(Demosthenes 7.22)
The Athenians, however, did not respond generously to this offer. They proposed two amendments: first, that both sides should retain, not the territories that each held when the Peace was sworn (Dem. 7.26), but those which lawfully belonged to them (Dem. 7.18); and second, that the Peace of Philocrates should not be binding solely upon Athens and Macedon and their respective allies, but should be a Common Peace, namely a peace to include all the Greek states and to guarantee their freedom and autonomy by armed intervention against any aggressor (Dem. 7.30–31). Hegesippus, a member of Demosthenes’ anti-Philip faction and the probable author of Demosthenes’ Seventh Speech, was sent to Macedon to deliver the Athenian answer.
Philip was very displeased with the first amendment, as this was an implicit claim by the Athenians of their legal right to regain their colony of Amphipolis, which was crucial to Macedon, both as a protection to its eastern flank and as the base for advancing into Thrace. Philip took his time, and did not reply until the following year. In the meantime, in the winter of 343/2, he intervened in the kingdom of the Molossi in Epirus, deposed the king and replaced him with Alexander, the brother of Olympias, one of Philip’s wives. He then advanced to Cassopia, just north of Acarnania, captured three small cities, and handed them over to Alexander (Dem. 7.32). In this way Philip consolidated the kingdom of the Molossi and therefore the south-western border of Macedon from outside attack. This military action strengthened the hand of Demosthenes who capitalized on the anti-Philip mood of the Athenians. He had already played his part in 343 in the downfall of Philocrates, the original proposer of the Peace (Aeschines 2.6) and had only just failed to secure the condemnation of Aeschines (Plutarch, Demosthenes 15.3). He now portrayed Philip’s actions against Cassopia as a planned attack on Ambracia (Dem. 7.32).
In 342, Philip made one last attempt to resolve his difficulties with Athens by diplomacy. He rejected outright the Athenian claim for Amphipolis, which was a non-starter from the beginning and which the Athenians had not possessed since 424 (Dem. 7.18). However, he was willing to accept the second amendment and be a willing participant in a Common Peace which he hoped would show his commitment to peace in Greece (Dem. 7.33). But Demosthenes and his faction were now dominant in Athens; the scathing and belligerent Seventh Speech, delivered by either Demosthenes or Hegesippus, rejecting all his proposals and offers of arbitration, was the turning point in Philip’s relations with Athens. Diplomacy had failed, because the Athenians had refused to trust him under this Peace and were not prepared to negotiate seriously in the formulation of a new peace, in which he could allay their fears. Now it would have to be war.
In mid-342, Philip once more turned to Thrace. According to Diodorus, his aim was to deal with Cersebleptes who was continually attacking and ravaging the territory of the Greeks in the Hellespont (16.71.1). Without doubt Philip had decided once and for all to finish off Cersebleptes, who had defied him since 352, and he quickly defeated and expelled the Thracian King (Dem. 12.10). But Philip’s aims must have been more far-reaching than the expulsion of Cersebleptes, since he continued to campaign for the next two years before he attacked Perinthus in 340 (see below). His campaigns took him beyond the river Hebrus into the far north of Thrace, and his marriage to the daughter of the King of the Getae in that region marked his success against that tribe. Philip incorporated much of Thrace into his enlarged kingdom, possibly turning it into a Macedonian province under the authority of a Macedonian general (17.62.5; Arrian, Anabasis 1.25). The northern parts of Thrace were turned into dependent client-kingdoms. It would seem, therefore, that Philip had planned the conquest of the whole of Thrace, and it is very possible that his main aim in this Thracian campaign was to secure his northern flank from Macedon to the Hellespont in preparation for his attack upon Persia.
Meanwhile the Athenians were enjoying some success at Philip’s expense in Euboea. In 348, the Euboeans had managed to gain independence from Athens, but internal rivalry between the contenders for the tyranny of both Eretria and Oreus gave Philip the opening to intervene in that island. In c.342, Cleitarchus, the tyrant of Eretria, appealed to Philip for help against his political rival and on three separate occasions received military aid (Dem. 9.58). Philistides, the tyrant of Oreus, also received Macedonian military backing to shore up his position (Dem. 9.59–62, 65). The presence of pro-Macedonian tyrants in Euboea, which was strategically important for Athens (see above), and the fear that Macedonian influence might spread throughout the island, drove Demosthenes and the Athenians into action. Demosthenes forcefully denounced Philip’sinfiltration of Euboea in his Third Philippic and, in 341, the Athenians formed an alliance with Chalcis, one of the most important cities in Euboea. A combined army of Athenians and Chalcidians overthrew both tyrants, thus removing a grave source of danger to Athens’ borders (Philochorus FGrH 328 fr. 159–60).
