I am persuaded, if he speak in conscience, he will confess that all the benefit he hath gotten by so tedious a pursuit hath been that he hath learned to know his own weakness. That ignorance which in us was natural we have with long study confirmed and averred. It hath happened unto those that are truly learned as it happeneth unto ears of corn which, as long as they are empty, grow and raise their head aloft, upright, and stout. But if they once become full and big with ripe corn, they begin to humble and droop downward. So men having tried and sounded all—and in all this chaos and huge heap of learning and provision of so infinite different things—and found nothing that is substantial, firm, and steady, but all vanity, have renounced their presumption and too late known their natural condition. It is that which Velleius upbraids Cotta and Cicero withal, that they have learned of Philo to have learned nothing. [14]
Pherecydes, one of the seven wise, [15] writing to Thales even as he was yielding up the Ghost, “I have” (saith he) “appointed my friends, as soon as I shall be laid in my grave, to bring thee all my writings. If they please thee and the other Sages, publish them; if not, conceal them. They contain no certainty nor do they any whit satisfy me. My profession is not to know the truth, nor to attain it. I rather open than discover things.”
The wisest that ever was, being demanded what he knew, answered he knew that he knew nothing. [16] He verified what some say, that the greatest part of what we know is the least part of what we know not; that is, that that which we think to know is but a parcel, yea and a small particle of our ignorance. We know things in a dream (sayeth Plato), and we are ignorant of them in truth. Omnes pene veteres nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt: angustos sensus, imbecilles animos, brevia curricula vitæ: Almost all the ancients affirmed nothing may be known, nothing perceived, nothing understood; that our senses are narrow, our minds are weak, and the race of our life is short. [17]
Cicero himself, who ought [18] all he had unto learning, Valerius sayeth that in his age he began to disesteem letters. And whilst he practised them, it was without bond to any special body, following what seemed probable unto him, now in the one, and now in the other sect, ever holding himself under the Academy’s doubtfulness. Dicendum est, sed ita ut nihil affirmem: quæram omnia, dubitans plurumque, et mihi diffidens. Speak I must, but so as I avouch nothing; question all things, for the most part in doubt and distrust of myself. [19]
I should have too much ado [20] if I would consider man after his own fashion and in gross; which I might do by his own rule, who is wont to judge of truth not by the weight or value of voices but by the number. But leave we the common people,
Qui vigilans stertit,
Who snore while they are awake.
Mortua cui vita est, prope iam vivo atque videnti:
Whose life is dead while yet they see,
And in a manner living be, [21]
who feeleth not himself, who judgeth not himself, who leaves the greatest part of his natural parts idle.
I will take man even in his highest estate. Let us consider him in this small number of excellent and choice men who, having naturally been endowed with a peculiar and exquisite wit, have also fostered and sharpened the same with care, with study, and with art, and have brought and strained unto the highest pitch of wisdom it may possibly reach unto. They have fitted their soul unto all senses and squared the same to all biases [22]; they have strengthened and under-propped it with all foreign helps that might any way fit or stead [23] her and have enriched and adorned her with whatsoever they have been able to borrow, either within or without the world for her avail. It is in them that the extreme height of human nature doth lodge. They have reformed the world with policies and laws. They have instructed the same with arts and sciences, as also by example of their wonderful manners and life. I will but make account of such people, of their witness, and of their experience. Let us see how far they have gone and what holdfast [24] they have held by. The maladies and defects which we shall find in that college [25] the world may boldly allow them to be his. [26]
Whosoever seeks for any thing, cometh at last to this conclusion and sayeth that either he hath found it, or that it cannot be found, or that he is still in pursuit after it. All philosophy is divided into these three kinds. Her purpose is to seek out the truth, the knowledge, and the certainty.
The Peripatetics, the Epicurians, the Stoics, and others have thought they had found it. These have established the sciences [27] that we have, and as of certain notions have treated of them.
