There has now to be a return to greater state interventionism, a conclusion that is reinforced by the failure of deregulation. That failure can be summed up as too much ‘short-termism’ and a corrosion of public institutions, coupled to a lack of controls for system risk. In terms of the economy, ways will have to be found to introduce regulation without crippling that sense of adventure and entrepreneurialism upon which a successful response to climate change will also depend. In a nutshell, overall macroeconomic steering, the main economic role of government for the past three or four decades, is no longer enough. There needs to be a greater emphasis on industrial policy. This point is obvious in the case of the fostering of low-carbon technologies, but surely must apply more broadly – although the issues involved stretch well beyond my specific concerns here. Supply-side mechanisms will continue to be vital areas for state investment, as in the case of education or the provision of infrastructure.
A return to planning will in no sense be a straightforward process. Planning has to be reconciled with democratic freedoms, some of which should be actively extended, rather than reduced, in relation to the demands of climate change. There will be a push and pull between the political centre, regions and localities, which will have to be resolved through democratic mechanisms. It will not be easy to decide where the balance should lie. National planning will demand that local concerns sometimes be overridden – but how and to what degree?
This issue arises, for example, with the creation of new towns. For planned communities are back in fashion – this time as eco-towns, now being built or envisaged in many countries. It is clear also that planning must stretch across the boundaries of nations. National plans can’t be hatched without due consideration of what neighbouring countries are doing. Compared to other countries, EU states should have a distinct advantage in this respect, since coordinated planning should, in principle, be much easier.
In thinking about planning, it won’t do to consider only the form it will take; we also have to decide about its content. Lessons can be learned from those who make a speciality of studying that nebulous entity, the future.4 How do we plan for a future which is inherently uncertain and in order to limit risks which, since we have no prior experience of them, cannot be assessed with complete precision? How can the mistakes made by the previous generation of planners be avoided? Planning in the old days was based on forecasting, but the limitations of this method are by now well known. It works best for short-term planning and also in cases where present-day trends are to some degree set in stone. In the case of energy forecasting in Britain, for instance, we know that the existing generation of power stations will need replacing within a certain timescale.
We often want to predict the future in order to change it – and where our attempts to change it become part of that future. This situation holds in the case of climate change. One way of dealing with it is by backcasting: asking what changes have to be made in the present in order to arrive at alternative future states. A successful outcome is imagined in the future, and different scenarios are calculated as to how it might be reached. We are talking therefore of alternative and plural futures, where adjustments, even radical revisions, are made as time unfolds and then built into other scenarios. This approach is essentially that used by the IPCC. The distinct advantage over traditional forecasting is that it allows much greater space for unforeseen contingencies that might dramatically alter predictions made at any specific date.
The point of backcasting is not to reveal what the future will be, but to weigh up future options and policy goals. Backcasting is especially relevant for environmental and energy planning issues, since they fit the circumstances to which the approach is most relevant. These are that the context is complex, a major reorientation of current trends is demanded and a timescale of several decades or more is involved. There are many examples from around the world. A project was instituted in the Netherlands in the late 1990s, for example, to look for alternatives to meat production and consumption. Its key assumption was that by 2040 new protein foods should replace 40 per cent of current meat consumption. The foods would have to be at least as tasty as the most popular forms of meat, while, among other qualities, having superior health value. The project considered how tastes might change to promote acceptance of such foods. It concluded that new protein foods could be produced 10–30 times more efficiently than meat, as measured in terms of reducing emissions, while at the same time producing a health bonus.5
Backcasting sounds technocratic. In fact, it almost always involves a visionary element, since, by definition, it projects a future that is different from that seen from the present. Of course, forecasting will not disappear and will continue to be part of government planning. It is obvious that backcasting and forecasting are often complementary. Take, as an example, planning for the future of the water industry in Australia, a country suffering from droughts that are probably influenced by global warming and where water is becoming an ever more scarce resource.6 Cynthia Mitchell and Stuart White argue that forecasting can identify policies that will produce results in the short term – it can help pluck the low-lying fruit. Backcasting is needed to think more radically about future possibilities. Forecasts about security of water supply in urban areas in Australia indicate major problems in guaranteeing adequate supply within a few years. Several policies that could quickly make a difference within the existing water system were identified, such as installing water-efficient shower heads and tap regulators, dual flush toilets, waterless urinals, taps operated by sensors and local water collection and recycling. In Queensland, where there have been prolonged periods of drought, reductions in customer demand of up to 30 per cent have been attained using such means.
Backcasting, however, has helped suggest more far-reaching innovations. Thus at the moment it is commonly assumed that water, sewage and storm-water systems should be considered and planned for separately. Thinking ‘backwards’ from a hypothetical situation of a total water cycle has produced quite a different perspective. What can be achieved has been demonstrated in a residential development in Melbourne, which generated a 70 per cent reduction in water demand. Another possibility is, instead of simply providing a water stream, to think of providing a service of a more general nature. Thus, in central Queensland about 80 per cent of raw water demand comes from industry, and some 80 per cent of it is for cooling. A high proportion of that demand could in fact be transferred to air cooling, reducing the need to use water.
