In the immediate aftermath of the battle, just as the Persians had put to sea, a flashing shield was seen:
The Persians sailed around Sunium, wanting to arrive at the city before the Athenian army. The Alcmaeonids were accused in Athens of proposing this plan to the Persians; for, it was said, they had made an agreement with the Persians to hold up a shield for them as a signal when they were now on board (115) … it seems remarkable to me and I do not believe the story that the Alcmaeonids would ever hold up a shield by agreement to the Persians, wanting Athens to be brought under the control of the Persians and Hippias (121).
(Herodotus 6.115, 6.121)
Even Herodotus, who went to great lengths to defend the Alcmaeonids against this accusation, admitted that a flashing shield was definitely seen (Herodotus 6.124); and it is clear from the above quotation that the Persians had high hopes of capturing the undefended city. However, they were prevented by the speedy return of the Athenian army from Marathon and were forced to return to Asia. Whether the Alcmaeonids intended to betray Athens to the Persians, it is impossible to say, but Herodotus’ lengthy protestations about their innocence show that many Athenians themselves believed the Alcmaeonids to be guilty, and that this belief was still current as late as the third quarter of the fifth century when Herodotus was writing. Those suspected of collaboration with the Persians and consequently considered to be ‘friends of the tyrants’ (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 22.6) were destined to suffer in the 480s.
Athenian politics 489–481
Miltiades’ reputation was at its highest in Athens due to his services at the battle of Marathon; and thus his proposal in 489 to put himself in charge of 70 ships with soldiers and money without naming the objective of his expedition but with a guarantee of acquiring great wealth for Athens was passed by the Ecclesia. In fact, he aimed to conquer the island of Paros but, after a siege of 26 days, he returned to Athens, wounded and without success. This failure provided an opportunity for his enemies to bring him down:
After Miltiades’ return from Paros, the rest of the Athenians criticized him, especially Xanthippus, son of Ariphron, who brought him before the people and demanded the death penalty on a charge of ‘deceiving the Athenians’…the people supported him in so far as they rejected the death penalty but fined him fifty talents for his crime.
(Herodotus 6.136)
Miltiades died soon after this, when the wound to his thigh became gangrenous, and his son, Cimon, paid the huge fine.
Xanthippus is named as the chief prosecutor of Miltiades, and it would have been very useful if Herodotus had stated Xanthippus’ motive for bringing this case. He may have been inspired by his desire for justice on behalf of the people, but his demand for the death penalty suggests bitter opposition to Miltiades and, very possibly, his policy of outright resistance to Persia. Xanthippus’ marriage to the Alcmaeonid Agariste provides more evidence of a possible political alliance with the family, some of whose members may have favoured cooperation with the Persians. If this is true, then his prosecution of Miltiades was designed to weaken the opposition by removing its political leader once and for all. This seems plausible, since the dominant political issue after Marathon must have been Athens’ future relations with Persia. Such a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Athenians, following on from the burning of Sardis, was bound to provoke Persian retaliation on a far greater scale. Those politicians such as Miltiades, who had always advocated resistance to Persia, would have supported a policy of preparing for the conflict by rearmament and by forming alliances with other Greek states; the others would have done their utmost to make peace at all costs with Persia and to rid Athens of dangerous warmongers.
It was in this context, when there was such a major and irreconcilable division within the state with potentially destructive consequences for Athens, that the people unleashed for the first time the weapon that Cleisthenes had forged to resolve such dangerous situations. There followed a series of ostracisms: Hipparchus, the relative of Hippias, in 488/7; Megacles, the head of the Alcmaeonids, in 487/6; almost certainly Callias, a political supporter of the Alcmaeonids (see above) in 486/5. These three were distinguished by Aristotle as the ‘friends of the tyrants’ (Ath. Pol. 22.6), but not Xanthippus who was the fourth to be removed in 485/4; according to Aristotle, he was ostracized because he appeared to have become too powerful and influential. There are good grounds for believing that Aristotle was wrong in alleging this motive to the people. Xanthippus was the brother-in-law of Megacles, usually the sign of a political alliance; and he conducted the successful prosecution of the anti-Persian Miltiades in 489, and may even have been his prosecutor in the first case in 493/2. Furthermore, the numerous ostraka cast against two other Alcmaeonids, Callixenos and Hippocrates, strongly suggest that any Alcmaeonid or Alcmaeonid political ally around the middle of the 480s were the prime targets of the people for ostracism. Thus it is reasonable to believe that Xanthippus, in the minds of the Athenian people, was either directly associated with the perceived pro-Persian policy of the Alcmaeonids or was suspected, through his marriage connections, of being in sympathy with this policy; and it was for this reason that he was ostracized.
