The Politics of Climate Change

Home > Other > The Politics of Climate Change > Page 1
The Politics of Climate Change Page 1

by Anthony Giddens




  THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE

  Books by Anthony Giddens:

  Capitalism and Modern Social Theory

  Politics and Sociology in the Thought of Max Weber

  The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies

  New Rules of Sociological Method

  Studies in Social and Political Theory

  Emile Durkheim

  Central Problems in Social Theory

  A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism

  Sociology: A Brief but Critical Introduction

  Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory

  The Constitution of Society

  The Nation-State and Violence

  Durkheim on Politics and the State

  Social Theory and Modern Sociology

  The Consequences of Modernity

  Modernity and Self-Identity

  The Transformation of Intimacy

  Beyond Left and Right

  Reflexive Modernization (with Ulrich Beck and Scott Lash)

  Politics, Sociology and Social Theory

  In Defence of Sociology

  The Third Way

  Runaway World

  The Third Way and its Critics

  Where Now for New Labour?

  Europe in the Global Age

  Over to You, Mr Brown

  Sociology Sixth Edition

  Edited Works:

  Emile Durkheim: Selected Writings

  Positivism and Sociology

  Elites and Power in British Society (with Philip Stanworth)

  Classes, Conflict and Power

  Classes and the Division of Labour

  Social Theory Today

  Human Societies

  On the Edge: Living with Global Capitalism (with Will Hutton)

  The Global Third Way Debate

  The Progressive Manifesto

  The New Egalitarianism (with Patrick Diamond)

  Global Europe, Social Europe (with Patrick Diamond and Roger Liddle)

  THE POLITICS OF

  CLIMATE CHANGE

  Second Edition, Revised and Updated

  Anthony Giddens

  polity

  Copyright © Anthony Giddens 2011

  The right of Anthony Giddens to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

  First published in 2011 by Polity Press

  Polity Press

  65 Bridge Street

  Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK

  Polity Press

  350 Main Street

  Malden, MA 02148, USA

  All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

  ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-5464-5

  A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

  The publisher has used its best endeavours to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.

  Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.

  For further information on Polity, visit our website: www.politybooks.com

  CONTENTS

  Acknowledgements

  Introduction

  1 Climate Change, Risk and Danger

  The sceptics and their critics

  The ‘climate wars’

  The radicals

  Conclusion

  2 Running Out, Running Down?

  Peak oil

  Sweating the assets

  The struggle for resources

  3 The Greens and After

  The greens

  Managing risk: the precautionary principle

  ‘Sustainable development’

  Over-development

  Polluter pays

  Ungreen themes

  The politics of climate change: concepts

  4 The Track Record So Far

  Sweden, Germany and Denmark

  Spain and Portugal

  The case of the UK

  Climate change policy and the US

  Lessons to be drawn

  5 A Return to Planning?

  Planning, then and now

  Changing lives

  Foregrounding

  A political concordat

  State and society: business and the NGOs

  6 Technologies and Taxes

  Technologies: where we stand

  The role of government

  Promoting job creation

  Carbon taxes

  Carbon rationing

  The re-emergence of utopia

  7 The Politics of Adaptation

  Adaptation in the context of Europe

  Floods in the UK

  Insurance, hurricanes and typhoons

  Adaptation: the developing world

  8 International Negotiations, the EU and Carbon Markets

  Further negotiations

  The role of the EU

  Carbon markets

  9 The Geopolitics of Climate Change

  An illusory world community?