The state has a history of drought alternating with periods of flooding. The latest episode of flooding, beginning in December 2010, was devastating in its impact. No one can say with certainty whether climate change influenced recent weather fluctuations, but it is possible that La Niña (see above, p. 28), which lies behind them, is becoming intensified as a result of global warming. In any case, temporary periods of ‘far too much water’ do nothing to alleviate the more chronic shortages to which the region is subject.
In thinking about planning, especially over the longer term, we find ourselves back with risk and uncertainty. ‘Planning’ sounds like a straightforward process, but this is far from the case – it is highly complex and contingent. One of the main reasons for this is the fact that predictions, forecasts and plans that are made become themselves part of the universe of events which they are about. In an important sense they have to do so, since the point is to shape the future; yet, at the same time, an inherent element of unpredictability is introduced and has to be coped with. Trying to alter public attitudes towards risk is a key part of planning policy, and it is to this topic that I now turn.
Changing lives
Looking at public attitudes in a number of industrial countries 12 years ago, a group of researchers concluded: ‘Our interpretation of existing data is that, all things being equal, a majority of citizens in most countries will support national and international initiatives designed to cope with global warming as long as these initiatives do not demand a sign
ificant alteration of lifestyle.’7 Broadly speaking, that assessment remains the case today, as subsequent comparative surveys show.
In a national survey carried out in the UK in 2008, 30 per cent of respondents said they were ‘very concerned’ about climate change, with a further 47 per cent saying they were ‘fairly concerned’.8 However, many expressed doubts about the status of the scientific findings on the issue: 60 per cent either ‘strongly agreeññd’ or ‘agreed’ with the statement that ‘many scientific experts still question if humans are contributing to climate change’, demonstrating the influence of the sceptics, which is out of all proportion to their numbers in the scientific community. Only 7 per cent ‘strongly disagreed’ with the statement, and 42 per cent either ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ that ‘I sometimes think climate change might not be as bad as people say’. Almost 60 per cent thought the government is using the climate change agenda to raise taxes. A large majority (77 per cent) endorsed the statement that ‘most people are not prepared to make big sacrifices’ to help stop climate change.
In terms of ranking the problems facing the country, 33 per cent chose the economy as their main worry – even before the 2008 financial crisis. Only 7 per cent put global warming at the top of the list. Climate change tends to be seen as a risk the responsibility for which lies with ‘the authorities’.9
In a similar survey repeated in 2010, much the same pattern emerged. A majority – 76 per cent – still said they were ‘very’ or ‘fairly worried’ about climate change. About a quarter put global warming as one of the top three issues facing Britain. However, the proportion expressing trust in independent scientists to provide correct information about climate change had fallen, suggesting that the episode of the leaked emails did make an impact on public opinion. Moreover, the proportion not trusting any source had grown.
In such surveys, a high proportion of people agree that ‘We are too small to make a difference’, and that ‘We shouldn’t take action until bigger countries do’. The responses echo a problem in climate change policy which crops up in many different contexts – that of free-riding. Free-riding can arise in any area of social or economic life in which collective outcomes hinge on decisions taken by individual actors. For example, suppose that the residents in a street vulnerable to crime get together to set up a neighbourhood watch scheme – each has to pay £100 to make the scheme work. Some might refuse to contribute, yet the system is set up anyway. These people are free-riding, since they benefit from the scheme for nothing.
Problems of free-riding exist everywhere in the area of climate change policy, from the level of ordinary citizens right up to the international arena. People who continue to drive gas-guzzling vehicles are free-riding off those who have switched to smaller cars. Countries that have done little or nothing to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions are free-riding off those that have been more active. Feelings about free-riders in the area of climate change are very strong. The result is the ‘I won’t unless you do’ syndrome, which is widespread.
Polls show that most people have only a vague idea about the causes of climate change. Many believe, for example, that healing the ozone layer will help stop global warming. A survey taken in the Seattle area – one of the most advanced in terms of environmental consciousness – showed that 45 per cent of respondents thought that stopping the use of aerosol sprays would be very helpful in reducing global warming.10 Many did not appreciate that greenhouse gases are not just another form of pollution; a significant proportion believed that they can be removed from the air as easily as the pollutants which cause acid rain. Most people had a clearer understanding of problems surrounding energy, and in focus groups their opinions were often framed more in terms of energy requirements than of climate change.