Many scholars have suspected that Themistocles was the mastermind behind some or all of these ostracisms, and certainly the large number of pre-480 ostraka inscribed with his name, including a find of 190 ostraka written by only fourteen hands, shows that he was sufficiently prominent and influential for his political enemies to attempt his downfall. The literary sources give no direct evidence about his political activities in the 480s until 483/2, when his proposal to build either 200 ‘triremes’ (Herodotus 7.144) or 100 (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 22.7; Plutarch, Themistocles 4.1–3) with the surplus from the silver mines at Laurium transformed Athens into a naval superpower. For the rest of the 480s he was the dominant politician in Athens, and held the post of ‘strategos autocrator’ (commander-in-chief) of the Athenian armed forces against the Persians in 480, the year of the battle of Salamis. The sources, therefore, concentrate on Themistocles when he was at the peak of his career. However, if a dramatic and sudden rise to power in 483/2 seems unlikely, then it is plausible to believe that Themistocles was politically active throughout the 480s, which is confirmed by the ostraka – many of which are linked by their location with Megacles and should be dated to his ostracism in 487/6. If he was the political opponent of the Alcmaeonids and their allies, then he in all probability supported the policy of resistance to Persia.
Themistocles has also been linked with the reform of 487/6 by which the archons were no longer appointed by direct election, but were chosen after a two-stage process: election of a larger group (possibly 100 in total, ten from each tribe) and then the use of lot among this number to choose the nine archons (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 22.5). The prestige of the archonship was affected by this reform, and from that date no well-known politician is known to have held this office. Either now or soon after, the ‘strategia’ (generalship) became the most important and the most sought after political post in Athens. Unlike the archonship, which could be held only once in a lifetime, the strategos (general) was eligible for re-election for as many years as he retained the confidence of the electorate. This continuity of office was essential for the approaching conflict with Persia, as it ensured that men of military ability were in a position to give coherent and consistent leadership. It was not long before generals were also being elected for their political ability, which must have led to the transfer of some powers of the archonship to the generalship. The importance of the generalship in the Persian Wars and in the rise of the Delian League in the 470s and 460s (see Chapter 10) increased its authority at the expense of the archonship. Themistocles was the main beneficiary in the 480s of this reform and the ostracisms, and it is for that reason that he is believed to have played a part in their implementation. Whether he did or did not, ostracism certainly provided the much-needed unity in the state by ridding Athens of Persian sympathizers, and the general
ship provided the continuity of command in the vital build-up to the war with Persia.
Aristides was the last man in the 480s to be ostracized (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 22.7) and, although it is not explicitly stated in the sources, the issue that probably led to his ostracism was Themistocles’ naval bill. Ostensibly, Themistocles’ proposal to build a new fleet was put forward to meet the threat from Aegina, but in reality he had Persia in view:
The Aeginetans and the Athenians and the other states possessed small fleets, and most of their ships were penteconters [50-oared ships]. It was only recently that Themistocles persuaded the Athenians, when they were at war with the Aeginetans and were at the same time expecting a foreign invasion, to build a fleet with which they fought at Salamis.
(Thucydides 1.14.3)
According to Plutarch (Aristides 2–3), there had always been great personal and political rivalry between the two politicians, but their disagreement over this issue was perceived by the Athenians to be so divisive and so potentially damaging to the state that only an ostracism could finally resolve the matter. Once again the sources fail to clarify the reason for Aristides’ specific opposition to Themistocles’ naval bill. Possibly he was worried that such an emphasis on sea power would weaken and undermine the quality of the Athenian ‘hoplite’ army. Far more likely was his fear that, if Athens’ future greatness depended upon sea power, the lower class thetes, who would be the oarsmen of the ships, were bound to demand more political power than was granted to them under Cleisthenes’ constitution which favoured the aristocracy and the middle classes. Themistocles, on the other hand, firmly believed that Athens’ future lay on the sea, and willingly accepted the political consequences of this policy (see Chapter 11 for a fuller discussion).
