the wronged individual but also the public interest, and therefore that any member of the citizen public should have the right to prosecute on behalf of the state. He did this by laying a written charge (‘graphe’) before the magistrate, and this Greek word ‘graphe’ came to be used for any public prosecution (see Chapter 14).
The ‘third’ legal reform granted the right of appeal to the ordinary Athenians. The Appeal Court was almost certainly the Ecclesia (the Assembly) sitting as a jury court, and in this capacity was known as the Heliaea (the People’s Court). However, there is scholarly dispute about how the system of appeal worked in practice. Some believe that there was no right of appeal from a magistrate’s judgement, if he kept the penalty within the limit prescribed by law; in this situation the magistrate’s judgement was final. But, if the magistrate wished to impose a higher penalty, he was obliged to refer the case to the Heliaea which would then decide to accept or reject the magistrate’s penalty.
Others have argued more convincingly that, although there were some minor cases in which the magistrate’s judgement was final, Solon in a majority of cases granted to any dissatisfied defendant the right of appeal to the Heliaea against a magistrate’s judgement. The Heliaea then conducted a re-trial and passed its own judgement that over-ruled that of the magistrate. This is confirmed by Plutarch:
For Solon also gave to all those who wanted it the right of appeal to the people’s court, even in the cases which he had assigned to the magistrates for them to judge.
(Plutarch, Solon 18.3)
Some scholars believe that Plutarch’s evidence is suspect on the grounds that its marked similarity to Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 9) must mean that he used Aristotle as his sole source, and that any extra information is pure conjecture on the part of Plutarch. However, it is known that Plutarch did use other fourth-century evidence. Moreover, he did see the published laws of Solon (Solon 25), and included quotations from them (e.g. Solon 19); consequently there is every reason to have faith in the accuracy of his account. What is indisputable is the fact that this reform, for the first time, made the aristocratic magistrates accountable to the Athenian people for their legal decisions (Aristotle, Politics 1274a 15–18); and thus marked the first stage in the development of the people’s control over the legal system that culminated in the reforms of Ephialtes (see Chapter 13).
Appraisal of Solon’s reforms
Economic reforms
Although the abolition of enslavement for debt was an outstanding social reform and the cancellation of debts provided immediate economic relief, Solon’s reforms did not remove all of the financial problems of the poor. The poorest of the former hectemoroi, even with full possession of their produce, and those who had been previously forced through poverty to become debt-bondsmen still faced the same difficulties of trying to make an adequate living for themselves and their families. Such men now found it harder to borrow, since they could no longer offer their own persons as reliable security for their debt and because creditors were wary about lending, having already suffered under one cancellation of debts. Their anger at Solon’s refusal to redistribute the land, which was (in their opinion) the ideal long-term solution for their economic plight, is made clear in Solon’s poem:
They came for plunder and were filled with hopes of riches, and each one of them thought that he would find great wealth … but now, being angry with me, they look at me suspiciously as though an enemy. This is not right. For, with the help of the gods, I accomplished all that I promised; and I did other things that were of worth. I chose neither to act with the brutality of a tyrant nor to give equal shares of our fertile homeland to the nobles and the common people alike.
(Solon fr. 34 in Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 12.3)
Therefore, although now free in the eyes of the law, many were forced to seek the patronage of the rich, and thus became their dependants – a source of physical strength for the politically ambitious aristocrats, but a destabilizing force within the state in the years that followed Solon’s archonship.
However, Solon’s economic policy had long-term objectives, and was designed to create a future prosperity for the Athenian people by removing the causes that had produced, and would produce again if changes were not made, the current economic crisis:
Seeing that … most of the land was unfruitful and poor in quality, and that sea-traders did not usually bring in goods to those who have nothing to give in exchange, Solon turned the citizens towards skilled trades, and he passed a law that there was no need for a son, if he had not been taught a trade, to support his father.