Clitomachus, Carneades, and the Academics have despaired the finding of it and judged that truth could not be conceived by our means. The end of these is weakness and ignorance. The former had more followers and the worthiest sectaries.
Pyrrho [28]and other Sceptics, or Epechists, [29] whose doctrine or manner of teaching many ancient learned men have thought to have been drawn from Homer, from the Seven Wise Men, from Archilochus and Euripides—to whom they join Zeno, Democritus and Xenophanes—say that they are still seeking after truth. These judge that those are infinitely deceived who imagine they have found it and that the second degree is over-boldly vain in affirming that man’s power is altogether unable to attain unto it. For, to establish the measure of our strength, to know and distinguish of the difficulty of things, is a great, a notable, and extreme science, which they doubt whether man be capable thereof or no.
Nil sciri quisquis putat, id quoque nescit,
An sciri possit, quo se nil scire fatetur.
Who thinks nothing is known, knows not that, whereby he,
Grants he knows nothing if it known may be. [30]
That ignorance which is known, judged, and condemned is not an absolute ignorance. For, to be so, she must altogether be ignorant of herself. So that the profession of the Pyrrhonians is ever to waver, to doubt, and to inquire, never to be assured of anything, nor to take any warrant of himself. Of the three actions or faculties of the soul, that is to say, the imaginative, the concupiscible, [31] and the consenting, they allow and conceive the two former; the last they hold and defend to be ambiguous, without inclination or approbation either of one or other side, be it never so light.
Zeno in gesture painted forth his imagination upon this division of the soul’s faculties: the open and out-stretched hand was appearance; the hand half-shut and fingers somewhat bending, consent; the fist closed, comprehension; if the fist of the left hand were closely clinched together, it signified science.
Now this situation of their judgement, straight and inflexible, receiving all objects with application or consent, leads them unto their Ataraxie [ataraxia], which is the condition of a quiet and settled life, exempted from the agitations which we receive by the impression of the opinion and knowledge we imagine to have of things. Whence proceed fear, avarice, envy, immoderate desires, ambition, pride, superstition, love of novelties, rebellion, disobedience, obstinacy, and the greatest number of corporal evils. Yea, by that means they are exempted from the jealousy of their own discipline, [32] for they contend but faintly. They fear not revenge nor contradiction in their disputations. When they say that heavy things descend downward, they would be loath to be believed but desire to be contradicted, thereby to engender doubt and suspense of judgement, which is their end and drift. They put forth their propositions but to [33] contend with those they imagine we hold in our conceipt. [34]
If you take theirs, then will they undertake to maintain the contrary: all is one to them, nor will they give a penny to choose. If you propose that snow is black, they will argue on the other side that it is white. lf you say it is neither one nor other, they will maintain it to be both. If by a certain judgement you say that you cannot tell, they will maintain that you can tell. Nay, if by an affirmative axiom, you swear that you stand in some doubt, they will dispute that you doubt not of it or that you cannot judge or maintain that you are in doubt. And by this extremity of doubt which staggereth itself they separate and divide themselves from many opinio
ns, yea from those which diverse ways have maintained both the doubt and the ignorance.
Why shall it not be granted then (say they) as to Dogmatists, or doctrine-teachers, for one to say green and another yellow, so for them to doubt? Is there anything can be proposed unto you, either to allow or refuse, which may not lawfully be considered as ambiguous and doubtful? And whereas others be carried either by the custom of their country or by the institution of their parents or by chance—as by a tempest, without choice or judgement, yea sometimes before the age of discretion, to such and such another opinion, to the Stoic or Epicurean sect, to which they find themselves more engaged, subjected or fast-tied, as to a prize they cannot let go: Ad quamcumque disciplinam, velut tempestate, delati, ad eam tanquam ad saxum, adhærescunt. Being carried as it were by a tempest, to any kind of doctrine, they stick close to it, as it were to a rock. [35]
Why shall not these likewise be permitted to maintain their liberty and consider of things without duty or compulsion? Hoc liberiores, et solutiores, quod integra illis est iudicandi potestas: They are so much the freer and at liberty, for that their power of judgement is kept entire. [36] Is it not some advantage for one to find himself disengaged from necessity which brideleth others? Is it not better to remain in suspense than to entangle himself in so many errors that human fantasy hath brought forth? Is it not better for a man to suspend his own persuasion than to meddle with these seditious and quarrelous [37] divisions?