Aristides’ ostracism removed the last obstacle to harmony in the state, and the Athenians decided that ostracism should be suspended in order to provide a unified front to the Persian invasion. Furthermore, in 481/0, they declared an amnesty for all those who had been ostracized (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 22.8), allowing them to return to Athens, admit the error of their former policies and join in defence of their homeland. All returned except Hipparchus, who was condemned to death in his absence as a traitor. The Athenians were now ready to face the sternest test in their history to date.
Bibliography
Hignett, C. A History of the Athenian Constitution, ch. 7.
Lenardon, R. J. The Saga of Themistocles, chs 3 and 4.
Lewis, D. M. Sparta and Persia, ch. 2.
Moore, J. M. Aristotle and Xenophon on Democracy and Oligarchy, pp. 241–46.
Murray, O. Early Greece, 2nd edn, ch. 15.
Ostwald, M. CAH vol.4, 2nd edn, pt 2, ch. 5.4.
Sealey, R. A History of the Greek City States 700–338 BC, ch. 7.
9
THE PERSIAN WAR: GREEK STRATEGY AND THE LEADERSHIP OF SPARTA IN 480–479
The sources
The fullest description of Xerxes’ invasion of Greece is contained in the last three books of Herodotus (all source references in this chapter are to Herodotus unless otherwise stated). Although he has been criticized justifiably by modern and ancient historians for his weaknesses (see Chapter 1 for a fuller discussion), his strengths, especially when compared with later writers, are such that his account of these events should be considered reasonably trustworthy. His accuracy has often been proved by other sources, when they are available, for example, his list of the six Persian nobles who helped Darius to seize the throne of Persia in 522 compares very favourably with Darius’ own list which was included in an official inscription at Behistun in Media, recording his achievements; there is only one mistake and that an explicable one. This accuracy was due to his painstaking research and interviews with many of the eyewitnesses, both Greek and Persian, of the events that he narrated. As he was writing in the third quarter of the fifth century, he had access to many of the combatants and junior officers who took part in the battles. However, his accounts of the discussions in the Greek councils of war must be treated with caution, as they must be based upon gossip and rumour, since the middle-aged chief commanders who left no memoirs were dead by the time of his research. It is also clear from his descriptions that he visited the sites of the battles of Thermopylae, Salamis and Plataea, although his understanding of strategy is very limited. It is to Herodotus’ credit that Thucydides, although critical of him as a historian (Thucydides 1.20.3), generally accepts his history of the war, and adds very little extra information when referring to the Persian War, with the exception of his praise of Themistocles’ qualities which was intended to contradict the anti-Themistocles traditions accepted too uncritically by Herodotus.
The other main contemporary fifth-century source is the Athenian tragedian Aeschylus, who took part in the battle of Salamis in 480 and commemorated this great victory by making it the centrepiece of his play, the Persai, performed in 472. It is useful to use his account of the battle to supplement and compare with that of Herodotus, but clearly the major aim of the play was to celebrate, with as much dramatic skill as possible, one glorious deed in the history of the Greek resistance to the Persians, and thus sheds little light on the Persian War as a whole.
Apart from Aeschylus, Herodotus and Thucydides, the other main evidence comes from or is derived from the fourth-century writers, Ephorus and Ctesias. Ctesias of Cnidus was the court doctor of King Artaxerxes II of Persia (c.404–360) and wrote a Persica, a history of the Persians in 23 books. His history has not survived; a brief epitome, written by the Byzantine Bishop Photius in the ninth century, survives, and there are references to his work in Plutarch’s Life of Artaxerxes, Strabo’s Geographia and Diodorus’ World History. He claimed to have used Persian royal documents (Diodorus 2.32.4) but, whatever his merit as a historian of Persian affairs during the second half of the fifth century, his account of the Persian War is filled with errors. The most glaring are the placing of the battle of Plataea (479) between Thermopylae and Salamis (both in 480), and the death of Mardonius, the Persian commander-in-chief killed by the Greeks at Plataea, at the hands of the gods in a storm that saved Delphi. His inaccuracy and untrustworthiness make not only his evidence unreliable but also those who used him as their source. Plutarch, who was particularly critical of Herodotus in his De Malignitate Herodoti (About the Spitefulness of Herodotus), used in his Life of Themistocles the work of a certain Phanias of Lesbos who appears also to have been dependent on Ctesias; and this may be the source of Plutarch’s account of the battle of Salamis which is not based on Herodotus’ narrative. In fact, Plutarch made use of many sources, and thus provides some interesting information to add to Herodotus’ account, but as their information is probably derived from Ephorus, it is of doubtful value.