(Plutarch, Solon 22.1)
In addition, Solon offered Athenian citizenship to all foreign skilled tradesmen who were prepared to settle permanently with their family in Athens (Plutarch, Solon 24.2). He also forbade by law the export of all agricultural produce, except olive oil (Plutarch, Solon 24.1). The long-term result of this legislation was threefold: first, it encouraged farmers to concentrate on olive oil production, which was Athens’ most lucrative agricultural export; second, it encouraged those who had capital to invest in craft manufacture; and third, the growth of an industrial base in Athens provided alternative employment for those citizens who could never make an adequate living from agriculture.
It is probably in this context that Solon – if he did pass this reform and that is debatable – may have changed the weights and measures system in order to increase the Athenians’ market share of foreign trade (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 10). The reform of the coinage can be dismissed, as coins were not minted in Athens until a generation after Solon. However, the later coins took their names from the original weights of silver, and it is this fact that may have led later writers to associate Solon’s reform of weights and measures with a change in the coinage. But it is feasible to believe that Solon deliberately changed to the Euboean standard, used by Euboea and Corinth, in order to provide a bigger outlet for Athenian manufactured goods in their markets, especially in Sicily and southern Italy. Supporting evidence for this comes from the distribution of Athenian black-figure pottery which, from c.600 to c.580, is found abundantly in sites in Greece, the Black Sea, the eastern Aegean and along the trade routes to the west. However, from c.580 to c.560, there is not only a dramatic increase in the volume of black-figure pottery discovered in these same sites, but also it is found in inland Asia Minor and in large quantities in southern Italy and Sicily; by c.550 Attic pottery was more popular than its Corinthian counterpart. Thus Solon can be praised for laying the foundations of Athens’ commercial success in the sixth and fifth centuries.
Legal reforms
Solon’s legal reforms were without doubt his greatest success. The right of any citizen, not just the wronged person or their family, to seek legal redress in the courts marks a fundamental change in Athenian law (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 8.1). Public law, in which certain actions were considered to affect the well-being of the state, was now considered to be more important and a fairer system for delivering justice in certain matters than private arbitration, which was conducted by a magistrate and only involved the parties in dispute:
For, b
eing asked apparently which city was the best of all to live in, Solon replied: ‘The one in which those who are not wronged, no less than those who are wronged, denounce and punish the offenders.’
(Plutarch, Solon 18.5)
The other right of any citizen, who believed that he had been treated unjustly by a magistrate, to make an appeal to the Heliaea (the People’s Court) not only made the aristocratic magistrates accountable to the people but also established a role for the people in the legal system. Aristotle was correct in his assessment that this was one of the three most ‘democratic’ reforms of Solon: the Heliaea and the Ecclesia, the people in judicial and legislative capacities, became the twin bases of Athenian ‘radical’ democracy in the fifth century.
These two important legal reforms, however, would have been less effective if Solon had not also replaced the narrow, harsh law-code of Draco (apart from the law on homicide) with a comprehensive, sophisticated body of laws that embraced the many complex areas of human experience. The range of his laws, particularly at such an early stage in Athens’ history, is worthy of admiration: apart from the obvious criminal and political areas of law (e.g. homicide, theft, treason and amnesty for exiles), there were also those that concerned public morality (e.g. adultery, speaking ill of the dead, bad behaviour in public places, prostitution and excessive displays of grief at funerals), family law (e.g. the rights of heiresses, the making of wills, inheritance and duties in marriage), land law (e.g. shared use of public wells, the planting of trees and boundaries), and commercial law (e.g. loans and exports). It was Solon’s law-code that formed the backbone of Athenian fifth-century law and, whereas those laws which had been superseded by newer laws were removed, Solon’s laws were kept on public view for many centuries as a testament to his ideal of justice for all citizens.