War finally broke out in 340, when Philip and Athens clashed in the Propontis, the small sea that connects the Bosporus to the Hellespont. There had already been tension in 341: the Athenian commander, Diopeithes, had attacked Cardia, which was an ally of Philip, but was claimed by the Athenians as part of their territory in the Chersonese. Philip’soffer to submit the dispute to arbitration was rejected by the Athenians, and therefore he supplied troops to protect Cardia from attack (Dem. 12.11). Diopeithes, in retaliation, attacked places in Thrace that belonged to Philip (Dem. 12.3; 8.8–9). In July 340, Philip attacked and besieged the city of Perinthus on the Propontis, which, according to Diodorus, was opposed to him and favoured the Athenians (16.74.2), although a more likely reason was its failure to supply troops to Philip’s campaign against Cersebleptes. However, help in the form of money, supplies and mercenaries was sent to Perinthus by the Persian satraps in that region on the orders of the Persian king, who was increasingly disturbed by the growth of Macedonian power on his western border (16.75.1; Dem. 11.5). Perinthus was further helped by Byzantium which also sent soldiers and generals (16.75.2). Therefore Philip also attacked and besieged Byzantium which was strategically far more important, since it commanded the Bosporus, the narrow strait that controlled access to and from the Black Sea.
This military operation caused the greatest fear among the Athenians because Philip, if he gained control of Byzantium, could prevent the Black Sea grain ships from reaching Athens, thus starving them into submission. The Athenians acted swiftly. They put aside their former hostility to the Byzantines, made an alliance, sent out a naval force and secured control of the sea around Byzantium (16.77.1). At the same time Byzantium’s other allies, Chios, Rhodes and Cos also sent help. Philip’s willingness to use diplomacy in his dealings with Athens was at an end:
‘These are my complaints against you. Since you have begun the aggression and, on account of my restraint, are already making more attacks on my interests and are harming me with all your power, I will justly resist you and, calling upon the gods as witnesses, I will take issue with you.’
(Demosthenes 12.23)
The Athenians responded to Philip’s declaration of war, delivered in September 340, by destroying the stone that recorded the Peace of Philocrates and by manning a fleet under the command of Phocion (Philochorus FGrH 328 fr. 55).
Philip soon realized that his siege of Byzantium and Perinthus, with their superb natural defences and with the increased reinforcements, would be long and arduous. Always the realist, Philip broke off both sieges: the conquest of that part of Thrace would have to wait. Athens was the real enemy, not Byzantium, which was far more likely to capitulate if Athens was defeated; in addition, there was still unfinished business in the north. Philip spent the winter of 340/39 advancing even further northwards than before, and, upon reaching the banks of the river Danube, he defeated the nomadic Scythians and married the daughter of their king, thus removing any possible threat to Macedon and Thrace from the north (16.1.5). Philip was now ready for the final reckoning with the Athenians.
A dispute in the Amphictyonic
League between the Athenians and the Locrians provided Philip with the opportunity to intervene in central Greece. The Locrians of Amphissa were accused by the Athenians of cultivating sacred land and of charging tolls at Cirrha, the port of Delphi. As a consequence, a fourth Sacred War was declared and Philip, who controlled most of the votes in the Amphictyonic Council, was chosen as the leader of the League’s forces against Amphissa (Dem. 18.143–52; Aesch. 3.113–31). This appointment was important for Philip, since his passage through Thermopylae had been blocked by the Theban seizure in 339 of the town of Nicaea that controlled the pass at Thermopylae (Philochorus FGrH 328 fr. 56b). Philip moved south with his Macedonian and Thessalian forces, and bypassed Thermopylae by going directly from Thessalian Lamia to Doris, north of Amphissa. However, in a lightning move, he suddenly captured Elatea in Phocis, situated near the Boeotian border and on the main route to Thebes (Aesch. 3.140). Tension between Philip and Thebes had already been in evidence from the seizure of Nicaea by the Thebans, who were traditional allies of the Locrians and also resented Philip’s ascendancy in the Amphictyonic League. Philip’s fortification of Elatea was a veiled threat to the Boeotians to stay loyal to their alliance with Philip.