The most important of the fourth-century writers was Ephorus, who wrote the Historiai,a‘universal’ Greek history in 30 books. His description of the Persian War has not survived, but it is widely agreed that Diodorus of Sicily, writing in the first century BC has followed his account closely but more briefly (11.1–19, 27–37). Ephorus clearly used Herodotus as a source, as Herodotus’ name, his history and its scope are specifically mentioned (Diodorus 11.37.6); and, on many occasions, there is a marked similarity in detail. However, he was a pupil of the orator and teacher Isocrates, and shared his beliefs in the use of history and rhetoric as a means of moral improvement, namely to glorify virtue and to condemn vice. His version of Thermopylae, influenced by such rhetoric, has the Spartan King Leonidas bravely attacking the Persian camp and even entering Xerxes’ tent on the night before the final destruction of the Greek forces. The differences between Ephorus’ account and that of Herodotus seem to be derived, not from a separate unidentified fifth-century source, but from his attempt to rationalize the different accounts of Herodotus, Aeschylus and Ctesias. If this is the case, then Ephorus (through book 11 of Diodorus) will add very little to the content of those three sources.
Preparations for war, 484–481
Xerxes succee
ded his father Darius as King of Persia in 486 and, after putting down rebellions in Egypt and Babylon, he turned his attention to Greece in 484. Under his father two attempts had been made to punish Athens (and Eretria) for taking part in the burning of Sardis in 499: the joint land and sea campaign through Thrace under the command of Mardonius in 492; and the sea-borne expedition across the Aegean under Datis and Artaphrenes in 490, culminating in the battle of Marathon (see Chapter 8). Although nominally the new campaign was against Athens, it was clear that the conquest of all Greece south of Macedon was the primary objective, and thus Xerxes had to choose between the two previous strategies. The presence of Mardonius as one of his chief military advisors and the difficulty of transporting a very large army across the Aegean probably influenced Xerxes to opt for the strategy of 492. Mardonius’ strategy had been based upon a joint land and naval campaign, with the fleet and army working in concert. He had succeeded, in the aftermath of the Ionian Revolt, in restoring Persian control over Thrace and Macedon as far as the borders of Thessaly. However, the destruction of his fleet when rounding the Mount Athos peninsula in Chalcidice and the heavy casualties inflicted by the Brygi, a Thracian tribe, led to the abandonment of his plans to punish Athens and Eretria (6.43–45). Xerxes firmly believed that a repetition of the setbacks that had troubled Mardonius could be avoided.
With this in mind Xerxes set about implementing a carefully planned programme to ensure the efficient and safe movement of his troops through Thrace and Macedon. From 484 to 481 various building projects were put into operation. Three years were spent on building a canal through the isthmus of the Mount Athos peninsula so that his fleet would not have to face the dangers of rounding that stormy promontory (7.22–23). Bridges were also built over the Hellespont and the river Strymon in Thrace (7.24), and presumably over the other rivers for speed of movement. Food depots were also located on the route through Thrace and along the coast, not only to feed the Persian forces on the march through those areas (the Greek cities were expected to offer generous hospitality), but also to be a source of supplies for the troops as they advanced into Greece, if they found that the Greeks had removed or destroyed the means to sustain themselves (7.25). Roads were built and paved, where necessary, in order to cope with wheeled transport. Finally, guard-posts, inns and courier stations were established along the route to protect the Persian lines of communication and to discourage any hostile action, particularly by the Thracians, that could threaten the safety of the forces in Greece. Thus Xerxes, unlike the foolish and headstrong autocrat as portrayed in Herodotus, had been meticulous in his planning for the invasion of Greece.
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 23
