The state should aim to create financial and fiscal conditions in which disaster and catastrophe cover can be expanded under the aegis of the insurance industry. It will not lose its role as insurer of last resort, but that role can be brought more within the bounds of realism. Ideally, insurance provided by the state should only kick in above a certain level, set according to the bounds of coverage by private insurance. The industry must not retreat in the face of an increasing preponderance of disasters and catastrophes, but must continue to explore ways of expanding insurability.
Adaptation: the developing world
Hurricane Jeanne made many people in the US homeless when it struck in 2004. However, it had already caused 1,500 deaths when it hit Haiti a short while earlier. During the hurricane, heavy rain fell on the island non-stop for 30 hours. Haiti is 98 per cent deforested, the result of the fact that the poor on the island harvest the trees for charcoal. As a consequence, the rain cascaded down the hillsides, inundating the capital city and other areas. Many survivors became homeless, rice and fruit harvests were obliterated and diseases spread.
The Dominican Republic shares half the island with Haiti. It is not as poor and much of the rainforest remains intact. Only 25 people died there as a result of the hurricane. An aid agency funded by the US had planted numerous trees in Haiti over a period of some two decades in order to replenish that which had been lost. Yet they were almost all cut down, mostly by people living in extreme poverty, for whom making charcoal was their only source of livelihood. In January 2010 further disaster hit Haiti when the country was shaken by a powerful earthquake. Some 200,000 people died.
J. Timmons Roberts and Bradley Parks carried out research into a large number of weather-related disasters in poor countries over the period between 1980 and 1992.14 They made use of the Emergency Events Database, developed by the US Geological Survey. This survey contains data on 12,800 disasters happening over that period. They included events from many sources, but the researchers were able to identify those where the major cause was related to weather, which made up about half the total. They judged the evidence sound and detailed enough to make effective comparisons in some 4,000 of these cases.
Figure 7.1 The long-term Climate Risk Index (CRI) Results (annual averages) in specific indicators in the 10 countries most affected, 1990–2009.
Source: Germanwatch: www.germanwatch.org/cri
The weather events included cyclones, droughts, floods, heat waves, hurricanes, tidal waves, tornadoes, tropical storms, typhoons, winter storms, hailstorms, dust storms, rainstorms, thunderstorms and waves of cold weather – the list itself is a potent reminder of the power that climatic fluctuations have over people’s lives. Roberts and Parks made tallies of the numbers of people killed, rendered homeless or otherwise seriously affected by the weather events. A single total was created for each nation covered, providing an indicator for the whole period. The aim was to help understand why some countries and regions suffer more profoundly and consistently as a result of extreme weather events than others do. Put the other way around, they studied why some seemed more resilient than others.
They found an overall connection between the level of income of a country and its capacity to withstand weather-related shocks. The most damaging human disaster of the closing decades of the twentieth century was the result of the drought in East Africa in 1984. It was concentrated in three particularly impoverished countries: Ethiopia, Sudan and Chad. About 500,000 people died, while far more suffered from malnutrition and lost their homes. The totals of those made homeless as a result of weather-related disasters over the period make sobering reading, as the authors observe. They include 62 million in Bangladesh and 50 million in China. More than 25 million people became homeless in Laos, India, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, the Philippines and Pakistan combined.
Comparison between the severity of the weather events and their consequences showed clearly that vulnerability correlates closely with economic and political weakness, with a steep rise for the very poorest countries – those comprising the ‘bottom billion’ in terms of population numbers (see below, pp. 213–16). Ineffective and corrupt government, dependence on low-value tropical crops, the existence of sprawling shanty towns and poor communications and transport links all play a part. It isn’t poverty as such that heightens vulnerability. Where countries remain very poor, but have overcome some of these problems, their resilience in the face of disasters is much greater.
The world has moved on from the time at which many leaders and citizens in the South believed that talk of climate change was a tactic used by the rich countries to stop others from developing. Such an attitude has been replaced by a more sober realization of just how threatened by the effects of global warming the less developed countries are. There is, in principle, the possibility of closer collaboration between North and South, not only in terms of contraction and convergence, but especially as concerns adaptation.
Aid and financial assistance from the rich to the poorer nations must focus much more on adaptation than has been the case up to now. At the moment, the resources needed to help the developing countries even begin to assess their vulnerabilities is lacking. The Adaptation Fund, mentioned earlier, is only just getting under way. Finance set aside for the 48 least developed countries to prepare national adaptation plans consists of about $33 million, around two-thirds of which is provided by the industrial countries. Yet how the money should be distributed remains the subject of strident debate, with the consequence that the money has not actually been forthcoming. Proper and detailed vulnerability assessments should be the first line of defence in adaptation, since practical action is hardly feasible if the extent and location of risks are not known.