What shall I choose? Marry, what you list, so you choose. A very foolish answer, to which it seemeth nevertheless that all dogmatism arriveth, by which it is not lawful for you to be ignorant of that we know not.
Take the best and strongest side, it shall never be so sure, but you shall have occasion to defend the same, to close and combat a hundred and a hundred [38] sides? Is it not better to keep out of this confusion? You are suffered to embrace, as your honour and life, Aristotle’s opinion upon the eternity of the soul, and to belie and contradict whatsoever Plato saith concerning that; and shall they be interdicted [39] to doubt of it?
If it be lawful for Panæcius to maintain his judgement about auspices, dreams, oracles, and prophecies, whereof the Stoics make no doubt at all, wherefore shall not a wise man dare that in all things which this man dareth in such as he hath learned of his masters? Confirmed and established by the general consent of the school whereof he is a sectary and a professor? If it be a child that judgeth, he wots [40] not what it is; if a learned man, he is forestalled.
They [the Pyrrhonists] have reserved a great advantage for themselves in the combat, having discharged themselves of the care how to shroud themselves. They care not to be beaten, so they may strike again. And all is fish that comes to net with them. If they overcome, your proposition halteth; if you, theirs is lame. If they prove that nothing is known, it is very well; if they cannot prove it, it is good alike: Ut quum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus momenti inveniuntur, facilius ab utraque parte assertio sustiniatur. So as when the same matter the like weight and moment is found on diverse parts, we may the more easily withhold avouching on both parts. [41]
And they suppose to find out more easily why a thing is false than true; and that which is not than that which is; and what they believe not than what they believe.
Their manner of speech is: I confirm nothing; it is no more so than thus, or neither; I conceive it not; appearances are everywhere alike; the law of speaking pro or contra is all one. Nothing seemeth true, that may not seem false. Their sacramental word is ἐποχή which is as much to say as, I uphold and stir not. Behold the burdens [42] of their songs and other such like. Their effect is a pure, entire, and absolute surceasing and suspense of judgement. They use their reason to inquire and to debate, and not to stay and choose. Whosoever shall imagine a perpetual confession of ignorance and a judgement upright and without straggering [43] to what occasion soever may chance—that man conceives the true Pyrrhonism.
I expound this fantazie [44] as plain as I can because many deem it hard to be conceived. And the authors themselves represent it somewhat obscurely and diversely.
Touching the actions of life, in that they are after the common sort. They are lent and applied to natural inclinations, to the impulsion and constraint of passions, to the constitutions of laws and customs, and to the tradition of arts. Non enim nos Deus ista scire, sed tantummodo uti voluit. For God would not have us know these things but only use them. [45] By such means they suffer their common actions to be directed, without any conceit or judgement, which is the reason that I cannot well sort unto this discourse what is said of Pyrrho. They feign him to be stupid and unmovable, leading a kind of wild and unsociable life, not shunning to be hit with carts, presenting himself unto downfalls, [46] refusing to conform himself to the laws. It is an endearing of his discipline. [47] He would not make himself a stone or a block but a living, discoursing, and reasoning man, enjoying all pleasures and natural commodities, busying himself with, and using all, his corporal and spiritual parts, in rule and right. The fantastical and imaginary and false privileges which man hath usurped unto himself, to sway, to appoint, and to establish, he hath absolutely renounced and quit them.