  The bottom billion

  Oil and geopolitics

  Coalitions and collaborations

  The US and China

  India and Brazil

  In conclusion: why we still need the UN

  Afterword

  Notes

  References

  Index

  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

  This work grew out of my involvement in a project organized under the auspices of the think-tank Policy Network and the Centre for the Study of Global Governance at the London School of Economics. I should like to thank my colleagues in both institutions for their help and advice during the writing process. My gratitude is due in particular to Roger Liddle, Olaf Cramme, Simon Latham and Jade Groves at Policy Network; and to David Held at the Centre. Anne de Sayrah helped the project in more ways than I can count. Karen Birdsall did a marvellous job for the first edition, checking footnotes and assembling the bibliography. Olaf Corry provided some important feedback on a draft manuscript. I owe an especially large debt to Hugh Compston, who commented in a meticulous way on an early version of the book; and to Johanna Juselius, who did the same at a later point. Victor Philip Dahdaleh generously provided the funding for the collective project, so a big vote of thanks to him. I am indebted to everyone at Polity Press, including especially John Thompson, Gill Motley (as always), Sarah Lambert and Emma Hutchinson. I would like to thank Emma in particular for her attention to detail and for the amount of work she put into the project. Sarah was unfailingly helpful in preparing this new edition. Olaf Corry provided further critical comments. Special gratitude is due to Anna Wishart, whose help and involvement were invaluable; Anna made a major contribution in particular to the section on the US in chapter 4. Tom Hale provided a very valuable critical reading of the manuscript. Sarah Dancy has done an excellent copy-editing job on both editions. I dedicate the work to Indie and Matilda, definitely members of the younger generation, in the hope that it might contribute a little to making the world in which they will grow up less daunting.

  INTRODUCTION

  This is a book about nightmares, catastrophes – and dreams. It is also about the everyday, the r
outines that give our lives continuity and substance. It is about the warming of our planet – a phenomenon which, if it proceeds unchecked, constitutes an existential threat to our civilization. The changes we are wreaking on the world’s climate will produce increasingly extreme and erratic weather, subject large areas of the globe to drought and eventually make them uninhabitable. Rising ocean levels will have the same effect upon low-lying coastal zones.

  The book is a prolonged enquiry into a single question. Why do most people, most of the time, act as though a threat of such magnitude can be ignored? Almost everyone across the world must have heard the phrases ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’ and know at least a bit about what they mean. The two terms can be used interchangeably. They refer to the fact that the greenhouse gas emissions produced by modern industry are causing the earth’s climate to warm up, with potentially devastating consequences for the future. Yet the vast majority of people are doing very little, if anything at all, to alter their daily habits, even though those habits are the source of the dangers in store for us.

  It is not as if climate change is creeping up on us unawares. On the contrary, large numbers of books have been written about it and its likely consequences. Serious worries about the warming of the earth’s climate were expressed for a quarter of a century or more without making much of an impact. Within the past few years the issue has jumped to the forefront of discussion and debate, not just in this or that country, but across the world. Yet, as collective humanity, we are only just beginning to take the steps needed to respond to the threats that we and succeeding generations are confronting. Global warming is a problem unlike any other, however, both because of its scale and because it is mainly about the future. Many have said that to cope with it we will need to mobilize on a level comparable to fighting a war; but in this case there are no enemies to identify and confront. We are dealing with dangers that seem abstract and elusive, however potentially devastating they may be.

  No matter how much we are told about the threats, it is hard to face up to them, because they feel somehow unreal – and, in the meantime, there is a life to be lived, with all its pleasures and pressures. The politics of climate change has to cope with what I call Giddens’s paradox – a theme that appears throughout this text. It states that, since the dangers posed by global warming aren’t tangible, immediate or visible in the course of day-to-day life, many will sit on their hands and do nothing of a concrete nature about them. Yet waiting until such dangers become visible and acute – in the shape of catastrophes that are irrefutably the result of climate change – before being stirred to serious action will be too late. For we know of no way of getting the greenhouse gases out again once they are there and most will be in the atmosphere for centuries.

  Giddens’s paradox affects almost every aspect of current reactions to climate change. It is the reason why, for most citizens, climate change is a back-of-the-mind issue rather than a front-of-the-mind one. Attitude surveys show that many of the public accept that global warming is a major threat; yet only a few are willing to alter their lives in any significant way as a result. Among elites, climate change lends itself to gestural politics – grandiose-sounding plans largely empty of content.

  What social psychologists call ‘future discounting’ further accentuates Giddens’s paradox – more accurately, one could say it is a sub-category of it. People find it hard to give the same level of reality to the future as they do to the present. Thus a small reward offered now will normally be taken in preference to a much larger one offered at some remove. The same principle applies to risks. Why do many young people take up smoking even though they are well aware that, as it now says on cigarette packets, ‘smoking kills’? At least part of the reason is that, for a teenager, it is almost impossible to imagine being 40, the age at which the real dangers start to take hold and become life-threatening.