Many of the mechanisms or changes needed for the developing countries to become richer are also important for adaptation to climate change. Population growth is a major influence on both, suggesting the vital importance of a renewed drive on the part of international agencies to help bring that rate down. The main means of doing so is well established – empowering women and assisting their incorporation into the labour force. Thus far, there has been little progress in linking adaptation to existing poverty-alleviation programmes. Some of the small island states in the Caribbean seem to have been the first to make some advances.
A commodity support fund that would protect cash-crop economies from the buffetings of price fluctuations in the marketplace would help promote resilience. It is a long way from local flooding and coastal erosion in Britain to the much larger disasters found elsewhere. Yet common strategies can be forged. For instance, partnerships instituted between government and business, and government and citizens’ groups, in order to tackle such problems are also relevant for poorer countries.
Serious attention should be given to extending the role of insurance in the vulnerable countries of the world. Insurance is far less extensive in the deprived countries than in the richer ones, for obvious reasons, but the potential importance of insurance is huge. For instance, climatic variations are a major threat to subsistence farmers in large areas of Africa; those variations will deepen with the progress of global warming. Two new approaches have been introduced in recent years to provide assistance to the farmers and prevent crop failure.15 One is the use of satellite and computer-based models to provide seasonal precipitation forecasts, which can help to reduce risk. Seed varieties can be adjusted, for example, to choose those most suitable for expected rainfall conditions. The other is the use of new mechanisms of insurance cover. Thus, index-based weather insurance can be developed and linked to micro-credit for agricultural inputs.
These programmes have so far remained separate from one another, but it may be possible to integrate them. A pilot insurance scheme has been introduced for smallholder farmers in Malawi. Those who tailor their crops to projected rainfall conditions will be able to get insurance coverage that should allow them greatly to expand the area of land they will sow for crops, as well as the yield they will
achieve.
Even in the most deprived conditions, poor people are not normally without resources – they have assets and capabilities that can help develop resilience. Adaptation policies should as far as possible focus on strengthening that resilience. For instance, traditional systems of adapting to climate variability include switching crops, social networks of support and assistance or collective savings mechanisms. All can in principle be bolstered by high-tech means of providing information or creating more extensive support networks.
Farmers in the high Andes of Peru and Bolivia observe the Pleiades star constellations so as to get advance warning of possible weather conditions several months into the future. They look at the intensity of the brightest star in the cluster, its size, the date of its first appearance and its position. If the star appears clear in the sky just before dawn, abundant rain is indicated and a rich potato crop predicted. Planting processes are modified accordingly. Scientists have confirmed that the level of visibility of the cluster is related to the presence or otherwise of wispy cirrus clouds high in the sky; and that these are also associated with the warm phase of El Niño. The farmers have, in effect, been monitoring the phases of El Niño for centuries; but they could get a lot of further help from modern methods of weather prediction.
As the examples of disasters mentioned earlier show, Bangladesh is one of the countries most exposed to the effects of climate change, because of its geographical location. The country is low-lying and will be one of the first to suffer from rises in sea levels. If those levels rise by 45 centimetres, then 10 per cent of the country will be under water. Even with its pre-established climate, the country gets too much rainfall in the monsoon season, causing frequent floods, while during other parts of the year it is prone to drought. The Bangladeshis are not just sitting around waiting for the rich countries to invest and help them in preventative adaptation – although this surely will be necessary. Meanwhile, the country has set up a National Adaptation Programme of Action, involving working groups from each of the main producing sectors.16 It has developed detailed assessments of vulnerability and suggested a range of action programmes, although the implementation of some of these will have to depend upon foreign aid programmes to be forthcoming.
Even in the very poorest areas, Bangladeshis are building dykes and embankments, changing their agricultural practices and sharing their knowledge with other poor countries in Asia and Africa. Full flood protection is currently widely practised in Bangladesh, but controlled flooding looks a necessary strategy for the future. An early warning system for cyclonic disasters already exists and could be further extended. Satellite and information technology allow for the continuous monitoring of the formation of cyclones in the Bay of Bengal.
Major efforts are under way to increase the resilience of local communities in areas under particular threat, drawing upon local expertise and involvement. One study, for example, identified 600 vulnerable households, made up of poor farmers, fishermen, day labourers and single parent households. Male-and female-headed groups developed ideas and plans for how to diversify their means of livelihood, set up training groups on the likely effects of climate change and introduce new production processes. The work produced a whole series of novel proposals, some of which were immediately implemented, with considerable success.
Floating gardens – an idea now copied internationally – were first introduced in Bangladesh. A floating garden uses aquatic weeds as a base on which crops can be grown. It can be introduced where land is otherwise unavailable to expand the productive capacities of local villages and towns. Floating gardens are inexpensive to construct and can be established on a permanent basis.
