It is normal and acceptable for political parties to claim that they, rather than their opponents, are the ones to turn to for firm action on global warming. Yet beyond a certain area, and beyond the rhetoric of immediate party politics, there has to be agreement that the issue is so important and all-encompassing that the usual party conflicts are largely suspended or muted.
The disastrous situation in American politics, discussed in the previous chapter, shows what happens where there is political polarization around climate change. Fortunately, the US here is very much the exception rather than the rule insofar as the vast majority of countries in the world are concerned.
How a cross-party consensus might be achieved was explored in a British context in a comprehensive report on the issue produced by an all-party group in Parliament. The group tried to reach a consensus about consensus and, to a significant degree, it succeeded in so doing. The objective was to investigate ‘the potential of a cross-party consensus on climate change to try to look beyond the tendency of politics to dwell in the terrain of competition for short-term advantage’.22 Is a consensus desirable and, if so, what form should it take?
A wide range of opinions was solicited for the inquiry. Some argued that a consensus would in fact be undesirable, since it would be likely to stifle debate and the critical examination to which all political proposals and policies should be subject. Moreover, they pointed out, a consensus could potentially lead to a loss of public attention and awareness for the issue. In addition, reaching shared agreement might mean opting for the lowest common denominator (much as has happened in the Kyoto and post-Kyoto negotiations).
However, while recognizing the force of these points, the large majority of contributors accepted that a consensus across the parties was not only possible, but necessary. There was more agreement about the need for a consensus on targets for emissions reductions than upon how they should best be reached. Yet many emphasized the importance of overall agreement about means as well as ends. Policies initiated by one government in areas such as fiscal measures or investment in R&D and technology would have to have a core of stability across changes of government.
Cross-party agreement has to be robust, since there will be a clear temptation for parties to sacrifice longer-term goals in pursuit of immediate political advantage, especially when unpopular decisions have to be taken. A consensus that focuses only on goals, even if it involves a general agreement on targets, is likely to be too weak to be effective. The chairman of the committee, Colin Challen, MP, expressed the point forcefully:
Until a binding consensus is reached, there will always be the danger that any party proposing the really tough measures necessary to tackle the problem will face . . . the strong likelihood that another party will present the electorate with a ‘get out of jail free card’ for their own electoral advantage. . . . There seems little point in drawing together a consensus that is merely promoting motherhood and apple pie. It is clear that the purpose of the consensus is to overcome the severe tension between short-term electoral politics and long-term climate change goals, a tension which has to date resulted in the triumph of short-termism.23
The committee concluded that a consensus doesn’t have to be ‘all or nothing’ in order to work. It should concentrate upon targets and upon a long-term policy framework that would offer a reasonable chance of meeting the targets. Examples already exist where a cross-party consensus has been formed and clear results have been produced – such as that which helped lead to a settlement in Northern Ireland.
A main recommendation was that an independent body be set up to monitor progress towards targets; and that the prime minister of the day should be held directly responsible for the cross-party consensus process. Such an agency was in fact later set up, in the shape of the Climate Change Committee, coupled with the introduction of legal obligations on the part of successive governments to make specific progress towards the targets (see above, pp. 84–6). Several other countries, such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Japan, have set up similar programmes to try to create and preserve cross-party agreements.
Although it is important that there should be consensus, it cannot be too minimalist. We should perhaps speak of a concordat rather than a consensus, because there should be a clear statement of principles that are publicly endorsed. In accordance with the overall themes of this book, I would emphasize that it must cover means as well as ends, and it has to home in on the short term as well as the long term in order to be effective. Agreement on targets set for decades down the line will be of little help, however demanding those targets appear. Should such a consensus imply a ‘suspension of hostilities’ between the parties, as far as parliamentary debate about climate change is concerned? Yes, it should. Left-of-centre parties or coalitions have a particular responsibility to tone down their rhetoric, especially of the red–green variety, since it stakes a claim to the privileged position of leftist thinking – a claim which is false. Such restraint is all the more important given the fact that it is the right-of-centre parties which tend to be most reluctant to support climate change policy.
A stronger monitoring body should be established than the Climate Change Committee set up in Britain. It should not be merely advisory, but have the capacity to intervene in legislation by, for example, having clearly specified rights to take the government to the courts if it has gone back on its obligations. Its composition is likely to be crucial, and appointment to it should not simply be the prerogative of the government of the day. Its brief has to extend beyond climate change and there has to be clear coordination with whatever major agency is responsible for energy and energy planning.
It will be essential to stop such a body from becoming too bureaucratic and fixed in its practices. Hence there must be a method of ensuring a regular turnover in its composition, whether by having relatively short terms of service or by other means. It must be subject to regular parliamentary as well as wider public scrutiny.