Surveys taken on a global level show that people in the developing countries are the most concerned about climate change. A cross-cultural study of nine developed and developing countries indicated that about 60 per cent of people interviewed about climate change in China, India, Mexico and Brazil felt a ‘high level of concern’, in contrast to figures of only 22 per cent in the UK and Germany.11 Furthermore, in the poorer countries, around 47 per cent of respondents expressed high levels of personal commitment to responding to climate change, compared to just 19 per cent in the UK. Although the proportion was even lower in the US, respondents there were by far the most optimistic of any that the problem could be solved. This finding is in line with a further study, which showed that 71 per cent of Americans agreed that steps taken to reduce emissions will help the US economy ‘become more competitive . . . in the long run’.12
Research produced in Britain by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) divides up the public into seven clusters in terms of their appreciation of the threat of climate change and their willingness to respond on the level of their day-to-day lives.13 One group, the ‘positive greens’, accept that they should do as much as they can to limit their impact on the environment. They made up 18 per cent of the sample of the population studied. Those comprising this group came mostly from affluent backgrounds – social classes A and B in census terminology.
A second group, the ‘waste-watchers’, follow a ‘waste not want not’ philosophy, relevant to environmental goals, but not especially inspired by them. Thrift is part of their lives, presumably most often simply because of lack of resources. They represented 12 per cent of the sample, and were concentrated mainly among older age groups. The third cluster, the ‘concerned consumers’, making up 14 per cent, say they ‘already do more than a lot of people’ and are not willing at the moment to do much more.
A fourth cluster, the ‘sideline supporters’, accept that climate change is a major problem. Yet they are not contemplating any particular changes to their lifestyles. They say, for example, ‘I don’t think much about how much water or electricity I use, and I forget to turn things off’, yet do seem to feel minor pangs of guilt about their attitudes. They comprised 14 per cent of the sample. A fifth group, the ‘cautious participants’, do little to help the environment, but would do more if others did – they form another 14 per cent.
Figure 5.1 Wide partisan differences exist in the US about global warming
Source: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. Little Change in Opinions about Global Warming: Increasing Partisan Divide on Energy Policies, 27 October 2010; a project of the Pew Research Center
The sixth cluster, labelled the ‘stalled starters’, say they don’t know much about climate change, and, in any case, lack the means to take any steps to help with the issue – they are mostly from non-affluent backgrounds. Most can’t afford a car, but would like to buy one if they could. Finally, the ‘honestly disengaged’ are either sceptical about, or indifferent towards, climate change. As one interviewee remarked: ‘Maybe there’ll be an environmental disaster, maybe not. Makes no difference to me, I’m just living life the way I want to.’
It follows, the DEFRA report argues, that policy concerned with securing more environmentally responsible behaviour should vary. The ‘positive greens’ have a high potential to do more, and are willing to do so – and, at least to some degree, so are the ‘concerned consumers’ and the ‘sideline supporters’. In these instances, policy should be to ‘enable and engage’ – it should be aimed at providing the means for individuals to build on the attitudes they already hold. Examples include providing information about how to lower carbon consumption, encouraging community action, improving infrastructure and so on.
For the ‘cautious participants’ and the ‘stalled starters’, the report says, the emphasis should be not only on enabling and engaging, but, in addition and in particular, on ‘exemplifying’. In the terms I used earlier, people in these groups are worried about free-riding. Community leadership and neighbourhood groups can play a part in reducing the impact of feelings of unfairness about free-riding. As for the ‘sceptics’, their attitudes will be harder to sustain if others
move the centre of gravity of public opinion onwards. The problem, as far as public policy is concerned, is one of ‘engagement’ – how to get such groups to take climate change seriously at all.
DEFRA hosted a ‘citizens’ summit’ to see how far a deliberative process might shift public attitudes towards global warming and foster lifestyle changes. It formed part of a wider public consultation process as part of the lead-up to the introduction of the Climate Change Bill. A representative group of citizens from different regions in the country took part in a series of workshops. Information packs were provided, and the participants were requested to try out taking steps to reduce their carbon consumption before the final meeting, the ‘summit’, took place.
As in wider surveys, the desire for the government to take the lead came through clearly. People feel strongly about the gap they see between what they can do as individuals and the global scope of the problem. At the end of the deliberative process, the proportion of participants who agreed with the statement ‘I am well informed about climate change’ more than doubled – 66 per cent at that point claimed to be well informed. The percentage agreeing that ‘action needs to be taken urgently’ rose from 65 per cent at the beginning to 82 per cent by the close. Before the workshops started, just over half of the participants agreed that the responsibility for countering climate change ‘belongs to all of us’. That proportion increased to 83 per cent.
About 40 per cent of emissions in the UK come from domestic sources if one includes household travel. There are many areas of day-to-day conduct where changes in behaviour would help lower this total. DEFRA separates them into ‘one-off purchasing decisions’, ‘habitual everyday lifestyle activities’, ‘occasional purchasing decisions’ and ‘habitual purchasing decisions’. Those in the first category include, for example, installing home insulation or buying a more energy-efficient car. The second consists of such factors as energy consumption in the home and the level of car usage. Occasional purchasing decisions include buying energy-efficient products such as low-energy light bulbs. The fourth category is made up of activities such as the purchase of food and household goods.
The Politics of Climate Change Page 12