In closing the gap between the attempts of the developed nations to limit climate change and those of the developing ones, assessments of vulnerability are likely to be very important. The vulnerability of the richer countries includes the knock-on effects of climate change-induced disasters in poorer states, which could greatly exacerbate the tensions already visible in world society. In chapter 9 I will consider such dangers in some detail.
8
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, THE EU
AND CARBON MARKETS
The history of international negotiations aimed at containing climate change goes back some 20 years. From small beginnings, the enterprise has mushroomed. The IPCC itself grew out of a previous environmental endeavour, the Montreal Protocol, initiated by the UN in 1987, which was concerned with eliminating the industrial chemicals that produced the hole in the ozone layer over the Antarctic. The initiative, mainly preoccupied with ensuring that the harmful chemicals, chlorofluorocarbons (or CFCs), were replaced by substitutes, seems to have been successful in beginning to reverse the harm done.
The IPCC’s first assessment of where the world stands in relation to climate change was offered in 1990, as part of the run-up to the Rio Earth Summit which followed two years later. The Summit introduced the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was signed by 166 nations at that point (today there are 195 signatories). The US and some other countries initially were strongly opposed to binding emissions targets, as a result of which no such targets were included. All participating nations agreed to calculate their emissions and report the levels annually. It was accepted that there should be ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ among nations for stabilizing climate change. All should at some point accept responsibility, but the developed countries have the obligation to act first.
In spite of some foot-dragging by the US and other countries, as the discussions evolved there came to be widespread acceptance that mandatory cuts would be necessary for progress to be made. At meetings in 1995 it was agreed that the industrial countries would set themselves targets for emissions reductions. The then US president, Bill Clinton, eventually came round to accepting this view after some initial hesitancy. The US Senate voted unanimously against any agreement that didn’t include cuts for the developing societies.
In 1997, at Kyoto in Japan, after tortuous negotiations, an agreement was drawn up by which the developed countries would cut their emissions by an average of 5.2 per cent relative to 1990 levels by the period 2008–12. The Kyoto Protocol was set up in such a way that it could come into force without complete consensus. The rule set up for the Protocol to become part of international law was that developed countries, accounting for at least 55 per cent of total emissions from the industrial states, would have to sign up. Russia, which accounted for 17 per cent of 1990 emissions, initially stated its opposition to Kyoto, but eventually ratified towards the end of 2004.
The administration of George W. Bush, inclined towards climate change scepticism anyway, and influenced strongly by industrial lobbies, was worried that China might achieve a competitive advantage over the US, given that the developing countries were not required to make any cuts. Bush believed that if the US were to take more steps to combat global warming, even in the context of the Kyoto agreements with other nations going along, the country might damage its international competitiveness. As the world’s dominant economy, the cost of taking steps to cope with climate change – since the US would have had to agree to substantial emissions reductions – might have affected the wider world economy too.
Apart from the US and Australia, all the other industrial countries, and a large majority of countries in the rest of the world, put their names to Kyoto.
The US pressurized Russia not to participate. The Russians were initially not inclined to do so anyway. One of President Putin’s economic advisers, Andrei Illarionov, claimed that Kyoto would destroy the world economy ‘like an international Auschwitz’.1 However, Russia at that point wanted EU support for its bid to join the World Trade Organization, while the EU, the leading force in climate change negotiations, needed Russian participation in Kyoto to salvage the whole thing. So, in effect, a bargain was struck.
An additional factor was that by the early 2000s Russian emissions were much lower than they had been in 1
990, because of the contraction of the economy and the collapse of some of the large state-owned industrial companies. The EU countries realized that this situation could help with the carbon trading scheme that had just been established. Russia’s emission ‘reductions’ would be available to help ease EU member–states’ problems with meeting their own emissions targets. An unfortunate outcome of the whole episode was that Russia was legitimated to carry on squandering energy domestically without thought to environmental damage.
The result of compromise, the targets agreed at Kyoto bear little relationship to what is required to make a serious impact upon global warming. They were too low and contained all kinds of anomalies. Take the case of Australia, which came out of the negotiations with the agreement that its emissions could actually be increased rather than cut. Like the Americans, the Australians initially wanted only voluntary reductions. They then argued that Australia is a special case, because it is a net energy producer with a very large transport-dependent sector. They also pointed to reductions in deforestation that had been made before 1990. Given the need to persuade Australia to sign, the country got what it was asking for (although it later opted out anyway, signing up only in 2008 after a change of government).
Because the Kyoto agreements were not adopted until 2004, most countries were slow in making any progress at all towards reaching even the modest targets that had been set. The EU has been by far the most forceful advocate of proposals to limit emissions, but even its record is wanting. Quite a few EU states have met their Kyoto targets, and some have well exceeded them. However, a large part of the reason is the impact of recession, mentioned earlier. And of course Kyoto did not include the developing countries at all – even though these are now major contributors to world emissions in absolute terms.
The Politics of Climate Change Page 21