Moreover, government must not only be an agent of change as far as combating global warming is concerned; it must be an exemplar too. Government and its officialdom shouldn’t find themselves in the position of the doctor who carries on smoking while advising his patients not to do so. ‘Do as I say, not as I do’ is not good enough. For example, governments shouldn’t only be in the business of setting targets; they should also be in the vanguard of showing concretely how to reach them.
State and society: business and the NGOs
An ensuring state must work with diverse groups and, of course, with the public, in order to deliver upon climate change goals. The classical liberal view of the rights and responsibilities of individuals, simply put, is that every individual should be free to pursue whatever lifestyle he or she chooses, so long as those choices do not harm others. However, the liberal state has not been accustomed to extending that principle to environmental goods, or to the avoidance of harm to future generations; both now have to become absolutely central.
The rights of future generations should be incorporated within standard democratic procedures. Environmentalists often bolster their arguments about climate change by asking rhetorically, ‘What would we say to our children’s children in 50 years’ time when they ask how we could have allowed such damage to occur, knowing that it was almost certain to happen?’ That question should not be an isolated one, however, but part of what we ask ourselves on a regular basis, as a normal feature of the democratic process. It has many implications. For instance, the debate about oil and gas is about when available supplies will be half gone, and therefore at what date they will be largely exhausted. Yet it could, and should, be asked how far we (the current generation) have the right more or less to destroy such a natural resource forever, whatever other sources of energy are developed in the future. The same question could, and should, also be asked about other mineral resources.
Environmental rights and responsibilities, incorporating due attention to the rights of subsequent generati
ons, should be introduced directly to the existing framework of liberal democracy. In other words, they should be added to and integrated with such rights and responsibilities as the right to vote, to enjoy equality before the law, freedom of speech and assembly. Robyn Eckersley24 suggests that environmental rights and responsibilities should include the following:
• as just mentioned, a responsibility on the part of government to include future generations and non-human species as moral referents;
• right-to-know legislation in relation to pollutants and toxic substances, which the state is mandated to provide, both on a regular basis and when asked by citizens’ groups or communities;
• the provision of public forums where the environmental impact of new technology or development proposals can be assessed;
• third-party litigation rights to allow NGOs and concerned citizens to ensure that environmental standards are being upheld;
• thoroughgoing acceptance of ‘the polluter pays’ principle, with penalties for those who cause environmental harm;
• the obligation of citizens, businesses and groups in civil society to act as positive agents of environmental change, rather than simply preventing destructive acts.
Such a framework would help integrate the diversity of groups whose activities are relevant to climate change policy. NGOs and businesses are the most prominent types of such groups and have long defined themselves partly in relation to one another. In each case they are quite often global in scope and their leading organizations are household names. Industry is, by any reckoning, a major force in the environmental area; it accounts for more than a third of the energy consumed across the world, and of course is involved in its production too. The NGOs like to portray themselves as minnows pitting themselves against the industrial giants, but, in truth, their influence has become very large. The best-known NGOs enjoy far higher levels of public trust than do their business counterparts.25
NGOs have long regarded large corporations as the prime agents of the irresponsible squandering of resources. In some large degree they have had good reason for such a view. Particularly important, in terms of climate change, have been the fossil fuel lobbies, representing heavy industry, transportation, coal, oil and chemicals. Until recently, the lobbies and the large majority of their individual members have argued that action to reduce greenhouse gases would be a mistake. They have mostly taken a sceptical position, as is shown in surveys of their literature and that of the think-tanks they help fund. The American Petroleum Institute, an industry research organization, claimed as its main goal to make sure that ‘climate change becomes a non-issue’.26
Industrial lobbies are especially well organized and powerful in the US, and undoubtedly played a major role in influencing the hostile attitudes of the Bush administration towards efforts to take action against global warming. During the first term of George W. Bush’s presidency, John H. Sununu, a prominent climate change sceptic, was the White House Chief of Staff. The lobbies had easy access to him, and to Vice-President Dick Cheney; they managed to block or dismember legislation regarded as a threat to fossil fuel interests. When Sununu stepped down, a newspaper headline announced: ‘Sununu resigns . . . coal lobby in mourning.’27 Industry groups have been a major influence in Europe too. They lobbied fiercely and effectively against the original commission proposals for a universal carbon tax, arguing, as their counterparts in the US did, that it would undermine competitiveness.
However, one should guard against the easy demonizing of the industry lobbies, and of big business more generally, that pervades much of the environmental literature. Business leaders are not all cut from the same cloth, while the lobbies themselves (as is true too of environmental lobbies) are quite frequently divided. For instance, in the run-up to the Kyoto Summit, the major oil interests were hostile to the proposals put forward, but the gas and electricity companies were in favour. The connection between these groups and the climate change sceptics has been well documented (see above, pp. 24–5).