  There is a high level of agreement among scientists that climate change is real and dangerous, and that it is caused by human activity. A small minority of scientists, however – the climate change ‘sceptics’ – dispute these claims, and they get a good deal of attention in the media. Many other, less expert, contributors have taken their side. Someone can always say, ‘it’s not proven, is it?’ if it be suggested that he should change his profligate ways. Another response might be: ‘I’m not going to change unless others do.’ Yet another reaction could be: ‘Nothing that I do, as a single individual, will make any difference.’ Or else he could say, ‘I’ll get round to it sometime’, because one shouldn’t underestimate the sheer force of habit. I would suggest that even the most sophisticated and determined environmentalist struggles with the fact that, under the shadow of future cataclysm, there is a life to be lived within the constraints of the here-and-now.

  Politicians have woken up to the scale and urgency of the problem and many countries have recently introduced ambitious climate change policies. Over the past few years, a threshold has been crossed: most political leaders are now aware of the hazards posed by global warming and the need to respond to them. Yet this is just the first wave – the bringing of the issue onto the political agenda. The second wave must involve embedding it in our institutions and in the everyday concerns of citizens, and here, for reasons just mentioned, there is a great deal of work to do. The international community is on board, at least in principle. Negotiations aimed at limiting global warming have taken place at meetings organized by the United Nations, in an attempt to get global reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. They are still continuing, but have produced little in the way of concrete results so far. There has been far more talk than there has been tangible action.

  Much of this book concentrates on climate change policy in the industrial countries. It is these countries that pumped most of the emissions into the atmosphere in the first place, and they have to take prime responsibility for controlling them in the near future. They must take the lead in reducing emissions, moving towards a low-carbon economy and making the social reforms with which these changes will have to be integrated.

  We do not as yet have a developed analysis of the political innovations that have to be made if our aspirations to limit global warming are to become real. It is a strange and indefensible absence, which I have written this work to try to repair. My approach is grounded in realism. Some authors say that coping with climate change is too difficult a problem to be dealt with within the confines of orthodox politics. Up to a point I agree with them, since quite profound changes will be required in our established ways of political thinking. Yet we have to work with the institutions that already exist and in ways that respect democracy.

  The state will be an all-important actor, since so many powers remain in its hands, whether one talks of domestic or of international policy. There is no way of forcing states to sign up to international agreements; and even if they choose to do so, implementing whatever is agreed will largely be the responsibility of each individual country. Emissions trading markets can only work if the price of carbon is capped, and at a demanding level, a decision that has to be made and implemented politically. The one major supra-national entity that exists, the European Union, is heavily dependent on decisions taken by its member nations, since its control over them is quite limited.

  Markets have a much bigger role to play in combating climate change than simply in the area of emissions trading. There are many fields where market forces can produce results that no other agency or framework could manage. In principle, where a price can be put on an environmental good without affronting other values, it should be done, since competition will then create increased efficiency whenever that good is exchanged. However, active state intervention is once again called for. The environmental costs entailed by economic processes often form what economists call ‘externalities’ – they are not paid for by those who incur them. The aim of public policy should be to make sure that, wherever possible, such costs are internalized – that is, brought into the mar
ketplace.

  ‘The state’, of course, comprises a diversity of levels, including regional, city and local government. In a global era, it operates within the context of what political scientists call multilayered governance, stretching upwards into the international arena and downwards to regions, cities and localities. To emphasize the importance of the state to climate change policy is not to argue for top-down government. On the contrary, the most dramatic initiatives are likely to bubble up from the actions of far-sighted individuals and from the energy of civil society. States will have to work with a variety of other agencies and bodies, as well as with other countries and international organizations, if they are to be effective.

  One can’t discuss the politics of climate change without mentioning the green movement, which has been a leading influence on environmental politics for many years. It has had a major impact in forcing the issue of climate change onto the political agenda. ‘Going green’ has become more or less synonymous with endeavours to limit climate change. Yet there are big problems. The green movement has its origins in the hostile emotions that industrialism aroused among the early conservationists. Especially in its latter-day development in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s, the greens defined themselves in opposition to orthodox politics. Neither position is especially helpful to the task of integrating environmental concerns into our established political institutions. Most green parties have now joined the mainstream. Yet just what is and what is not valuable in green political philosophies has to be sorted out.

 

‹ Prev