The news of Philip’s capture of Elatea, only two days’ march from Attica, caused panic among the Athenians (Dem. 18.169–70). An Athenian embassy, including Demosthenes, was despatched to Thebes to attempt to negotiate a military alliance with the Boeotians against Philip. In Thebes they found Philip’s embassy requesting the Boeotians as his allies to either join in his attack on Athens or give him free passage through Boeotia (Dem. 18.213). It is a tribute to Demosthenes’ eloquence and Boeotian courage that the Boeotians decided to risk all by allying themselves with Athens. During the winter of 339/8, both sides stayed on the defensive with some minor skirmishing, but the Athenians used this time in winning over the support of Achaea, Corinth, Megara, Euboea, Acarnania, Leucas and Corcyra for the show-down with Philip (Dem. 18.237).
It was well within Philip’s power to bring the issue to a quick decision by forcing a battle with the Athenians and Boeotians before they received reinforcements from their new allies – thus it is probable that his decision to delay battle was motivated by his preference to resolve the situation by diplomacy. His planned invasion of Persia would have a much greater chance of success, if he did not leave behind in Greece a deep-seated bitterness and implacable hostility towards himself by conquered opponents, as Agesilaos and the Spartans had discovered to their cost in the 390s (see Chapter 24). However, his offer of peace terms, although favourably received by the Athenian general Phocion (Plutarch, Phocion 16.1) and by the Boeotarchs, the elected leaders of the Boeotian League, was vehemently rejected by Demosthenes, denouncing as a traitor any man who brought forward Philip’s peace overtures for discussion in the Athenian and Boeotian Assemblies (Aesch. 3.148–51). Demosthenes carried the day and both sides met at the battle of Chaeroneia in August 338: Philip’s overwhelmingly decisive victory made him the master of Greece.
The Macedonian hegemony of Greece, 338–336
Although the Athenians and the Boeotians feared the worst, Philip had no intention of destroying his enemies. His ultimate aim was to attack Persia; to succeed in this undertaking, he needed the political cooperation and the military support of the Greeks. The means would be a newly constituted league, the so-called League of Corinth, which would formally recognize the Macedonian hegemony of Greece. However, before this could be implemented, he had to deal with the states that had opposed him. His toughest treatment was reserved for the Thebans.
Philip’s harsh punishment of the Thebans is reminiscent of his unforgiving treatment of the Olynthian-led Chalcidian League (see above). These two allies, towards whom he had acted generously but who had subsequently betrayed his trust by allying themselves with Athens, felt the full force of his displeasure. The Thebans were obliged to pay ransoms for the return of their dead and those who had been captured at Chaeroneia (Justin 9.4.6); a Macedonian garrison was installed in the Cadmeia, the citadel of Thebes (16.87.3); the Theban opponents of Philip were either executed or exiled, and the pro-Philip Theban exiles were restored to power (Justin 9.4.7–8); Plataea and Orchomenus, which had been destroyed by the Thebans, were either rebuilt and repopulated (Pausanias 9.1.8, 37.8) or planned for the future (Arrian, Anabasis 1.9.11). There is a possibility that the Boeotian League – the source of Theban power – was dissolved, but the evidence suggests that Philip allowed it to continue: Arrian (see beginning of Chapter 27) mentions the Boeotarchs, the leading officials of the League, in 335 (Anabasis 1.7.11).
By contrast, the Athenians were treated with remarkable leniency. Admittedly, the Second Athenian League was dissolved, but this was not a serious blow, as it had already been severely weakened by the secession of many of the strongest allies (Pausanias 1.25.3). On the other hand, the Athenians were allowed to keep their ‘cleruchies’ (see Glossary) on Samos, Lemnos, Imbros, Scyros and Delos (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 61.6, 62.2), and were also given Oropus, the much disputed town on the Athenian–Boeotian borders, which at that time had been in the possession of the Boeotians (18.56.6–7). It was also a great relief to many Athenian families, when Philip restored the 2,000 Athenian captives without requiring a ransom (Justin 9.4.4; Polybius 5.10.4). Philip made it clear that he had no intention of attacking Athens by initiating a peace treaty and an alliance with the Athenians, to which they readily agreed (16.87.3). Such generous treatment must be linked with Athens’ powerful navy, which was essential for his planned invasion of Asia Minor, and with Athens’ influential position within Greece: a grateful and compliant Athens would be a major asset in his new Greek league.