NGOs tend to cloak themselves in moral garb and are no doubt sincere in their desire to better the world. Yet they too are lobbying groups, like the new associations springing up that represent the renewable technology industries. As has often been pointed out by critics, NGOs are neither elected bodies nor subject to the market discipline that industrial bodies have to face. It is difficult to assess the level of their influence, since their activities tend to be less formalized than those of the industry lobbies.
The Climate Change Network is an organization of 365 NGOs from diverse countries and regions, and includes the well-known ones, such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the World Wildlife Fund. The network boasts a world membership of 20 million people, which is the basis of its claim to speak for large constituencies of concerned citizens. It follows a ‘three-track’ approach. One involves putting pressure on nations to set themselves rigorous targets, as agreed at the 2007 Bali Summit, to set up a new round of international agreements to limit climate change. The second, the ‘greening track’, is about helping developing countries to adopt renewable technologies. The third, the ‘adaptation track’, is concerned with helping the most vulnerable countries anticipate and prepare for unavoidable consequences of climate change.
NGOs are not only pressure groups, but also play a significant role in coordinating scientific information and bringing it to the notice of decision-makers and the public. The two workshops set up in the late 1980s which led to the emergence of the IPCC were organized by NGOs. NGOs have also been closely involved in the setting of climate change policy in many countries, where they have tried to prompt governments to act, and have then pushed for their actions to be far-reaching.
A new generation of business leaders – who quite often work directly with NGOs – is arising which not only acknowledges the perils of climate change, but is active in the vanguard of reaction to it. Businesses such as Wal-Mart, which for years were seen by environmentalists as public enemies, have swung behind the climate change agenda, and in much more than just a face-saving way. Wal-Mart has planned substantial reductions in its own emissions, in the short as well as the long term, and it has demanded that its suppliers measure and report their emissions too. Tesco has pledged to put ‘carbon labels’ on all its 80,000 product lines, so that consumers know what volume of greenhouse gases has gone into their production. The firm has set itself the goal of halving its emissions per case of goods delivered worldwide by 2012 against a baseline of 2006. Of course, there are many who doubt the authenticity of these commitments. The NGO Corporate Watch lists no fewer than 20 kinds of ‘corporate crimes’ of which Tesco is accused.
As far as the environmentalist claims of businesses are concerned, it is important to separate the wheat from the chaff. The making of disingenuous or false claims to environmental credentials – ‘greenwash’ – has become a real problem. In front of me, I have two large ads from a daily newspaper. One is for one of the most thirsty SUVs on the road, which, in this case, is seen in a field rather than the city streets where most of its counterparts roam. The makers announce how proud they feel to be doing their bit for ‘the environment’ because they have made some improvements in the energy efficiency of their production processes. The second ad, even more absurdly, makes similar claims for a sports car that, when driven in town, travels fewer than 10 miles per gallon of fuel consumed.
In most countries, regulatory authorities do not have sufficient authority, or resources, to intervene in an official and effective way. The same standards, backed by law, should be imposed that apply in other areas, such as those governing racism. Attacking ‘greenwash’ is not a trivial or marginal pursuit. One reason, of course, is that it is necessary to ensure that companies take seriously their obligations to reduce their emissions. Perhaps even more important, though, is the fact that ‘greenwash’ is a way of wilfully misleading the public.
The standards that companies should meet can be fairly easily described. Their
claims should apply across the whole of their carbon output, not just one selected part of it where some sort of improvement has been made. Assertions made should be backed up with concrete and measurable actions, set against a given baseline, or they should not be made at all. Corporations could call in third parties to audit their performance, and their results should be published, just as are those of their financial operations.
We must wait and see with Wal-Mart and other supermarket chains, but some corporations have in fact already delivered on their promises. Nike, for example, has reduced its carbon footprint by 75 per cent over a period of 10 years. The company has stated that it aims to achieve zero waste, zero toxicity and complete recyclability across its product range by 2020. It might not happen, but there seems no more reason to doubt the firm’s seriousness of intent than the declarations made by countries about what they will achieve by that date. Of course, as in the case of the state, NGOs exist in order to put pressure on organizations whose activities don’t match up to their proclaimed intent.
There are many corporations today, such as those mentioned above, that are transforming their attitudes just as radically as are states. They are doing so partly for business reasons and in order to respond to the coming of carbon markets and carbon taxes – but they are doing so also because the message of the need for change has struck home.
The Politics of Climate Change Page 14