Political reforms
Aristotle and Plutarch describe the crisis in Attica as a class struggle between the rich nobles and the common people, but there are good grounds for believing that this view does not adequately explain the main cause of Solon’s appointment as mediator. The rich and powerful landowners were not likely to put their political dominance and their personal wealth at risk simply because the poor were discontented. It seems more likely that the nobles were afraid that someone powerful would exploit the grievances of their own dependants, draw them into his own faction and use their armed strength to become tyrant, thus destroying the nobles’ power, wealth and privilege. It was this fear of tyranny that led the nobles to turn to Solon and be willing to contemplate a diminution of their power which was bound to follow from his reforms. Evidence for this view comes from Cylon’s attempt at tyranny in c.630 and the expulsion and cursing of the aristocratic family of the Alcmaeonids in the aftermath, which reflect the true nature of political conflict in Athens at this time: rivalries between competing aristocratic-led factions. For the separating lines of the political divisions in Athens were not horizontal between rich and poor, but vertical, dividing powerful families or groups of families, together with their dependants, from other families with their dependants. This is confirmed by the nature of the political struggles after Solon and by Peisistratus’ attempts to become tyrant. Thus a pure class struggle at the time of Solon, sandwiched between factional struggles earlier and later, seems extremely unlikely.
If this political conflict among the factions was the major problem that Solon was appointed to resolve, he failed:
The Athenians continued to suffer from disorder in their internal affairs: some used the cancellation of debts as a cause and an excuse for their discontent (for they had been reduced to poverty), others were displeased at the great change in the constitution, and some because of rivalry amongst themselves.
(Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 13.3)
The first cause of dissatisfaction presumably refers to the Eupatridai (the Well-born) who would have suffered financially from the abolition of payment of one-sixth of produce from the hectemoroi, although their ownership of large estates makes Aristotle’s statement about poverty an exaggeration. The second cause was the reduction in the political power of the Eupatridai, which opened up the top political posts to wealthy non-nobles. Rivalries between the competing factions was the third and greatest cause of internal disorder in Athens. After Solon’s departure from Athens, there was so much political conflict that no ‘eponymous archon’ was elected in 590/89 and again in 586/5. Furthermore a certain Damasias held onto this post for two years and two months (582/1; 581/0 and two months of 580/79), which must be seen as another attempt to set up a tyranny (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 13.1–2). The decision, after the deposition of the Eupatrid Damasias, to share out the archonships between five Eupatridai, three ‘agroikoi’ (farmers) and two ‘demiourgoi’ (artisans) probably reflects a concession that was forced upon the Eupatridai by the politically ambitious non-Eupatrids, and shows that there was still tension among upper-class Athenians.
The extent of Solon’s failure in his political reforms can be seen in the emergence of and rivalry between three powerful factions in the second quarter of the sixth century (575–550): ‘The Men of the Coast’ under the leadership of the Alcmaeonid Megacles; the ‘Men of the Plain’ under Lycurgus; and ‘the Men of the Hills’ (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 13.4) or ‘Men from beyond the Hills’ under Peisistratus (Herodotus 1.59). This shows that the regional power-base of the aristocratic factions, supported by their dependants, was still untouched by Solon’s measures. It was almost inevitable that political infighting between these factions would lead to civil unrest and eventually to tyranny. Solon tried desperately, but unsuccessfully, to warn the Athenians about approaching tyranny:
From a cloud there comes forth the strength of snow and hail, and from a bright flash of lightning there comes thunder. From powerful men comes the destruction of the city, and the people in their ignorance fall into slavery under one master. It is not easy later on to restrain a man, whom you have raised too far.
(Solon fr. 9 in Diodorus 9.20.2)
It was not until the tribal reforms of Cleisthenes in 508 (see Chapter 7) that the regional power of the aristocrats was finally and effectively destroyed, thus bringing the long-term political stability that Solon so desired to achieve.
Bibliography
Andrewes, A. CAH vol. 3.3, 2nd edn, ch. 43.
——Greek Society, ch. 6.
——The Greek Tyrants, ch. 7.
Finley, M. I. Economy and Society in Ancient Greece, ch. 9.
Moore, J. M. Aristotle and Xenophon on Democracy and Oligarchy,pt2.
Murray, O. Early Greece, 2nd edn, ch. 11.