Little is known of Philip’s treatment of his other opponents, but it is very likely that peace treaties were also signed with them, with the deliberate
Map 10 Growth of Macedonian power, 359–336 BC
exception of Sparta. This was probably accompanied by his sympathizers and supporters within these states gaining control of their respective governments – thus smoothing the way for acceptance of his future proposals about Greece. Macedonian garrisons were used sparingly, being placed in key strategic positions to maintain his grip on Greece: Ambracia in the west, Chalcis in the east and Corinth in the south (17.3.3; Deinarchus 1.18). The last of his preliminary operations was in the Peloponnese, where he
ravaged Spartan territory and resolved long-standing territorial disputes by giving Spartan frontier districts to Tegea, Megalopolis, Argos and Messenia (Polybius 9.28.6–7; Pausanias 8.7.4; Tacitus, Annals 4.43). In this way he won the goodwill of these states, and removed the source of tension that had led to the break-up of the Boeotian–Peloponnesian alliance and the loss of Theban influence in the Peloponnese (see Chapter 25) – another lesson that he had learned from his close observation of Theban foreign policy in the 360s. Now Philip was ready to place the Macedonian hegemony of Greece on a constitutional and legal footing.
In mid-337, a congress, to be held at Corinth, was announced to which all Greek states were invited to send representatives, possessing the power to take decisions on behalf of their states (16.89). At this congress, the so-called League of Corinth was established with its own constitution; Sparta refused to attend, because once again the independence of Messene was implicitly accepted by its right to participate. The main evidence for the constitution comes from a damaged stone, which records the terms of a general Greek peace with Philip (GHI 177); and from Demosthenes’ speech ‘On the Treaty with Alexander’ (17), delivered in 331/0, in which he cites alleged infringements of the constitution by Alexander. Many of the terms were typical of the Common Peaces that had been sworn throughout the fourth century: for example, the guarantee of each state’s right to freedom and autonomy, and a sanctions clause, i.e. the right to take military action against those who broke the terms of the Peace. However, there were two significant differences, arising from the fact that a league had also been created.
First, a
‘synod’ (meeting) of all member-states was established (Aesch. 3.161), which had the power to pass decrees that were binding on all members and to exercise jurisdiction. Second, the position of ‘hegemon’ (leader) was formally established, who also had the authority under the sanctions clause to intervene directly against any state that broke the Peace (Dem. 17.6, 17.19): this provided Philip with the legitimate right, backed by the League, to suppress any action perceived as anti-Macedonian. It is clear from this particular stipulation in the constitution that Philip intended to use the League as the means to control Greece. At the second meeting of the League, Philip was elected as ‘general of Greece with full powers’, and he began to organize a Greek expedition against Persia (16.89.3; Justin 9.4). In 336, an advanced force was sent to Ephesus under the command of two of Philip’s generals, Parmenion and Attalus (16.91.2). Philip was making preparations to follow with a much larger force when he was struck down by an assassin’s dagger.
Philip’s outstanding achievements have not always been fully appreciated in the past. This is probably due to three reasons: first, the brilliance of his son; second, the main surviving record of his life and actions comes from Demosthenes, his arch-enemy; and third, the fragmentary nature of Theopompos’ Philippica, which was the first general Greek history centred on the exploits of an outstanding individual. But Philip is worthy of the highest praise. By a combination of adroitness in diplomacy and superiority in warfare, he welded Macedon into a permanently unified state, thus avoiding the usual internal convulsions and civil war that followed the death of a Macedonian King; and he had put Macedon at the centre of Greek politics – Macedon, previously considered semi-barbarian and of marginal importance to the former traditional super-powers of Greece. He had laid the political and military foundations of Macedon’s supremacy over Greece, which enabled Alexander to dedicate most of his short life to the acquisition of eternal fame by the conquest of Persia. If he had lived, perhaps he may have gained the title of ‘Philip the Great’.
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 68