Yet is there no sect but is enforced to allow her wise Secter in chief [48] to follow diverse things nor comprized [49] nor perceived nor allowed, if he will live. And if he take shipping, [50] he follows his purpose, not knowing whether it shall be profitable or no, and yields to this—that the ship is good, the pilot is skillful, and that the season is fit; circumstances only probable. After which he is bound to go and suffer himself to be removed by appearances, always provided they have no express contrariety in them. He hath a body, he hath a soul, his senses urge him forward, his mind moveth him. Although he find not this proper and singular mark of judging in himself and that he perceive he should not engage his consent, seeing some falsehood may be like unto this truth, he ceaseth not to conduct the offices of his life fully and commodiously.
How many arts are there which profess to consist more in conjecture than in the science? That distinguish not between truth and falsehood but only follow seeming? There is both true and false (say they), and there are means in us to seek it out, but not to stay it when we touch it. It is better for us to suffer the order of the world to manage us without further inquisition. A mind warranted from prejudice hath a marvellous preferment to tranquility. [51] Men that censure and control their judges do never duly submit themselves unto them. How much more docile and tractable are simple and uncurious minds found, both towards the laws of religion and politic decrees, than these over-vigilant and nice-wits, [52] teachers of divine and human causes?
There is nothing in man’s invention wherein is so much likelihood, possibility, and profit. [53] This [Pyrrhonism] representeth man bare and naked, acknowledging his natural weakness, apt to receive from above some strange power, disfurnished of all human knowledge, and so much the more fit to harbour divine understanding, disannulling his judgement that so he may give more place unto faith. Neither misbelieving nor establishing any doctrine or opinion repugnant unto common laws and observances, humble, obedient, disciplinable, [54] and studious; a sworn enemy to heresy, and by consequence exempting himself from all vain and irreligious opinions invented and brought up by false sects. It is a white sheet [55] prepared to take from the finger of God, what form so ever it shall please him to imprint therein. The more we address and commit ourselves to God and reject ourselves, the better it is for us. Accept (sayeth Ecclesiastes) in good part things both in show and taste, as from day to day they are presented unto thee; the rest is beyond thy knowledge. Dominus novit cogitationes hominum, quoniam vanæ sunt. The Lord knows the thoughts of men, that they are vain. [56]
See how of three general sects of philosophy, two make express profession of doubt and ignorance, and in the third, which is the dogmatists, it is easy to be discerned that the greatest number have taken the face of assurance only because they could set a better countenance on the matt
er. They have not so much gone about to establish any certainty in us as to show how far they had waded in seeking out the truth. Quam docti fingunt magis qam norunt: which the learned do rather conceit [57] than know. [58]
♦ ♦ ♦
Thy reason hath in no one other thing more likelihood and foundation than in that which persuadeth thee a plurality of worlds. [59]
Terramque et solem, lunam, mare, cætera quæ sunt,
Non esse unica, sed numero magis innumerali.
The earth, the sun, the moon, the sea and all
In number numberless, not one they call. [60]
The famousest wits of former ages have believed it, yea, and some of our modern, as forced thereunto by the appearance of human reason. For as much as whatsoever we see in this vast world’s-frame, there is no one thing alone, single, and one.
——cum in summa res nulla sit una,
unica quæ gignatur, et unica solaque crescat:
Whereas in general sum, nothing is one,
To be bred only one, grow only one. [61]
And that all several kind are multiplied in some number. Whereby it seemeth unlikely that God hath framed this piece of work alone without a fellow and that the matter of this form hath wholly been spent in this only Individuum:
Quare etiam atqæ etiam tales fateare necesse est,
Esse alios alibi congressus matiriaï,
Qualis hic est avido complexu quem tenet Æther.
Wherefore you must confess, again again,
Of matters such like meetings elsewhere reign.
As this, these skies in greedy grip contain. [62]
Namely, if it [63] be a breathing creature, as its motions make it so likely that Plato assureth it, and diverse of ours either affirm it or dare not impugn it; no more than this old opinion that the Heaven, the stars, and other members of the world are creatures composed both of body and soul, mortal in respect of their composition but immortal by the creator’s decree.
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