Rhodes, P. J. A Commentary on the Aristotelian ‘Athenaion Politeia’.
Rihll, T. E. ‘Hektemoroi: partners in crime?’, JHS 111 (1991).
Stanton, G. R. Athenian Politics c. 800–500 BC A Sourcebook, chs 2–3.
6
THE TYRANNY OF THE PEISISTRATIDS AT ATHENS
The account of tyranny at Athens is covered in three stages by the literary sources – the rise of Peisistratus, his rule, and the downfall of the tyranny – but only Aristotle (or a pupil) in the Ath. Pol. covers all three. Herodotus concentrates on the first (1.59–64) and the third (5.55–61); and Thucydides briefly on the second (6.54.5–6) and more fully on the third (1.20.2; 6.53.3–59). The details and the nature of Peisistratus’ rule are described in Aristotle’s Ath. Pol. (16) and his Politics (1314a–1315b), but only in broad, general terms. However, although concrete facts are few in number, there is sufficient agreement among the sources that Peisistratus’ tyranny was for the most part popular: he achieved the much-desired political stability at home by conciliating the upper class through diplomacy, and by winning the goodwill of the lower class by his economic policies.
The rise of Peisistratus
The one conspicuous failure of Solon’s reforms, discussed in detail at the end of the previous chapter, was his inability to bring an end to the political unrest at Athens. The main cause of this was the conflict between the competing politic
al factions and the personal rivalry of their aristocratic leaders. According to Aristotle, there were three major factions:
One was the faction of the ‘Men of the Coast’ (‘Paralioi’) whose leader was Megacles, the son of Alcmaeon, and who seemed especially to be pursuing a middle type of constitution; another was that of the ‘Men of the Plain’ (‘Pediakoi’) who wanted the oligarchy and were led by Lycurgus; the third was the faction of the ‘Hillmen’ (‘Diakrioi’) over which had been appointed Peisistratus, as he seemed to be the most democratic.
(Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 13.4)
Herodotus, much closer in time to these historical events and therefore more reliable, especially as Aristotle is clearly using (and even mentions) Herodotus as his source (Ath. Pol. 14.4), refers to Peisistratus’ faction as the ‘Men from beyond the Hills’ (‘Hyperakrioi’). This term is likely to be more accurate since Peisistratus’ family home was at Brauron, on the east coast of Attica, and the main bulk of his supporters would have come from that region and the north-east.
Although Herodotus saw the geographical regions in Attica as the distinguishing feature of these three factions (1.59.3), Aristotle added political ideology as another. Aristotle’s use of such political labels as ‘middle’, ‘oli-garchic’ and ‘democratic’ is clearly anachronistic, and is more applicable to political conditions in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, but it is reasonable to believe that his description does reflect the basic attitudes of the three factions to Solon’s reforms. The faction of the Alcmaeonid Megacles might well be viewed as ‘middle’ in its acceptance of Solon’s legislation (or most of it), when compared to the other two factions that wished to alter it. The ‘oligarchic’ faction of Lycurgus, which represented the interests of the ‘Eupatridai’ (the Well-born) who possessed the best land in Attica and were among the richest, desired change through the abolition of Solon’s reforms and a return to the pre-594 state of affairs. They resented his political reforms, which opened up the archonships (and membership of the aristocratic council, the ‘Areopagus’) to the non-nobles and which established the legal right of the lower and middle classes to attend the ‘Ecclesia’ (Assembly) and to serve as an appeal court (‘Heliaea’) in bringing public officials to account; and his economic reforms, which cancelled all debts and released the ‘hectemoroi’ from their obligation to hand over one-sixth of their produce to themselves (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 13.3). The ‘democratic’ faction of Peisistratus probably represented the poorer farmers, including the former debt-bondsmen and hectemoroi, whose economic suffering had been removed only temporarily by the cancellation of debts, and consequently desired more radical reforms to ensure their long-term prosperity and the avoidance of debt in the future.
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 16
